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Abstract
This thesis brings a contemporary critical approach to the use of Sufism in Arabic poetry after 
1960, focusing on three major poets, cAbd al-Wahhab al-Bayyatl, Salah cAbd al-Sabur and 
Adonis. Using appropriate theoretical approaches, the objective is to make a significant 
contribution to the development of a post-Orientalist, interdisciplinary understanding of the 
Middle East’s cultural and psychological environment. It investigates the proposition that these 
poets have attempted to synthesize radical social and political beliefs with aspects of their 
spiritual and cultural heritage in order to create a visionary new conception not only of Arabic 
poetry but Arab civilization as a whole. The cultural institution of poetry -  ‘register o f the Arabs’ 
-  has a unique spiritual and revolutionary power in a historically aniconic society in which it has 
been for centuries the dominant artform, enabling sensitive insight into the m odem  Arab 
existence. On the basis of an initial investigation of the artistic, philosophical and socio-political 
aspects of Sufism, as well its relation to modem European thought, the thesis examines how 
committed modernist Arab poetry shifted towards a ‘neo-Sufi’ paradigm, reviving Sufi concepts, 
principles and historical figures.
As such, the project focuses on the extrinsic ramifications of these poets’ neo-Sufi experiences, 
analysing what role Sufi ideas play in modem Arabic thought within the sphere of autocratic state 
ideologies and local and regional political struggles. Consequently, it considers how neo-Sufism 
relates to the development of a uniquely Arab postmodern condition, and how the relationship 
between Arabic poetry and political commitment evolved since 1960. The thesis contemplates 
the Arab poet both as individual and as social being, in a world where profound senses of identity 
confront the need for change. By investigating the constantly evolving interaction between 
creative, individualistic instincts and external social reality in the contexts of Arab nationalism, 
the Palestine question, Communism, political Islam, Western hegemony and globalisation, it 
aims to illuminate the predicament of the later 20th century Arab intellectual on specific and 
universal levels.
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1HISTORICAL AND THEORETICAL INTRODUCTION
‘My heart has become capable of every form ... ’ -  ibn al-cArabi'
Prologue
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the use of Sufism in modem Arabic poetry and thought in 
the post-1960 period, focusing specifically on three writers: cAbd al-Wahhab al-Bayyati (Iraq, 
1926-99), Salah cAbd al-Sabur (Egypt, 1931-81) and Adonis (the penname of CA1I Ahmad SacId, 
Syria, 1930-). Given the stubborn prevalence of over-simplistic oppositions between ‘East’ and 
‘W est’, an initial clarification of objective and method is necessary. While geographical and 
historical specifications are inevitable, this thesis rejects a priori the notion of definitive 
distinctions between cultural enclaves; indeed, this would be an entirely inappropriate approach 
to the study of mysticism, which precisely cuts across cultural boundaries towards a profound 
common humanity.
The sceptic might well argue that any open-minded dialogue between ‘East’ and ‘W est’ is 
impossible so long as the latter remains linguistically and conceptually dominant, ‘dictating all 
the time the nature and direction of the exchange’. However, Western culture is not an 
encapsulated entity, entirely separate from the ‘O rient’. Furthermore, besides the well- 
documented ‘political domination, economic exploitation [and] religious proselytism’,3 an East- 
West exchange of an entirely different nature has also occurred: one involving self-analysis, self- 
criticism, and a mutual search for identity.4 The intellectual hybridity of the poets studied in this 
thesis -  the result of a deep engagement with both the European and the Arab-Islamic heritage -  
in itself further demonstrates the invalidity of discrete notions of ‘East’ and ‘W est’. As such, they 
can be seen in the context of a long-standing dialectical exchange within and between 
overlapping civilizations.
1 Muhy al-Din ibn al-cArabi, The Interpreter of Desires, tr. Reynold A. Nicholson Tarjuman al-Ashwaq: A
Collection of Mystical Odes, (Theosophical Publishing House, London, 1978), p. 67 
' J.J. Clarke, Jung and Eastern Thought: A Dialogue with the Orient, (Routledge, London, 1994) p. 191
3 Halbfass, quoted in Clarke, ibid, p. 9
4 Ibid, pp. 9-11
2While scholars of the humanities must be aware of their own intellectual ‘fore-structures’ -  the 
set of presumptions and expectations underlying the production of judgments, opinions, or even 
‘facts’ -  valid viewpoints on modem Arab thought nonetheless remain both accessible and 
necessary. The fact that a doctoral thesis, by definition, is historically and geographically located 
does not preclude its legitimacy per se. However, as Hans-Georg Gadamer has pointed out, ‘all 
reading involves application, so that a person reading a text is himself part [or even all] of the 
meaning he apprehends.’5 A study of modem Arabic poets will inevitably contain as much of the 
analyser as of the analysed: interpretation is a restless dialogue between reader and text, and no 
single, solid meaning lies waiting to be discovered. As Heraclitus said, ‘Things keep their 
secrets’6: the hermeneutical circle refuses to be definitively closed.
Moreover, in the present time and context, the scholar of humanities is heir to not only the 
Enlightenment enterprise, but the many and diverse strands of human knowledge that constitute 
the ‘conversation of mankind’. The present project does not claim any universally objective or 
final perspective on the historical period in question, but aims merely to contribute positively to 
that conversation. It will therefore be undertaken within the broadest possible framework, namely 
in terms of a ‘world civilization,’ which is at once a single narrative involving an endless 
interplay of sub-themes and sub-plots. This approach can be defined, idealistically perhaps, as 
‘transm odem ’: an inherently pluralistic and decentred viewpoint celebrating the validity of 
alternative modernisms, insofar as this is possible given the aforesaid epistemological problems.
5 Gadamer, quoted in ibid, p. 45
6 Heraclitus, Fragments, tr. Brooks Haxton, (Penguin, London, 2001), p. 9
Part I: Historical Basis
3
Reality and Poetry Post-1948: Alienation, Fragmentation, Despair
The middle of the 20th century was a time of considerable upheavals in the political and cultural 
landscape of the Arab world. Foremost among these was the Palestinian disaster, al-Nakba, in 
1948, in civilizational terms an episode of seismic proportions whose effects can be traced to the 
present time. Of this event Edward Said has written:
N ot on ly  did 1948 put forth unprecedented challenges to a co llectiv ity  already undergoing the political 
ev o lu tio n  o f  several European centuries com pressed  into a few  d e ca d es ... but [it] put forw ard a 
monum ental enigm a, an existential mutation for which Arab history was unprepared.
This year, then, inaugurated both a new phase of W estern hegemony in the region and a 
watershed in Arab consciousness and existential speculation. Identifying the writer’s role directly 
with the problematics of Arab contemporaneity, Said continues:
[The Nakba] exposed  the Arabs’ disunity, lack o f  technological culture, political unpreparedness, and so  
on; more significant, however, was the fact that the disaster caused a rift to appear betw een the Arabs and 
the very possib ility  o f  their historical continuity as a p eo p le ... U nless Arab culture, em ploying the full 
resources o f  its sp ec ific ity ... could participate freely in its own self-m aking, it w ould be as if  it it did not 
e x is t ... N o Arab could say that in 1948 he was in any serious w ay detached or apart from the events in 
Palestine. He m ight reasonably say that he was shielded from Palestine; but he could not say -  because his 
language and his religious cultural tradition im plicated him at every turn -  that he was any less a loser, an 
Arab, as a result o f  what happened in P alestine. Furthermore nothing in his h istory ... gave him  an 
adequate m ethod for representing the Palestine drama to him self. Arab nationalism, Islam ic traditionalism, 
regional creeds, sm all-scale comm unal or v illage solidarities -  all these stopped short o f the general result 
o f Z ion ist su ccess and the particular experience o f Arab defeat. N o concept seem ed large enough, no 
language precise enough to take in the com m on fate.
7 Edward Said, Reflections on Exile and other Literary and Cultural Essays, (Granta, London, 2001), p. 46
8 Ibid, p. 47
4The spirit of rejection and commitment that dominated Arabic literature in the 1950s sprang to a 
large extent from the shock and humiliation of this event, the defeat of the Arab nation despite its 
glorious history. On a spiritual level, the predicament to some extent mirrored that of the 
European intellectual in 1914, when it became clear that, far from assisting humanity towards 
salvation, modern science and technology could well provide the catalyst for its final 
annihilation. Just as the onset of World War I in 1914 represented ‘the beginning of the end of 
the bourgeois civilization of Europe’, 1948 represented a turning point between a time of relative 
innocence, characterised by a romantic movement in Arabic poetry, and one of realism and 
regrouping, characterised by adab multazim  (committed literature) and the ‘Unionist’ period 
spearheaded by Jamal cAbd al-Nasir. In the context of defeat, and its consequent undermining of 
the entire Arab Weltanschauung, it is no surprise that many Arab poets saw in T.S. Eliot’s The 
Wasteland an expression of their own predicament.
In 1914, European man awoke to find his supposedly enlightened world a shattered dream, 
revealing that the ‘apparent stability, security, and material progress of society had rested, like 
everything human, upon the void. [He came] face to face with himself as a stranger. When he 
ceased to be contained and sheltered within a stable social and political environment, he saw that 
his rational and enlightened philosophy could no longer console him with the assurance that it 
satisfactorily answered the question What is m a n l’9 1948, likewise, focused the Arab 
intellectual’s attention towards existential questions: what is an Arab and what is his/her place in 
the modem world?
In this new era, Arab man came face to face with the terrifying contingency of everything, 
painfully aware not only of his own human finitude but that of the entire heritage. In Said’s 
words, ‘the present may after all be only that, perhaps not a consequence of the past and certainly 
not a basis for the future.’10 The triumph of secular Zionism, a symbol of continued external 
dominance, exposed the religious conception of life as outdated and fatally flawed, leaving him 
an uprooted and fragmentary being. This was not only physical, through exile, but also 
psychological: it highlighted the existential split between man and his self. The search for a new 
collective narrative, a new “Arab idea” to hold together a shattered identity and history, was
9 William Barrett, Irrational Man: A Study in Existentialist Philosophy, (Anchor, New York, 1990), p. 34
10 Said, op.cit., p. 55
5reflected in post-1948 poetry: it was simultaneously a rupture with the past and an attempt to 
rediscover it and remould it along new lines.
In the 1950s, renewed hope and optimism was provided by the doctrine of Arab nationalism, 
which coincided with major changes not only in the form of Arabic poetry, after centuries of 
prosodic inertia, but also its style and tenor, moving away from romantic sentimentality towards a 
socialist realism more capable of reflecting the bleak reality. Committed literature was both a 
reaction of the shock of modernity and the rise of nationalism and also the result of younger Arab 
intellectuals’ interest in Marxist philosophy, which became available during and after World War 
II, and the considerable impact of European existentialists such as Sartre and Camus. Throughout 
the 1950s, the free verse movement, which began in Iraq in 1947, still entailed a revolutionary 
poetic form which afforded far greater scope for self-expression than was previously the case; by 
the early 1960s, however, the internal inconsistencies and corruption of supposed revolutionary 
or regenerative ideologies, such as pan-Arabism and Bacthism, was increasingly clear. In the gap 
between rhetoric and reality the committed Arab poet would attempt to carve out a meaningful 
existence. Despite the new generation of leaders, the structure of life remained essentially 
unchanged, leading in 1967 to further defeat and ideological turmoil. It was this ideological 
breakdown that paved the way for a general shift towards cultural authenticity and the 
reconstruction of an indigenous heritage -  or romanticized versions thereof -  which would 
assume very different forms. The drift back towards the Arab heritage, and specifically Islam, is 
usually traced back to 1967. In this context, neo-Sufism will be analysed as a movement both 
back towards submerged elements of this heritage and forward towards a new dialogue with 
them, whilst at the same time predating the 1967 “setback” .
By the early 1960s, then, the initial optimism of the Egyptian and Iraqi revolutions had worn off 
to reveal a renewed disillusionment and despair. This marked the beginning of a new phase in 
Arabic literature, informed by the struggles to resolve the new problems of the post-colonial era: 
the lack of cultural cohesion, the loss of traditional stability, the conflicts between different social 
classes and visions, the ongoing issues of urbanization.11 The post-independence period brought 
social and ideological debate, socio-political pluralism, a more individualistic outlook, the
11 Sabry Hafez, ‘The Transformation of Reality and the Arabic Novel’s Aesthetic Response’, BSOAS 57, (1994), p. 
94
6disintegration of patriarchal structures and the concomitant fragmentation of social harmony, 
internal discord and sectarian violence, and, most notably, a deeply alienated and ruptured sense 
of selfhood. In short, this period burst apart and left open to question all that had been held 
together by the oppressive but unifying presence of the imperialist other.
The so-called “setback” or Naksa in 1967 heralded a collective outpouring of anger, despair and 
resentment on the part of Arab intellectuals, ‘a vast and continuing literature in self-analysis’12 
which was often marked by a sense of guilt: ‘no Arab can have been immune from the feeling 
that his modem history, so laboriously created... would prove so easy to brush aside in the test. 
The almost incredible outpouring of print after 1967 suggests a vast effort at reconstructing that
1 Thistory and that reality.’ Thereafter, with the irrefutable corruption and decay of military 
regimes exposed, the increasing rejection of reality and spiritual angst among Arab poets led 
them inevitably towards immersion in projects of psychological reconstruction: the only 
remaining way to restore meaning and purpose to the world was via a renewed selfhood.
On a cultural level, the rapidly developing socio-political reality of the 1960s generated not only 
distrust of modernisation, which was synonymous with the aggressive Western powers, and a 
renewed Islamic ideology, but also a more profound dialogue with the Arabic literary and 
cultural tradition, including the exploration of more peripheral cultural strands such as the oral, 
the popular/folk, and the pre-Islamic. A greater plurality of previously marginalised voices -  
either by race, creed or gender -  began to open up the scope of Arabic literature. At the same 
time, particularly through writers in exile, the spread and influence of European thought 
continued in new and different forms, albeit from a more critical perspective, and Arabic poetry 
closed the developmental gap between itself and world poetry. This period also saw an important 
shift from metonymic to metaphorical rules of reference, which had the effect of
liberating the literary text from slavish adherence to the log ic  and order o f  social reality and allow ing for 
occasional flights o f  fancy, the dissolution o f  time, a w ider gap betw een the world o f  art and that o f  reality 
and a higher degree o f  textual autonom y. The relationship betw een the literary work and reality [was] no
12 Issa J. Boullata, ‘Challenges to Arab Cultural Authenticity’, in Hisham SharabI, ed. The Next Arab Decade, 
(Mansell, London, 1998), p. 148
13 Said, op.cit., p. 59
7longer based on sim ilarity but on d ifference, and their interaction [becam e] that o f  tw o autonom ous, 
though related entities. 14
After the formal and technical changes starting in the late 1940s, this decade heralded a new 
vision that attempted to encompass the entirety of man’s experience.
In this bewildering post-1948 world, Arab intellectuals found themselves victims of a threefold 
exile: that of physical separation, that of rootlessness and severance of a meaningful link with 
their history, and that of existential meaninglessness. The latter is, of course, part of the modem 
human condition: ‘the modem period itself [is] spiritually orphaned and alienated, the age of 
anxiety and estrangem ent.’15 The mood was further characterised by rejection, anxiety, 
powerlessness, uprootedness, fragmentation and loss (of purpose and identity), which in some 
cases combined to generate a profound sense of despair. Oppression was a double-edged sword, 
both internal and external. Internally, the revolutions of the 1950s had given way to military 
regimes that were increasingly totalitarian and out of touch with their peoples. Externally, the 
consistent political, economic and cultural dominance of the West meant that Arab-Islamic 
civilization was either in terminal decline or urgently required some sort of revival. This despair 
at the predicament of the modem Arab reached its apotheosis in 1967, when the crushing military 
defeat brought an end to the pan-Arabist doctrine and further underlined the precariousness of 
Arab civilization and existence.
Alienation and despair, therefore, define the modem Arab predicament: a spiritually ruptured and 
marginalised existence from which the individual searches desperately for relief. If Simone Weil 
was correct in stating that ‘to be rooted is perhaps the most important and least recognized need 
of the human soul,’ then the effects would be catastrophic. In this context, the influence on Arab 
poets of European existentialist thought, which issued in a comparable spiritual alienation, is 
hardly surprising. The latter was prompted by
a sense o f  the basic fragility and contingency o f  human life; the im potence o f  reason confronted with the 
depths o f  existence; the threat o f  N othingness, and the solitary and unsheltered condition o f  the individual
14 Hafez, op.cit, pp. 99-100
15 Said, op.cit., p. 173
before this threat. One can scarcely subordinate these problem s logically  to one another; each participates 
in all the others, and they all circulate around a com m on center. A  single atm osphere pervades them  all 
like a ch illy  wind: the radical feeling o f human finitude. 16
The commonality between Europe and the Arab world was, of course, the decline and fall of the 
all-embracing religious worldview (Christianity, Islam) in the face of modem reason, the effect 
of which, according to the Danish philosopher Spren Kierkegaard (1813-55) was precisely 
despair: ‘a sickness of the spirit’ or a ‘sickness unto death’.17 When a society can no longer 
reconcile religion with reality, it is faced with a choice: either redouble its efforts to maintain the 
integrity of the religion, on the grounds that the ‘sickness’ was caused by a lack of proper 
observance; or to dispense with it altogether, on the grounds that it is no longer tenable and 
hinders individual fulfilment. The latter course requires a new conviction to replace the old, since 
man’s religious instinct cannot be rationalised out of existence.
Either way, for a civilization -  not to say the individuals of whom it consists -  that senses its very 
existence to be under threat, such a dilemma becomes critical. It came at a time when, in an 
increasingly globalised world, the colonial subjugation of Arab lands had been supplanted by less 
direct, but no less pervasive, forms of hegemony. The contrast between an economically and 
militarily dominant West, with its Israeli ally, and an East whose organic development towards 
modernity -  despite its rapid acceleration since the 19th century -  had become distorted by the 
new imperialisms, rendered the conundrum considerably more complex. In the face of defeat, 
those on either side would find evidence to support their case. For the religionists, maintaining 
Arab authenticity in the face of modernity was synonymous with an Islamic revival at all levels 
of life. For secular poets of the 1960s, any re-evaluation and redefinition of that heritage would 
necessarily uphold its pluralist and dynamic characteristics and encompass its more marginal and 
unorthodox elements. Emerging from the remnants of disillusioned leftist movements across the 
region, they turned to a radically different and subversive conception of existence, on both 
specific and universal terms. Rather than attempting to resuscitate transcendent religion in a 
godless world, they would draw on ancient mythology, irrational philosophy and eastern 
mysticism to express both external political commitment and inner existential concerns. Such a
16 Barrett, op.cit., p. 36
17 Spren Kierkegaard, The Sickness unto Death, (Penguin, London 1989), p. 43
9hybridised philosophy implicitly questions both Sufism’s ‘religious’ status and their ‘secular’ 
status, and undermines the notion of a definitive boundary between the two.
The decades following World War II saw a proliferation of third-world liberation movements, 
which often generated a simultaneous demand for revolution and tradition, connecting the past 
with the future. In the Arab world, there were similar attempts to regenerate the formidable 
heritage, of which Sufism is one part, in the light of modem principles in order to make sense of 
the future, albeit from many different angles. This synthesis attempted to restore meaning not 
only to the present but also to the past, reinterpreting the experiences of medieval poets and 
mystics to help illuminate the way forward.
10
The Neo-Sufi Generation: al-Bavvati, cAbd al-Sabur and Adonis
The choice of these three well-known and distinguished Arab poets as case studies for the 
development of neo-Sufism rests on several criteria. Firstly, each in their own way stands out 
among modem Arab poets as having used, or engaged in a dialogue with, the Sufi tradition in 
their work. This is reflected in the depth and originality of their thought, in the richness and 
diversity of output, and in their considerable influence on other Arab poets. Secondly, given their 
different national, religious and ideological backgrounds, this dynamic generation represents an 
effective cross-section of an intellectual development across the cultural centres of the Middle 
East and beyond. All bom within a five-year period (1926-1931), their simultaneous trajectories 
and mutual interaction offer ample opportunity for comparison and contrast. Thirdly, their 
different approaches towards and experiments with Sufism will help to clarity the nature of the 
movement, if indeed it can be seen as such. Above all, these were central figures in the 
revitalisation of Arabic poetry in the 20th century, and pioneers of a new discourse that captured 
the Arab Zeitgeist in the post-1967 period.
The grandson of an imam, cAbd al-Wahhab al-Bayyatl (1926-99) was bom near the shrine of the 
12th century Sufi cAbd al-Qadir al-Jllanl in Baghdad. After graduating from Baghdad University 
and publishing his first collection of poetry in 1950, he taught Arabic language and literature. 
One of the first poets to break away from classical forms and embrace free verse, by 1954 he had 
become the editor of an influential cultural magazine al-Thaqafa al-Jadlda (New Culture) and 
produced a second volume, to wide literary acclaim. However, due to his involvement in radical 
leftist politics, the magazine was closed down and he was dismissed from his teaching post and 
jailed. The following year he began a four-decade period of intermittent exile, ending up in a 
series of Arab and European capitals. After the 1958 Iraqi revolution, he returned to Baghdad and 
was eventually appointed as Iraqi cultural attache, first in Moscow and later in Madrid, an 
enriching experience that influenced many of his poems. Al-Bayyatf s peripatetic way of life 
affected him deeply, and exile became a major motif in his work. Despite the alienation and 
suffering, it enabled him to maintain a fluid, progressive and insightful existential outlook. In 
1995, Saddam Husayn’s government stripped him of his Iraqi citizenship after he attended a 
cultural festival in Saudi Arabia. He died in Damascus in August 1999, aged 73.
11
Al-Bayyatf s committed modernist poetry was one of the most important experiments dominating 
the literary scene in the latter 20th century. One of the most renowned and prolific members of the 
vibrant Iraqi poetry scene, he saw the artist’s role as inextricably bound up with the people, 
dedicated to resisting oppression and promoting social justice. The themes of freedom, exile, 
death and love are paramount in the work of this self-proclaimed revolutionary, who says of 
himself: ‘rebellion was bom within me at my first cry in the midwife’s h and ...’18 The Iraqi 
revolution of 1958 brought him great hope and optimism, but the setback of 1967 had a 
shattering effect, prompting bitter self-criticism and self-condemnation. By this point, his realist 
style had developed towards a more mature, complex and multilayered voice, ‘enriched and 
deepened by disillusionment and the tragic complexities of existence.’19 Over time, he began to 
add a strongly introspective dimension to his passionate commitment, exploring universal, 
mythological and mystical themes through a series of poetic masks.
The poet and dramatist Salah cAbd al-Sabur (1931-81), who was bom in Zaqazlq, Egypt, was 
also an exponent of realist literature during the 1950s. Unlike al-Bayyatl, however, he was deeply 
religious in his youth, and had memorized the Qur’an by the age of eight. His later interest in 
mysticism can be traced directly back to this early period, and he tells of an ecstatic religious 
experience he underwent as a 14-year-old boy in which, after spending a whole night devoted in 
prayer, he fell into a delirium not unlike the shathiyyat of the Sufis. Educated at the University of 
Cairo, he was appointed editor of the influential monthly a l-K a tib  before becom ing 
Undersecretary of State for Culture and subsequently head of Egyptian Book Organisation prior 
to his sudden death in 1981. His first collection of poetry, al-Nas f i  Biladl (The People of my 
Country, 1957), was considered an immediate success, and he later received the State Prize for 
Literature for his verse play interpretation of the trial and execution of the famous Sufi al-Hallaj, 
M a’sdt al-Hallaj (The Tragedy of al-Hallaj, 1963). He published several other major verse plays 
and volumes, culminating in al-Ibhar f i  al-Dhakira (Sailing in Memory, 1979).
cAbd al-Sabur is seen as one of the most modern of 20th century Arab poets, expressing m an’s 
predicament in the contemporary Arab world in a register very similar to contemporary Arabic.
18 cAbd al-Wahhab al-Bayyatl, Tajribatl al-Shicriyya, (Al-Mu’assassa Al-cArabiyya lil-Dirasat wa al-Nashr, Beirut, 
1994) p. 9
19 M.M. Badawi, A Critical Introduction to Modern Arabic Poetry, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1975) 
p. 213
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Rather than focusing particularly on political issues like al-Bayyatl, during his shorter lifetime 
cAbd al-Sabur went further in exploring the correspondence between existentialist concerns and 
Sufi concepts, becoming a leading exponent of the resurgence of Sufism in modem Arabic poetry 
in the 1960s. His early realistic poetry about village life revealed a strong social commitment, in 
a spirit similar to the prose writer Yusuf Idris. However, by his second volume, this initial 
realism was yielding to more metaphysical concerns and, particularly, mystical inclinations. Like 
al-Bayyatl’s shift from open Marxism towards the inner experience, he began to turn away from 
the socialist ideal towards an increasingly personal vision which, according to Badawl, ‘alternates 
between a mild form of mysticism and melancholy meditations on death and... despair’.20 This 
tendency towards introspection and overpowering pessimism grew stronger throughout the 
1960s, and particularly after 1967 and the demise of Arab nationalism, which occasioned a 
general withdrawal from the painful external reality. His poetry reflected a nightmarish world 
inhabited by spiritually emaciated human subjects. In the volume T a’ammulat f i  Zaman Jarih 
(Meditations on a Wounded Age, 1969), he suffers from a recurring nightmare in which he is 
shot, disembowelled and hung as a museum exhibit, once again recalling the fate of al-Hallaj. In 
his autobiographical prose work, Hayatl f t  al-Shicr (My Life in Poetry, 1969), cAbd al-Sabur 
draws on ancient Greek, modem European and Sufi thought to promote ‘a basically moral and 
spiritual view of poetry which he now regards as closely akin to mysticism, and he devotes much 
space to criticism of the conventional Marxist view, pointing out that poetry affirms values like 
truth, freedom, justice.’21
Adonis (b. 1930), whom critics have described as the foremost contemporary Arab poet, 
responsible for a revolution in poetic language, imagery and approach, was bom in the village of 
Qasabln, near Latakia in the mountains of north-western Syria. Until the age of fourteen he lived 
there with his father, a learned man who schooled him in Arab culture and Islamic sciences. The 
family was from the cAlawIs, an extreme heterodox branch of Shlcism. After receiving a 
scholarship for secondary school in Tartus, he later enrolled at the Syrian University in Damascus 
and received a doctorate from St. Joseph’s University in Beirut for his thesis ‘The Static and 
Dynamic in Arabic Culture’. Adonis’ formative years saw involvement in the Syrian National 
Socialist Party, and he is said to have been close to its leader, Antun Sacadah. Although not
20 Ibid, p. 217
*i Ibid, p. 218
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involved at its inception, Adonis’ role in the development of the free verse movement and new 
poetry was pivotal. In 1957, having relocated to Beirut and acquired Lebanese citizenship, he 
established a modernist poetry magazine in partnership with the poet Yusuf al-Khal, entitled 
S h icr (Poetry). The latter became a vehicle for many of the most important poetic experiments, 
developing alongside al-Addb, its more ideologically committed counterpart, as a magazine 
dedicated to poetry in its own right. At this time Adonis was involved in what would become 
known as the Tammuzl movement, which employed the ancient Phoenician god of rebirth and 
renewal as the symbol of a new future. This archetypal theme accounts for the poet’s choice of 
penname. In 1960 he received a scholarship to study at the Sorbonne in Paris, during which time 
he wrote the groundbreaking work Agharii M ihyar al-D im ashql (Songs o f  M ihyar the 
D am ascene), which achieved a balance between poetry’s socio-political role and a symbolic 
‘language of absence’. During the 1960s he moved on from Shicr to take a variety of journalistic 
posts, including the editorship of a Beirut newspaper, and also published his definitive Anthology 
o f  Arabic Poetry. As a poet and theorist, his innovative ideas began to exercise a powerful 
influence on his contemporaries and younger poets. By 1968 he had launched a new literary 
journal named M aw aqif a more culturally and politically oriented journal subtitled “Freedom, 
Creativity and Change”. In the first edition, Adonis gave further illustration of his radical vision 
of Arab culture, defining the new journal as ‘our expression, a living part of us, our complement; 
therefore, it is simultaneously a truth and a symbol; it represents the shattering of an Arabic 
generation which experienced only what was broken; in this journal we will search and start 
building anew.’ True to this credo, M awaqif became one of very few forums in which writers 
could express themselves freely. Subsequent to its launch, Adonis taught at the Lebanese 
University until 1985, when he returned to Paris as professor of Arabic at the Sorbonne.
Adonis’ iconoclastic and controversial perspectives on the Arab predicament have won him both 
friends and enemies, who have taken his criticisms as a wholesale rejection of the culture and 
identification with ‘the W est’. He believes that this culture has become essentially static, and 
only a total re-evaluation of the Arab heritage and values would enable it to once again contribute 
positively and originally to world civilization. He asserts that such a radical change can be 
achieved by delving into this heritage -  of which poetry is a major part -  and developing its 
positive, dynamic aspects in tandem with those of other civilizations. As such, he has attempted 
to relate Arabic poetry and thought to the wider global setting without having it lose its own
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identity. He has constantly endeavoured to transcend the traditional concept of the poem, 
emphasizing originality, creativity, and the breaking of boundaries and conventions, although his 
diction is more classical than, for example, cAbd al-SabOr’s vernacular style. With an acute 
sensibility towards the natural world and a profound knowledge of Arabic literature since pre- 
Islamic times, his poetry appears to function in a hyper-reality beyond the mundane world of 
binary oppositions, aiming for a unity between words and things. In short, Adonis’ poetry 
attempts nothing short of a radical reorientation or revitalization of Arab civilization.
In this struggle against the stagnation to which, in his eyes, Arab life has succumbed, Adonis sees 
exile -  literally or metaphorically -  as a pivotal motif. He believes that such stagnation derives 
primarily from the fact that orthodox religious doctrines have denied poetry, among other arts, its 
right to innovation, nullifying its role and cognitive mission and reducing it to a mere ideological 
tool with which to celebrate the Truth of Qur’anic revelation. Poetry, as the highest linguistic art 
form and one existing within a ‘divine’ language, has seen its essential creativity undermined by 
a social, cultural and political force dominating that same language. He has therefore dedicated 
himself to the immense -  perhaps Sisyphean -  endeavour of freeing it, and thereby culture in 
general, from such shackles, to help create a real future for the modem Arab world.
Fundamentally, Adonis’ poetry reflects a universal vision of harmony, integration and oneness, 
implying that the modem Arab must embrace the other and stand outside his own culture in order 
to know himself. In this context the other can be understood either as the unconscious / esoteric -  
man’s psychic other -  or the cultural other of the West. Adonis envisions a future Arab culture 
transcending divisions altogether through a dialectical creative activity between these selves and 
others, subordinating geographical specificity to universal human dignity: ‘All my stmggle could 
be said to be centred around this goal: for the geographic homeland to become a living part of the 
creative and universal one. No East, no West: only a man in one world.’22 Such a multilayered 
fusion of self and other is analogous to that between the Sufi and God. To articulate this vision he 
has used an array of forms, images, moods, rhythms and voices, creating a discourse of 
simultaneous harmony and difference.
22 Adonis, ‘Beyond East/West: Toward a Culture of the Future’, delivered at Dartmouth College, 19th May, 2001.
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These three poets, al-Bayyatl, cAbd al-Sabur and Adonis, have each been profoundly affected by 
the social, political and cultural predicament of their fellow Arabs. Although their conceptions of 
the artist’s role have taken different trajectories, the relationship between the modem struggle and 
the dynamic and revolutionary principles inherent in Sufism may provide common ground. While 
al-Bayyatl, who was deeply convinced of poetry’s role in the fight for social justice and political 
freedom, personally suffered the injustice of Iraq’s political system through dism issal, 
imprisonment and exile,23 Adonis, too, was imprisoned without trial for political activities.24 All 
three expressed a commitment -  explicit or implicit -  to a human ideal, however they chose to 
represent it, and a rejection of the existing political and/or cultural order. Al-Bayyatl’s use of 
Sufism would have to be reconciled with his longstanding Marxist and existentialist inclinations, 
while cAbd al-Sabur would attempt to fuse the individual nature of the Sufi experience with 
social responsibility. The presence of Sufi characters and concepts in their poetry suggests not 
only an increasing disillusionment with attempts to transform society, but also a quest to create 
the perfect human archetype for whom perfection of self meant simultaneously perfection of 
society, thereby creating a just and equal world redefined on its own terms rather than those of 
the imperialist or totalitarian oppressor.
23 Al-Bayyatl, Hubb wa Mawt wa Nafy: Love, Death and Exile, tr. Bassam K. Frangieh, (Georgetown University 
Press, Washington, 1990), pp. 2-3
24 Adonis, Banipal 2, (June 1998), p. 35
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Part II: Theoretical Basis 
Defining Sufism
Given the centrality of Sufism to the project, one awkward and recurrent problem must be 
addressed: what is it? This question has not been answered with any precision or authority in the 
literature on the subject, due to the broadness and diversity of the Sufi tradition and the inherent 
difficulties in attaching linguistic definitions to esoteric disciplines. Consequently, attempts to 
define Sufism tend towards descriptions of its concepts and practices, such as the principle of 
wahdat al-wujud (the unity of existence) or the dhikr ritual (repetition of devotional formulae). 
Its elusive nature is evident when Lings describes it as ‘a touchstone, an implacable criterion 
which reduces everything else, except its own equivalents, to a flat surface of two dimensions 
only, being itself the real dimension of height and depth.’25 Schimmel writes that in its formative 
period Sufism meant ‘an interiorization of Islam, a personal experience of the central mystery of 
Islam, that of taw hld , “to declare that God is one”,26 while another scholar defines it as ‘the 
esoteric or inward (bdtin) aspect of Islam’.27
However, these variable approaches, epitomised in the famous Sufi story of the elephant in the 
dark28, are in general agreement that Sufism is ‘the phenomenon of mysticism within Islam ,’29 
i.e., a body of esoteric doctrine and practice based loosely upon the Qur’an. Historically, it is 
considered to have emerged as a spiritual counterpoint to the political and military expansion of 
the early Islamic era, maintaining the inner meaning of the new religion. Herein the movement’s 
alternative and radical nature, which would later appeal to modem secular poets, can already be 
discerned. From the start, the Sufis rejected the external world in favour of an inner journey 
towards God, a mystical path that transcends religious boundaries. Naturally, Sufism did not arise 
in a spiritual or philosophical vacuum: influences as varied as neo-Platonism, Aristotelianism, 
Christian monasticism, ancient Iranian religions and nomadic Buddhist monks have been 
proposed and disputed at length. Given its debatable origins, it will be suitable here to view it in
25 Martin Lings, What is Sufism? (George Allen & Unwin, Surrey, 1975), p. 8
26 Annemarie Schimmel, Mystical Dimensions of Islam, (N.C. University Press, Chapel Hill, 1975), p. 17
27 Titus Burckhardt, An Introduction to Sufi Doctrine, (Ashraf Press, Lahore, 1963), p. 3
281. Shah, The Sufis, (Octagon Press, London, 1999), p. 36
29 Louis Massignon, ‘Tasawwuf, The Encyclopaedia o f Islam, (El) ed. Bearman et al. New ed., (Leiden, Brill, 2000)
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the wider context of man’s relationship with reality and the self, as opposed to a mere subsection 
of Islamic culture.
Rather than attempting a historical synopsis, it is more appropriate to establish the characteristics 
of the Sufi experience. The Sufi’s ultimate objective is, broadly speaking, to achieve a ‘mystical 
union’ with God, i.e. integration of the self, in order to become al-insan al-kamil, the perfect 
man. To reach this state, the Sufi passes through various ascending levels of consciousness, 
notably fa n d ’, annihilation of the ego, and baqd’, subsistence in God. Through this experience, 
Divine Truth is gradually unveiled to the seeker, until he stands before God’s face or acquires His 
characteristics. The authenticity of this Sufi path was originally vested in various Qur’anic 
passages and the exemplary model of the Prophet Muhammad. Over time, this intense spiritual 
discipline generated a corpus of esoteric (batini) knowledge with a distinctive Islamic colouring, 
such as Muhy al-Dln ibn al-cArabI’s (1165-1240) transcendental theosophy of wahdat al-wujud.
In discussing Sufism, it must be emphasized that esoteric vision does not deny the physical 
world, but transcends it: there is no pearl without a shell. Since visionary endeavours meet at a 
point beyond the limits of intellectual enquiry, there are clear difficulties in defining the Sufi 
experience. Nevertheless, the present objective is to relate it a proposed ‘neo-Sufi’ trend in 
modem Arabic poetry. This is not to suggest that certain modern Arab poets subscribed fully to 
the principles of Sufism, but to ask whether such principles became part of a distinctive outlook 
on Arab and human existence. The question, therefore, is to what extent these secular modernist 
thinkers considered certain Sufi principles applicable to the contemporary age, or used them as a 
means of expression. Did these poets utilise particular Sufi ideas, motifs and personalities as 
means to revitalize their psychological and socio-political realities, and if so, why? In this 
context, then, ‘Sufism’ refers both to the inner kernel of esoteric thought and its historical 
proponents, such as ibn al-cArabI or al-Husayn ibn Mansur al-Hallaj (858-922). However, to 
contextualise and comprehend the place of Sufism in modern Arabic poetry first requires 
examination of its key concepts.
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Fana’ (annihilation) and baaa’ (subsistence)
The mystical withdrawal from the world implies escapism and indifference towards the fate of 
mankind. However, the Sufi dialectic of fa n a ’ and baqa’ challenges this assumption, since the 
unio mystica, or the numinous experience, is merely a temporary transcendence of the world. The 
terms fa n a ’ and b a q a ’ refer to specific stages on the Sufi path that are both antithetical and 
complementary: ‘annihilation’ of the self and its ‘subsistence’ in God’s attributes,30 or the 
replacement of the mystic’s human consciousness by a supposedly pure, divine consciousness.31 
Fana ’ is not the disappearance of the human self -  the Sufi naturally remains physically present -  
but the transition towards creating the ‘perfect selfhood’.32 To more orthodox-inclined Sufis, 
fana ’ does not imply complete fusion between man and God. In any case, it is not the apex of the 
mystical journey, since it is followed by the more perfect stage of baqa’, ‘a return to the mystic’s 
consciousness of the plurality of the... world. The second follows from the first, since being with 
God means also being with the world which has been created by God and in which He is 
manifested, however imperfectly... This “return” to the world [is not] a simple return to the pre- 
fa n a ’ state of the mystic, since his experience has given him an altogether new insight [with 
which] to perceive its inadequacies and to endeavour to make it more perfect.’33
Therefore, at the apex of the Sufi journey, the seeker is not removed from the world, but 
inextricably involved in it through a restored and revitalized sense of selfhood, one transformed 
by mystic experience. The perfect self, subsistent in God, is the world in symbolic form: 
microcosm of macrocosm. Since the transformed Sufi sees the world as the manifestation of God, 
his actions constitute both a form of worship and an affirmation of the unity of existence. 
Moreover, given the identity of self and world, it would be entirely erroneous to suppose that the 
Sufi ‘perfect man’ disregards socio-political reality. On the contrary, his complete, i.e. prophetic, 
consciousness allows him unique insight into the complexities of human existence. In this sense, 
the prophet - ‘mystic par excellence’ -  being simultaneously with God and the world, has a 
mission to perfect it in divine Truth. He is the ideal human being, uniting words with actions, 
inner perfection with outer responsibility. Thus his own personal perfection cannot be complete
30 F. Rahman, ‘Baqa’ wa Fana’, El, vol ], p. 9 5 1
31 Ibid, p. 951
32 Ibid, p. 951
33 Ibid, p. 951
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until all of mankind is perfected: he must bring others towards God. The Sufi prophet eschews 
hermetic solipsism and lives in and for his community, shaping the destiny of humanity. B aqa’, 
then, the highest state of Sufi consciousness, is a dynamic return to the world after the abstraction 
of fa n a ’.
If baqa ’ can be compared to a renewed selfhood through unmediated contact with the 
unconscious, then the mystical poet, like the prophet, may harness its profound revolutionary 
power. His mission, too, is to transform himself and the world, with words as his means. Baqa ’, 
the rebirth of the spirit, inheres a mutual inclusivity between psychological fulfilment and 
political commitment, and is therefore amenable to the aspirations of the modem secular 
intellectual who strives for truth on both individual and collective levels.
The Sufi path, then, rose from the false notion of the autonomous subject, which could be 
controlled by more powerful external forces, to the self transformed and guided by identification 
with ‘God’. The modem Arab poets would aim to cultivate not the passivity and hierarchy of the 
traditional shaykh-m urid  relationship, but an active, transformed selfhood through which 
individuals and societies could recreate their own destiny. This is individual rather than 
institutionalised Sufism, experience rather than tradition. Historically, Sufis realised this active 
self by passing through the stages of the mystical path, graduating from rejection of the status 
quo and realisation of a lack in the ego towards the apex of the esoteric journey where an 
integrated, fortified self could create a new order.
The esoteric conception of the divine, which stresses immanence and presence, stands in direct 
contrast to the exoteric conception, which implies transcendence or absence. Identification with 
this ‘G od’ was traditionally achieved by the Sufi ‘not through the passive acceptance of 
traditional ideologies or any prevailing hegemonic discourse but through a direct experience of 
one’s true condition as a desiring subject.’34 Through this the individual became inspired to 
question all inherited ‘truth’ and to strive to perfect his broader human environment as a part of 
self-perfection. It is such dynamic aspects of Sufism — its fuller engagement with the fate of 
humanity -  that a modem Arab poet might appropriate as part of a radical vision of the future.
34 Katherine Pratt Ewing, Arguing Sainthood: Modernity, Psychoanalysis and Islam (Duke University Press, 
Durham, 1997) p. 267
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As Lings puts it, ‘When the exile turns his face in the direction of Mecca he aspires above all, if 
he is a Sufi, to the inward return, to the reintegration of the fragmented finite individual self into 
the Infinitude of the Divine Self.’35
35 Lings, op.cit, p. 37
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Wahdat al-wuiud and wahdat al-shuhud: ontological and phenomenological monism
The Sufi principle of wahdat al-wujud, the ‘unity of existence’ or ontological monism, which is 
traditionally attributed to Ibn al-cArabi36, is an emanationist theosophy in which the Sufi may 
take on the attributes of God. An alternative conception, wahdat al-shuhud, or phenomenological 
monism, in which the Sufi may come face to face with God, became prominent in the 17th 
century through the reformist NaqshbandT shaykh Ahmed SirhindT (1564-1624). Both ontological 
(wujudi) and phenomenological (shuhudi) monism are subsumed under the rubric of Sufism; 
however, it is worth establishing the theoretical, and thereby ethical, distinction between them.
At issue here is the interpretation of Islam ’s seminal principle: tawhid, the unity of God. 
According to Chittick, the phrase wahdat al-wujud itself has a history, originally designating ‘the 
oneness of the real w udjud ,37 (i.e. God) and later coming to signify a certain perspective on the 
whole of reality with varying interpretations. According to it, there is no ultimate separation 
between the Absolute (God) and everything in existence -  hence the Persian Sufi phrase hama 
ust, ‘All is He’. Ibn al-cArabi therefore upholds the principle of interexistence: the distinction 
between subject and object is a cultural construct, not an absolute boundary. Reality, for ibn al- 
cArabI, encapsulates both the unity of God’s existence and the plurality of His knowledge -  ‘the 
two principles through which he gives existence to the cosmos’38 -  so that when he speaks of 
“that which is other than God” (md siwa Allah), ‘he is using the term in a metaphorical sense... 
There is only one Being, one wujud, even though we are justified in speaking of many “existent 
things” in order to address ourselves to the plurality that we perceive in the phenomenal world’39. 
If wujud  is Reality, then everything other than it exists only in so far as it manifests the Real. 
Therefore, whilst not denying exoteric existence, ibn al-cArabI sees it as a mere expression of the 
esoteric Source, united or divided by an isthmus, or harzakh. From this viewpoint, the notion of 
definitive boundaries disintegrates into an infinite continuum emanating from that source.
The primacy of the esoteric in wahdat al-wujud, which generated an alternative socio-political 
perspective, placed it distinctly at odds with Islamic orthodoxy. As such, a staunch guardian of
36 Although there is no record of him using this exact phrase, the concept is attributed to him.
37 William Chittick, Sufism: A Short Introduction, (Oneworld, Oxford, 2000) p. 37
38 Ibid, p. 39
39 Ibid, p. 75
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the latter, the Hanball jurist ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328), attacked it fiercely, equating it with the 
heresies of h u lu l  (incarnation) and i t t i h a d  (unification). Later, Sirhindl also criticised the 
principle on the basis that Muslims were using it as a pretext to avoid observance of the s h a r f a .  
As even al-Ghazall had hinted, belief in the cosmic unity of existence reduced the ritual 
conformance of the s h a r f a  to mere arbitrary status. Sirhindl therefore distinguished between the 
existence of God and the world, and insisted that God could be witnessed (i.e. sh u h u d )  but not 
experienced (i.e. w u ju d ).
However, Sirhindl’s effective denial of the noumenal realm must be seen in historical context. 
His Naqshbandl reformism was an attempt to forestall the amalgamation of Islam and Hinduism 
in 17th century India to which w a h d a t a l-w u ju d  contributed. If God alone existed, physical objects 
were no more than divine ‘flashes’ or ‘appearances’ which could be worshipped ‘as 
manifestations of the divine will’40, giving credence to Hindu beliefs. Since this would entail a 
descent into heterodoxy and polytheism ( s h ir k ) ,  ibn al-cArabi’s theosophy would have to be 
firmly subordinated to the s h a r i ca .  Phenomenological monism is therefore an exoteric system, 
maintaining a separation between God and man, while the esoteric ontological monism sees man 
as a constituent part of the one Reality. By according divine status to the human construct of the 
s h a r i ca ,  Sirhindl equated non-adherence with non-belief. By contrast, the esoteric perspective 
prioritises h a q tq a ,  truth, over s h a r lca ,  law. For ibn al-cArabI, reality is the mirror through which 
an immanent God contemplates Himself; for Sirhindl, reality is the reflection of a transcendent 
God, not to be mistaken for the Original. Such differences have significant implications: 
Sirhindi’s exoterism, although nominally Sufi, maintained the dominance of the s h a f t 0a  and 
cu la m a  \  keeping Islam within rigid conservative boundaries and distinguishing Muslims from 
infidels on the basis of orthopraxy. Conversely, ibn al-cArabI’s esoterism is simultaneously 
monotheistic and polytheistic, issuing from an unconscious realm that transcends all exoteric 
boundaries.
The alternative political philosophies of these viewpoints are self-evident, not least in the 
acceptance or rejection of the other. In light of this deep schism within Sufism, an important 
clarification is necessary. The term ‘Sufism’, henceforth, will refer to the ontological strand and
40 Malise Ruthven, Islam in the World, (Penguin, London, 2000) p. 275
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the noumenal experiences thereof, and neither to the phenomenological strand nor the ta r iq a  
institutions into which Sufism was later systematized.41 Sirhindl’s approach has a clear parallel in 
Nietzsche’s rejection of the notion of an inaccessible reality beyond sensible things, and therefore 
with postmodern relativist’s denial of absolute truth. To what extent the proposed ‘neo-Sufi’ 
movement fuses Nietzschean scepticism with Akbarian esoterism remains to be seen.
To further illustrate the nature of ontological monism, we may examine the important metaphor 
of the mirror, which neatly symbolises the relation in Sufism between lover and Beloved. The 
Sufi lover desires to return to the Beloved, and he polishes “the mirror of his heart” in order to 
reflect the latter’s radiance. Lover is therefore a mere reflection of Beloved, a visible 
manifestation of His existence. The closer he gets to the Beloved, the more perfectly he reflects 
Him, and is ultimately fused into complete Unity. The Sufi perfect man, a l- in s a n  a l-k a m il ,  has 
reached the point where he reflects Him perfectly. This is, in fact, the return of the Beloved to 
Himself, exemplified in Corbin’s Sufi quote: ‘I am the mirror of thy face; through thine own eyes 
I look upon thy countenance’42. Thus the Sufi’s being (w u j i id )  returns to its original unity 
( w a h d a ), thus reaffirming the principle of w a h d a t a l-w u ju d .
The mirror metaphor, like al-Junayd’s water metaphor discussed below, reveals the equivalence 
between the medieval Sufi concept of God and the modem concept of the self as lacking intrinsic 
content. Just as the water takes on the colour of the container, so the mirror takes on the 
appearance of the viewer: both entail a greater Absence. God, the Real, is the mirror; the seeker is 
merely the image. In f a n a ’, therefore, the Sufi dissolves his ego into the greater Self of the 
mirror. Thus spoke the Sufi al-Bistaml: “You were my mirror; I have become the mirror.”43 
Whether the Sufi can actually b e c o m e  the mirror, or merely see its perfection, is a question of 
w u ju d l  (ontological) or sh u h u d i (phenomenological) monism respectively.
41 The tariqa itself is a socio-political constellation, distinct from esoteric truth around which it is based, each with its 
own specific characteristics, rituals and symbols. For the modern poets, its hierarchical structure is undoubtedly an 
objectionable aspect of Sufism.
42 Henri Corbin, The man of Light in Iranian Sufism, quoted in Paul Davies, Romanticism and Esoteric Tradition: 
Studies in Imagination (Lindisfame, New York, 1998) p. 45-6
43 Abu YazTd al-Bistaml, Les Dits de Bistami, tr. Abdelwahab Meddeb, (Fayard, France, 1989)
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Sufism and Political Commitment: the case of al-Hallai
As noted above, Sufism’s esoteric orientation does not necessarily preclude the potential for 
political action. The notion of a total revolution transcends the categories of internal and external. 
In a modem context, therefore, rather than being merely an otherworldly escape from external 
concerns, Sufism could represent a means of transcending a shattered reality and a furtherance  of 
political commitment. This thesis proposes that Sufi concepts might have been reconciled with 
modem thought to generate a neo-humanist philosophy, on both an individual and collective 
level. For example, the immanent nature of the Sufi deity -  there are as many ways to God as 
human souls -  is compatible with the democratic ideal. It is possible that the “neo-Sufi” 
development, after the failure of political ideologies, is a further expression of the search for 
truth, freedom and justice. To investigate this proposition requires consideration of the archetype 
of the radical Sufi mystic: al-Hallaj, who would become emblematic of the intellectual climate of 
1960s Arabic poetry.
Mystic, poet, political dissident and ultimately martyr, al-Hallaj, who was revived as a literary 
persona by all three “neo-Sufi” poets, was executed in Baghdad following his infamous statement 
of union with God: And al-Haqq, “I am the Truth”. His life can be seen as a journey towards the 
complete immersion of his individuality into the divine consciousness, culminating in the 
blasphemous references to God as synonymous with himself. The charge against him -  al-dacwa 
ild al-rububiyya, or ‘usurpation of the supreme power of God’ -  is revealing: al-Hallaj’s extreme 
esoterism clearly subverted the authority of the exoteric, institutional God and the attendant legal 
and political order. In placing himself above the jurisdiction of Prophet and Imam, al-Hallaj’s 
crime was to undermine Islamic law and thereby foundations of the state. From a modern 
viewpoint, his status as challenger of a corrupt theocratic order and champion of the oppressed, 
who was prepared to sacrifice himself for his beliefs, represents an inspirational model. Implicit 
within the unitive utterance “I am the Truth” is the idea that divinity is immanent within 
humanity, rather than transcendent. For the modern Pakistani poet Muhammad Iqbal, this 
utterance was a ‘bold affirmation in an undying phrase of the reality and permanence of the 
human ego in a profounder personality’.44 In such a context, al-Hallaj becomes a modem hero
44 Elizabeth Sirriyeh, Sufis and Anti-Sufis: The Defence, Rethinking and Rejection of Sufism in the Modern World, 
(Curzon, Richmond, 1999), p. 135
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whose statements of devotion to ‘God’ can equally be interpreted as invocations of the integrity 
of the individual self. This anti-transcendentalism, contrary to the oppressive and dehumanising 
effect of religious dogma, opens the way for a dynamic conception of the human being as master 
of his own destiny. This dynamic, illuminated self, embodied by an idealised al-Hallaj, is a 
symbol of political and spiritual resistance with particular resonance for poets suffering as 
atomised individuals in opposition to overarching state ideologies.
Al-Hallaj’s ‘usurpation’ of the exoteric God freed him from the restraints of the external legal 
framework of the sharica, thus allowing open-mindedness and innovation. This can be seen in his 
exhortation to perform the tawaf ‘round the k a cba of your heart’, discarding the exoteric action 
whilst retaining the esoteric meaning. The god within requires no holy texts or rituals, merely an 
inner truth which must be brought into the world. In his numinous experience al-Hallaj 
transcended religion altogether, and he was rejected even by his own Sufi brothers. To the 
modem poet, then, al-Hallaj’s appeal lies in his pursuit of truth regardless of the consequences.
From the esoteric perspective, there is no ultimate boundary between the self, the microcosm, and 
the world, the macrocosm. To perfect the self and live in truth therefore means likewise for the 
world, since no self exists in isolation. Individual and collective revolution become an 
indistinguishable whole: ‘God’ becomes synonymous with socio-political justice. As shown 
above, the Sufi state of baqa , or prophetic consciousness, entails the very same principle. This is 
the premise behind al-H allaj’s rejection of political reality. From this perspective, too, 
institutional religion and state ideology are equally misrepresentative, since they are both 
founded on rationalistic ( cilm) principles that have relatively little penetration of truth. For the 
modem poet who despairs of both religious and secular dogma, the inner Sufi path of the self, 
exemplified by al-Hallaj represents the natural, perhaps inevitable alternative.
The revival of al-Hallaj, then, reveals a Sufi hero who combines spiritual distinction and social 
mission in one person, i.e. who unites words and actions. His life itself was supposedly divided 
between ascetic practices, such as solitary prayer and meditation, and social activities, such as 
preaching and giving counsel, thus achieving a balance between both existential aspects. 
According to Massignon, he was inclined towards extreme humility and renunciation of property, 
while ‘an overflowing faith incited him to preach in public those rules of life that he had found
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beneficial for himself, [which he did] among his Muslim brothers and even among the idolaters, 
among the great as well as the lowly.’45 From the esoteric viewpoint, when al-Hallaj’s personality 
was annihilated {fana’) and became subsistent in the divine {baqa’), his identity, thoughts and 
actions became indistinguishable from those of God, since He alone exists, in accordance with 
wahdat al-wujud. As such, Massignon postulates that he was ‘interpreting directly the essential 
will of God, and participating in the divine nature, “transformed” in God,’46 i.e., his actions in 
this state were by definition divine and perfect. Regardless of this moral absolutism, freedom and 
individuality are not destroyed but maintained in the Sufi doctrine of baqd’\
The effect o f  d iv ine reality is not the destruction o f  the m ystic’s personality, by crushing it w ith rites 
(sa b r , sah w )  or disengaging it through ecstatic intoxication (sukr)\ divine unity perfects it, consecrates it, 
exalts it, and makes it its own fr e e  and living a gen t.47
The perfect man, in the Hallajian sense, lives in God, who augments his personality, sanctifies his 
every word and deed, sets him free from all external constraints and makes him responsible for 
his environment. In contrast to strict adherence to arbitrary, immutable rules supposedly laid 
down for all time by a remote divinity, this state entails individual freedom, and therefore 
responsibility. In Sufi terms, it is where the creation rejoins and embraces his Creator, and there 
flows an intimate, burning discourse between the Beloved and his heart. Al-Hallaj would have 
known the consequences of denying exoteric Islam, and his execution was therefore an 
ambiguous affair: death would mean final and permanent union with the Unknown, it would give 
his life meaning. It was this gruesome death that would become the focus of Arab poets’ 
existentialist concerns over a millennium later.
45 Louis Massignon, The Passion of al-Hallaj: Mystic and Martyr of Islam, tr. & ed. Herbert Mason, (Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1994), p. 133
46 Ibid, p. 134
47 Rahman, op.cit, p. 951
27
Sufism, Poetry and Post-Structuralist Theory
Sufi writing, or mystical poetry, can be conceived as an attempt to answer the ‘question of 
questions’, i.e. to express the meaning of existence. The mystical poem endeavours to symbolise 
the ever-expanding cosmos, or God’s universe, through the communicative medium of language. 
This cosmos, in both esoteric thought and contemporary science, is dynamic and interexistent: no 
thing is utterly static or isolated from all else. The same principles apply to the mystical poem: 
each component, as part of a unified whole, acquires meaning in relation to the others, thus 
reflecting the chaotic harmony of the cosmos. Ideally, the phonological, syntactical, semantic and 
rhythmical units all fuse to create a totality expressible only in that form -  implying the 
breakdown of the standard categories of subject and object. The mystical poem thereby embraces 
genuine meaning as the existential microcosm, linking the specific to the universal.
However, this theoretically ideal poem will never be composed, since its linguistic constitution 
exiles it from absolute truth. This is something acknowledged both in post-structural theory and 
in classical Sufi poetry:
Neither words, nor any natural fact
. * • 48 can express this.
The perpetual gap between signifier and signified compels the mystical poet to employ an 
alternative language in which silence is the dominant motif: a kind of expressive implosion. This 
accounts for the inspired succinctness of ibn al-cArabI’s formula: huwa la huwa (He / not He).49 
The Islamic shahada -  the expression of God’s unity or reality, la ildha ilia Allah -  can also be 
viewed in this light, while the same pursuit of truth in European postmodernism accounts for the 
spiralling of artistic creation into the vortex of its own annihilation (fana’).50 The shahada  
involves a negation or fa n a ’ (‘no god’) and an affirmation or baqa’ ( ‘but G od’), revealing the 
fragile consistency between Sufi vision and Islamic belief. It is, in other words, a negation of
48 Jalal al-DTn al-Rumi, The Essential Rumi, tr. C. Barks & J. Moyne (Penguin, London, 1995) p. 10
49 William Chittick, ‘Rumi and Wahdat al-Wujud’, in Poetry and Mysticism in Islam: The Heritage o f Rumi, 
(Eleventh Giorgio Levi Della Vida Conference, University of California, Los Angeles, 1987,) p. 76
50 John Cage’s silent musical composition, entitled “4 ’33”, is one example of postmodern fa n a ’.
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non-existence -  ‘no Reality’ -  and an affirmation of existence -  ‘but The Reality.’ For the Sufis, 
writes Schuon,
the s h a h a d a h  com prises tw o m eanings, depending on w hether one has in mind transcendence or 
im m anence: firstly, the truth that G od alone is real, as opposed to the world which, being contingent, is 
illusory; then the truth that no existen ce can be situated outside God: that all exists “is not other than H e” 
(Id ghayruhu ), failing which, precisely the world w ould not ex ist.51
In Sufi terms, then, the shahada means ‘There is no Absolute, but The Absolute’. ‘God’ is merely 
a name, which cannot convey direct meaning. Sufism entails an entirely different conception of 
God -  as latent within man, or ‘closer than his jugular vein’ (Qur’an 50:16) -  based on the unity 
of existence. From this perspective, the shahada  is merely a one-line Sufi poem defining the 
mystic’s belief. The Sufi dhikr, the ritual repetition of this phrase to achieve an ecstatic state, is in 
effect a poetry recital for which the audience is the Absolute Himself.
The intimate connection between Sufism and poetry revolves around this notion of tawhid. For 
the Sufi, this unity entails the syzygy of exoteric and esoteric domains, what is seen and Unseen. 
In his exoteric state, i.e. ego-consciousness, man is separated from God; the mystic’s goal is 
union with the esoteric divinity. Divine union synthesizes polar opposites: God is simultaneously 
both One and Many, just as white light diffracts into the spectrum whilst remaining the same 
light. The Sufi conceives of reality through these reciprocal aspects, which are two sides of the 
same coin, and in mystical union he sees or embodies their unity. Ibn al-cArabI, for example, 
‘asserts both the oneness of God wudjud [sic] and the manyness of His knowledge, the unity of 
His Essence and the multiplicity of His nam es...’52 Sufism emphasizes the immanent alongside 
the transcendent nature of God, or His esoteric in complement to His exoteric aspect. The 
esoteric is the domain of the heart -  union and love, two central themes in Sufi poetry -  while the 
exoteric is that of the mind -  reason and logic. Poetry, with its intoxicating subversion of 
linguistic norms, is the natural vehicle to convey the experience of the esoteric, through which 
the Sufi strives for perfect selfhood. The Sufi opens himself to ‘effusions of divine love’, which 
can be ‘so overwhelming that they lose their powers of rational discernment and tend to express
51 Frithjof Schuon, Sufism: Veil and Quintessence, (Evergreen, Lahore, 1985), pp. 161-2
52 Chittick, ‘Rumi and Wahdat al-Wujud', p. 77
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themselves in ecstatic and paradoxical language.’53 Super-rational experiences -  such as the 
rapture of Sufi union -  necessitate the super-rational language of poetry. Such poetry, the attempt 
to name divine reality, has no logical endpoint, since to the intoxicated Sufi all things are a 
reflection of God.
Given its esoteric nature, the experience of (re-)union with the Absolute transcends language. 
When things are returned to and unified with their source, explicit communication is no longer 
necessary or desired, since the linguistic medium exiles its speaker from truth. Words, for both 
Sufis and post-structuralists, are a veil to truth: esoteric reality is known only through direct 
experience, which is beyond description. The mystical experience and its poetic expression are 
two parallel but never contiguous lines, separated by the gap between name and reality. Hence 
the metaphorical and/or metonymical nature of Sufi discourse: its endlessly varied imagery and 
symbolism are an attempt to bridge this gap. In this sense, Sufi poetry attempts the impossible: to 
reveal the invisible, or to bring order to chaos.
Understanding Sufi poetry therefore hinges on awareness of the relationship between language 
and existence, between word and essence. The fundamental significance of the word in 
Abrahamic monotheism is beyond doubt: the Torah and Gospel attest to linguistic originality -  
‘In the beginning was the W ord’ -  while Islam considers the Qur’anic text a sacred entity 
revealed by God in Arabic for all time. Against such “logocentricity” the Sufi experience would 
maintain the inexpressible nature of God’s essence. However, a parallel can be drawn between 
the simultaneous unity and multiplicity of the Divine and the concept of language as the endless 
diffraction of the primary Word or Logos, symbol of esoteric divinity. Through this emanatory 
process the Sufi may represent his experience of God:
Origin/Word (esoteric) ^  existence/language (exoteric).
The W ord’s descent into flesh is the evolution of man from divine to human, from the womb to 
life, from esoteric to exoteric. The way of the Sufi, the mystical return to Origin, is a 
reintegration of this original psychic split.
Chittick, Sufism, p. 35
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The restless and paradoxical multiplicity of the Absolute Oneness is reflected in the myriad of 
metaphors (m a j a z ) in Sufi discourse. Light is one such metaphor: pure white light descends 
through the prism into infinite colours, as in Ibn al-cArabi’s concept of a l-w a h id  a l-k a th ir  ( ‘plural 
singular’). In accord with the Sufi al-Junayd’s (d.910) statement that “The water takes on the 
colour of the container,”54 modem physics instructs that humans see not the thing itself, but 
merely the light it reflects. Such is the relationship between man and God in Sufism. As Chittick 
puts it: ‘The universe is nothing but the outward manifestation of the innate properties of w u ju d  
[existence], just as colours, forms, and shapes are nothing but the outward manifestations of 
ligh t... the multiplicity of colours does not negate the oneness of light. Red and blue have no 
existence of their ow n... their existence is only a mode of light’s existence.’55 Likewise, in 
mystical writing, language, which is exiled from esoteric reality, exemplifies a process of 
abstraction, f a n a \  in order to symbolise it, or to become the Singular in plural form:
O nly love.
Only the holder the flag fits into, 
and wind. N o flag.56
Metaphor, then, is the umbilical link between poetry and Sufism, between visible and invisible. It 
is the prism, the point of transformation, or the conceptual isthmus between esoteric meaning and 
exoteric image. At this point dimensionality implodes and writing attains a zero-degree. As such, 
the metaphor is analogous to the Sufi concept of the b a r z a k h ,  an intersection of modes of 
consciousness which forms the fulcrum of the unitive perspective. The Sufi al-Niffari (d.c.976) 
calls it ‘the tomb of reason and the cemetery of things,’57 since beyond it lies the esoteric. 
Metaphor unites image and meaning; the Sufi b a r z a k h  unites man and God. The emptiness of 
linguistic signifiers implies that “literal” language is impossible and that conscious use of 
metaphor must be the truest form of expression. Indeed, both mysticism and poetic language are 
premised on the principle of s im u l ta n e i ty : ‘that a thing not only can be both itself and not itself
54 The water represents the Divine essence, and the container represents man, a potential truth. Water entails 
transparency, an abstraction of colour. Transparency o f the container, if achieved, is fan a’, the annihilation of the 
ego, when any qualitative distinction between the water and the container -  God and man -  disappears.
55 Chittick, ‘Rumi and Wahdat al-Wujud’, p. 76
56 al-Rumi, op.cit., p. 29
57 Adonis, An Introduction to Arab Poetics, (Saqi, London, 1990), p. 62
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but is so in the nature of things.’58 Contrary to Aristotelian logic and Cartesian rationality, God is 
simultaneously present and absent, near and far, everything and nothing, united by the b a r z a k h .  
The ‘secret’ of mystical unity is precisely this simultaneity: that the self is at the same time the 
other, that the whole requires the presence of both constituent elements, God and man, 
unconscious and conscious. The simultaneity principle is, in this sense, the essence of mysticism.
The Sufi poet understands the fundamental illogicality of metaphor, which equates two ostensibly 
different things. As Adonis puts it: ‘metaphor is an effective refusal of the Aristotelian logic 
which denies that a thing can be both itself and not itself at the same time -  on the contrary, 
metaphor affirms precisely that, in the simplest of term s... In many forms of poetry this principle 
can be witnessed in operation, when the ornamental function of metaphor gives way to the 
cognitive.’59 Language, like science, cannot circumscribe an infinite existence of which it is itself 
a part. Conceived as a ‘sacred grammar’, Existence (like Heidegger’s D a s e in ) is the only subject 
-  an infinitive, intransitive verb, ‘to be’ -  and all existent things are its predicate. Sufi poetry, 
then, employs metaphor in full, self-ironic awareness of its absurd undertaking: the exoteric act 
of communication betrays esoteric experience. Although even metaphor is unable to convey true 
meaning, it remains the best means available. Frithjof Schuon argues that genuine identity 
between word and concept is not only impossible but unnecessary, since otherwise all symbolism 
would become obsolete.60 Paradoxically, the vitality of poetry depends on its very exile from 
truth.
An illustration of such principles can be found in the poetry of Rumi, which contains expressions
that ‘seem to contradict all logic, and yet make perfect sense in the context of a poem,’61 and
62confirm that “the metaphor is the bridge toward Truth’” . His poetry is described as ‘an organic 
unity, like that of a tree with ever new branches, leaves, blossoms, and fruits, all of which, 
different as they may look, grow out of one deep root and constitute an indivisible unity.’63 
Rumi’s poetic experience shifts the emphasis from the ‘content’ of the words themselves towards 
their actual syntactic structure and its allegorical nature. This is a meta-verbal expression: an
58 Davies, op.cit.,p. 175
59 Adonis, al-Sufiyya wa cil-Suryaliyya, (Dar al-Saql, Beirut, 1995), pp. 178-9
60 Schuon, op.cit, p. 157
61 Annemarie Schimmel, ‘Mawlana Rumi: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow’, in Poetry & Mysticism in Islam, p. 12
62 Ibid, p. 13
63 Ibid, p. 16
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alchemical fusion of words, images, sounds creates the intoxicating product, which is more than 
the sum of its parts. The meaning is distilled between the linguistic components and themselves, 
impervious to any faithful translation, rational analysis or meaningful unpacking.
Just as in the Sufi tradition that there are as many ways to God as there are human souls, so there 
are infinite ways to express the Absolute. To symbolise the infinite existence of God, poetic 
expression must be constantly revitalised. To remain true to the vision, therefore, form undergoes 
an irrevocable explosion, as Rumi hints: “no room for form with love this strong.” It must attune 
to the perpetual flux of existence, in keeping with the Taoist formula: ‘change is the sole 
unchanging existent.’64
The foregoing conception of the mystical poem bears a striking correspondence to the later 
Barthes’ meta-linguistic ‘text of bliss’, which ‘supersedes  grammatical attitudes: it is the 
undifferentiated eye which an excessive author... describes: “The eye by which I see God is the 
same eye by which He sees me” .’65 Likewise, in ontological monism, the human self is merely 
part of the Absolute, whilst also separate from it. The phoneme eye/I is semantically multiple in 
both English and Arabic: cAyn means both ‘eye’ and ‘source’, thereby connoting not just vision, 
but the original source of existence. Ibn al-cArabI exploits this semantic overlap to articulate his 
concept of the all-Seeing Eye, similar to Blake’s ‘eye of vision’. As ‘God’, in this sense, is the 
only source and subject in this interexistent universe, the all-Seeing Eye is also the all-Seeing I. 
He also uses the term cayn in its dual form, caynan, to denote the two sides of reality, esoteric 
and exoteric. Each human has two eyes, the outer and the inner, with which to find God: the 
perfect man exemplifies a balance between the two.66 The same duality underscores Barthes’ 
differentiation between ‘texts of pleasure’ and ‘texts of bliss’:
‘Pleasure can be expressed in words, b liss cannot. B liss  is unspeakable, inter-dicted. I refer to Lacan 
(“What one must bear in mind is that bliss is forbidden to the speaker, as such, or e lse  that it cannot be 
spoken except betw een  the l in e s ...”) [em phasis added] and to Leclaire (“ ...W h oever speaks, by speaking  
denies bliss, or correlative]y, w hoever experiences bliss causes the letter -  and all possib le speech -  to 
collapse in the absolute degree o f the annihilation he is celebrating”). W ith the writer o f  b liss (and his
64 Davies, op.cit., p.43
65 Roland Barthes, The Pleasure of the Text, tr. Richard Miller (Hill and Wang, New York, 1975), pp. 16-17
66 J. Hunwick, ‘Tasawwuf, El, vol. 10, p. 328
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reader) begins the untenable text, the im possib le text. This text is outside pleasure, outside criticism , 
unless it is reach ed  through an oth er text o f  bliss: you cannot speak “on” such a text, you can only speak 
“in” it, in its fa sh ion , enter into a desperate plagiarism, hysterically affirm the void o f  b liss .’67
In the text of bliss, and its socio-political ramifications, lies the intersection between Sufism and 
post-structuralism. In both cases, speech (exoteric) denies bliss (esoteric) and implicitly 
legitimises the prevalent order. Where Barthes distinguishes “on” and “in”, the Sufi declares his 
experience of fana  ’ -  the “void of bliss” -  to be inexpressible. The uniqueness of the esoteric 
experience corresponds to the imperviousness of the text of bliss. Further, both the Sufi tradition 
and post-structuralist theory inhere the concept of permanent incompleteness: both al-insan al- 
kcim.il and the text of bliss reflect the infinitely-expanding nature of the cosmos.
Post-structuralist theory deconstructs the received notion of ‘reality’ as premised on a system of 
empty signs. Sufi thought, likewise, undermines and invalidates external reality’s claim to truth, 
whilst maintaining the agency of the noumenal realm. Beyond the barzakh, language and the 
illusory selfhood it substantiates, are dissolved. Mystical poetry involves an exponential 
abstraction, or singularity, to reach this degree-zero point. As al-Niffarl says: “Expression 
narrows as vision broadens”68: at the barzakh  materiality implodes and the poet acquires a 
‘hypostatic dimension’ of creativity, taking on all dimensions and none. The mutual exclusivity 
of esoteric and linguistic experiences reveals the logic behind practises such as Eastern 
meditation and silent dhikr. Sufi poetry, by virtue of its linguistic constitution, is deconstructable, 
but the Sufi experience  is not. The closest language gets to this experience is in its original 
command, ‘Be’, which Elemire Zolla claims is the only word that can denote static unity: ‘Be in 
itself and by itself in the infinitive tense denotes timelessness: the One.’69 However, the true 
mystical conversation is a silent one -  Rumi observes that ‘When the lips are silent, the heart has 
a hundred tongues.’70 With the complete annihilation of language, divine speech comes into its 
own and words become synonymous with nature.
67 Barthes, op.cit., pp. 21-2
68 Adonis, Kitdb al-Tahawwulcit f i  Aqallm al-Ncihdr wa al-Layl, (Dar al-cAwda, Beirut, 1965) p. 9
69 Davies, op.cit., p. 45
70 Lynn Wilcox, Sufism and Psychology, (Abjad, Chicago, 1995), p. 110
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Like esoteric writing, Barthes’ text of bliss ‘imposes a state of loss... unsettles the reader’s 
historical, cultural, psychological assumptions [and] brings to a crisis his relation with 
language’71, one that effects an ‘abrupt loss of sociality’.72 It partakes in the ‘destruction’ of 
culture, whereby the reader ‘enjoys the consistency of selfhood (that is his pleasure) and seeks its
70
loss (that is his bliss).’ Similarly, the esoteric text is inaccessible to external modes of enquiry, 
which it subverts. Furthermore, just as the Sufi journey dismantles the construct of ‘reality’ and 
fuses opposites, the post-structuralist text of bliss ‘destroys utterly, to the point o f contradiction, 
its own discursive category, its sociolinguistic reference (its “genre”)... [and can even] attack the 
canonical structures of the language itself.’74 The contradictions are neutralised at a point beyond 
rationality, i.e. in fa n a ',  bliss, the ‘zero of the signified’, the vortex into which culture is 
swallowed. Barthes and Derrida delight in the disfiguration of language just as the classical Sufi 
poets did before them. Sufi writing, then, is also a non-genre, a language of bliss, or silence. In 
the esoteric experience, the superficially contradictory belies a profound inner coherence: Sufism 
teaches one not to be a Sufi.
The poem, as defined above, is a semantic ecosystem expressing the true relationship between 
humanity and Existence. Enlightenment rationalism posits man as the existential subject. By 
contrast, the esoteric perspective of wahdat al-wujud, based on the principle of interexistence, 
restores Nature to the centre, although it is simultaneously within man. In grammatical terms, 
then, man can only be the predicate, never the subject. We do not speak; we are spoken. Since 
existence has no outer limit -  the universe, like the self, is a constantly expanding totality -  the 
poem can never be static, finished or self-enclosed. It must always remain open and figurative, 
since the categorical or ‘complete’ utterance sets artificial borders, and therefore engenders 
ideology. From this perspective, in order to maintain the correspondence between language and 
cosmos, the poem should represent a beginning, a question, rather than an end or answer.
The ethical and political ramifications of this perspective, analogous to Kristeva’s theory of the 
semiotic, are considerable.75 Like metaphor, the semiotic is anti-Aristotelian: it is language’s
71 Barthes, op.cit, p. 14
72 Ibid, p.39
73 Ibid, p. 14
w Ibid, p .31
7!) Julia Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language, (Columbia University Press, New York, 1984)
35
‘other’, but at the same time intimately connected to it. When an infant (literally: ‘speechless’) 
enters the symbolic order of language, its pattern of behavioural forces is suppressed into the 
unconscious. However, this suppressed ‘semiotic’ remains discernible not just in language’s tone, 
and rhythm, but also its ‘contradiction, meaninglessness, disruption, silence and absence.’76 This 
semiotic, then, is the esoteric ‘language of silence’: the antithesis of the explicit signification. The 
Sufi experience is a transcendence of the very same symbolic order that is undermined by the 
semiotic ‘meta-language’, contrary to language in the sense of ‘meanings’ attached to words. 
Both the semiotic and the esoteric experiences imply that a word can simultaneously be itself and 
its other; both, therefore, threaten and disrupt the hegemonic discourses that are founded on static 
identification of word and meaning.
Such methods of articulation, in other words, are utterly at variance with transcendental 
signification: they annihilate any alleged meaning of the linguistic sign. Language undergoes 
fa n a ’: it becomes de-rationalised and decentred, there is an implosion of socially constructed 
meanings towards fluidity, plurality, precariousness and absence. The deconstruction of binary 
oppositions into a unified whole has seismic ramifications for the society predicated on such 
constructs: the illusion of iogocentricity’ can be exposed and replaced by a new order. Such texts 
constantly create their own parameters (in the poem’s case, its form); they are simultaneously 
uncertain and visionary, and conventional social and ethical principles cease to have meaning. 
Sufi poetry, then, through its reconciliation of outer signifier and inner sense, may function as a 
deconstructive text, challenging the arbitrary foundations of the exoteric order.
Through this ascent from culture to nature, from the mass distortions of ideology to the integrated 
truth of the individual, Sufi poetry effectively deconstructs and reassembles the human subject. 
Its sheer subjectivity denies the possibility of a collective Answer to m an’s spiritual aspirations, 
the seed of political ideology and religious orthodoxy. Likewise, by revealing the incomplete 
nature of human knowledge, it undercuts science’s claim to objective truth. For the Sufi, truth 
comes through the unitive experience, whereby logical oppositions/complementarities are 
resolved and the barzakh between the human and the sacred is bridged. However, the seeker 
cannot know the truth; only the truth can know the seeker, and thereby itself.
76 Terry Eagleton, An Introduction to Literary Theory, (Blackwell, Oxford, 1983), p. 162
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Sufism, like poststructuralism, is predicated on the unreality or absence of the human subject. 
The Sufi is therefore a sceptic: he ‘questions all received truth, since reliance on such a truth is a 
turning away from God.’77 Since ontological monism removes the theoretical boundary between 
the self and the world, the exemplary Sufi, al-insdn al-kamil, must strive to perfect both inner and 
outer reality. He must be committed to both personal and political truth, since these cannot be 
ultimately distinguished. Establishing whether -  and if so, how and why -  such a conflation 
influenced modem Arab poets is also among the objectives of this thesis.
The foregoing analysis reveals some points of convergence between medieval Sufi and recent 
European ideas, particularly in the area of post-stmcturalism, thus hinting at their deeper identity. 
The eventual re-emergence of Western thought from the conceptual straitjacket of rationality in 
postmodemity has facilitated the return of religious motifs. The task, therefore, is to establish the 
extent to which this generation, as heirs to both the Arab-Islamic heritage and modem European 
thought, utilized Sufi and post-modern ideas simultaneously as an integrated mode of expression 
characterised by irrationality, incompletion and structural fluidity.
77 Ewing, op.cit., p. 263
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Sufism and the Self
i) A Modern Psychological Approach
In Sufi terms, the human subject, or ego, is a deficient, split being, who is separated -  exiled -  
from God. It is a cultural construct, an illusory self, and only through fa n a ,  its annihilation, can 
Divine love be fulfilled. The notion that the ego represents a discrete, autonomous self, 
possessing free will and independence, can be seen as an ideology veiling the infinite truth of the 
self, and therefore containing the potential for external oppression. By this logic, overcoming 
ego-consciousness and replacing it with a fuller self is the path towards emancipation, the 
prerequisite for a new life of truth. This state, which the Sufis call baqa’, is the real selfhood, an 
individuality that incorporates the whole of existence. In this subversion of the socially 
constructed self, and the collective order that substantiates it, lies the revolutionary potential of 
Sufism. Moreover, since from this perspective there is no definitive boundary between self and 
world, this subversion must be effected on both a personal and a cosmic level.
In Europe, Freud’s revolutionary decentring of the human subject opened the way towards an 
exploration of the unconscious mind, and thereby to the possibility of a psychoanalytic approach 
to the Sufi experience. Following Freud, Lacan’s proposal that the subject is split by its entry into 
the symbolic order and thereby alienated from its own desire forms the very premise of the Sufi 
experience, which effectively reverses the psychological progression from need-based input 
towards an order in which signs shape perception. For Lacan, the source of existential alienation 
lies in the human being’s internalisation of language and culture: it has become an exoteric being. 
To overcome this disjunction, or exile from the ‘lost real’ of organic being, entails traversing the 
perpetual gap between the organism and the signifying subject -  i.e. the Sufi barzakh -  back to 
esoteric reality, which is ostensibly the mystic’s aim. Likewise, the alienated modem individual 
would also attempt to transcend the exile of exoteric consciousness towards complete selfhood. 
This extra-linguistic ‘real’ is the same ‘semiotic’ that, according to Kristeva, unconsciously 
informs human signification, particularly in creative endeavours such as poetry, which can be 
seen as an expression of the desire for re-unification with it.
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However, the psychologist Jung, who has been described as ‘one of the first psychotherapists to 
recognise the possibility of a fruitful relationship between Western and Eastern concepts of the 
mind,’78 seems the closest European thinker to classical Sufism. The undeniable centrality of the
79‘religious experience’ in Jungian thought exposed him to frequent accusations of mysticism, 
unacceptable at a time when scientism and reductionism were in the ascendancy.80 However, 
times have changed, and neo-Sufism, if anything, is itself a part of this change. The undeniable 
and valuable affinity between Sufi mysticism and Jungian thought can be summarised as 
follows81:
Jung’s emphasis on the primacy of the inner experience (al-batin) and psychic reality (al- 
H aqq), which is prior to physical form. For Jung, the human psyche, or self, is the 
fundamental point of reference and womb of all arts and sciences. For the Sufis, an 
introjected concept of God held the same status.
His view that the essence of religion is an individual numinous experience (cf. ru ’ya), as 
opposed to the social institution of a ‘creed’ or collective faith, and the belief in the 
absolute integrity of this subjective religious event.
His recognition of the precedence of the unconscious or esoteric mind, and the resultant 
inversion of subject-object relations.
His theory of an amplified selfhood {baqci’) of which the conscious ego is merely a 
relatively insignificant component, and which is the product of a long process of self­
transformation or ‘individuation’ (fana’ and baqa’).
78 Clarke, op.cit, p. 3. He also quotes Mokusen Miyuki: “C.G.Jung’s Analytical Psychology has provided the West 
with the first meaningful avenue to approach Buddhism and other Asian religious experience.”
79 The term “Jungian thought” rather than “psychology” is used here, since it incorporates his investigations into 
alchemy and Eastern philosophy, which are relevant here, and for which he uses the same terminology. As Jung was 
aware, there is an inescapable circularity in any theory of the self, since the psyche is both the subject and object of 
such a theory. He was very much aware that the concept of “the unconscious” (like the Sufi concept of God) could 
never be more than a hypothetical proposition which was observable merely in its secondary effects rather than itself. 
He is therefore mindful of the limits of his approach, as of any other: “Psychology can do nothing towards the 
elucidation of this colourful imagery except bring together materials for comparison and offer a terminology for its 
discussion.” -  Modern Man in Search o f a Soul, (Routledge, London, 2001), p. 168
80 For his part, Jung was adamant that his method is empirical and based on experience rather than speculation. The 
accusation of mysticism is premised on the assumption that this is inherently wrong, which itself only makes sense 
from a purely rational perspective. However, Jungian thought, like Sufism, does not deny the self-evident validity of 
the rational perspective, but merely points out that it is incapable of circumscribing a very large part of human 
experience, in particular that part which pertains to self-knowledge and individuation. At the same time, this 
supposedly “mystical” inclination in Jungian psychology is precisely what makes it appropriate to the analysis of the 
Sufi and “neo-Sufi” experiences.
81 Clarke, op.cit., pp. 5-6
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His efforts to resolve the “c o m p le x io  o p p o s i to r w r i” between mind and matter, or between 
complementary opposites within the psyche, in order to achieve psychic wholeness.
His espousal of the super-rational and paradoxical as an individualistic counterbalance to 
the rational function (cilm ) that maintains the collective order.
His conception of the inner microcosm of the psyche and the outer macrocosm of the 
world, and their essential unity.
His idea that at the most profound level humanity shares a common psychological 
structure, which exists independently within its simultaneous differences.
His ability to distance himself from his cultural, historical and intellectual roots and 
recognise the essentially plural nature of human knowledge, experience and expression, 
whilst simultaneously emphasizing their underlying unity (w a h d a t a l-w u ju d , a l- w a h id  a l-  
k a th ir ,  the simultaneity principle).
His constant engagement with the other, the unknown, and the esoteric aspects of both 
Western and Eastern thought. For him, as for the Sufis, the schism of the world was not 
geographical (East/West) but psychic (unconscious/conscious, or esoteric/exoteric).
The parallel between the Sufi concept of God and the ‘indefinitely large hinterland’ of the 
Jungian unconscious. Like the Sufi God, this unconscious is the active subject which is 
visible not in itself, but merely in its secondary effects. For both it can be said that the 
ego, which Jung compares to an island in an ocean, is ‘subordinated to, or contained in, a 
superordinated self as a centre of the total, illim itable and indefinable psychic 
personality.’82 Fundamentally, Jung is in agreement with the Sufi premise of essential 
identity between God and man, in contrast to the exoteric transcendent view.
These points, in te r  a lia ,  regardless of their objective truth-value, validate the proposition that 
Jung’s phenomenology of the self, which he himself realised to be as arbitrary and relative as any 
other science, provides the most appropriate methodological and terminological framework 
through which to analyse the Sufi experience, and hence its “neo-Sufi” successor. This can be 
summed up in his statement that: ‘there is only o n e  Earth and o n e  mankind, East and West cannot 
rend humanity into two different halves. Psychic reality still exists in its original oneness, and
82 C. G. Jung, Psychology and Religion, (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1938), pp. 47-8
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awaits man’s advance to a level of consciousness [a l- in s a n  a l-k a m il] where he no longer believes 
in the one part and denies the other, but recognizes both as constituent elements of the psyche.’83
ii) Sufism, Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious
Jung hypothesizes the existence of a ‘collective unconscious’ consisting of myth-forming 
structural elements -  archetypes -  in the human psyche. The archetype is an involuntary 
manifestation of unconscious processes whose existence and meaning can only be inferred. It is 
essentially ‘an unconscious content that is altered by becoming conscious and by being 
perceived, and it takes its colour from the individual consciousness in which it happens to 
appear.’84 This is tantamount to al-Junayd’s above-quoted statement: “The water takes on the
QC
colour of the container”. Like the water, the archetype is a ‘hypothetical and irrepresentible 
model’ that lacks intrinsic content, assuming definite form only in projection, i.e. metaphorically. 
As such, the term ‘archetype’ is merely a translation of inexpressible elements into another 
metaphorical language, as is the case with Sufi poetry.
Jung deems archetypes to be ‘complexes of experience that come upon us like fa te ...’86 As the 
constitutive elements of the collective unconscious, they embody simultaneity, i.e. logical 
opposites in their still undifferentiated state. Their autonomy means they cannot be integrated 
purely rationally, but through a dialectical procedure, of which the Sufi dialogue between man 
and God is an example. Like the Sufi God, the collective unconscious has absolute, universal 
status: it is a ‘sheer objectivity’ in which the self becomes coterminous with the world.87 The 
activation of an archetype allegedly produces ‘a conflict of pathological dimensions, [i.e.], a
o o  t
neurosis’ , whereby conscious will is subordinated to the implementation of the archetypal drive.
Three closely interrelated archetypes merit discussion here: rebirth, the perfect man, and the 
child. Historically, the universal idea of rebirth, which is a psychic rather than externally tangible
83 Jung, Collected Works 8, p. 682, quoted in Clarke, op.cit, p. 189
84 C.G. Jung, The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious, (Routledge, London, 1990), p. 5
85 Jung himself also points out that ‘water is the commonest symbol for the unconscious... Water is the “valley 
spirit”, the water dragon of Tao, whose nature resembles water -  a yang embraced in the yin. Psychologically, 
therefore, water means that the spirit has become unconscious...’ This was no doubt the case with al-Junayd.
86 Ibid, p. 30
87 Ibid, p. 153
88 Ibid, p. 48
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reality, has been enacted both through institutionalized religious rituals (exoterically) and through 
inner transformation (esoterically). Jung posits Nietzsche’s Noontide Vision, as well as mystical 
experiences, as an example of the latter: his Dionysian experience promised psychic resurrection. 
Exoteric renewal has been concretized in myths of the death and rebirth of a god-hero, such as 
the Phoenician deities Adonis and Tammuz, through which the initiate experiences the 
permanence and continuity of life, and maintains hope of immortality. This archetype was 
conspicuously active from the 1930s onwards, when the “neo-Sufi” generation grew up: the 
Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party (SSNP) was strongly identified with the Tammuz myth, while 
the rise of Hizb al-Bacth, “The Party of Resurrection”, revealed the Arab nation’s yearning for a 
new beginning.
The Sufi concept of al-insan al-kamil, the perfect or complete man, like the Chinese chen-yen, is 
comparable to the alchemists’ complete man, or “second Adam”, who represents ‘the glorified, 
incorruptible body of resurrection.’89 The second Adam, or Anthropos archetype, suggests a link 
between beginning (pre-conscious) and end (post-conscious), completing the circle of human 
development. This provides the basis for related concepts, such as the qutb (“axis” or “pole”) in 
Sufism, the mahdi and hidden imam in ShPism, as well as Nietzsche’s Uberman. As Jung notes, 
‘the primordial being becomes the distant goal of man’s self-development’90: future man is also 
the original man. But future man has made a choice: he is the maker of his own fate. In his 
perfect consciousness, he is simultaneously part of the world and carries the world in himself. His 
identity is supra-personal. He is the conscious and the unconscious, the microcosm and the 
macrocosm, which are one indivisible unity. He is both unique and universal, the axial point of 
the cosmos in which the original chaos resides. It follows that whatever is wrong with the world 
is, by that same token, wrong in the psyche of man. To understand the psyche, therefore, requires 
contemplation of the whole world. Jung elucidates the dialectical unitive relationship between 
self and world which entails simultaneous identity and difference:
89 Jung, Psychology , p. 111. He later notes that ‘the great problem and concern of philosophical alchemy was the 
same as underlies the psychology of the unconscious, namely individuation, the integration of the self.’ Archetypes,
& 383Jung, Archetypes, p. 175
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A s an individual phenom enon, the se lf  is “sm aller than sm all”; as the equivalent o f  the cosm os it is
“bigger than b ig” . The self, regarded as the counter-pole o f  the world, its “absolutely other”, is the sin e
91qua non  o f  all empirical know ledge and consciousness o f  subject and object.
Connected to the Anthropos archetype is that of the child, which likewise represents ‘beginning 
and end, an initial and terminal creature... Psychologically speaking, this means that the “child” 
symbolizes the pre-conscious and post-conscious essence of man... In this idea the all-embracing 
nature of psychic wholeness is expressed.’92 The child has a redemptive significance: it is ‘a 
symbol which unites the opposites; a mediator, a bringer of healing, that is, one who makes
QTwhole... a wholeness which embraces the very depths of Nature.’
Childhood is a unitive state prior to the split between the organic self and the symbolic order. 
This is the psychological backdrop to the Sufi state of tawakkul, total reliance on God. If the 
child is ‘bom out of the womb of the unconscious,’ then tawakkul effectively reverses the process 
of psychological development from the illusory autonomy of the ego to a point equivalent to 
presence in the maternal womb. At this fleeting moment, separation is dissolved in the ‘perpetual 
presence’94 and the Sufi becomes, in al-Ghazall’s words, Tike a corpse in the hands of the corpse- 
washer’.95, i.e. restored to unconsciousness. Therefore, in tawakkul, a kind of “death” equivalent 
to f a n a ’, the psychic unity and security of the original womb are both re-established. 
Psychologically, the attraction of such a state to the alienated subject is clear: ‘there are no 
problems without consciousness... That, no doubt, is also why in Paradise it was the tree of 
knowledge which bore such fateful fruit.’96
The child archetype also entails futurity: as a symbol of the creative union of opposites, it points 
forward to an as yet unattained goal, namely individuation. The childhood motif anticipates ‘the 
figure that comes from the synthesis of conscious and unconscious elements in the personality’: 
i.e. the perfect man.97 Moreover, the synthesis between self and other generates truth and
91 Ibid, p. 171
92 Ibid, p. 178
93 Ibid, p. 170
94 Leonard Lewisohn, ‘Tawakkul’, El, vol 10, p. 377
95 Ibid, p. 378
96 Jung, Modern Man, p. 100
97 Jung, Archetypes, p. 164
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meaning in the form of an irrational third element or by-product such as the dream or the work of 
art.
iii) Sufism and Individuation
As is now clear, these archetypes are all cognate and ultimately interchangeable expressions of 
inner transformation and rebirth, i.e. individuation , ‘the process by which a person becomes a 
psychological “in-dividual” , that is, a separate, indivisible unity or “whole”.98 This process 
subordinates the many to the One, and its goal is psychic wholeness through the synthesis of the 
self. The Sufi dialectic o f fa n d ’ and baqa’ -  abstraction (tajrid) to a point prior to any split in 
identity, and rebirth into a new, fortified selfhood -  is a psychological equivalent, analogous to 
complete integration of conscious and unconscious. This explains the Sufi directive to ‘die in 
order to live’. Ibn al-cArab!’s theory of ontological monism itself is an example of Sufi 
individuation, whereby m ultiplicity is reconciled into unity. Jung’s own description of 
individuation is highly reminiscent of Sufi discourse:
... it reveals our relationship to that inner friend o f  the soul into whom Nature herself would like to change
us -  that other person who w e also are and yet can never attain to com pletely. W e are that pair o f  D ioscuri,
one o f  w hom  is mortal and the other im m ortal, and w ho, though alw ays together, can never be made
99com pletely o n e ... [It is] the transformation o f  what is m ortal... into what is immortal.
Individuation is none other than a technical term for that most ancient of directives: to know the 
self. And the process of self-knowledge involves an often painful meeting with the ‘shadow’. 
Between the hammer and anvil of conscious and unconscious, psychic balance is forged into an 
indestructible whole. Jung’s description of this meeting recalls the Sufi union with God in which 
opposites are fused, producing the simultaneity principle:
[It isj a boundless expanse full o f  unprecedented uncertainty, with apparently no inside and outside, no 
above and below , no here and there, no m ine and thine, no good and bad. It is the world o f  water, where
98 Ibid, p. 275
99 Ibid, pp. 130-4
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all life floats in suspension ... where I am ind ivisib ly  this and  that; where I experience the other in m yse lf  
and the other-than-m yself experiences m e .100
As hinted above, the individuation process is inherently creative, and produces something 
qualitatively new and different. The meeting of opposites creates a by-product, like the hatching 
of an egg. Achieving selfhood stimulates innovation (b id c) and imagination (khayd l), the 
alchemical by-products of fusion, expressed in art, dreams, and other irrational phenomena.
iv) The Circle and the Fall
How can the internal union of individuation be externally represented? The perfect symbol of 
wholeness is the circle. Jung quotes St. Augustine: “God is a infinite circle (or sphere) whose 
centre is everywhere and circumference nowhere.”101 This is an expression of the divine in man, 
or the infinite nature of the individual self, since it is a part of “the unconscious”. The circle is 
simultaneously the symbol of perfect meaning and meaninglessness, of constant (non-)arrival at 
the destination, of perfection through return to the origin, of madness and mesmeric entrapment. 
The Mevlevi “whirling dervish” is a Sufi expression of the eternal, symbolising the endless cycle 
of existence: death and rebirth. As Barrett observes, ‘the circle is the pure archetypal form for the 
eternal: “I saw Eternity the other night,” says the English poet Vaughan, “Like a great ring of 
pure and endless light.” The idea of the Eternal Return thus expresses, as Unamuno has pointed 
out, Nietzsche’s own aspirations toward eternal and immortal life.’102
For Jung, the circle is the natural symbol of the m andala103, a Sanskrit word representing the 
expression of a yogin’s final transformation into the divine all-consciousness, just as in Sufi 
baqa’. In Jungian psychology, the mandala , which is ‘an involuntary confession of a peculiar 
mental condition,’ is elevated to a universal archetype, articulated in various recurring symbols 
according to circumstance (ring, cross, eye, egg, sun, flower, wheel, city, etc). The circular image
100 Ibid, pp. 21-2
101 Ibid, pp. 324-5, quoted from Baumgartner: “Deus est figura intellectualis, cujus centrum est ubique, 
circumferential vero nusquam.”
102 Barrett, op.cit., p. 194
103 Unsurprisingly, the mandala is a very common motif in Sufism, see for example the diagrams in al-Hallaj’s Kitdb 
al-Tawdsin (Islamic Book Foundation, Lahore, 1978) and Laleh Bakhtiar’s Sufi: Expressions o f the Mystic Quest 
(Thomas & Hudson, London, 1976)
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can be drawn, painted, modelled or even danced, as in the Sufi dhikr. It expresses ‘completeness 
and union [and therefore] has the dignity of a “reconciling symbol” ... When we now speak of 
man we mean the indefinable whole of him, an ineffable totality, which can only be formulated 
symbolically.’104 In other words, man, the microcosm, like the universe, the macrocosm, is a 
lim itless totality, a whole without borders, and therefore eternally open and unfinished. 
Significantly, in modem times, man has replaced the deity as the subject of the mandala, while 
the identity of God and man is a definitive element -  indeed, the ‘secret’ -  of “pre-modern” 
Sufism. Jung relates the circularity of the deity to the act of circumambulation, which recalls the 
Islamic ritual of tawdf around the K acba in Mecca, symbolising the circularity of the psyche. In 
this light, al-Hallaj’s blasphemous suggestion to ‘perform the taw af around the k a cba of your 
heart’ reveals an attempt to restore meaning to the exoteric action through internalisation. As in 
the relationship between language and meaning, the taw a f is an endless walking around the 
periphery in search of an elusive centre, which is God. Just as the circumference does not exist, 
neither does the central axis, or qutb, for which the circumambulant searches. The production of 
the m andala, according to Jung, always entails the process of ‘squaring the circle’, that is, 
translating chaos into order, unconscious into consciousness. This is most likely the 
psychological motive behind the ritual of circumambulation around a cube-shaped structure.
Furthermore, the mandala is a protective symbol, a motif of psychological strength, enclosing the 
subject and preventing disintegration and collapse. It provides order and balance against psychic 
disruption, and therefore represents both the divine being latent within man and the vessel in 
which the alchemical transformation from human to divine occurs. The protective circle is ‘the 
traditional antidote for chaotic states of mind’, such as exile, loss and fragmentation105:
A s a rule a m a n d a la  occurs in conditions o f  psychic d issociation  or d isorientation ... [particularly] in 
adults who, as the result o f  a neurosis and its treatment, are confronted with the problem o f  opposites in 
human nature and are consequently d isorientated ... In such cases it is easy to see how the severe pattern 
im posed by a circular im age o f  this kind com pensates the disorder and confusion o f  the psych ic state -  
nam ely, through the construction o f  a central point [axis, i.e. “G od”] to w hich everything is related, or by 
a concentric arrangement o f the disordered m ultiplicity and o f  contradictory and irreconcilable elem ents.
Jung, Psychology, pp. 95-100
ltb Jung, Archetypes, p. 10
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This is evidently an attempt at self-healing on the part o f  Nature, w hich does not spring from  con sciou s  
reflection but from an instinctive im pulse.106
The mandala, then, is the ‘archetype of wholeness’; its purpose is the self, the totality of the 
psyche, in contradistinction to the ego, which is merely ‘the point o f reference for 
consciousness.’ Enclosure within it represents both psychic unity and protection (i.e. selfhood); 
exile outside it represents separation from one’s true self (i.e. ego-consciousness). The Sufi 
journey begins with the seeker’s dissatisfaction with this exilic state. This is the psychological 
explanation for the myth of Adam ’s fall from Paradise: man’s split on entering the symbolic 
order, as the first lines of R um fs masterpiece the Mathndwl attest:
Listen to the story told by the reed,
O f being separated.
“S ince I was cut from the reedbed,
I have made this crying so u n d ...” 107
Despair at this existential exile, with its pain and uncertainty, inspires the Sufi’s search for the 
psychological security of the God within. ‘No one is more conscious of the fall of man than the 
mystic’108, says Lings, for whom the essence of Sufism is: divesting the soul of the limitations of 
fallen man, the habits and prejudices which have become ‘second nature’, and investing it with 
the characteristics of man’s primordial nature, made in the image of God.109 Jung, likewise, notes 
that the myth of man’s fall ‘presents the dawn of consciousness as a curse [removing him from] 
the paradise of unconscious childhood.’110 The retreat from consciousness means either real 
death, or symbolic death, fa n d ’. Starting from birth, when the child leaves the sanctity of the 
womb, the horizon of life expands steadily towards a critical point, usually around midlife, 
‘when, beset by problems, the individual begins to struggle against it’.111 This watershed moment 
corresponds to the beginning of the Sufi retreat from consciousness towards fa n a ’ or tawakkul.
106 Ibid, pp. 387-8
107 al-Ruml, op.cit., p. 17
108 Lings, op.cit., p. 58
109 Ibid, p. 18
110 Jung, Modern Man, p. 99
111 Ibid, p. 104
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From the esoteric perspective, the act of creation divided the opposites that are unified in the 
deity, giving rise to the infinite multiplicity and energy of the world. The Sufi journey effectively 
returns the seeker to this primordial moment, the birth of existence. Since the Sufi moves forward 
in time, the circle joining originality and finality is squared: birth and death therefore become 
synonymous, the same point in space-time.
Perfect union or wholeness, however, would entail a static state, i.e. death, and mandalas 
therefore tend to remain open or occur in series. The return to the world in baqa’ is but part of an 
endless existential flux whereby the circle of individuation re-opens the very moment it is closed. 
The closure of death is thus sublimated into the opening of life.
v) Sufism and Esoteric Chaos: Madness, Creativity and Resistance
We have established that Jung’s concept of the unconscious bears similar characteristics to the 
Sufi conception of the divine. Given that the unconscious, by definition, supersedes rational 
cognition, it can also be closely identified with the notion of chaos. The Muslim scholar Ziauddin 
Sardar points out that the term ‘chaos’ does not imply disorder, but has to do with ‘edifices of 
complexity without real randomness’112, i.e. that disguise underlying harmony. This recalls the 
Sufi principle of wahdat al-wujud, ontological monism. In this context, Jung talks of ‘the pre­
existent meaning hidden in the chaos of life’ and ‘the chaotic waters of the beginning’, whilst 
also hypothesizing that the structure of the self can be seen as ‘a principle of order against 
chaos.’113 All mysticisms are sciences -  orderings -  of esoteric chaos, as Jung seems aware: ‘it is 
just the most unexpected, the most terrifyingly chaotic things which reveal a deeper meaning... 
in all chaos there is a cosmos, in all disorder a secret order, in all caprice a fixed law, for 
everything that works is grounded in its opposite.’114 The unconscious is a problematic and 
“unscientific” category precisely because it is ‘not a second personality with organized and
112 Ziauddin Sardar, Introducing Chaos, (Icon, Cambridge, 2002), p.80
113 Jung, Archetypes, p. 375. The alchemists, he notes, ‘took their prima material to be a part of the original chaos 
pregnant with the spirit... Their intention was to extract the original divine spirit out of the chaos.’ Psychology, p. 
109
114 Ibid, pp. 31-2
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centralized functions but in all probability a decentralized congeries of psychic processes’, which 
he argues, manifests itself in ‘fairly chaotic and unsystematic form’:
T he ground p r in c ip les ... o f  the unconscious are indescribable because o f  their w ealth  o f  reference, 
although in them selves recognizable. The discrim inating intellect naturally keeps on trying to establish  
their singleness o f m eaning [cf. exoteric m onotheism ] and thus m isses the essential point; for what w e can 
above all establish  as the one thing consistent with their nature is their m anifold  m eaning [cf esoteric  
p o ly th e ism ], their a lm ost lim itle ss  w ealth  o f  reference, w hich m akes any unilateral form ulation  
im p ossib le .115
In the apparent chaos of psychotic fantasy Jung noted a hidden coherence that provided an insight 
into the roots o f the imbalance. The unpredictable behaviour of the insane signals a 
disappearance of ego-consciousness in the unconscious. Historically, Sufis have often been aware 
of the parallel with their relatively controlled and voluntary integration of conscious and 
unconscious. Like them, Jung advocates allowing the ‘chaotic life of the unconscious’ its rightful 
role in life, since no sooner does individuation process stop than the shadow, ‘the “chaos” that 
hides behind the se lf , gains the ascendancy.
If the m andala  represents unity, chaos represents infinite multiplicity. Since existence is in 
permanent flux, the synthesis of elements that constitutes psychic wholeness is forever prone to 
disintegration. As Yeats puts it, “things fall apart” . The human self struggles against this 
recurring chaos, seeking to return it to the perfect order of the circle, which encompasses 
multiplicity in its unity. This ordering, this integration of multiplicity and unity, however fleeting, 
is the goal of the Sufi. Schimmel observes that unity ‘can reveal itself only through unfolding in a 
dialectical process, and its bifurcation and subsequent split into many parts is necessary to keep 
the current of life going...’116 In this way, Sufi poetry is a means of perceiving ‘the Divine Unity 
behind contradictory manifestations’117: it reveals that the apparent chaotic multiplicity of 
existence belies a deeper, unified order. This in turn accounts for the heterogeneity and 
spontaneity of its imagery.
115 Ibid, p. 38
116 Schimmel, op.cit., p. 19
117 Ibid, p. 19
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The fragmentation of Arab life in the 1960s and beyond, when the generation of poets in question 
reached maturity, would have only increased their awareness that the perfect circle of pre- 
conscious unity had been shattered. This external reality can be conceived as a chaos for which 
the subsistence of a unified self might act as a cure. In such a context, the m andala  is a 
reassembling of the fragmented whole, bringing unconscious into consciousness, or restoring 
chaos to order: ‘they serve to produce an inner order -  which is why, in a series, they often
follow chaotic, disordered states marked by conflict and anxiety. They express the idea of a
118refuge, of inner reconciliation and wholeness.’
Since chaos is identified with the unconscious, it is intimately related to creativity. One of the 
definitive characteristics of great art, according to Jung, is that, like chaos, it forever eludes 
rational formulation: ‘it can be obscurely sensed, but never wholly grasped.’119 The meaning of a 
poem is another poem. In discussing Faust, Jung touches on the esoteric nature of poetic 
creativity, which he calls the visionary mode of artistic creation:
[It] arises from  tim eless depths; it is foreign and cold , m any-sided, dem onic and grotesque. A grim ly
ridiculous sam ple o f  the eternal chaos [,..] it bursts asunder our human standards o f  value and aesthetic
form ... the primordial experiences rend from top to bottom the curtain upon w hich is painted the picture
p oo f an ordered world, and allow  a glim pse into the unfathomed abyss o f what has not yet becom e.
Two ideas are relevant here: the notion of re-ordering the world through chaos; and the parallel 
between madness and creativity. Art can be seen as the outcome of a pathological or neurotic 
condition, while the output of psychotics likewise reveals insights usually expected of geniuses: 
both involve an immediate or numinous experience. Lacanian theory suggests that anyone unable 
to enter the symbolic order, i.e. to represent their experience linguistically, would become 
psychotic. In the ill-adapted incoherence of psychosis there are evident parallels with the Sufi 
experience of esoteric reality. The poetic affinities of ‘psychosis’ are discernible in an effect such 
as schizophrenia, which
118 Jung, Archetypes, p. 384
119 Jung, Modern Man, p. 157
120 Ibid, p. 160
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invo lves a detachm ent from reality and a turning in on the self, with an ex cess iv e  but loosely  system atized
production o f  fantasies: it is as though th e ... unconscious desire, has surged up and flooded the conscious
mind with its illogicality , riddling associations and affective rather than conceptual links betw een ideas.
121Schizophrenic language has in this sense an interesting resem blance to poetry.
Eagleton’s implication is entirely correct: creative inspiration, whether classified as psychotic or
mystical, entails a divorce from exoteric reality, the very same subversive ‘madness’ celebrated
122by Sufis throughout the ages. This is the source of poetry’s ‘illogicality’ and disruption of 
normal conceptual criteria.
Creativity, like chaos, contains something forever unknowable, a mystical secret, and the creative 
activity will never be fully unpacked: ‘the artist does not function in an official capacity [order] -  
the very opposite is nearer the truth [chaos]... Art is a kind of innate drive that seizes a human 
being and makes him its instrument. Whenever the creative force predominates, human life is 
ruled and moulded by the unconscious as against the active will, and the conscious ego is swept 
along on a subterranean current...123 Profound artistic creation functions at a universal level of 
human experience: the collective unconscious, hence its transcendence of cultural boundaries.
Human existence, on an individual and collective level, can be seen as an endless contest 
between order and chaos. Collectively, mankind displays a strong inclination for delimiting ‘the 
unruly and arbitrary “supernatural” influence by definite forms and laws’, i.e. ordering chaos, or 
subordinating the individual numinous experience to the institutional one. This rationalising, or 
exotericising, tendency, which accompanied the development of human consciousness, finds ‘the 
God within’ a problematic and heretical supposition, since it is hard to reconcile with a fixed 
political order. (The ideal democracy, in this sense, is a form of organised chaos.) To maintain a 
socio-political contract, archetypal images become ‘embedded in a comprehensive system of 
thought that ascribes an order to the world, and are at the same time represented by a mighty, far- 
spread, and venerable institution...’124 It is when this institution has become so entrenched as to 
be almost entirely static and out of step with reality that the voice of esoteric chaos reasserts
121 Eagleton, op.cit., p. 138
122 Sufism and psychosis differ, however, in to what extent the ego is deliberately submerged by unconscious forces.
123 Jung, Modern Man, p. 172-3
124 Jung, Archetypes, p. 8
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itself, exposing and deconstructing the arbitrary order. In light of the extreme anathematisation of 
the esoteric function, which is seen as a subversive threat, chaos becomes a motif of political 
resistance.
From the exoteric, institutional perspective, God is synonymous with the collective Order: the 
maintenance of a ‘divine’ socio-political structure to which all individuals are nominally 
subordinated. This exoteric order, whether through theologians or ideologues, seeks to perpetuate 
itself by enforcing its self-legitimating values and warning gravely of the dangers of non­
conformism. In the esoteric perspective, the integrity of the individual self takes precedence. 
Against an arbitrarily imposed order, therefore, the Sufi effectively posits the divine chaos of the 
super-rational unconscious, rejecting the need for oppressive social control within a static, 
conservative edifice and opening the way for a political philosophy of freedom and mobility. 
Using Sufi ideas may therefore be a way of undermining the inherited order and attempting to 
remake the world. This tension between individual integrity and collective distortion is 
encapsulated in al-Hallaj’s challenge to the edifice of theocratic control. By rejecting the 
dominant political order, al-Hallaj undermined its totalitarian claims to divine reality and opened 
a path to the restoration of individual truth.
The theoretical background discussed thus far -  particularly the parallels between Sufism, post­
structuralist thought and Jungian psychology -  can be represented diagrammatically in a modem 
mandala showing man’s departure from the divine womb of unconsciousness into the exile of the 
symbolic order, i.e. the fall from Paradise. The aim of the classical Sufi was to restore himself to 
this circle, i.e. to become original and complete man simultaneously, joining beginning and end. 
This will help to conceptualise and contextualise the psychological journey of neo-Sufism.
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125 “Uncertainty” refers to the physicist Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, while “certainty” refers both to the pre­
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The Crisis of Modernity
i) Split Consciousness
The neo-Sufi poets, while specifically Arab, were heirs to both the European Enlightenment and 
Arab/Islamic thought. As discussed above, the catastrophe of W orld War 1 manifested a 
profound mental disturbance in the European mind, undermining the rational perspective and 
paving the way for existentialist philosophy, and the events of 1948 had a similar impact in the 
Arab world. For the present purposes, the mainstream traditions of European Christianity and 
Arab Islam, which are already highly problematic concepts in themselves, can be viewed as 
alternative but neighbouring strands of Abrahamic monotheism. Viewed from beyond this 
context -  for example, from the perspective of Buddhism or Taoism, both of which exhibit 
philosophical parallels with Sufism126 -  these traditions reveal more similarities than differences: 
both were essentially exoteric, institutional religions that posited an absolute opposition between
127good and evil and demanded total allegiance from their adherents. Levi-Strauss’ encounter 
with Islam, which he described as ‘the West of the East’, is instructive here. The psychological 
crisis of modernity, being a human phenomenon, has therefore applied to both cases, albeit in 
different ways.
M an’s descent into consciousness -  the fall from nature to culture -  is the definitive characteristic 
of the modem era. From time immemorial, Nature held sway over the world and the gods 
performed their roles. In modem times, however, the world of instincts was swallowed up and the 
gods were no more. Science became the watchword and universal standard of the age. This shift 
produced an inner tension in the psyche, which became at variance with itself, a battleground 
between conscious and unconscious. In Europe, the dominance of reason from the 16th century 
opened up a profound schism within the collective psyche: man became progressively uprooted 
from his instinctual foundation, identifying with ego-consciousness at the expense of integrated 
selfhood. Indeed, Jung argued that Western man is in danger of losing sight of his shadow 
altogether in favour of the abstract world of scientific rationalism, a relatively narrow
126 See for example Toshihiko Izutsu, A Comparative Study of the Key Philosophical Concepts in Sufism and 
Taoism: Ibn cArabi and Lao-Tzu, Chuang-Tzu (Keio Institute of Cultural and Linguistic Studies, Tokyo, 1966-7)
127 Similarly, Jung noted that from the Eastern or archaic perspectives, our exoteric consciousness appeared mad or 
psychotic.
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consciousness through which he has actually placed himself in severe danger of possession. The 
underestimation of the unconscious factors in life, or the anathematisation of the esoteric, is 
pursued at the cost of psychic imbalance: intellectual gain entails a spiritual loss. Progress and 
development, for all their benefits, remain false so long as man is a mere fragment of himself. 
The danger here is that the conscious mind, being split off from its origins, relapses into the 
prim itive condition of an identity, or “participation mystique”, with the mass, which only 
accentuates the problem. The anathematisation of the esoteric traps man in an aimless, 
meaningless experience for which the intellect has no answer. Such a predicament may lead 
towards annihilation or voluntary death - f a n a ’ -  of the conscious ego in the face of a resurgent 
archetype:
Human interpretation fails, for a turbulent life-situation has arisen that refuses to fit any o f  the traditional 
m eanings assigned to it. It is a mom ent o f  collapse. W e sink into a final depth -  Apuleius calls it “a kind
o f  voluntary death” . It is a surrender o f  our ow n pow ers, not artificially w illed  but forced upon us by
128natu re ...
The split consciousness of Enlightenment rationalism led directly to both the dominance of 
ideology and a condition of spiritual orphaning, with the consequent re-activation of unconscious 
drives. The great achievements of science brought a simultaneous lack of introspection and self- 
knowledge, based on the assumption of mutual exclusivity between scientific and religious truths. 
W ithout the metaphysical framework of religion, morality became unstuck. As the religious 
worldview lost authority, however, long submerged archetypal forces could reassert themselves 
once more. The end of religion did not signal the death of absolutism, since ‘a natural function 
which has existed from the beginning, like the religious function, cannot be disposed of with 
rationalistic and so-called enlightened criticism.’129 For Jung, man is always, overtly or covertly, 
possessed by a supraordinate idea, which remains his motivating force:
The modern mind has forgotten those old truths that speak o f  the death o f  the old man and o f  the making
130o f a new one, o f  spiritual rebirth and similar old-fashioned “m ystical absurdities.”
128 Jung, Archetypes, p. 32
129 C.G. Jung, The Undiscovered Self, (Routledge, London, 1957), p. 19
130 Jung, Psychology, p. 41
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It is worth noting that such a view of the modem predicament corresponds to a large degree to the 
Sufi view of ‘normal’ man as fatally blinded to the source of reality and in need of replenishing 
his immediate spiritual experiences.
One salient aspect of the modern era, particularly in the Arab context, is the accumulation of 
urban, industrialized masses, who have often been tom from the soil of their youth or ancestry for 
economic or political reasons. Once cut off from ‘the nourishing roots of instinct’, man may fall 
prey to extreme alienation, and his dependency on others increases. Dissociation between the 
childhood state and the present predicament, which may result from the pursuit of an external 
goal, produces a sense of falsehood and rootlessness, which is precisely the condition for a 
‘vehement confrontation with the primary truth.’131 The more the urban man’s differentiated 
consciousness pushes him towards a one-sided viewpoint, the further he deviates from the roots 
of his being. However, the split-off part of the psyche is ‘only apparently inactivated; in actual 
fact it brings about a possession of the personality, with the result that the individual’s aims are 
falsified in the interests of the split-off part.’132 In other words, the unconscious psyche continues 
to manifest itself, and it is merely a question of the preparedness and attitude of the individual in 
question whether this turns out beneficially or otherwise. In this context, the power of the 
archetype to unite opposites makes it a medium between unconscious and conscious: ‘it throws a 
bridge between present-day consciousness, always in danger of losing its roots, and the natural, 
unconscious instinctive wholeness of primeval times.’133 No sooner has a pathological state been 
reached than the archetypes irrupt autonomously into consciousness. By repressing the 
transcendent function of the archetypes, rather than allowing them expression, the modem era is 
prone to collective neuroses. At such times, not only individuals but whole civilizations are 
charged with rediscovering their unconscious backgrounds. In both cases, the task is to 
reintegrate and reconcile the more recently acquired consciousness with its older counterpart.
The Islamic worldview, with its appeal to one transcendent God, was not immune to the threat 
posed by reason. Its disintegration can be interpreted as a combination of external and internal 
factors: the challenge of W estern modernity, with its technology and power, and the
131 Jung, Archetypes, p. 162
132 Ibid, p. 163-4
133 Ibid, p. 174
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institutionalization and ossification of the original revealed knowledge of the Prophet into a 
divinely sanctioned Order, which increasingly removed it from individual experience. The 
dissolution of the age-old Weltanschauung and weakening of its institutions gave rise to relative 
intellectual pluralism. But just as this religious worldview disappeared, another rose in its place: 
the modem state. Both are external institutions that base their authority on rational principles, or 
cilm. If the religious state entailed absolutist theocracy, the state inclined towards totalitarianism, 
a secular absolutism:
The old religions with their sublim e and ridiculous, their friendly and fiendish sym bols, did not drop from  
the blue, but w ere bom  o f  this human soul that dw ells w ithin u s ...  Our fearsom e gods have only changed  
their names: they now rhyme with - is m .134
Just as the worldly institution of a religion attempts to maintain a monopoly on spiritual 
wellbeing, so the state tended to become the sine qua non of the individual’s right to existence. 
The allegiance of the masses was converted ‘from an extramundane goal to a purely worldly 
be lie f, whilst maintaining a similar level of dedication. The god-like status of Jamal cAbd al- 
Nasir is a case in point. By the 1960s, radical Arab intellectuals had begun to realise that the face 
of political order had changed, but not its structure. However, the religious institution does at 
least offer some possibility of a metaphysical experience, in contrast to the rank materialism of 
the state. Furthermore, its original undermining had provided a new freedom from external 
control, whereby man had the chance of unique spiritual experience, but it also meant the loss of 
the protective ecclesiastical walls within which existential meaning could be conceived. The 
Kierkegaardian belief in a commitment to the irrational is one reaction to this loss; for him, 
modern society had ‘forgotten why man’s life should be sacrificial, that is, offered up to an idea
135greater than man.’
The age of Enlightenment and the disintegration of transcendent religion was, therefore, a 
double-edged sword: it left man exposed, imbalanced and alienated -  ‘battered by the elemental 
forces of his own psyche’ -  but it also offered him a new opportunity for self-knowledge. 
Without the familiar historical symbols to provide psychic security, the great, dark abyss of
134 C.G. Jung, Essays on Contemporary Events, (Routledge, London, 2002), p. 95
135 Jung, Psychology, p. 94
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nihilism yawned before him. Attempts to elevate secular dogma to absolute status, effectively in 
place of God, only compounded the predicament. Mankind’s very progress was at the heart of the 
problem:
W hen any natural human function gets lost, i.e. is denied conscious and intentional expression, a general 
disturbance results. H ence, it is quite natural that w ith the triumph o f  the G oddess o f  R eason a general 
neuroticizing o f  modern man should set in . . .136
Furthermore, Jung argues, it is precisely when consciousness enters a critical situation that 
unconscious fantasies are activated as a means of compensation. Failure to integrate this 
compensatory unconscious into consciousness only leads to neurosis or psychosis, both 
individually and collectively. The removal of the highest symbol allows secret unconscious 
forces to be reborn and hold sway. This unconscious Zeitgeist both offsets the conscious attitude 
and anticipates imminent changes. Modern art itself is an example of this: its above-noted 
nihilistic tendency towards disintegration, with its breakdown of aesthetic values, is ‘an act of 
psychological education’ and ‘a symptom and symbol of a mood of world destruction and world
137renewal that has set its mark on our age.’ Against this state of spiritual emptiness the dark art 
of poetry provides a balance:
It is only w e w ho have repudiated [the esoteric] because o f  our fear o f  superstition and m etaphysics, and
because we strive to construct a conscious world that is safe and m anageable... Yet, even in our midst, the
poet now and then catches sight o f  the figures that people the night-world -  the spirits, dem ons and gods.
He know s that a purposiveness out-reaching human ends is the life -g iv in g  secret for man; he has a
138presentiment o f  incom prehensible happenings in the pleroma.
The poet instinctively embodies the archetypal images that are activated to counterbalance a 
false, one-sided reality, archetypes such as the perfect man, the redeemer, and the wise man, who 
comes to restore the psychic equilibrium of the epoch and meet the spiritual needs of his society.
136 Jung, Undiscovered Self, p. 46
137 Ibid, p. 77
138 Jung, Modern Man, p. 167
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The dangers of the archetypal resurgence are clear. According to Jung, Nazism revolved around 
the revival of an ancient Germanic symbol, Wotan, producing a mass emotion which utterly 
overpowered individual will. This was, however, a direct symptom of the collective neurosis of 
modern man: the psychic imbalance that was so conspicuous in Germany, where national 
isolation combined with centralization and mass psychology to such devastating effect, was in 
fact a universal condition. In the Arab world, the revival of ancient myths by the Bacth and the 
SSNP was also response to the defeat, social disruptions, and disintegration of transcendent 
authority. Industrialization and urbanization herded large sections of the population into cities 
and estranged them from the natural laws of human existence, producing ‘unstable, insecure and 
suggestible’ individuals. In both the European and Arab cases, the powerful resurgence of archaic 
“representations collectives”, the compensatory move of the unconscious, produced catastrophic 
results. In both, the dire circumstances and loss of religious worldview increased the need for a 
heroic bringer of collective salvation, who would be the exponent of a “new order”. Furthermore, 
the prevailing belief that truth came from above and the subordination of individual responsibility 
to a rigid sense of duty only exacerbated the proclivity towards mass psychology.
ii) Individual and Mass in Modern Society
For Jung, modern consciousness has dramatically decreased the value and importance of the 
individual, the carrier of the human psyche, in relation to mass movements, which carry only a 
false psychic reality. He considered the political mass movements of his time as psychic 
epidemics, i.e. mass psychoses, in which the individual became weak and virtually non-existent. 
Both religious theocracy and secular totalitarianism prioritized the notion of the collectivized 
mass and their rulers over the individual, reducing him to ‘a helpless particle.’139 A state run on 
this basis entailed the destruction and atomization of the fragile individual for the sake of a fictive 
entity that was itself no more than a group of exploitative individuals claiming to represent the 
whole nation. Such mass movements subordinate the very individuals for whom they purportedly 
function to a purely theoretical objective: maintenance of the state became a goal in itself, 
imprisoning its subjects in the process. They were ‘the greatest temptation to unconsciousness’:
139 Jung, Contemporary Events, p. 44. He quotes from Pestalozzi: “...A ll the means requisite for the education of 
man, which serve to make him truly humane and to bring him to mankindliness, are in their origin and essence the 
concern of the individual and of such institutions as are closely and intimately attached to his heart and mind. They 
never were nor will be the concern of the masses. They never were or will be the concern of civilization.”
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by activating unconscious archetypes, they subordinated the responsible human being to a 
hypostatized super-organism and thus relegated him/her to an intellectually and ethically inferior 
level:
T he co llec tiv e  man threatens to stifle  the individual man, on w hose sense o f  responsibility everything  
valuable in mankind ultimately depends.140
The artist is the individual par excellence; his higher consciousness by definition sets him apart 
from the mass. It is his process of individuation -  fulfilling his individual potential -  that 
balances out the collectivized self. For mystic and psychologist alike, individual integrity is 
paramount:
... the individual experience, with its very poverty, is im m ediate life, it is the warm red blood pulsating  
today. It is more convincing to a seeker after truth than the best tradition.141
Further, ‘absolute reality has the character of irregularity’142: the more any theory or idea claims 
exclusive universal validity, the less it can do justice to each individual, who is by definition 
unique and exceptional, an irrational datum. Self-knowledge, the ultimate objective of the 
individual, cannot be approached through theoretical assumptions. Prioritising uniqueness over 
uniformity substantiates the mystical view of identity as internally rooted. Scientific or statistical 
methodology, based on abstract knowledge, imparts a one-sided perspective: ‘one of the chief 
factors responsible for psychological mass-mindedness is scientific rationalism, which robs the 
individual of his foundations and his dignity [whereby] he can only play the role of an 
interchangeable unit of infinitesimal importance.’143 A specifically collective human goal that is 
externally enforced on the individual is a contradiction in terms. In succumbing to a collective 
identity, man is thereby estranged from himself, or exiled from real existence: he exists only as a 
function of an abstract, external idea. Furthermore, the dictator state not only denies the 
individual his rights, but also deprives him of the metaphysical foundations of his existence.
140 Jung, from a lecture given in 1933, quoted in ibid, p. 89
141 Jung, Psychology, p. 63
142 Jung, Undiscovered Self, p. 5
143 Ibid, pp. 9-10
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Ideology betrays human dignity whether it is “left” or “right”, while the mystical path functions 
esoterically, i.e. beyond this political spectrum altogether.
By inhibiting the possibility of individual development, collective ideas arouse a yearning for 
spiritual freedom among more perceptive individuals, not least artists, who seek to restore a 
balance. In this context, both religious and secular institutions may be equally fallible and prone 
to absolutism. The individual is threatened on both sides: he may overcome the religious 
institution only to fall into its secular equivalent. Indeed, Jung perceived ‘a fatal parallelism 
between the State religion of the Marxists and the State religion of the C hurch...’144 While one 
institution promised perfection in the next world and one in this, both relied on the same 
epistemological foundations, namely rational, exoteric knowledge, or cilm,145 which denies that a 
thing can be simultaneously itself and its other.
If the individual comes before the collective, then all social and political transformations 
originate in him, and he must make him self responsible. The mass movement cannot, by 
definition, provide the deep-seated transformation for which man yearns: hence the naivety of 
expecting everything from the state. Resistance to this organized mass, Jung asserts, can only be 
achieved by the man who is as organized as the mass himself, i.e. who views himself as an 
existential microcosm, but such a self-conception has mostly disappeared with the advance of 
modernity. This existential microcosm is none other than the Anthropos, al-insan al-kamil, who 
redefines the parameters of truth and morality.
In the modern collective context, then, man is atomized, fragmented, frustrated and 
fundamentally exiled from himself. His unique individuality, wherein he may experience 
fulfilment and meaning, is constantly threatened with annihilation into an abstract idea, lured by 
the temptation of a participation mystique. M an’s modem immersion in exoteric consciousness 
blinds him to the inexorable activity of his unconscious drives, which may ultimately control 
him. It is precisely this exoteric state that the Sufi rejects in order to reassert the immaculate truth 
of the individual self through appropriation of the God within, i.e. by neutralising these same
144 Ibid, pp. 27-8
145 It seems highly significant here that the Arabic word ‘ilm can refer to both theology and science, thus putting 
them on an equivalent epistemological level.
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unconscious drives. In the radically exoteric modern era, then, the unconscious will inevitably 
compensate its undervaluation, whether collectively through the activation of dangerous and 
distorting archetypes, or individually through active engagement by those wishing to restore 
existential meaning and human integrity.
iii) Nietzsche’s Zarathustrian Experience
‘W hy’, asks Jung, ‘have the antique gods lost their prestige and their effect upon human souls? It 
was because the Olympic gods had served their time and a new mystery began: God became 
m an.’146 It is no coincidence that someone who engaged so openly with Eastern religion was so 
influenced by Nietzsche and so fascinated by his psychological condition.147 This tortured soul, 
who took it upon himself to kill off the transcendent, exoteric God and in doing so portended the 
reassertion of his esoteric counterpart, is a pivotal figure in the historical and theoretical 
background to neo-Sufism. It is not illogical for a previously suppressed psychological condition 
to reassert itself when the factors suppressing it -  God projected as an autonomous entity -  begin 
to subside. Jung draws our attention to ‘the disintegrating and schismatic effect of individual 
revelation.’ With the breakdown of the dogmatic fence and the loss of ritual authority and its 
protective power, man is confronted with the inner experience. Paradoxically , the 
despiritualization of the world, or the withdrawal of projections, encouraged an esoteric 
resurgence: ‘the way of the soul in search of its lost father... leads to the water, to the dark mirror 
of that reposes at its bottom... This water is no figure of speech, but a living symbol of the dark 
psyche.’148 For Jung, Nietzsche was the latest symptom of Europe’s conspicuous mental change:
D id not N ietzsche announce that God w as dead and that his heir was the Superman, that doom ed rope- 
dancer and fool? It is an immutable psychological law that when a projection has com e to an end it alw ays
146 Jung, Psychology, p. 98
147 Like Jung, Nietzsche was profoundly aware that ego-consciousness is merely superficial and that primary reality 
belonged to the subliminal world of dreams. He even appeared to be conscious of the existence in dreams of what 
Jung would later call archetypes: “In our sleep and in our dreams we pass through the whole thought o f earlier 
humanity. I mean, in the same way that man reasons in his dreams, he reasoned when in the waking state many 
thousands of years. The first causa which occurred to his mind in reference to anything that needed explanation, 
satisfied him and passed for truth. In the dream this atavistic relic of humanity manifests its existence within us, for it 
is the foundation upon which the higher rational faculty developed, and which is still developing in every individual. 
The dream carries us back into earlier states of human culture, and affords us a means of understanding it better.” 
Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, II, p. 27, quoted in ibid, p. 65
148 Jung, Archetypes, p. 17
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returns to its origin. So w hen som ebody hits on the singular idea that God is dead, or does not exist at all,
the p sych ic  G od -im a g e ... finds its w ay back into the subject and produces a condition  o f  “G od-
149A lm ightiness” ...
Such a condition is potentially disastrous, since the unconscious is an ethically ambiguous 
domain, in which ‘good’ and ‘evil’ are as yet undifferentiated. It contains both genius and 
madness, both enlightenment and the ‘shadow’ that lurks behind the facade of contemporary 
man. Nietzsche’s terrifying proclamation of God’s death in 1882 tellingly reveals his own 
realisation that alternative conceptions, such as that of man unified and divine, must fill the 
psychological vacuum:
W e have killed h im ... H ow  w ere w e able to drink up the sea? W ho gave us the sponge to w ipe aw ay the 
w hole horizon? What did w e do when w e loosened  this earth from  the sun? W hither does it now  m ove?  
Whither do w e m ove? A w ay from  all suns? .. .  D o  we not stray, as through infinite nothingness? .. .  Has it 
not becom e colder? D oes not night com e on continually, darker and darker? ... What lustrum s, what 
sacred gam es shall w e have to d evise?  Is not the magnitude o f  this deed too great for us? Shall we n o t 
ou rselves have to becom e G ods, m erely to seem  worthy o f  it?150
Something was needed to restore meaning to existence in place of the bankrupt orthodoxy. No 
sooner had Nietzsche debunked the Christian god than he re-introduced another, more ancient 
one, Dionysus, an archetypal rebirth god. With the fragmentation of the monotheistic Christian 
god came both the rise of atheism and the resurgence of polytheism, the ancient gods. It was a 
time of no god and many gods simultaneously, and the psychic God-image remained potent. In 
the German case, this archetype became Wotan, the ‘ancient god of storm and frenzy... a restless 
wanderer who creates unrest and stirs up strife, now here, now there, and works m agic... the 
master of secret knowledge, the magician, and the god of the poets [who has a] mythological 
background and a fateful significance.’151 Wotan had been asleep in the primeval pagan German 
soil. For Nietzsche, the classical scholar, he became manifested in the form of Dionysus-Zagreus, 
and later Zarathustra, also ‘a soothsayer, a magician, and the storm -wind...’ Jung’s interpretation
149 Jung, Contemporary Events, p. 82
150 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, quoted in K.J. Phillips, Dying Gods in Twentieth Century Fiction, (London and 
Toronto, Associated University Presses, 1990), pp. 18-9. Emphasis added.
131 Jung, Contemporary Events, pp. 12-22
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of Nietzsche’s seminal distinction between the Apollonian and Dionysian aspects of life reveals a 
strong Sufi resonance:
. . .th e  dark, earthly, fem in ine side, with its m antic and orgiastic characteristics, has p o ssessed  the 
im agination o f  philosophers and poets [for whom ] logos and consciousness are the destroyers o f  creative 
p reconscious life. [Here] w e w itness the gradual rejection o f  reality and a negation o f  life  as it is. This
leads in the end to a cult o f  ecstasy , culm inating in the self-d issolution  o f  consciousness in death, w hich
152m eant, to them, the conquest o f  material limitations.
Thus the archetypal Wotan was reborn as a chaotic, elemental Dionysus ‘breaking into the 
Apollonian order’153, embodying the instinctual aspect of the unconscious and later sweeping a 
defeated, alienated nation from its insecure roots, something Nietzsche himself prophetically 
foresaw. This god represents a primitive totality, recalling a time when the human had not yet 
been differentiated from the divine, and simultaneously presaging to a time when this split might 
be reintegrated, as in the Anthropos archetype.
Nietzsche himself was a sickly, emotionally starved, spiritually exiled wanderer. He came from a 
line of Protestant pastors and was deeply religious in his youth. It is axiomatic that ‘the religious 
influences of childhood are the hardest things to extirpate.’154 His poem “To the Unknown God”, 
written at the age of twenty, reveals a more god-possessed man than he dared later admit:
I shall and w ill know thee, Unknown One,
W ho searchest out the depths o f  my soul,
And b low est through my life like a storm,
Ungraspable, and yet my kinsman!
I shall and w ill know thee, and serve thee.155
Nietzsche remained possessed by this Unknown God, who reappears in the words of the sorcerer 
in Thus Spoke Zarcithustra:
152 Ibid, p. 14
153 Ibid, p. 21
154 Barrett, op.cit., p. 183
155 Nietzsche, quoted in ibid, p. 186
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Thus I lie
Bend m yself, twist m yself, tortured 
B y every eternal torment 
Smitten
B y you, cruel huntsman,
You unknown -  G o d !156
So overwhelming was the task of ‘breaking the old tablets’ that Nietzsche clearly needed to 
support himself through a revivified Zarathustra: an alter-ego, a secondary personality with 
whom he became fully identified, thus falling into psychosis: ‘the tragedy of Zarathustra is that, 
because his god died, Nietzsche himself became a god... and this happened because he was no 
atheist [for] there are not many individuals as sensitive and as religious as N ietzsche...’157 The 
death of God exposes the religiously inclined directly to the perils of “inflation”: identification 
with the infinite realm of the unconscious. The considerable energy of the “tremendum” will 
always reappear under another name, often an -ism , a representation collective. The transcendent 
function cannot be rationalised out of existence: man cannot escape this condition.
Like the Sufis, Nietzsche effectively sought to eradicate the human and replace it with the divine, 
recreating ‘the legendary seer of prehistoric times.’158 For Heidegger, he at once embodied the 
culmination and destruction of the entire edifice of Western exoteric thought that had been 
founded when Descartes set up a fatal antagonism between the ego and the external world of 
nature, reducing it to a theatre of human exploitation. By completing the circle, Nietzsche ended 
this metaphysical tradition, exposing both the fundamental error at its origin and the terrifying 
contingency of its morality. He was a destroyer, madman and prophet, ruthlessly exposing the 
blindspot that pervaded Western thought. All that remained was the organic unity of the human 
psyche, out of which the esoteric gods of postmodemity would emerge.
N ietzsche’s instinctive, super-moral Superman, or god-man, combines unconscious with 
consciousness, and thus connects the primordial past to an as-yet unrealised future in a putative 
mandala, like a snake with its tail in its mouth. These two temporal aspects share the primacy of
1:16 Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, (Penguin, London, 1961), p. 265
157 Jung, Psychology, pp. 103-5
158 Jung, Modern Man, p. 168
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the unconscious, in contrast to ego-consciousness: the long-forgotten past of drunken ecstasy 
represents a time prior to the split in human consciousness, which is restored in an idealised 
future, as in Sufi baqa’ or Buddhist nirvana,159 The Superman is an expression of the Anthropos, 
whose prominence in the Sufi tradition is rooted in the concept the Muhammadan reality (al- 
haqTqa al-Muhammadiyya). The Anthropos archeptye, or al-insdn al-kamil, which was developed 
by ibn al-cArabi and culminated in the systematization of cAbd al-Karfm al-JllI (c. 1365-1428), 
reaches a prophetic level of consciousness. Nietzsche’s Superman, likewise, was the prophet of a 
new epoch, albeit one who claimed to disdain followers: ‘and only when you have all denied me 
will I return to you.’160
Nietzsche’s project was explicitly the ‘revaluation of all values’, i.e. a re-ordering of things, 
which required immersion into the esoteric chaos. His destructive frenzy -  his ‘overthrowing of 
idols’ -  is a symptom of his headlong plunge into the dark and dangerous world of the 
unconscious. Only there, wherein lies the unity of opposites, could the world be remade:
- and he who wants to be a crea tor in go o d  and ev il has f i r s t  to be a destroyer and  break values.
Thus the g rea test ev il belongs with the grea test good: this, however, is the crea tive  go o d . 161
His is an extreme esoterism: his works, particularly Thus Spoke Zarathustra, testify to a painful 
journey of self-knowledge and the sublime chaos of the unitive experience. His fate was ‘one of 
the great episodes in man’s historic effort to know himself.’162 As in Sufism, the emphasis was on 
the actual experience of higher consciousness, rather than theoretical understanding thereof: he 
even claimed that reading this book ‘would raise one to a higher level of mortals than ‘modem ’ 
man could attain to.’163 His descent into the unconscious was a dangerous -  he who dives down 
must first ensure his contact with the surface -  but necessary mission to restore something that 
seemed irrevocably lost: the primary reality of the psyche.
I;>9 Nietzsche himself spoke approvingly of Buddhism, which is philosophically close to Sufism, in contrast to ‘such 
pitiable things as Christianity.’
60 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, p. 105
161 Nietzsche, Why I Am So Wise, (Penguin, London, 2004), p. 60
162 Barrett, op.cit., p. 179
162 Nietzsche, Why I Am... p. 48
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Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, which he describes as ‘bom out of the innermost abundance of truth’,164 
can be read as a passionate argument for the integrity of the individual against an arbitrary moral 
orthodoxy and ideological institution. At every turn, Nietzsche endorsed individual specificity 
against mass orthodoxy. He himself embodied in its most acute form the struggle between nature 
and culture that defined the age, the pagan Dionysus versus Christ. Man, a complex and 
inherently contradictory being, had become an enigma to himself and his prophetic mission was 
to rediscover his identity. The most civilized of men had cut themselves off from their roots and 
were in serious danger of losing their connection with the earth. M odern life had 
departmentalized and fragmented man’s being; Dionysus, the god of intoxication and instinct, 
might restore these psychic fragments into a whole. As such, Nietzsche’s ecstatic extremism was 
a dramatic response to the modem predicament: he was the definitive symbol of the attempt to 
restore inner meaning. His philosophy was a personal and self-contradictory confession, in 
keeping with the characteristics of the unconscious.
Nietzsche’s voice ‘is unorthodox, it is even unconventional to a shocking degree: it takes religion 
seriously, puts it upon the very apex of life, of a life containing “either side”, and thus upsets the 
most cherished intellectual and rational prejudices.’165 ‘Religion’ plays a largely social function, 
substituting the genuine spiritual encounter for a set of mediating symbols and rituals organized 
around a central dogma. Orthodoxy thereby shields the majority from the powerful and 
subversive nature of the immediate religious experience, extinguishing individuality in the super­
organism. If Zarathustra was ‘godless’, his creator most certainly was not. Nietzsche’s atheism 
revealed the meaning of the religious experience far more effectively than most forms of theism. 
Zarathustra was, in fact, far more religious than the institution he deigned to replace. He was 
Nietzsche’s autobiographical, poetic work, created not by the intellect but by the gushing torrent 
of the unconscious. But for all his esoteric chaos, Zarathustra reveals an inner coherence, despite 
his author’s professed distrust of all systems. His mountain existence symbolized the solitude of 
the spirit, reflecting Nietzsche’s isolation. Like the primordial figure of the wise magician or the 
medicine man, Zarathustra is:
Ibid, p. 5
16:1 Jung, Psychology, p. 51
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the lo fty  spirit o f  an alm ost Homeric a g e ... the carrier and m outhpiece o f  [N ietzsch e’s] ow n “D ionysian” 
en ligh ten m en t and ec sta sy ... [He] is more for N ietzsch e  than a poetic figure, he is an involuntary  
confession , a testament. N ietzsche too had lost his w ay in the darknesses o f  a life that turned its back upon  
G od and C hristianity, and that is w hy there cam e to him  the revealer and en lightener, the speaking  
fountainhead o f  his so u l.166
Writing Zarathustra was a shattering experience: out of a critic and aphorist it conjured a poet and 
a prophet, sent to restore balance to the age. In Nietzsche’s hands, poetry was once more a dark, 
subversive art. For better or worse, the poet / prophet is guided by the collective unconscious to 
the attainm ent of that to which people unconsciously aspire. As such, Zarathustra was a 
compensatory reaction to the Z eitgeist from the artist par excellence , who embodies an 
overweight of collective psychic life. Nietzsche was well aware of the enormity of this task:
The unm asking o f  Christian values is an event w ithout equal, a real catastrophe. He w ho exposes it is a 
fo rc e  m ajeure, a destiny -  he breaks the history o f  mankind into two parts. One lives before  him , one lives  
after  h im .. . 167
This higher man is overtaken by an innate drive that sculpts the psychic life of mankind and 
sacrifices his individual interests for the sake of his mission:
Great poetry draws its strength from the life o f  m ankind... W henever the co llective unconscious becom es  
a liv ing experience and is brought to bear on the conscious outlook o f  an age, this event is a creative act 
w hich is o f  im portance to everyone living in that age. A  work o f  art is produced that contains what may 
truthfully be called a m essage to generations o f  m en .168
The Zarathustrian symbol had already been seen in Goethe’s Faust, which expressed ‘the same 
“hungering for the infinite” bom of inner contradiction and dichotomy, the same eschatological 
expectation of the Great Fulfilment.’169 Spengler used the term “Faustian culture” to refer to the 
entire modem epoch in which man challenged the ascendancy of nature. N ietzsche’s self­
conception as the anti-Christ and rejection of morality recalled Faust’s pact with the devil. Each
166 Jung, Archetypes, p. 37
167 Nietzsche, Why I Am... p. 68
168 Jung, Modern Man, p. 169
169 Jung, Contemporary Events, p. 73
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symbolised their author’s individuation, their quest to find the superior, complete individual. If 
traditional morality was falsely premised and blind to its own psychological motives, man must 
incorporate his devil, as in certain Eastern religions, since ‘the tree that would grow taller must
170send its roots down deeper’ into the earth. Nevertheless, this left the not inconsiderable 
problem of the ethical ambiguity of the unconscious.
In the Arab milieu, the crisis of modernity that culminated in N ietzsche’s Zarathustrian 
experience was accentuated by two significant factors, rendering Jung’s critique of rationalism all 
the more relevant. Firstly, due to the presence of the imperialist other whose identity was firmly 
bound up in rational principles, the experience of modernity could not occur as a natural or 
organic process. Secondly, this process was concertinaed into a far shorter period than in the 
European case, where it had matured over several centuries. Thus, the Arab intellectual found 
himself confronted with a predicament equivalent to, yet even more precarious and traumatic, 
than that which Nietzsche had suffered. The Islamic God had not been killed by an organic 
development from within the same culture, but by implication of the presence of an aggressive 
and exploitative other. It will come as no surprise, therefore, to find that Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, 
who was explicitly linked to the long esoteric tradition of Persia of which Sufism is part, would 
become a seminal symbol among Arab poets who struggled to restore meaning to a wounded age. 
Jung’s insights into modem man’s spiritual malaise and his searching appraisal of Nietzsche’s 
condition, thus provides a significant foundation for the examination of neo-Sufism.
170 Barrett, op.cit., p. 190
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Specific Objectives
This introductory chapter has examined the historical and theoretical background against which 
to examine neo-Sufism. This has included biographical information on the poets in question and 
a summary of the cultural and political milieu in which they wrote, followed by investigation of 
the nature of Sufism and its relation to poetry and existence, including reference to certain key 
Sufi concepts such as wahdat al-wujud, f a n d ’ and baqa ’, al-insan al-kdmil, al-barzakh and 
tawakkul. This has necessitated a comparative analysis between Sufism and modem European 
thought, particularly vis-a-vis Nietzsche, post-structuralism and Jungian psychology. We have 
seen that post-structuralist theory reveals exoteric reality to be no more than a symbolic order -  a 
system of signs -  founded on an existential absence. It is this absence, this hypostatic dimension, 
that the Sufi conceives of as the divine Presence. For him, this is the true Reality: a surreal, 
interexistent, and infinite domain where intuition and imagination hold sway over logic and 
reason. As Jung observed, such a contention cannot be objectively proved or disproved -  the only 
consideration is that it is his truth. The foundations have thereby been laid for examination of 
each poet’s use of Sufism, which will form the main body of the thesis (chapters 1,2 and 3).
As noted above, the choice of these three poets was based on the prominence of Sufi ideas in 
their work, their various national and ideological backgrounds and experiences, and their diverse 
literary inclinations. As such it is hoped that, considered both as separate case studies and 
collectively, they will provide a reasonably accurate cross-section of the radical Arab intellectual 
and writer in the mid-late 20ch century. However, we will also need to consider two hypotheses in 
particular: (1) that Sufism was used as a statement of individuality in the face of mass ideas; and 
(2) that Sufism gained a greater prominence as a theme in Arabic literature as merely part of a 
broader shift towards more indigenous cultural thought systems and spiritual or religious 
phenomena. If either hypothesis proves valid, what conclusions can be drawn? In sum, we must 
investigate the accuracy and effectiveness of classifying this Sufi inclination as a specifically 
“neo-Sufi” movement, and as well as the possibilities of defining it temporally, geographically, 
philosophically, and in terms of scope and influence. If the three poets began to use Sufism at a 
particular historical moment, to what extent should this be attributed to psychological and/or 
sociological factors?
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Moreover, whilst acknowledging the importance of Sufism in this context, the potential pitfall of 
overstatement must be avoided. Sufi ideas cannot be examined in isolation from the other 
theoretical influences on these poets, and their neo-Sufism will no doubt prove to be a hybrid 
phenomenon existing alongside other traits. The strong influence of modem Western thought, 
such as that of Nietzsche, must be taken into account. Finally, this thesis will consider in what 
respects these writers’ aspirations have been realised, and to what extent their particular 
viewpoints are realistic and effective catalysts for cultural and political change in the Arab world. 
This chapter has demonstrated the importance of the Sufi state of baqa ’ and its parallels with 
Jung’s individuation -  but what role can it play in the creation of a just and democratic society? 
These are questions to which I will return in the conclusion after examining the work of each 
poet individually.
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CHAPTER 1: THE VIRTUOUS CITY
THE DEVELO PM ENT A N D  SIG NIFICANCE OF 
C A B D  A L-W AH H A B A L -B A Y Y A T T S N EO -SU FISM
‘The poem is a form of spontaneous suffering in a moment’s unity of self and the world’171
• 172“Therefore know yourselves, for you are the city, and the city is the kingdom”
This chapter will examine the development and significance of the Iraqi poet cAbd al-Wahhab al- 
Bayyatl’s (1926-99) use of Sufi concepts, symbols and personae, from the early 1960s until 1999. 
A threefold methodology will be used: firstly, exploration of the distinct role and character of 
Sufism  in al-Bayyatl’s work; secondly, analysis of his influences and preoccupations -  
ideological, theoretical or literary -  and examination of their relative compatibility with 
mysticism; and thirdly, analysis of individual poems. In particular, the objective is to ascertain 
how the poet reconciled his radical early convictions into a more balanced and mature totality 
with “neo-Sufi” overtones. Examples from 38 specifically selected poems will be cited to 
illustrate the answers to the essential questions: why did al-Bayyati increasingly turn to mystical 
and mythological ideas, and how successfully does he integrate them into a cohesive whole? 
Given the radical tone of his writings, the aim is to determine to what extent al-Bayyatl may be 
characterised as an exponent of a ‘revolutionary esoteric’ school of modem Arabic literature, i.e. 
fusing inner and outer revolution.
It would be erroneous to investigate al-Bayyatl’s use of Sufism in isolation from the other 
important themes in his life and work, with which it is without doubt closely related. The present 
analysis therefore considers these themes and their relation to Sufi ideas. All these themes -  
alienation and exile, existentialist concerns (mortality, meaning), collective issues (social and 
political justice, Communism, revolution, commitment), and love -  have a bearing on the “neo- 
Sufi” inclination. In this way, it is hoped that a reliable picture will emerge of a poet whose life
171 Jean Dammo, Banipal 17 (2003), p. 35
172 Jung, Archetypes, p. 35
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was defined almost entirely by exile -  a theme he came to internalise and theorise -  and who was 
famed for his trenchant left-wing principles and commitment to the Arab future.
As will be demonstrated, the circular theme discussed in the introduction provides a highly 
appropriate framework through which to interpret al-Bayyatl’s oeuvre and to establish the 
relative importance of Sufism therein. The m andala  diagram overleaf -  a variation on that 
depicted in the previous chapter -  incorporates the principle motivating factors in al-Bayyati’s 
poetry, embodies its internally circular theme, and reflects his search for an elusive and 
impenetrable ‘virtuous city’ (al-madina al-fadila) which is a function of his exilic state.
This ‘forbidden circle’ represents both the perfect city from which al-Bayyatl is forever exiled 
and the poet’s psychic state of which that city is a metaphor. The significance of the mandala has 
already been established, and circular motifs -  the ring, the whirlpool, the crown, the sun, the 
earth, the cycle of the seasons, the religious ritual of circumambulation (tawaf) -  run through al- 
Bayyatl’s poetry.
73
al-Bayyati’s perfect city / The Forbidden Circle
Conscious
Unconscious
flung)
Mortality
Immortality
Culture
Nature UnityThe Perfect City 
(Thebes, Mshapui; Shiraz, etc)
Revolution
(Marx) Love(Aisha)
AncientDeath Modem
Truth
(aH M aj)
Falsehood
Home
EsotericE x ile
Exoteric
Permanent Exile
City Walls, or the Bcirzakh
The following are two examples of this circular imagery and its psychological significance:
I split the orange o f the sun into two 
Gave one half to the crow o f  separation 
And the other I threw in the sea
The sea burst into flames, but my beloved did not return
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To put together the two halves with m e .173
And:
cAshtarut w eeps over the Euphrates
Searching in its depths for a lost ring and a dying so n g .. . 174
The frequent references to circularity -  the perfect expression of wholeness -  have multiple 
references. For the poet it comes to symbolise not only the attempt to regain a lost unity but also 
a desire to transcend the endless cycle of life and death that constitutes existence, revealing al- 
BayyatFs preoccupation with immortality. They also represent interconnection or interexistence, 
confirming that each constituent theme has equal and related importance in al-Bayyati’s work. 
And of course the circle, the complete, reunited being, is the goal of the Sufi. There is a 
connection here with the circularity of the tawaf, the ritual through which man links his temporal 
earthly existence to the divine cosmic eternity, and thus finds meaning. Al-Bayyatl’s use of tawaf 
imagery leaves little doubt as to his recognition of its symbolic power:
I hid my face in my hands 
And saw
cA ’isha circling the black stone in her shroud175
This ritual remained with him until the very end, when he wrote:
It seem s I have been struck
By fear and madness
Since I no longer remember
M y journey with M uhy al-DIn ibn al-cArabI
To M ecca, or my circling with him around the Kacb a 176
173 al-Bayyatl, Q asa’idH ubb ‘aid Bawd bat a l-‘Alam al-Sabc, (Wizarat al-P’lam, Baghdad, 1971), p. 67
174 al-Bayyatl, Dlwcin, (Dar al-cAwda, Beirut, 1971) p. 134
175 al-Bayyatl, Q asa’id Hubb, p. 94
176 al-Bayyatl, Nusus Sharqiyya (al-Mada, Cyprus, 1999), p. 89
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The numerical function of the circle is n , the irrational symbol of infinity and therefore 
immortality. The ever-present theme in al-Bayyatl’s work is endless search for the unattainable, 
that which is always beyond man’s grasp, “that which comes and does not come”, leaving him a 
confused and tragic exile. The circle’s unitive structure transcends the duality of cause and effect, 
or beginning and end, which belong to the rational perspective. It involves no hierarchy: each 
constituent occupies an equal and interconnected place, allowing it to symbolise both al- 
Bayyatl’s Communist beliefs and neo-mystical inclination. The circle is also the symbol of the 
sun, the source of all life and energy, object of the ancient pagan rites to which al-Bayyatl so 
often alludes. As noted previously, the sun and its rays are a classic model for understanding 
Sufism: the former represents God in Himself (the ‘Essence’) and the latter His attributes. The 
Sufi symbol cAin Shams, ibn al-cArab!’s beloved, is the “eye of the sun”.177 In Sufi teaching, the 
word cain -  ‘eye’ or ‘source’ -  comes to signify ‘the essence of God’s quintessence’.178 The 
notion of cAin Shams, the eye or source of the sun, is therefore a reference to God, the Absolute, 
the ultimate point on the mystical path. In this ambiguous language, erotic in form but potentially 
mystical in meaning, two distinct identities can dissolve into one:
[a time w ill com e] when cA ’isha w ill rise from beneath the w ild  grasses and black stones, a golden gazelle  
fleein g  from me as beneath the vine. I seize her, undress her, and see my nakedness. You w ere my mirror;
I have becom e the mirror.179
Each name I say is her name
Each house I lament in the morning is her house
One is unified with a ll180
Here al-Bayyatl uses Sufi language both as a romantic expression and as a search for truth and 
justice, the two ultimately embodying the same process of unification and arrival at the absolute 
moment:
Here are you on the bed
177 al-Bayyati’s later autobiographical work is also entitled Ycinabr al-Shams
178 J. Baldick, Mystical Islam: An Introduction to Sufism, (I.B. Tauris, London, 2000), p. 41
179 al-BayyatT, Hubb wa Mawt wa Nafy: Love, Death and Exile, tr. B. Frangieh (Georgetown University Press, 
Washington D.C., 1990), p. 250
180 al-BayyatT, Qasa'icl Hubb, p. 12
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In the circle o f  magic  
In my kingdom
A gazelle  moaning beneath the passion o f  kisses.
Your hair like fire in the forest
W hich o f us reached out a drowning hand to the other?181
For this highly committed poet, the circle’s many references include the indispensable symbol of 
revolution. The cyclical nature of existence is evident in a poem such as The Birth and Death o f  
cA ’isha, which progresses from death to rebirth back to death, or Lament fo r  Hafiz o f Shiraz, 
which ends in the familiar theme of rebirth after death:
By the cup o f  immortal w ine you were cured
M y agony increased
Sleep  cam e over me
I cried out: here is autumn
Spreading through the gardens o f the gods
Leaving in its wake the fires o f birth.182
Man began his psychic journey in the womb of the unconscious, i.e. the garden of Paradise, 
stationed securely in the centre of this cosmic unity. Then comes his expulsion from the magic 
circle, the fall from nature to culture, and the alienation and perpetual exile of the external order. 
In al-Bayyatl’s case, he therefore becomes engaged in a tragic quest to rediscover this original 
purity, symbolised by his vision of the unknown, perfect city (Thebes, Nishapur, Babel, Shiraz, 
the ‘city of love’, etc) or by another favourite metaphor, the orchard. He repeatedly discovers 
himself forbidden from entering this city, i.e. from crossing the circumference of the circle back 
into unity, which is precisely the goal of mysticism:
W e were in exile: each living our own exile, wearing shrouds 
Searching from one place to the next for meaning, and in the book o f  Exodus 
W e couldn’t find the orchard’s gate183
181 al-Bayyatl, Buka’iyya ila Hafiz al-ShirazT, (Dar al-Kunuz al-Adabiyya, Beirut, 1999), pp. 21-2
182 al-Bayyatl, ibid, p. 24
183 al-Bayyatl, Qasa’id Hubb, p. 97
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Instead, he is condemned to wander endlessly around the walls of the city in the hope that God, in 
His mercy and compassion, will one day allow him in. This is al-Bayyatf s primary reason for the 
use of religious archetypes and ideas. God, love, truth, justice: all these are absolute ideals lying 
inside the city, enclosed, intangible. The poet is painfully aware that, due to his physical 
existence, mankind’s fate is exile, the denial of unity:
A nd when I return at the end o f  the road I see the day has com e again, to leave m e solitary at the 
beginning o f  a new  road, beneath the sky o f  cities w hose people have left them and departed: in front o f  
the gate o f  Thebes, or Babel... There the Sphinx asks me: “What walks on four legs in the morning, tw o in 
the day and three in the evening?” I reply: “Man -  when he is a child he craw ls on his hands and feet, 
when he grow s up he walks on two feet, but when he grow s old he m oves with difficu lty and leans on a 
stick .” W hen the Sphinx hears my answ er, he is not grief-stricken, nor does he com m it su icid e by 
throwing h im self from a rock as in the legend, but instead he debars me from entering Thebes and I am 
left at its gates, a martyr and an ex ile .184
This ‘new Nishapur’, the city of social justice and equality -  a testimony to al-Bayyatl’s 
Communist convictions -  appears time and again throughout his poetry. Here, the Sufi 
experience, which transcends the physical world, is a potential means of entry.
Naturally, al-Bayyatl attempts to write through the barzakh, or circumference, despite its being 
an impossible task. He speaks of writing at the foot of the city walls, searching for a way in. The 
great Sufis, such as ibn al-cArabI or c Attar, were able to scale these walls and look over into the 
city itself, i.e. to contemplate God. But when al-Bayyatl assumes the mask of ibn al-cArabI, his 
lover cAin Shams abandons him to exile:
W e possessed each other under the Eastern sky
W e gave each other roses as we prayed in the kingdom o f  the Lord,
W aiting for the lightning.
But she returned to Damascus 
With the birds and the dawn light
184 al-Bayyati, Tctjribati al-Shicriyyci, (al-Mu’assassa al-cArabiyya lil-Dirasat wa al-Nashr, Amman, 3rd ed, 1994), pp. 
48-9
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L eaving her slave in e x ile 185
The Sufi path, then, is one path that leads back to the Garden, or through the city walls. Al- 
B ayyatf s detractors -  political opponents, critics, the cruelty and tyranny of the world -  play the 
role of guards preventing his entrance. The poet’s aim, despite the variety of his portrayals of it, 
is the one inner truth, the secret of existence without which he cannot live, but which signifies his 
death. All externalities, he discovers, are but obstacles in his way. There is a clear overlap 
between his poetic mission and the spiritual-psychological quest that is the inner content of the 
religious life.
Due to his own particular misfortunes, al-Bayyatl was acutely sensitive to man’s insurmountable 
exile that seems to sidestep every attempt to overcome it, just when salvation seems at hand. 
Such is the fate of al-Bayyatfs al-Khayyam in his pursuit of his beloved cA ’isha in That which 
comes and does not come:
cA ’isha has no place here 
She is with time, in time,
Lost like the w ind in the wasteland
Like the morning star in the evening
So go  back to Nishapur
To her other face, you drunkard
Go back and rebel against the tyrants and blind gods
A gainst m eaningless death and fate.186
Al-Bayyatl sees the human condition as being condemned to exile -  equivalent to a 
psychologically split self -  which is surmountable only through love or death. Both of these can 
be interpreted along Sufi lines, as cishq and fa n a ’ respectively. The ultimate aim of the journey 
back into the circle, as al-Bayyati himself acknowledges in his autobiography, is immortality, the
187final victory over death. The poet is constantly seeking ways of making his existence 
permanent, so that he can be reborn in every new age. In the desperate attempt to enter the city,
183 al-Bayyatl, Qasa’id Hubb, pp. 16-7
186 al-BayyatT, Diwdn, p. 108
187 al-BayyatT, Tajribatl, p. 23
79
or to reach full selfhood, the written word ultimately proves insufficient. The ‘kingdom of poetry’ 
-  another variation on the forbidden circle theme -  envisioned by the poet is nothing but a 
mirage, an existential paradox. However much the poet wishes, poetry cannot be the route to 
eternal life, since the self is not made out of words. Language, as the mandala shows, is itself by 
definition exiled from the holy city, beyond the barzakh. With the failure of poetry and language, 
al-Bayyatl is left with only with love and death, and the terrifying thought of silence that so 
contravenes his rebellious instincts.
The equidistant placement of the components of the mandala demonstrates the complementary 
yet opposite relationship between them, reflecting the web of themes running through al- 
Bayyatl’s poetry. Seen from the esoteric perspective, opposites are not only contradictory but 
also complementary. Each theme has not only its explicit opposite lying immediately the other 
side of the circumference, or barzakh, but also its equivalent in the corresponding position on the 
other side, revealing the particular internal structure between four given themes. For example, 
separation and oppression stand against love and revolution, with the poet caught in the 
overwhelming clash of opposites. Jung observes that it is precisely this problem of opposites that 
leads to psychic disintegration, chaos and neurosis,188 and it is within this web of contradictory 
values that the poet searches for meaning. Al-Bayyatf s mandala, then, reveals eight such pairs of 
polarities, which stand in mutual substantiation, and through analysis of which we may interpret 
his predicament.
Fragmentation -  Death Oppression -  Separation Conscious -  Exoteric Mortality -  Exile 
Unity -  Life Revolution -  Love Unconscious -  Esoteric Immortality -  Home
Order -  Religion Culture -  Modem Darkness -  World Language -  Falsehood 
God -  Sufism Nature -  Ancient L igh t-E arth  Silence -T ru th
188 Jung, Archetypes, p. 387
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The Polarities of the Forbidden Circle
Examination of these parallels and polarities with regard to al-Bayyatl will illustrate how each 
theme becomes part of his integrated poetic quest, and will thereby help to ascertain and evaluate 
the position of mysticism within his life and work. In particular, his “neo-Sufi” credentials will 
depend on his position vis-a-vis the definitive exoteric/esoteric dialectic.
Fragmentation -  Death 
Unity -  Life
Al-Bayyatl described himself as living his own death: ‘I say that I have died for seventy years, so
189why should I be afraid of death?’ He lived this death both through his own traumas in exile and 
vicariously through the suffering of his fellow Arabs. The irony that death might be the key to 
immortality was not lost on him; on the contrary, it becomes a central theme in his work:
Innovation is love  
And love is death
And innovation, love and death are all birth190
The same idea is expressed when he recasts himself as al-Hallaj:
And now I sleep
W aiting for the dawn o f  my salvation, the m om ent o f  execution .191
Moreover, he sometimes seems to acknowledge that perfection and life are mutually exclusive:
You have arrived before the time o f  the banquet 
And after the guests have dispersed.192
189 al-Bayyatl, quoted from www.kitabat.com
190 al-BayyatT, Bustan 'A ’isha (Dar al-Shuruq, Beirut, 1989), p. 41
191 al-BayyatT, Sifr al-Faqr wa al-Thawra, (Dar al-Adab, Beirut, 1965), p. 24
192 al-BayyatT, Q asa'id  Hubb, p. 65
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Such a view was also prevalent among Sufis, who mostly believed that human salvation -  
complete union with the divine -  was beyond man’s reach. If perfection can be reached through 
death, al-Bayyatl searches for the/rm d’-esque “Death in Life” -  to quote the title of one of his 
volumes -  as if to overcome or reclaim the ubiquitous death that he lived on a personal, national 
and super-national level. The cyclical theme in his poetry posits a unity between death and 
rebirth, just as the Sufi fa n d ’ that entails rebirth onto a new and more illuminated plane. In the 
grip of the rebirth archetype, this becomes his perennial desire:
Things fall apart
Suns and m oons explode
T he flood w ashes away this ignom iny
W e are bom in Madrid
Beneath the sky o f a new w orld193
Fragmentation and death are psychic equivalents here, as are the unity and life that might yet 
emerge from them. The prevalence of the fragmentation motif in al-Bayyatl’s poetry reflects both 
the breakdown of the time in which he lives, with its political upheavals and spiritual abyss, and 
the consequent disintegration of his own self into a void of meaninglessness and despair. The 
image of the poet ‘prolonging [his] death’194 outside the city reflects this psychic fragmentation: 
he knows that inside the city his heart would be reunited into a complete whole, whether through 
the emotional union of the lover or the mystical union of the Sufi, whose imagery and vocabulary 
are appropriated by the modem secular poet:
I scream , but in all the journeys to and from you I wonder about you, both in drunkenness and sobriety. 
B ecom e me, oh my beloved, pawn your rags for w ine and weep, mad with lo v e .195
The tragic aspect issues from the fact that both these unions perpetually elude him and, although 
he never fully succumbs to despair, the negative sides of these polarities prevail, leaving him face 
to face with his inevitable human finitude:
193 al-Bayyati, Diwan , p. 162
194 al-Bayyatl, Hubb wa Mawt, p. 176
195 Ibid, p. 2 5 4 ’
8 2
G ive m e w ine and lay me dow n in my madness beneath the vine, for living death lurks in the taverns and 
markets and in the eyes o f this cupbearer who plunges a knife into my ch est.196
His search for immortal life is couched in various analogous and often interchangeable metaphors 
-  light, birth, revolution, etc -  in which Sufism, the search for unity, can also be counted. Al- 
Bayyatl does not take Sufism so much at face value, but as a figurative expression of his inner 
suffering and search for salvation, something he is at pains to clarify:
. . . i f  there are som e poets w ho approach ta s a w w u f  by way o f  im itating its philosophy, I am not one o f  
those. For my ta sa w w u f  [ . . .]  is part o f  my poetic vision and my being is burnt into it [ . . .]  I do not strive 
for G od ’s Kingdom  in the A fterw orld, but I work for the Kingdom  o f  G od and Man in this w orld [ . . . ]  
ta s a w w u f  does not mean for me wearing w ool or becom ing a dervish or d w elling at m editation circles. 
Rather, it means absolving on ese lf o f  selfishness, hatred, harm, and evil and entering the union with the 
spirit o f  this world and with the m usic o f  this universe that m anifest them selves in the poem  that becom es  
a being glorifying truth, freedom , justice and supreme lo v e .197
In other words, al-Bayyatl stresses the importance of the mystical experience’s poetic essence, 
which is prior to the exoteric institution and formalised rituals that Sufism later became. He 
searches not for secondary manifestations, but primary truth, the archetypal nature of man that 
precedes all exterior colourings and forms. Nevertheless, for someone of his ideological 
background this essence assumes certain mutually interchangeable meanings: love, justice, 
freedom, immortality. His attitude towards life and death evolves into a cyclical vision 
reminiscent even of Buddhist karma, as in this later poem:
A stone said to another:
“I’m not happy with my existence in this naked wall 
M y place is in the sultan’s palace.”
Said the other: “friend,
You have been sentenced to death 
W hether here or in the sultan’s palace 
For tomorrow this palace w ill be destroyed
196 Ibid, p. 248
197 al-Bayyatl, quoted in Saadi A. Simawe, ‘The lives of the Sufi masters in cAbd al-Wahhab al-Bayyatl’s poetry,
JAL 32 (2001), p. 126
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Just as this wall w ill be 
By an order from the sultan’s men 
To bring the gam e back to the start 
And reallocate the roles.” 198
Oppression -  Separation 
Revolution -  Love
As a politically active poet, al-Bayyatf s concern for the poor and downtrodden of the world, and 
his commitment to the idea of revolution, reached a quasi-religious status. Against tyranny and 
oppression both locally and globally he posits his idealised revolution which he claimed, 
following his hero Ernesto Guevara, to be an expression of the deepest human emotion, love. So 
firm is al-Bayyatl’s belief that removing oppression is the most human act and the highest calling 
that it becomes synonymous with his own personal salvation. Thus in the mandala scheme, 
which is itself in revolution around its axis (God), he must enter inside to reach the revolution he 
craves, to reach the “perfect city” that represents his Absolute. Initially at least, then, collective 
salvation (social justice, attainable through revolution) assumes equivalent status as individual 
salvation (union of the self, attainable through love or mysticism), just as it does in the mandala. 
The surest sign that revolution and religion are ultimately one symbol for al-Bayyatl comes in his 
self-designation as ‘imam of the poor’, which explicitly combines the political and the spiritual:
How silly she was
N ot to know that the one who kissed her
And gave her a ring
Was the imam o f the poor.199
His work therefore can lean towards a kind of mystical socialism, in which the circle of truth is 
the city of justice, if only it may be entered. This is why al-Hallaj, the revolutionary mystic, 
becomes such a powerful symbol. In 1965 his al-Hallaj says:
I was unified
198 al-Bayyati, Bustan, p. 93
199 al-Bayyatl, Nusus, p. 87
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Embraced
B lessed  -  you are I
M y wretchedness
M y lonesom eness
And in the ruins o f  the city
M y poor brothers raised the cry
And w ept200
while a decade later al-Bayyatl reflects on al-Hallaj’s Kitab al-Tawasln, with the circular theme, 
centred around both the mystic himself and the symbol of mysticism, still prominent:
The poor all gathered around al-Hallaj and the fire 
In this night that was possessed  by the fever o f som ething
?oi
That might or might not em erge from behind the walls."
For al-Bayyatl, the much hoped-for step beyond the walls into the circle will be the beginning of 
his self-regenerating revolution. But in the outer world, as for instance in 1958, this revolution 
forever eludes and betrays him, providing brief optimism followed by trenchant gloom. Beyond 
the Iraqi picture, meanwhile, the internally fragmented Arab nation was suffering successive 
humiliations at the hands of Western powers. His increasing disillusionment and despair in the 
hope of a just world, particularly after 1967, precipitates his inward turn towards a more esoteric 
revolution. Prior to this shift, the banners of Communism and Arab nationalism keep his political 
dreams to some extent alive, but these one-sided worldly ideologies -  socio-economic and ethnic 
respectively -  unravel in the unseemly schemes of power. However, rather than giving up on his 
leftist ideals, al-Bayyati attempted to fuse them with mystical and mythological perspectives into 
a unified whole, which like the Sufi perfect man would be simultaneously exoteric and esoteric. 
This is evident in his exaltation of Palestinian martyrs, whose self-immolation for a political 
cause elevates it to a religious level. Here they transcend death and touch immortality; the strong 
mystical overtones are unmistakeable:
He shines in the light o f the lamp niche
al-Bayyati, Sifr, p. 23
201 al-Bayyatl, Hubb wa Mawt, p. 174
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United in the essence o f  God
He is not annihilated /  like the peoples o f  the Earth
In his revolution he defies death.202
If revolution is one side of salvation, then love is very much the other. Sufism places a strong 
emphasis on the notion of love, which is ‘the motive force for God’s creative activity’203, and 
classically considered one of its highest stations:
.. .  the friends o f  God, by loving one another, bear w itness to the reality o f  lo v e ... The lovers o f  G od reach 
either unitive fusion  w ith him (ittihad, a concept condem ned  in later Sufism ), or the ‘sta tion ’ o f  
experiencing G od’s uniqueness (tawhld), w hich means reaching him , so  that he seem s both to be and not 
be in and through everything.204
Sufism is the symbol and enactment of love in al-BayyatT s poetry; the two often become entirely 
interchangeable:
She became transformed into an apple, into w ine  
A hot loaf
In the sacred tem ple o f  love
She became addicted to the sw eet embrace
She appeared in my dreams, I said: A  butterfly
Fluttered in the summer o f  my childhood
Prematurely
She transmigrated into every face  
And wandered -  sleeping in my blood  
A saint fleeing in the darkness205
Love is personified throughout his work by the ephemeral anima figure of cA ’isha, who 
possesses the divine qualities of simultaneous presence and absence. The poet describes cA ’isha, 
the god-figure in his ‘religion of love’, as:
202 al-Bayyatl, Bustdn, p. 31
203 Chittick, Sufism. p. 64
2(M Baldick, op.cit, p. 57
205 al-Bayyatl, Bustdn, p. 51
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the individual and co llec tiv e  sym bol for love  w hich  have been united w ith each  other and u ltim ately  
disso lved  into the constantly revitalized spirit o f  being. cA ’isha, who Orpheus, D ik  al-Jinn and Abu Firas 
chase en d lessly  as children chase butterflies... is alw ays elusive and slippery, like sm oke or air, alw ays 
appearing and disappearing, leaving her lovers searching for her in the hell o f  this world and in every age. 
This is cA ’isha, nothing but the spirit o f  the world in its renewal through death, for the sake o f  revolution  
and lo v e r 06
The poet hopes to fuse his split self with another -  cA ’isha -  to regain unity and recover his lost 
Reality. This occasions an immersion not only in mystical musings but in a wholehearted and 
neverending search for love, and cA ’isha, his imperishable romantic symbol, becomes, in the 
poet’s own words, ‘the twin of Sufism’. In her different guises she blends into a definition of 
Sufism itself: she is a surreal and fleeting image that transcends boundaries of time, place and 
identity and, like the circle/city, is always just beyond reach. These are merely different 
metaphors for al-Bayyatl’s fundamental aim of entering this interdicted state, which at times he 
calls the ‘virtuous city’, al-mcidina al-fadila, and at others the ‘city of love’, madinat al-cishq\
He dug a claw  and a tooth into the flesh o f  the nights,
M ade a pilgrim age to the city o f  love207
Separation is the diametrical opposite to love in both mystical and emotional senses since it 
entails a gap or abyss between two entities that require a barzakh, a bridge:
Perhaps the polar star
W ill becom e a bridge for me over the infernal river o f  love208
This separation is usually couched in terms of the city walls patrolled by the Sphinx, or ‘the wild 
beast that lurks / at the gate of the unknown’209, which can also function as metaphors for 
political adversaries and oppressive powers. The wall is the most potent symbol of separation: the
206 al-BayyatT, Tajribati, pp. 45-6
207 al-BayyatT, Bustdn, p. 62
208 al-BayyatT, Q asa’id Hubb, p. 92
209  ^  1 A f .
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poet stands in exile on one side, the symbols of unity -  the virtuous city and the vanishing 
cA ’isha, incarnated here as an elusive butterfly -  on the other:
Light hung over the m eadow  in Shiraz 
A blue butterfly opened its gates and fluttered 
Over its wall and the face o f  the poor lover.
He rose up to fo llow  her, but she vanished behind the wall 
Leaving behind a trail o f  blood in the coppices o f  sunset 
I cried out to her: 
cA ’isha!
cA ’isha! But she neither heard me 
Nor saw the lover in his hell crawling towards the fire 
W aiting at the last gate.210
Conscious -  Exoteric 
Unconscious -  Esoteric
As hinted above, there is a distinct rupture in al-Bayyatl’s poetry in the 1960s, when it appears he 
underwent a particularly intense period of psychological trauma and began to discover that the 
solution to his question -  often referred to in his poetry as the ‘secret’, a term laden with Sufi 
overtones -  lay not in exoteric political ideology but in a modern esoterism. The emphasis 
therefore shifts gradually away from political commitment towards more personal and spiritual 
concerns. He emerges from this creative bottleneck a more complete artist, aware of both sides of 
existence and the relationship between them. His goal then effectively becomes that of the 
mystic: to discover the secret through which these two realities -  the expressible and the 
inexpressible -  may be dialectically fused into one, so that the ‘finite being’ can ascend to 
infinitude. His answer, usually, is love:
On the last day, I told her:
You are the fire o f the forests,
The water o f  the river,
The secret o f  fire
210 Ibid, p. 69
H alf o f  you: inexpressible
The other half: a priestess in the temple o f Tshtar.211
The quest for this eternal secret repeatedly recurs, symbolically alluded to by the ring, the gate, 
the door, and so on. As the quest for the secret possessed him, he was not unaware of the 
doctrinal centrality of the ‘secret’ in Sufism, which according to one modem writer:
... continues to have great im portance up to our ow n time. In particular, it is often repeated that G od’s 
attribute o f  Lordship (rububiyya ) has a secret which, if  revealed, would nullify that Lordship itself.212
Al-Bayyatl, too, senses the paradox of the secret: to discover it is to nullify it. The virtuous city 
for which he searches may in fact be merely a mirage, just as cA ’isha is no more than smoke and 
air. He can only lament that ‘we could not find the orchard’s gate’213 or admit that Damascus -  
resting place of ibn al-cArabI -  is always near but perpetually out of reach.214
Confronted with the problem of opposites -  between the invisible, intangible esoteric domain and 
the visible, physical exoteric domain -  al-Bayyatl increasingly attempts to synthesize the two 
rather than to achieve the impossible and pass fully into the esoteric. In his capacity as a modem, 
secular thinker, he knows that he must live in the exoteric, wherein lie his socio-political 
concerns. However, his crisis effectively inverts this viewpoint, calling into question his 
existential preconceptions and compelling him to focus more on personal and metaphysical issues 
such as love and spiritual salvation. Hereafter, in contrast to the radical separation of religion and 
politics, a unitive picture gradually emerges in which revolution means love, love means life, and 
life means revolution. The poet acknowledges the circularity of their mutual value as he seeks to 
create his poetic kingdom:
You are here with m e in the depths 
Escorting the cycle  o f  seasons 
In the poem o f the body.215
211 al-Bayyati, Bustdn, p. 88
212 Baldick, op.cit, p. 52
213 al-Bayyati, Q asd’id Hubb, p. 97
2U Ibid, p. 19
“l:> al-Bayyatl, Bukd’iyya, p. 22
89
Mortality -  Exile 
Immortality -  Home
N o one know s anyone in this exile  
A ll are solitary
The heart o f the world is a stone 
In this kingdom  o f  ex ile .216
Exile is perhaps al-Bayyati’s central theme. He is a perpetual wanderer in the wilderness of 
separation. In his own stark assessment, ‘Man is bom in exile, lives in exile and dies in exile.’217 
Permanent severance from the holy city is the poetic metaphor for his feelings of physical, 
emotional and spiritual rupture, and his permanent sense of alienation and insecurity in the world. 
His work is replete with images of peripatetic existence, expressing his cumulative feelings of 
rootlessness: as a modem Iraqi, as an Arab, and as a human being and poet. This permanent exile 
is the shadow of m an’s mortality, since life wandering outside the city is but a prolonged and 
painful death:
Your cries w ere m y cries as I scaled the w alls o f  this earth’s cities, departing in the snow , prolonging my 
death in the pagan lands o f  music, revolution and love, o f G o d .218
The exile longs for home: he longs to overcome his alienation and feel his roots stretching down 
into the earth. Like cA ’isha and the perfect city, ‘home’ is a fleeting dream for al-Bayyati, 
disappearing as soon as it appears, as occurs most vividly in the third part of The Birth and Death 
o f cA ’isha. So long as the key to the gates of Nishapur eludes him, the lonely wanderer can be 
sure of only one thing: that he will die. At the same time, the only answer to a life of exile is this 
death, the ultimate moment of deliverance. Only inside the city, beyond the door of death, can he 
realise the life and meaning he craves. To create ‘the Kingdom of God and Man in this world’ is 
an impossible task. This unbearable paradox shakes the poet to the very core of his being, since it 
implies a return to a religious perspective that cherishes the afterlife as God’s kingdom.
216 al-Bayyall, Hubb wa Mawt, p. 206
217 al-Bayyall, quoted from www.kitabat.com
218 al-Bayyatl, Hubb wa Mawt, p. 176
90
Exile permeates al-Bayyatl’s whole being. On an ideological level, he is constantly wandering in 
search of the answer to man’s suffering; spiritually, he wanders in search of fulfilment and union; 
existentially, in search of eternal life and meaning. Through this universal search the themes of 
death, mysticism and exile are inextricably linked:
Al-H allaj w ould com e back ill and sleep for years, dying repeatedly and shaking the stony bars o f  every  
prison o f  the world. He said “Farewell” , and flow erbeds disappeared. Farewell, forests o f  the childhood o f  
my love! Water w ill turn to tears and death to departure in this ex ile .219
Order -  Religion 
God -  Sufism
This set of parallels and polarities cuts to the heart of the subject of this thesis: the role of Sufism 
in the modem world. The institutional face of religion, the exoteric God, is synonymous here 
with the dominance of a certain Order, in contrast to the subversive, esoteric God of Sufism. The 
radical al-Bayyatl strives to transform the prevailing socio-political order and realign its 
foundations. Thus Sufism in al-Bayyatl’s poetry effectively becomes the mirror image of the 
revolution, a metaphor for the pursuit of the freedom that is so lacking in the modem Arab 
reality. Like the revolution, Sufism for him is a symbol of equality and creativity. The suffering 
of Sufi characters in al-Bayyatl’s poems reflects this dual objective: purification of the socio­
political order and of the self, the two being ultimately indistinguishable:
I rave beside the wounded vessel and say: A  time w ill com e when man becom es mist for his brother (and 
lord o f  the h eaven s...) , pawning his rags for w ine and w eeping, possessed  by desire, a time when cA ’isha 
will rise from beneath the w ild grasses and black stones, a golden gazelle fleeing from me as from beneath
. i • 2 2 0the vine.
The internal Sufi God inheres an individual freedom to define the divine on one’s own terms, 
while the external, institutional God implies the oppressive strictures of power imposed on the
219 Ibid, pp. 172-4
220 Ibid, p. 250
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individual from above. Accordingly, the former is associated with the eternal and the latter with 
the temporal:
W e shared bread and wrote poetry about v isions o f  the poor, abandoned and hungry in the kingdom  o f  the 
great m ason, about the secret o f  the rebellion o f  the man w ho burned with desire for the light, w ho bow ed  
his head before the tyrant sultan.221
Religion and God are effectively strangers, separated by the dividing barzakh, the impenetrable 
city walls: the poet is free to find his own god once he has removed all traces of the old one. Al- 
Bayyati explicitly invokes his own esoteric god, for example, in Death and the Lamp:
M y language becam e a lamp at G od ’s door. M y life  slipped betw een  m y fingers, took shape, and that 
shape becam e reality.222
Religious order inevitably involves a social hierarchy, contrary to the poet’s cherished principle 
of human equality. This is true even in Islamic culture, where all men are supposedly equal 
before God, as well as in institutionalised Sufism. Aware that this ‘order’ is a societal construct 
based on relations of power, al-BayyatTs innate inclination is to undermine or transcend this 
hierarchy. This is one of his central motivations: to create a kingdom in this world, even if merely 
a poetic one, where all men will be truly equal.
In the underworld beneath this enchanted hill 
For the fire and the magic rites
For the body o f  the earth that is resurrected beneath the kisses o f  summer, for 
the Euphrates 
I bear the scars o f captivity’s whip 
In the kingdom of the Lord 
And the kingdom o f man.223
221 Ibid, p. 172
222 Ibid, p. 182
223 al-Bayyatl, Qasa’id Hubb, pp. 143-4
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Thus he rejects exoteric religion, with its stratifying and dehumanising tendencies and its 
permanent separation of man and God, in contrast to the esoteric, in which the Absolute is 
theoretically attainable. This is reflected in al-BayyatT s perfect city, within which lie Sufism / 
God, identifiable as m an’s true nature. Order / Religion, conversely, lie outside, since they are 
extraneous and unnecessary for the fulfilment of inner perfection. Such a scheme reflects the 
nature of al-BayyatTs heroes, such as the sublimely individualistic al-Hallaj who saw no 
boundary between his own purification and social justice. For him, as for al-BayyatT, the apparent 
paradox belied an inner continuity.
Al-Hallaj’s transgression of Islamic rituals and his heretical concept of tawaf around the kacba of 
the heart signal a desire to go beyond outer actions towards inner meaning. Al-BayyatT s 
relentless wandering around the city walls is undoubtedly his own version of this tawaf. Exoteric 
religion, as Jung noted, separates the individual from the original vitality and dynamism of its 
essence, thus curtailing spiritual freedom. To the true mystic only the inner essence of love is 
important, an idea that al-Bayyatl tries to capture by stripping himself of everything, leaving 
nothing between himself and God:
Take the sunflow er
W ho lays her cheek down on mine
Take the m em ories o f  the childhood o f  my love
Take m y books, my death
M y voice will remain
A lamp at G od’s door.224
Sufism is the mystical act of love, the ‘way of the heart’. In al-Bayyatl’s later life, love gains 
almost total dominance and becomes his ‘religion’, increasingly representing not only a means of 
entering the city -  and reaching psychological balance -  but a blissful escape from life’s travails. 
Both love and Sufism involve a restoration of the heart towards its original Adamic unity, a 
fusion of the split self with the beloved/Beloved. Their poetic imagery are therefore identical and 
ambiguous, allowing al-Bayyatl, like the Sufi poets before him, to speak on many levels 
simultaneously. Sufism and love both entail completion: the union of the two broken halves,
224 al-Bayyatl, Hubb wa Mawt, p. 182
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which for the Sufi is the all-encompassing key to immortality. As noted above, however, al- 
Bayyatl’s vision of union, to be achieved through love and revolution, constantly eludes him:
The sea burst into flam es, but my beloved did not return 
To put together the two halves with m e.225
Culture -  Modern 
Nature -  Ancient
In an apparent paradox, al-Bayyatl, the progressive thinker who was integral to the modernist 
movement in Arabic poetry, harks back to the ancient times of ancient rites and natural order. 
Living in the modem era, al-Bayyatl comes to feel an unmistakable sense of lacking, which is 
often expressed in terms of exile: despite, or because of, his acculturation, man has become 
somehow cut off from true selfhood. Adam, the original man, was ejected at the dawn of the 
human era from the Garden and condemned to a life of exile. References to this human condition 
of lost innocence are evident throughout al-BayyatFs poetry: the virtuous city becomes the ‘city 
of childhood’, signifying the time of unconsciousness before entry into the symbolic order. As 
previously discussed, this relates closely to the Sufi’s ‘return’ to tawakkul, depending on God as 
the child depends on its mother. The city and the concept of childhood thus become 
psychologically analogous for al-Bayyatl:
The Russian vio lin ist’s music in the com er o f  the bar,
I saw: the white cities o f childhood in its m elodies,
R ivers o f  ice and forests in the Urals226
Indeed, the poet’s very progressiveness suggests a return to the origin, in keeping with the 
circular theme of individuation, like the Sufi’s return to God. This explains the position of 
‘original man’ at the centre of al-Bayyatl’s mandala: the king, as it were, of the peifect city. Like 
the Sufi, the poet’s is a move through culture -  which for all its achievements brings alienation -  
back to nature, this circular progression leading to an original unconscious state of pre-fall bliss.
225 al-Bayyati, Qasa’id Hubb, p. 667
226 cAbd al-Wahhab al-Bayyatl, Sira Dhcitiyya li-Sariq al-Nar (Wizarat al-T'lam, Baghdad, 1974), p. 76
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In both poet and mystic, the same psychological need applies, the same transcendence of linear 
temporal constraints. Such ideas are couched in terms of original innocence, using images of 
prim ordial nakedness (whose ambiguity offers m ultiple interpretations) and elem ental 
phenomena redolent of early man, such as fire. Concepts such as fire and nakedness can be 
interpreted both in a modem secular sense, signifying the suffering and denudation of modem 
man, and esoterically, as the burning away of the ego and subsequent proximity to God. In such a 
way, one senses the sublimation of psychological trauma into spiritual transcendence:
Here am I, naked as the desert sky 
Sad as a gypsy horse 
Consum ed by Fire.227
Nakedness carries connotations of a primordial sexual union in which lover and beloved coalesce 
as part of the earth’s ancient mysticism. Al-Bayyati’s orchard symbol, a recurring and more 
romantic variation on the virtuous city theme, implies humanity’s subordination to the divinity of 
nature:
When w e meet tomorrow in the orchard o f  love
I w ill strip you naked
And cover your body in roses
And kiss you on every rose.228
Al-Bayyatl taps into ancient conceptions of the poet as a natural mystic with super-sensory 
powers. This shift from a highly political agenda to the pre-Socratic and pre-Islamic conception 
of the true role of the poet as visionary and seer is perhaps an example of Adonis’ influence. The 
natural (as opposed to cultural) poet possesses powers akin to those of the mystic, the two often 
being combined in the same person, as with the great Sufi poets, R um I, c Attar and so on.
The poet’s alienation is manifestly a symptom of modem civilization, which for him has left the 
Arab nation perpetually teetering on the brink of the abyss of being and nothingness. These 
existential concerns and his reaction to this aspect of modernity lead directly into his esoteric
227 al-Bayyatl, Hubb wa Mawt, p. 178
228 al-Bayyati, Nusils, p. 82
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orientation. Typical symbols of the new, disturbing reality are the sprawling, chaotic quagmires 
of the modem city, where the poet’s feelings of isolation and anxiety reach their apex. The city is 
corrupt, the locus of lost innocence. Baghdad had become a place whose great civilizations ‘had 
died and disappeared for ever’229. His revulsion of the city and exaltation of rurality corresponds 
to the psychological need to return to a more natural mode of existence. Original, natural man 
had been ejected from the Garden and was now being hounded from city to city, always on the 
run:
H e chases me m ercilessly
He blocks me in the darkness
The streets o f these cities that slept starless
He looks at me from my cup230
The desire for the eternal in man -  both ancient and modem -  occurs in al-Bayyatf s poetry not 
only through Sufi ideas, but also through extensive use of ancient ideas and symbols -  paganism, 
rituals, magic charms, talismans. Psychologically speaking, these are also the ‘twin of Sufism’, 
and a potent means of rediscovering the lost innocence from which the city walls separate him. In 
particular, the ancient is expressed through his renewal of the Babylonian, Sumerian and 
Assyrian gods and legends, whose heroines, cIshtar or cAshtarut, metamorphose into one another, 
fusing identities and trajectories with al-Bayyatl’s dominant romantic symbol, cA ’isha.
Darkness -  Light 
World -  Earth
Throughout al-Bayyatl’s career, the virtuous city is depicted as a place of light, a powerful 
symbol of the divine in classical Sufism, which generally sees Muhammad and the Qur’an as the 
‘guiding lights in the darkness of unreal things’.231 The title of one poem refers to the ‘light that 
comes from Granada’, the Andalusian city of enlightenment, or, in another poem referring 
explicitly to Sufism:
229 al-Bayyatl, Tajribatl, pp. 19-20
230 al-Bayyatl, Sifr, p. 83
231 Chittick, Sufism, p. 13
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[M y father] taught me: departure,
Sadness and walking
Around the hom es o f G od’s friends,
Searching for light and the warmth o f a future spring 
That still lies in the inner earth and seashells
232W aiting for the seer’s prophecy.-
By contrast, exile is a state of blindness or darkness, which is redolent of ignorance, oppression 
and death. In Sufism, the transition from darkness to light symbolises the ascent from body to 
spirit.233 Similarly, al-Bayyatl aspires to move from blindness to vision:
Blind, and yet you see with the eyes o f words
You verify the mirror by touch
And the shelves o f books that drown in light234
The world, as defined by Heidegger, is the domain of society and culture, a man-made and man- 
oriented, exoteric environment. Its counterpart, the earth, is the esoteric domain in which nature, 
rather than man, is the subject. Heidegger’s use of eastern mystical sources in his philosophy is 
well attested. For al-Bayyatl, the world represents the realm of exile and darkness, or in Sufi 
terms, the unreal or nonexistent. The poet appears to oscillate between his outer social concerns 
and an attempt to give it an esoteric colouring: to make social justice his God, somewhat along 
the lines of Jung’s participation mystique. In this sense he fluctuates between world and earth, 
trying to unify the two into one. This reciprocity between world and earth produces interface 
(,barzakh) symbols, such as the temple, as in this description of cA ’isha:
Searching for my face and tresses in the m agic cities
And in the priests’ spells in the tem ples o f tw ilight235
Here the duality of the describable and indescribable is portrayed in similar terms:
232 cAbd al-Wahhab al-Bayyatl, al-Kitaba cald cil-Tin, (Dar al-Adab, Beirut, 1970) p. 89
233 Chittick, Sufism, p. 86
234 al-Bayyatl, Bustcin, p. 33
235 al-Bayyatl, Qasd’id Hubb, p. 137
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H alf o f  you: inexpressible
T he other half: a priestess in the temple o f cIshtar.236
Al-Bayyati’s veneration of the earth as a life-sustaining organism in which humanity takes its 
place emerges through his quasi-pantheistic references to earthly phenomena such as trees, 
forests, rivers, mountains, sea, and sky, as well as the earth itself:
And when he kissed me: I felt the earth spinning around tw ice, rain fell 
I w as running in a forest, my hair dishevelled  
Barefoot on a carpet o f  golden sky and flowers 
In the forest o f  m agic237
In his incarnation as al-Khayyam, he conceives of death in terms of the all-important return to the 
Earth in the familiar unending cycle of life, death and rebirth, blurring the conceptual boundaries 
between earth, mother and God.
W e w ill return, who knows, or not 
To our mother Earth who bears the embryo 
o f this hope in her bow els 
And the depth o f this sadness and promises 
The butterfly o f existence hovers around our fire.238
Language -  Falsehood 
Silence -  Truth
Although language is inescapably the poet’s tool and medium of expression, it entails an exile by 
its very nature. Al-Bayyatl’s search for psychological salvation mirrors the search for the 
transcendental signifier; both seem destined to be fruitless. If the walls of al-madina al-fadilci, the 
virtuous city, represent the barzakh, or gap between exoteric and esoteric, the poet is denied entry 
by the very poetic utterances that make him what he is. In this cruel paradox, language -  the
236 al-Bayyati, Bustcin, p. 87
237 al-Bayyatl, Dlwcin, p. 149
238 Ibid, p. 134
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poet’s lifeblood -  is exiled from truth, leaving him with a terrifying choice between words and 
silence.
As noted above, love, death and silence are al-Bayyatl’s three possible paths to salvation. Silence 
is the meditative, asocial option, the frontier of Eastern mysticism, but al-Bayyatl cannot bring 
himself to contemplate something synonymous with defeat and acquiescence. In the grip of this 
tortuous dilemma, he describes how his mouth has been sealed by ‘the wax of silence’239, or 
wonders:
W hy are words exiled? W hy does love turn to agony? W hy is silence torment 
in this exile , why do words becom e lifebuoys
for those who drown in this w ave haunted by the chaos o f  things?240
Or, even more succinctly:
Exile is my homeland 
Words are my ex ile .241
The poem, which he describes as ‘my only weapon’, thus only deepens his devastating sense of 
alienation. Conversely, the esoteric realm of silence may say more than words ever can: silence 
can sometimes say more than the loudest declamation. Sometimes, then, he displays a reverence 
for it that belies his customary abhorrence:
He used to love the sultan’s daughter 
He lived on the riverbanks o f  her voice  
O f her silence
But she died -  like a white butterfly in the fields 
D ies at sundown  
He went mad at her death
Taking refuge in silence and glorifying only her nam e242
239 al-Bayyati, Q asa’id Hubb, p. 99
240 al-Bayyatl, Hubb wci Mciwt, p. 174
241 Ibid, p. 180
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Al-Bayyati seems unsure whether silence is part of God’s realm or a symptom of his oppression. 
In Sufi terms, too, silence is paradoxical: distance from God is a spiritual muteness and proximity 
to God lights the fire of poetic creativity, yet also identification with God overcomes the need for 
language. When the poet talks of ‘a blind musician [bleeding] over the strings, raising his hand 
like me in the silence of the void of things, searching for what he has lost, circling alone around 
God’243, the void seems to refer to the abyss of exile rather than the silent realm of truth.
The poet’s ambiguous attitude towards silence reflects his inability to fully reconcile himself with 
the esoteric mode. For him the real world is the one in which people must live, regardless of its 
truth-value. Nevertheless, by the 1970s, his breathless early productivity had waned, as he 
perhaps came to believe that only death would bring his desired immortality. As the idealistic 
vision of the perfect city increasingly proves elusive, his former political passion appears to yield 
to an attitude of acceptance and a slight reduction in his appetite for poetic expression.
While a wholeheartedly meditative existence does not appear to suit al-Bayyatl -  he is in fact a 
hybrid of ‘East’ and ‘W est’, heavily influenced from an early stage by influential figures in 
western literature, philosophy and politics, such as Marx and Camus -  he remains an essentially 
Eastern poet. Following Shabistari and LahijI, Chittick elucidates the symbolic notions of East 
and West in Sufism:
... each existent thing can be said to have tw o faces[:] the “eastern face” and the “western face”. If we 
look at the western face o f  things, w e find no trace o f  the sun, since it has set. If w e look at the eastern 
face o f  the sam e things, w e see the sun shining in its full glory. Everything displays both faces at the sam e 
time, but the vast majority o f  people see only the western face. They have no awareness that everything is 
a sign o f  God in which He is d isclosing His own reality ... The prophets and the great Sufis see the eastern 
face. In their case, God has answered the prayer, “Show  us things as they are.” For them, all things are 
truly and actually the signs o f  God.244
‘ ' al-Bayyatl, Sifr, p. 20-1
243 al-Bayyatl, Hubb wa Mawt, p. 234
244 Chittick, Sufism, pp. 13-14
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In moving across these pairs of parallels and opposites, al-Bayyati expresses his essential desire 
to graduate from a state of non-being (which entails lack, absence, exile, death, etc) to genuine 
being (God, justice, love, truth, etc). His poetry thus functions externally on a number of levels, 
each of which symbolise the same inner desire for transformation from one state to the other, i.e. 
from without to within the circle. Sufism -  its archetypes, symbols and doctrines -  is a 
metaphorical language of individuation, merely one of the various poetic expressions of this 
transformation. The poet never loses his desire to fuse his exoteric aims -  social justice, 
revolution -  with his esoteric aims -  salvation and love -  into an indistinguishable whole, and the 
language of Sufism fulfils this ambiguity. This synthesis o f individual and collective 
emancipation recalls Marx’s statement that: ‘the free development of each is the condition for the 
free development of all’.245 It is therefore worth examining how al-Bayyati reconciles his broader 
preoccupations -  notably Communism and existentialist thought -  with this Sufi tendency.
:4S Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto, (Orion, London, 1996), p. 36
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Collective Issues: al-Bayyati, Communism and Sufism
Al-Bayyati’s concern for the wretched of the earth and profound commitment to justice in the 
world found him a spiritual home in the Communist party, whose exoteric ideology reached 
quasi-religious status. In establishing to what extent these inclinations were compatible or 
otherwise with the “neo-Sufi” tendency, it becomes clear that the pivotal notion of the perfect 
city reveals a direct continuity between his Communism and esoterism.
His initial conviction that Communism would one day unlock the gates of this city of salvation, 
his ideal vision of human existence, yields in time to a more subtle and nuanced view.246 
Nevertheless, al-Bayyati finds himself expressing his more personal aspirations in very similar 
terms to his socio-political concerns: entry into the forbidden place. In both cases the important 
factor is the original ideal (esoteric), rather than the institution that inevitably follows (exoteric). 
Importantly, Communism’s anti-religious appearance is not evidence of a conflict with Sufism: 
both movements evolved from the urge to reorder the world, but merely approached it from 
different angles. The Communist Manifesto itself points out that:
N othing is easier than to g ive Christian asceticism  a Socialist tinge. Has not Christianity declaim ed against 
private property, against marriage, against the State? Has it not preached in the place o f  these, charity and 
poverty, celibacy and m ortification o f  the flesh , monastic life and Mother Church? Christian Socialism  is 
but the holy water with which the priest consecrates the heart-burnings o f  the aristocrat.247
Both the Communist and Sufi ideal uphold an ascetic, anarchic modus vivendi but vary in their 
interpretations. For the Communist, material wealth must be distributed equally; for the Sufi, 
material wealth is ultimately a barrier from the desired proximity to God. Marx’s claim that ‘the 
Communist revolution is the most radical rupture with traditional property relations; no wonder 
that its development involves the most radical rupture with traditional ideas,’248 outwardly 
reflects the mystic’s radical internal revolution and abandonment of worldly pleasures. If Sufism
246 It is revealing to note here that while al-Bayyatl remained a Communist, al-Sayyab, his famous compatriot and 
fellow Communist, had rejected this ideology by the early 1960s, suggesting that, had he lived longer, the latter 
might have produced more “neo-Sufi” thought than al-Bayyatl himself.
247 Marx, op.cit., p. 39-40
248 Ibid, p. 34
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is the key to the city gates, then obtaining this key requires relinquishing all worldly attributes, 
just as the true Communist relinquishes all personal property.
Further, both issue from a rejection of the status quo and a desire to transform it. For the 
Communist, total reform of the socio-economic structure of society is the key; for the Sufi, it is 
the inward structure of the psyche. Likewise the dissolution of boundaries: Communism was 
conceived as an all-encompassing system of equality, ‘independently of all nationality’249, while 
the Sufi experience obliterates all that stands between man and God. Ideally, both Communists 
and Sufis view national or ethnic divisions as superfluous. The central Islamic doctrine of 
equality before God reveals an evident parallel to the Communist ideal. It is no surprise then that 
for al-Bayyatl, the self-styled ‘imam of the poor’, God and equality become effectively 
indistinguishable.
Connected to this dissolution of boundaries is, in both cases, the breakdown of ego- 
consciousness: for the participation mystique of Communism, in which the individual’s 
uniqueness is subsumed in the ideal, classless society, read the Sufi’s abstraction (tajrld) of his 
illusory selfhood ‘as a snake sloughs off its skin’.250 ‘Annihilation’ of the ego in fa n d ’ leads 
directly to ‘subsistence’ or ‘survival’ in b a q a ’, the renewed sense of selfhood, which the 
Communist is supposed to find in the collective identity. Baldick points out that in fa n d ’, ‘one 
can see the celebrated ‘negation of the negation’, which is one of the distinguishing 
characteristics of dialectical thought and finds its ultimate development in the works of Hegel and 
M arx ...’251 For Jung, moreover, Communism is effectively a religion without the transcendental 
function, which is all the more dangerous as this is projected onto the state, leading only to 
precisely the corruption and oppression that the revolution set out to abolish. It is this realisation 
-  conscious or otherwise -  that pushes the poet away from exoteric ideology towards the truth of 
the self.
The implication, then, is that, just as the Communist loses his ego-status in the larger self, the 
poet must undergo a process equivalent to Sufi fa n d ’ in order to reach baqci’ and thereby enter
X U i u ,  p .
250 Baldick, op.cit, p. 36
251 Ibid, p. 45
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the city. This is partly why he speaks in terms of Death in Life -  his 1968 volume -  ambiguously 
referring both to his self-proclaimed condition of living death and the fand  ’ that might overcome 
it. At the city gates the conscious meets the unconscious, and beyond this point man achieves true 
selfhood; in Sufi terms, he is baqi billah, ‘subsisting in God’. The poet’s deepest needs and 
anxieties, which he approached initially in Communist terms, are therefore structurally 
compatible with the stations of the Sufi path. This in turn allows him to express them in the form 
of poetic interpretations of historical Sufis’ psychological torments:
I search for you in my drunkenness and my sobriety as long as the cupbearer’s goblets speak without 
tongues.
Oh spirit o f  this w orld’s elem ents, o f  the silver-blue night lights 
Here am I, prostrating m yself drunkenly in Presence252
The most probable reason for the shift away from direct Communist sentiments is that, with their 
inherent structural difficulties and limitations of vision, these highly exoteric ideas lacked the 
means to express the poet’s increasingly profound spiritual torment. Communist ideology paints 
a flat, denuded picture of man as a mere social component, insufficient for an exploration of the 
inner recesses of human nature. Moreover, after the critical mid-point in his life around 1963-4, 
al-Bayyati seems far more aware of his own mortality, and personal concerns begin to take 
precedence over collective ones.
In place of Communism, Sufism begins to form a ‘meta-ideology’ for al-Bayyatl, something 
more subtle and profound than this supposedly all-encompassing solution. As the perpetual 
journeyman, his hope is that this path will take him to a new level of consciousness, thus 
overcom ing his perm anent exile, reversing his fallen status and restoring his split 
consciousnesses to a perfect, whole self:
T w o nights I slept .
In which I dreamt I was no longer two words 
I was unified233
252 al-Bayyati, Hubb wci Mawt, p. 248
253 al-Bayyati„ Sifr, pp. 22-3
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In the final analysis, then, al-Bayyatl’s enduring commitment to Communism was only ever a 
barrier obstructing him from entering the city, despite his attempts to conflate the social and 
individual into one. In this sense, exoteric Communism, a collective, socio-economic view of 
human life, stood in direct contrast to the esoteric Sufi experience, which offered a more 
individual path to salvation.
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Al-Bayyati, Existentialism and Sufism
Through his total exile, al-Bayyatl comes to experience the predicament of modem man in its 
most acute form. He reaches a point of utter alienation: from his fellow men, from nature, but 
most significantly, from his own self and from God. Such is the concern of existentialist 
philosophy. For Heidegger, this alienation, or “fallen-ness” (Verfallenheit) entails contemplation 
of the abyss of nothingness, a fragmented and contingent state of non-being. If the ‘rampant 
extroversion’ of modem civilization has brought it to ‘the brink of the abyss’, the counterweight 
to this predicament must lie within the self. As noted, the psychological predicament of the Arab 
world after 1948 bears a distinct parallel to the development of existentialism after World War I: 
both were an emphatic end to innocence. In a godless world, man was confronted with the most 
profound existential question: the inevitability and finality of death. He now recognised that:
the tim eless world, the eternal, has disappeared from the horizon o f  the m odem  writer as it has from  the 
horizon o f  modern E xistentialists like Sartre and H eidegger, and from the horizon o f  our ow n everyday  
life; and time thereby becom es all the more inexorable and absolute a reality. The temporal is the horizon  
o f  modern man, as the eternal was the horizon o f  the M iddle A ges.254
In despair at this human finitude, al-Bayyati desperately searches for a means to retrieve the 
eternal. If Sufism is the path from human temporality to divine eternity, it is therefore only 
natural that mystical ideas resurface in his work. As he puts it himself:
Finite beings carry the seeds o f  their own death with them, and they are weaker than nature, because they  
are divided unities. Therefore their existence ends with the end o f  their life  on earth, leaving behind them: 
the artist-revolutionary -  their inheritor and their son who defeats death for them -  whom  they make from  
their sw eat, their blood, their suffering and their dreams o f  justice. The artist_revolutionary, then, is the 
em bodim ent o f  the w ill o f  fated, oppressed fin ite beings, and their extension  across history through  
m om ents o f regeneration towards a more perfect selfhood [i.e. infinitude].255
Al-Bayyati’s attempts to conceive the infinite image of man in his poems corresponds to the 
‘faceless and anonymous hero, who is at once everyman and nobody... everywhere exposed to
254 Barrett, op.cit, p. 53
255 al-BayyatT, Tajribati, p. 46
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Nothingness... threatened by the void’256 through which Western existentialist literature also 
tried to portray the definitive human image. This is perhaps best exemplified by his recreation of 
the Persian poet and polymath al-Khayyam, whose rubdciyyat display deeply existentialist 
concerns. This persona, who is described in the subtitle to Death in Life as meditating ‘on being 
and nothingness’ (al-wujud wa-l-cadam), reflects that:
W e must choose
W e must seize the wind and turn the voids 
W e must find the meaning behind the futility o f life 
For life on this closed sphere is suicide.257
A l-Bayyati’s move towards Sufism corresponds to the realisation of the existentialist 
philosophers -  notably Nietzsche and Heidegger -  that the rational, Enlightenment tradition is 
ultimately insufficient in the search for truth. The previous chapter discussed Nietzsche’s seminal 
influence on the modem generation of Arab poets, and al-Bayyatl was no exception: in 1971 he 
even wrote a poem entitled Thus Spoke Zarathustra, calling for the Superman to descend from 
the mountain into the cities that ‘await the flood and conquest / and the fire of innovators.’258 If 
Heidegger sees man in the modem world as decisively alienated from, if surrounded by, Being 
(.Dasein), the Sufi paradoxically views the world as separation from God, despite His presence in 
it. Both Existentialist philosophy and Sufism imply that the exoteric world is the realm of non­
existence, thus turning rationality on its head and suggesting the need for purification. This 
explains m an’s feelings of spiritual alienation, which for personal and political reasons 
culminated for al-Bayyatl from around the mid-1960s. A poem such as the following, then, can 
be interpreted as an expression of this inversion of reality, recalling two Qur’anic verses of 
particular significance in the Sufi tradition, 2:115 (“Wherever you turn, there is the face of God”) 
and 55:26-7 (“Everything on earth is annihilated, but there subsists the face of your Lord”):
Your face in the mirror: two faces 
D on’t lie -  God
256 Barrett, op.cit, pp. 61-2
237 al-Bayyatl, Diwan, p. 133
238 al-Bayyatl, al-Kitdba , p. 67
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Sees you in the mirror.259
This denudation of the modern experience, this revelation of the contingency of life, is precisely 
what the Sufi attempts to overcome through the process offa n a ’: rejection of man’s exoteric non­
existence, or illusory existence, in order to reach genuine existence (baqa’). The mystical path is 
the means to transcend the existential state of exile. From this perspective, Sufism is an atheistic 
enterprise: Heideggerian man’s existence in Being is comparable to the Sufi’s existence in God:
individuals have no se lf  other than what they are with God, and all o f  what they are belongs to God, not to 
them. Our true and proper se lf is no se lf at all, that is, no se lf o f  our ow n.260
The old conflict between faith and reason was the motive behind much existentialist philosophy. 
While not negating reason, Sufism sees truth as beyond its scope, something with which 
Heidegger appeared to agree: “Reason, glorified for centuries, is the most obstinate adversary of 
thinking”.261 Sufism’s indifference towards reason is clearly echoed in the existentialist tradition:
Both Kierkegaard and N ietzsch e point up a profound d issociation , or split, that has taken place in the 
being o f  W estern man, w hich is basically  the con flict o f  reason w ith the w h ole man. A ccording to 
Kierkegaard, reason threatens to sw allow  up faith; W estern man now stands at a crossroads forced to 
choose either to be relig ious or to fall into despair. H aving chosen the former, he must, being rooted 
historically in Christianity, enact a radical renewal o f  the Christian faith. For N ietzsche the era o f  reason 
and sc ien ce raises a question o f  what is to be done with the prim itive instincts and passions o f  man; in 
pushing these latter aside the age threatens us with a decline in vitality for the w hole species. What lies 
behind both prophetic m essages is the perception that man is estranged from his own being.262
Such is al-Bayyatl’s predicament: his “neo-Sufism” is essentially a psychological counterpoint to 
Kierkegaard’s ‘renewal of the Christian faith’. Like the existentialists, he lives in a time when 
man has become severed from God and must find his way back. The Sufi conception of God and 
Heideggerian conception of Being differ in little more than a linguistic and cultural sense:
259 al-Bayyatl, Bustcin, p. 59
260 Chittick, Sufism, p. 46
261 Heidegger, quoted in Barrett, op.cit, p. 206
262 Ibid, p. 207
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H eid egger’s philosophy is neither atheism or theism , but a description o f  the w orld from  w hich God is 
absent. It is now  the night o f  the world, H eidegger says, quoting the poet H olderlin; the god has 
withdrawn h im self, as the sun sets below  the horizon. And m eanw hile the thinker can only redeem  the 
tim e by seeking to understand what is at once nearest and farthest from man: his ow n being and B eing  
itself.263
Heidegger’s concept of “the One”, denoting the impersonal or public being which every man is 
supposed to be prior to himself, recalls al-Bayyati’s attempts to integrate the individual and the 
collective in a mystical revolution. Heidegger’s anti-anthropocentrism, consistent with the Sufi 
view that God/Being, rather than man, is the axis of existence, also informs al-Bayyati’s acute 
sense of exile. While m an’s position outside the city precludes him from cosmic centrality, to 
enter the city -  through mystical union with God, thus achieving a unity of humanity and divinity 
-  would restore him to such a status.
Existentialism and Sufism, therefore, are but different faces of m an’s continuous search for truth, 
and al-Bayyatl’s existentialist concerns lead directly into his experiments with Sufism. In this 
regard, his mid-late 1960s volumes -  The Book o f Poverty and Revolution (1965), That which 
comes and does not come (1966), and Death in Life (1968) -  reflect the apotheosis of his 
existential musings interwoven with an increasing use of mysticism, both in terms of concepts 
and characters. Moreover, it was the existentialists Nietzsche and Heidegger who paved the way 
for later 20th century postmodern thought, and after this point al-Bayyatl’s work begins to display 
distinctly postmodern characteristics that are also highly compatible with Sufi ideas. For 
example, the notion of perpetual incompletion -  the focal theme of al-Bayyatl’s poetry -  evokes 
the Sufi recognition of the impossibility of full and permanent identification with God:
W hich o f  us is blind  
In the prison o f  freedom ,
Crying beneath the stony w alls 
And dying in sheer isolation,
Condemned by the rules o f  the game?264
Ibid, p. 208
264 al-Bayyatl, Bustcin, p. 34
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Al-Bavvati’s Anti-Sufi Inclinations
However, al-Bayyatl’s use of mysticism is by no means a straightforward affair. His 
autobiographical My Poetic Experience (1968) reveals a lingering distaste for the intuitive 
approach, as opposed to the grounded rationalism that he still maintains will provide salvation:
... the objective understanding o f  opposites that prevails over the law  o f  life , and the understanding and 
discovery o f  the log ic  o f  history and its interaction with current events, g ive  the poet the com plete v ision  
and power to transcend towards the future. S ince the future is not bom  in a vacuum , the poet can achieve  
this transcendence only if  he is able to live with and com prehend the present... I therefore disdain the 
many false poetic experiences that are laden with Sufi hallucination and a lleged ly  intuitive perception, as 
they are m ostly based on an idealist vision that is against rationality, science and reality, that despises the 
present and elim inates it from its vision o f social c lasses.265
Still clearly in ideological mode, al-Bayyatl is restating his firm conception of the poet, not as a 
romantic escapist oblivious to human suffering, but as a committed revolutionary who is 
‘drowning up to his ears in the chaos and turmoil of world’266 The implication is that Sufism is an 
abdication of responsibility, an obstacle to commitment. Al-Bayyati’s al-Hallaj is undoubtedly as 
much a revolutionary as a mystic, but at this point, perhaps wishing to maintain his committed 
reputation, he appears to disregard the correlation between the two roles. It is only later, when his 
revolutionary ideas have evolved towards a more personal perspective, slipping from the modem 
belief in rational truth into the irrational postmodern flux, that he can fully appreciate the 
contribution of Sufis such as cAttar and Hafiz:
You were born in the gardens o f  the gods 
And died in Shiraz
All your lovers in the houses o f  the dead  
And in the tombs o f ashes 
Were illuminated by passion, and awoke in tears 
When you opened for them a crack in the w all.267
263 al-Bayyati, Tajribati, p. 38
266 Ibid, p. 42
267 al-Bayyati, Buka'iyya, p. 9
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Analysis of Individual Poems
In order to demonstrate the validity of the arguments above, and to further illustrate the 
developing role of Sufism in al-Bayyatl’s work and its thematic interrelation to his other concerns 
as a poet, the following section of this chapter will examine in chronological order a number of 
his poems written during the period 1964-98.
The Torment of al-Hallai (1964)
This poem was contemporaneous with Salah cAbd al-Sabur’s verse play The Tragedy o f  al- 
Hallaj, and three years subsequent to Adonis’ Elegy to al-Hallaj: all three poets used al-Hallaj 
within this short period. The title of al-Bayyatfs volume, The Book o f  Poverty and Revolution, 
hints strongly at his conception of al-Hallaj as the revolutionary champion of the poor who 
strives for justice and equality, in accordance with his own self-image. However, some critics 
have questioned the efficacy of al-Hallaj’s persona in this poem in light of the poet’s own 
comments on the purpose of the mask, arguing that insufficient characterization fails to avoid the 
pitfalls of subjectivity and imbalance between the voices of the poet and the mask.268 Using al- 
Hallaj as the inspiration for the poem, the argument goes, should not preclude a sufficient degree 
of semantic clarity and characterization that would contribute to its overall value and message. 
The poet is accused of letting his own voice dominate that of the persona to the point where the 
latter is indistinguishable and opaque, and that therefore the intended message suffocates the 
poem’s internal structure and artistic integrity. However, it seems that the motive behind the 
writing of The Passion o f al-Hallaj was not to create an account of al-Hallaj’s life: the poem falls 
somewhere between the narrative and contemplation. In many of his mask poems, al-Bayyatl 
aims not for full characterization but for a more oblique reflection of the characters’ lives. To 
explore his own experience by speaking through the character is the poet’s primary objective. 
Although al-Hallaj does not emerge as a distinct, independent character, the opacity and fluidity 
of his persona appears to be a deliberate artistic choice. It is precisely such qualities that imbue 
him with greater depth and complexity, and allow him to represent the poet’s vision of humanity.
268 Simawe, op.cit., pp. 127-32
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Coincidentally or not, the blurring of identities between poet and mask is consistent with the 
absence of boundaries in the Sufi worldview, while the use of section titles to advance the 
narrative aspects allows the poet to focus on the psychological predicament of his hero.
It is clear, both from the intertextual nature of al-Bayyatl’s poems and from the evidence of his 
autobiographical writing, that the historical and modem characters and masks used throughout 
his career are intended to converge into one universal, inspirational character whose various 
attributes transcend the boundaries of geography and temporality, the ‘faceless hero’ of 
existentialism discussed earlier. This reflects the poet’s own endless, peripatetic search for truth. 
As such, his comments on the poetic mask apply not only in this instance but also to many of the 
poems discussed hereafter:
I tried to present the “exem plary hero” in this age o f  ours, and in all ages (at the m ost critical situation o f  
his life), to explore thoroughly these ideal characters’ feelings in their most profound existential situations, 
to express the fin ite and infinite, the socia l and cosm ic ordeal that they faced, and the progression or 
transcendence o f  what they are into what they w ill be. T hese [mask] poem s therefore acquired this extra
269dim ension o f  being reborn in every new era.
Thus al-Bayyatl’s hero stands on the barzakh uniting the temporal and the eternal, becoming 
coterminous with the Sufi search for the perfect man, al-insan al-kamil. Indeed, al-Bayyati’s 
reference to mawqifuhu al-niha’T -  the extreme or ultimate situation -  implies the Sufi’s 
unification with the Divine Essence. All the different paths lead finally to the same goal, and 
cannot be absolutely differentiated: the real poet is by his very nature a revolutionary and a man 
of truth, and therefore a lover of God. This is summed up in al-Bayyatl’s definitive statement:
The death and martyrdom o f  lovers [ cu sh sh aq \ and revolutionaries and artists remains the bridge that 
human civilization must cross in order to achieve a more perfect selfhood .270
Thus it appears that by the mid-1960s the secular al-Bayyati was increasingly aware that his 
beliefs and aspirations -  the very fabric of his being -  were compatible with Sufi expression. This 
‘perfect selfhood’ fused his existentialist position with a strong sense of revolutionary mysticism:
269 al-Bayyatl, Tajribciti, p. 41
270 Ibid, p. 45
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T he idea o f  the p oem ... is that o f  the eternal struggle betw een the artist -  and his prodigious powers o f  
creativity -  and the oppressive temporal authorities -  and its tyrannical, cunning and deceitful w ays. This 
struggle ends w ith the tragic death o f  the artist, but his death, here, does not mean that his role in the 
course o f history is over. Rather, death means real birth in the course o f  history.271
A change in the structure and style of his poetic creativity belied a continuity in its underlying 
motivation. However, what al-Hallaj undergoes is no longer merely death, reflecting the finality 
of the existentialist, but rebirth, reflecting the immortality of the mystic:
For the oil in the lamp w ill not run dry, and the appointment w ill not be m issed  
The wound w ill not heal, and the seed w ill not die.272
The mystic lives, dies and is reborn in the course of the poem, reflecting the mystical 
transcendence of worldly limitations. The seed clearly symbolizes new birth, while its fulfilment, 
the tree, represents the cyclical pattern of existence and humanity’s reawakening and redemption:
The spirit o f  the unknown lover and b e lo v ed ... has been d isso lved  into the universal spirit o f  the world. 
The drops o f  blood o f  the crucified al-Hallaj have turned into oil in the lamp o f  humanity, and into a seed, 
then a tree, then a forest.273
The poem contains several references to al-Hallaj’s enlightenment and ultimate transcendence, 
such as the lamp oil. The lamp will never run out of oil: the spirit of al-Hallaj will return in all 
ages and places. Albeit suffused with anger and sorrow at m an’s tyranny towards himself, 
whereby the bringer of salvation is crucified, the poem remains optimistic and determined that 
this salvation will come. Al-Bayyatl is aware that al-Hallaj’s immolation only brings him closer 
to his goal of mystic union, and that the contemptuous throwing of his ashes into the river -  one 
of his favourite symbols for paradise -  ironically only further reunites him with his Essence. The 
physical destruction of his body, the container of his spirit, is no matter, since truth lies beyond
271 Ibid, p. 42
272 al-Bayyatl, Sifr, p. 30
273 al-Bayyatl, Tajribatl, p. 45
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the material world. Its burning and scattering represents al-Hallaj’s final abstraction and ascent 
towards the Source.
This brings us to al-Bayyati’s principal motive for the use of al-Hallaj as a historical archetype. 
The rebel mystic is highly attractive to the self-professed poet/revolutionary because he severely 
undermines the foundations of society. In this poem, al-Hallaj mystically achieves the ultimate 
victory, setting an example for those in hardship and fear under repressive regime. At the same 
time, his transcendence of human suffering and death reveals his universal human relevance. The 
final seed and lamp images provide a telling counterpoint to the first line of the poem, in which 
al-Hallaj admonishes the poet as a Sufi novice: “You have fallen into the darkness and the void.”
The poem’s trajectory, therefore, is from pessimism to optimism, from darkness to light, from the 
void of Heidegger’s Verfcillenheit to paradise regained. Part 1 sees the Sufi seeker at the 
beginning of his redemptive journey, with al-Hallaj giving him counsel and comfort in his 
malaise. Al-Bayyati depicts himself here as the modern-day seeker after truth, who has lost faith 
in the world and is returning to God for salvation. In this sense, he represents the 20th century 
Arab intellectual suffering from ‘vertigo’ as he stands at the crossroads of religion and 
modernity, stripped of freedom by his political circumstances and of security by his human 
condition. He seems to turn as a last resort to al-Hallaj, who represents the solution to both the 
political and the existential problems at the same time, teaching his pupil to penetrate the inner 
meaning of existence, where he will find God and salvation.
It is a constitutive part of al-Bayyatl’s engaged poetic project to merge the worldwide struggles 
against injustice from earliest history into the distant future -  giving birth in the process to the 
timeless exemplary hero. The poet makes a dual reference to the prophets of Islam -  ‘your 
silence: a spider’s web’ -  and Christianity -  ‘your crown: a cactus’ -  commencing an analogy 
with Christ that continues throughout the poem. The parallel between al-Hallaj and Christ adds a 
certain universality to the poem, crossing the boundaries of religion and culture. Casting the poet- 
revolutionary in the role of prophet harks back to the ancient unity between the two, as well as 
the Sufi state of baqa’, in which the mystic re-assumes a committed social role. Al-Hallaj’s story 
is thereby linked to the death of revolutionaries and martyrs both trans-temporally and trans- 
geographically, imbuing it with cosmic significance.
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Part 2 reflects al-Bayyatl/al-Hallaj’s lament for his human environment, where ‘the hungry 
workers’ bread’ has been eaten by ‘packs of wolves’. The dominant themes here are darkness, 
hunger and loneliness. Al-Hallaj calls upon God to ‘reach out your hand across the years of death 
and siege’ and ‘tear up this darkness’. The seashells function as a metaphor for the search for 
truth, the ‘kernel of the kernel’, which might relieve the gloom and sorrow:
A nd here am I, overturning seashells
That might be rose petals, carried on the wind over a corpse,
That might be ghosts.274
Part 3 allegorises those who engage with corrupt temporal power, leading ultimately to betrayal 
and disillusionment, represented by the death of the sultan’s daughter. This prompts a shift 
towards the esoteric qualities of madness and silence. In his torment the jester seeks out al-Hallaj 
for relief, but the latter, like Sheikh cAli al-Junaydl in Mahfuz’s al-Liss wa-l-Kilab, only speaks 
to him in enigmatic hints, for the path to deliverance is long and difficult.
In part 4 al-Bayyatl /al-Hallaj is released from his disturbing confrontation with the authorities 
into a dream in which he is finally unified with his Essence: ‘you are I / my wretchedness / my 
lonesomeness’. However, as al-Bayyatl cannot forget his commitment, so the dream_state is only 
temporary, and al-Hallaj wakes to find that his ‘poor brothers’, on whose behalf he has 
endeavoured, are weeping ‘in the ruins of the city’, leaving him surrounded by the sultan’s 
sycophants, eager for his demise. At this dramatic moment he feels utterly abandoned, even by 
God, and the only refuges left to him are sleep and, ultimately, death, the ‘dawn of salvation’, 
which he seems to welcome as an escape from the emptiness and insecurity of life.
The climactic fifth part again emphasizes the intimate connection between al-Hallaj and the 
wretched of the earth: the poor, the lepers, the blind and the slaves. In contrast to the sultan, al- 
Hallaj is the true king of all humanity, but no sooner has he been metaphorically crowned than he 
is desecrated by his enemies. This occasions a Christ-esque moment of doubt in al-Hallaj, a 
connection made explicit through the image of his ‘last supper’. In a sudden moment of panic, he
274 al-Bayyatl, Sifr, p. 16
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wonders whether he really will overcome his physical death, and appeals desperately to his 
Creator to rescue him from the barrenness and waste.
In part 6 -  the aftermath of al-Hallaj’s crucifixion and dismemberment -  his spirit remains alive 
despite (perhaps more so because of) the desecration of his body. His doubts are allayed, and his 
death becomes a victory, the final emancipation:
For I am free now, without rags
Free as this fire and this wind, free for ever.275
Liberation from life’s cruelty at the cost of death -  this is al-Hallaj’s message, according to al- 
Bayyati, and it is one of hope rather than nihilism. For this poet, death is the only passage to new 
life: the ashes of al-Hallaj’s body will nourish the forest of the new generation of humanity. The 
hero functions as a mythological fertility or rebirth symbol, like the Phoenix, expressing the need 
for regeneration and a new dawn in Arab life.
This poem makes telling use of the mask technique to reflect al-Bayyati’s ongoing insights into 
his exile and existence. Its structure mirrors the poet’s own experience as he finds his new inward 
direction, signalling a more subtle interpretation of revolution that fuses the personal and the 
political. The poet undergoes a new birth, from the repentance of part 1 to being ‘born in 
adulthood’ in part 3 and ‘unified’ in part 4. Ultimately, however, the political oppressors remain 
dominant and his only path to deliverance is to sacrifice his life, as al-Bayyati notes elsewhere:
Death has becom e the price for freedom and freedom the price for death.276
Therefore, while portraying what he considers a model revolutionary and a symbol of eternal 
resistance to tyranny, the poet emphasizes, through the voluntary death of the protagonist, the 
disturbing relation between freedom and mortality. For the despairing, alienated al-Bayyatl, as 
for Sufis, death will increasingly acquire a new and more optimistic connotation.
275 Ibid, p. 29
276 al-Bayyati, Tojribatl, p. 27
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Elegy to the Unborn City (1970)
This poem is a succinct example of al-Bayyatl’s revolutionary impulse viewed through a 
primordial and mystical lens. Its 19 lines contain references to nearly all the constituents of the 
mandala diagram, the most significant of which is the theme of exile from the virtuous city. Al- 
Bayyatl acknowledges that this city is ‘unborn’, i.e. it will never exist, although he cannot give up 
the search. He describes how his father -  a god-like figure -  teaches him to intuitively understand 
earthly but ephemeral phenomena: rivers, fire, clouds and mirages. The unborn city itself is a 
mirage, and therefore inevitably condemns the poet to perpetual ‘departure’ and ‘sadness’. His 
‘walking around the homes of God’s friends’ conjures the notions of the Sufis’ proximity to truth 
and the absurdity of the tawaf, the circular ritual that aims to overcome man’s exile from God. 
This is the infinite and absurd quest for absolute truth, which for al-Bayyatl takes the form of the 
perfect city. Although he continues this search for ‘on the map of the world’, he admits that it is 
‘hidden and enchanted’ and therefore unattainable. If exile on earth is his living fate, it seems the 
alternative is death or its equivalent.
The object of his search is described in mystical images -  the homes of God’s friends -  and in 
terms of ‘light,’ ‘warmth’ and ‘inner earth’, thus demonstrating the interchangeable nature of 
these motifs in his psyche (see diagram). The ‘seer’s prophecy’ is another example of the 
super_rational insights associated with mysticism, as the subsistent Sufi attains the visionary 
powers of prophethood. Al-Bayyati fuses all these ideas to sum up the absurdity of an endless 
quest for something that cannot be found. This, however, is precisely the undertaking of the Sufi.
Eve of the Sun, or the Transformations of Muhv al-DIn ibn al-cArabi in The Interpreter o f  
Desires (1971)
In this poem, a passionate eight-part expression of his deep existential angst, al-Bayyatl assumes 
the mask of the great Sufi master ibn al-cArabI, the ‘seal of God’s friends’.277 cAin Shams, the 
eye of the sun, is his beloved, and therefore by extension symbolises the divine Source of 
existence. This is unmistakeably the midpoint of the mandala, the zero-dimension epicentre of
277 Baldick, op.cit, p. 83
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cosmic energy towards which the mystical path offers a return. For the Sufis, human love is but a 
part of the all-encompassing divine love: the symbol of cAin Shams works on both levels, 
allowing al-Bayyatl to express his simultaneous search for love and truth.
Here, as in The Torment o f al-Hallaj, the devastation of man’s exile does not prevent al-Bayyatl 
from ending on a note of desperate optimism, whereby the virtuous city’s walls disintegrate:
The shadow and the mask will fall from my face and yours 
And the w alls w ill crumble.278
The poet insists that the darkness of the shadow/mask will give way to the light of truth, i.e. man 
comes face to face with God. However, this elusive unveiling -  and psychological salvation -  
seems more hope than expectation. In part 1 he describes his experience of cosmic unity, 
implying ibn al-cArabI’s doctrine of wahdat al-wujud, although here and in part 3 he also appears 
to refer to the mutual exclusivity of human life and perfection.
Part 2 makes reference to the Sufi doctrine that God revealed man as a manifestation of Himself, 
while going on to suggest that man’s worldly existence is a continuous death. This exile in the 
world is man’s blindness from the true light, and al-Bayyatl’s ibn al-cArab! is then led into this 
exile by his beloved, cAin Shams.
Part 4 expresses ibn al-cArabI’s union with God and return to the world through the metaphor of 
cAin Shams. Significantly, this union -  ‘we possessed each other’ -  occurs ‘under the Eastern 
sky’, i.e. in the direction of Sufi truth. But cAin Shams returns to Damascus, ibn al-cA rabf s 
resting place, leaving him a ‘slave in exile’, physically alive but spiritually dead, which clearly 
allegorises al-Bayyatl’s own predicament.
Damascus, this poem’s virtuous city symbol, is simultaneously near and far, reflecting the absent 
presence both of al-Bayyatl’s ideals of love and revolution and of the Sufi god: in the Qur’an 
(50:16) God is nearer to man than his jugular vein, yet simultaneously distant and intangible.
278 al-Bayyati, Qcisa'icl H ubb , p. 24
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There is a sharp contrast between ibn al-cArabi’s unitive experience and the modem torment 
experienced by the poet:
Are separation and death our destiny?
In this land without water, grass or fire 
Is all w e have the flesh o f  horses and wom en  
And the corpses o f  ideas?279
The natural and elemental images -  water, grass and fire -  refer to the inner vitality and truth in 
which the dying Arab wasteland is so lacking. Such symbols of purity stand in diametric 
opposition to the notion of flesh, symbolizing moral and physical decay, and the ‘corpses of 
ideas’ that characterise the modern Arab reality. Nothing remains for the poet but transformation 
of the self through love, but even this, he points out in Part 7, is seen as a heinous crime: the 
oppressive order condemns poets as subversive madmen.
In the final part, death is portrayed once again as the key to the virtuous city: through his death 
the Sufi master returns to Damascus, where al-Bayyati eventually found his own resting place. 
He still wonders, however, how to overcome the living death of Arab reality:
W ho w ill stop the bleeding?
A ll that w e love departs or d ie s . . .280
This image of bleeding -  a potent, recurring symbol of death and departure -  is the prelude to al- 
Bayyati’s trademark defiance in the final lines, in which the cycle of life and death is continued 
through the vision of a ‘new birth’.
The opaque relationship between the poem’s subject and the corresponding historical character is 
perhaps even more marked here than in The Torment o f al-Hallaj: by the 1970s, the poet has 
moved well away from realistic portrayals. Perhaps inevitably, there is more of al-Bayyati here 
than of ibn al-cArabi, whose presence in the poem entails something of an absence. However, the
279 Ibid, p. 20
280 Ibid, pp. 23-4
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character works as an expression of the poet’s own existential turmoil, which he skilfully weaves 
between the layers of ibn al-cArabI’s own mystical preoccupations.
Letters to the Imam al-ShafiT (1971)
In this more pessimistic poem al-Bayyati further articulates the theme of death for the sake of 
salvation, and continues to explore his exilic state. This poem, perhaps more than the earlier ones, 
defines his ideas on the cyclical, irrational nature of life and death, being and nothingness. 
Acknowledging the inevitability of lifelong exile, he conceives of his death and resurrection as a 
process through which he will finally transform his fleeting visions of the perfect city into a 
reality. In part 1 he is taken by his guide, the sheikh to his murld, to the gates of the ‘cities of 
innovation’, on whose walls he is eventually crucified, like al-Hallaj, at the end of the poem. The 
poet’s trauma is captured in images such as the nakedness of the lonely road of misery. 
Nakedness is an ambiguous theme: the denudation of the modern experience is at once the 
psychological abstraction and return to nature. Unveiling the mask of culture will restore man to 
his pure selfhood, as with the Sufi insdn kamil, but the poet cannot remove the mask: he stands at 
the gates of the city, unable to enter. ‘Do not reveal the secret,’ says the guide, recalling the 
untellable Sufi secret, before leaving the poet/lover floundering ‘in his loneliness, calling on the 
power of things.’
In contrast to his alienation, in part 3 al-Bayyati appears to proclaim a profound, almost mystical 
love for Being: ‘my heart is infatuated with all things.’ These things include ‘death’ and ‘the 
miracles of dawn’, which again suggests the rebirth archetype. Existence ideally entails a 
perpetual new dawn, always beginning afresh. As is also clear from a later poem, this rebirth is 
his permanent objective:
W e sw ore together: by the man the sun, by the lyre the woman  
Has the miracle o f  life after death taken place?281
In part 5, the city reappears in his vision of a green oasis in the desert, which inevitably turns out 
to be a mirage. The non-existent oasis leaves the poet in crisis, enveloped in darkness, waiting for
281 al-Bayyati, Sira D hatiyya , p. 81
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death so that he can reach the real oasis. His exilic predicament remains unchanged: he cannot 
enter the banquet (parts 5/6), but must await his fate at the ‘gates of [Shiraz’s] impossible’. In 
part 7, the same predicament is articulated in terms of the two separated halves of the sun, 
analogous to the lover and the Beloved. These two halves cannot be reconciled: the lover cannot 
return to his Beloved and al-Bayyati is forever denied his goal of a ‘more perfect selfhood’.
Part 8 sees the poet, in his desperation, returning to religious rituals and the image of childhood, 
and once more invoking ‘the power of things.’ His psychological needs here, it seems, can be 
fulfilled through dissolving into the essence of humanity, the most potent image of which is, for 
him, ‘the poor of the earth’ (line 4). The ‘meadow in Shiraz’, this poem’s image of Paradise, is 
bathed in light, and its gates are opened by the butterfly, a symbol of beauty and ephemerality. 
This butterfly is none other than cA ’isha, who disappears into the meadow, leaving him ‘waiting 
at the last gate’, as his guide had foretold. Thus al-Bayyati is denied in his search for 
transcendental love as for immortal Being. Like the truth, cA ’isha is always ultimately concealed.
The conclusion follows that the ‘source’, the secret of perfect selfhood, cannot be found in this 
world. As the Sufis attest, this source cannot be reified, nor therefore found. Like cA ’isha, the 
symbol for love, it is an ethereal, esoteric entity, simultaneously present and absent. Even here, 
however, al-Bayyati shows his strong sense of hope: the guide’s tears are another symbol of 
rebirth, of ‘silent nature’, only to be shattered by his own death in the final line.
Death and the Lamp (1975)
This poem signals al-Bayyatf s continuing departure from the outer realms of social and political 
critique to focus on his inner psychological turmoil. The ‘inner intellect’ is literally synonymous 
in Arabic with the esoteric: al-batin, which the poet describes here in terms of the following 
interrelated concepts: ‘pagan lands of music, black magic, sex, revolution, death.’ These pagan 
lands are also the realm of God, as he points out at the end of part 1. Another prominent motif 
here is fire, which is similar to nakedness in its ambiguity. It often symbolizes spiritual 
devastation, as in part 6; at other times it evokes the burning passion of the lover for his Beloved.
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In part 7 al-Bayyati confronts the exile of language: words are his only possible refuge, but they 
are also exiled by their very nature. Thus language and poetry are empty homes that provide no 
shelter from the threat of nothingness. Al-Bayyati dreams of creating a new language to replace 
the old, dead one. Both he and language need rebirth, as is indicated in part 8:
M y being took shape
And that shape becam e reality in the virgin language.282
This expresses his desire for rebirth into a transcendental language that will speak the truth and 
end his exile. In part 9, then, his language becomes ‘a lamp at God’s door’. Then finally the poet 
commits suicide ‘before the pole star set’, perhaps so that he can still reach God. This suicide 
seems to be a mystical journey from the non-existence of life to the real existence behind it. In 
this esoteric reality, as the Sufis attest, materiality no longer holds any value: he cathartically 
casts his possessions away, leaving only his voice at God’s door, the gate to immortality.
The Light from Granada (1979)
By the late 1970s, al-Bayyati’s poems have become haunting streams of consciousness, or, more 
accurately, streams of unconscious, for pieces such as this one are Nietzschean, dream-like 
effusions that speak of the loss of identity and the search for God in a godless world. This is one 
of al-Bayyatl’s deepest and most complex poems, in which the defiant optimism of earlier poems 
is absent. He seems to have internalised the notion of climbing a path towards esoteric truth, 
approached via the themes of love, death, birth, language and music. At the end of this disturbing 
dream-sequence only his permanent exile prevails, leaving him utterly bereft. Again, the idea that 
death is the cost for the return to lost innocence is prominent: the poet describes a rebirth in the 
Arabian desert, returning as ‘an orphan to the cave of Hlra.’ This reference to the prophet 
Muhammad sees him in his role as the original Sufi, who transcends ‘the human condition, 
circling around God and His earthly abodes.’ Here the ancient ritual of tawaf reappears to reveal 
its original meaning: to restore man from his exoteric ego to his esoteric self.
282 al-Bayyati, Hubb wa M awt, p. 180
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In part 1 al-Bayyati ascends an internal path in order to overcome the human condition. At the 
climax he sees a ‘blind musician’, a recurring theme implying that physical blindness belies 
esoteric vision, istibtdn. As with the Sufi and God, their identities fuse at the climax: the 
poet/musician raises his hand ‘in the silence of the void of things, searching for what he has lost, 
circling alone around God’. Here is the clearest acknowledgement of his loss: loss of complete 
selfhood at birth, the original pre-fall perfection that the mystic attempts to recapture by 
performing the tawaf around his heart/inner God. The climax of the path puts him ‘beneath the 
sky of a different land’, i.e. transcending his humanity, but al-Bayyati cannot stay there: ‘the 
strings still chase me in the silence of the hall.’ His climactic identification with the musician 
subsides to resume the harrowing experience of exile, his default state. He confronts the paradox 
of rebirth: the door to immortal life is a re-entry into the human condition; the irrational 
circularity of the one ‘who must leave or stay, who begins or ends his journey’ (part 2) is utterly 
bewildering. To find ‘the land of becoming’, the poet must as ever overcome the Sphinx, the 
guard of his perfect city, ‘who rejects the unknown void with a smile’. In defeat he is left with 
‘this fire’ (part 3), his unflinching desire, and the ‘agony of poets’, whose fate it is to seek what 
they will never find.
The journey continues in part 4: al-Bayyatl’s ‘manchild’ -  recalling the child archetype and Sufi 
tawakkul -  is unified in love and again loses or transcends his identity. But he is possessed by 
‘these two opposites’: trapped in the irreconcilable polarity of exoteric and esoteric. This is an 
unanswerable question, suggesting that exile is permanent: ‘He who has no house now will never 
build one.’ The climax comes once more, and al-Bayyati dissolves in his love, leaving the woman 
weeping ‘in her eternal exile’ (part 5) and the vision of Granada, the perfect city, unfulfilled.
Selections from the Torments of Farid al-Dln al-c Attar (1979)
Taken from the same volume, The Kingdom o f Grain, this poem is a similarly complex melange 
of concepts couched in more explicitly Sufi terms, specifically the wine and tavern metaphors. 
Here al-Bayyati wears the mask of the famous Persian poet cAttar, author of the long poem 
Mantiq al-Tayr, who searches for his Beloved. Again, identities fuse and the seeker sees his true 
self in the Sought, recalling the words of the famous Sufi Abu Yazld al-Bistaml:
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Y ou were my mirror; I have becom e the mirror. I see my nakedness as I render you naked before me; I 
search for you in my drunkenness and my sobriety as long as the cupbearer’s goblets speak w ithout
283tongues.
The images of mystical union in Part 1 later give way to al-Bayyatf s defiant vision of a future 
time of esoteric enlightenment when ‘man becomes mist for his brother’ and cA ’isha will rise’, 
i.e. unity/love/truth will be achieved. True to form, no sooner has this vision of cA ’isha arisen 
than it is dashed: and the poets’ lanterns are thrown ‘into the depths of wells’, thus continuing the 
reign of darkness over the light.
In claiming that ‘Only the taverner is victorious’, al-Bayyati adapts the Islamic maxim ‘La  
ghalibci ilia Allcih\ suggesting m an’s insignificance and powerlessness in relation to God. The 
sense is ambiguous, since wine is the classic Sufi metaphor for mystical intoxication. In parts 6 
and 7 the poet, in a Khayyam-esque spirit of hedonistic abandon, accepts the finitude of life, 
before he is returned to the ‘belly (batn) of the earth’ to begin the cycle of Being again. Yet still 
he cannot fully come to terms with the inevitability of death, and in part 8 entreats the taverner -  
God -  to save him from this fate. Here al-Bayyati seems tom between the existentialist view of 
human finitude and the Sufi transcendence of the human condition, whereby he can ‘become the 
mirror’. Ultimately, however, only the taverner remains, as testified in the Qur’anic verse (55:26- 
7): “Everything on earth is annihilated, but there subsists the face of your Lord”.
From cA ’isha’s Papers (1989)
In this volume, cA ’isha’s Orchard, written a full decade later, al-Bayyatl’s unattainable virtuous 
city appears as its psychological equivalent: the orchard, realm of love. While the style and 
structure of the poems has changed -  shorter and more succinct than the rambling, hallucinatory 
visions of earlier -  the underlying theme continues. By now, the search for love seems to be the 
poet’s main preoccupation, to the exclusion of his well-known socio-political concerns: hence the 
mandala appears as orchard rather than city. Love has become the Absolute, although for al- 
Bayyati, revolution and love are ultimately one. Here he describes how cA ’isha builds ‘a temple
283 Ibid, p. 248
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to love’, thus giving it religious status. As he suggests elsewhere, his ‘religion of love’, the theme 
that dominates the remainder of his career, is but a variant of the neo-Sufi paradigm:
Borges is blind
But he is better than me
For he reads sacred books
And he is not as sad as me
Because he knows every religion
And 1 know only the religion o f  love.284
Therefore this temple -  a barzakh symbol mediating world and earth -  is the place of worship for 
his ‘religion of love’. Building a temple to worship divine Love is a continuation of al-Bayyatl’s 
mystical theme of sublimating the finite into the infinite. It connects man to God/earth; this 
internal semantic circularity is symbolised by cA ’isha’s ring.
If love is the fusion of lover and Beloved into one, cA’isha is al-Bayyatl’s goddess of love, and 
she therefore takes on divine attributes. In the same volume, the poet says of her:
She transmigrated into every face 
And wandered -  sleeping in m y blood
9 3 5
A saint fleeing in the darkness. “
Just as al-Bayyatl’s al-Hallaj fulfils the archetype of the perfect man, his cA ’isha represents that 
of love. All female figures in his poems are variations of her: she remains omnipresent (and 
omniabsent) in his work, especially later on. All these different forms of cA ’isha possess the 
same essential spirit; all are masks hiding the true face of a divine Love. In this sense, the mask 
corresponds to the city walls: the barrier between external appearance and inner truth. Therefore, 
as his poems illustrate, al-Bayyati can never fully know cA ’isha.
284 al-Bayyati, Nusus, p. 78
283 al-Bayyati, Bustan, p. 52
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Birth in the Unborn Cities (1989)
In this concise expression of the paradox of his existence, the poet adapts the same Islamic 
maxim to his ‘religion of love’: ‘Only love is victorious.’ The search for love is psychologically 
analogous to the search for truth: the ‘lost Real’ is the object of both. al-Bayyatfs exile can be 
overcome through the security of love, through entering cA ’isha’s orchard. Being ‘bom in unborn 
cities’ neatly expresses his total exile, his state of existential absence. He will only truly exist in 
the perfect city, but he lives and dies in unborn cities, non-Reality. His poetry becomes a sacrifice 
to the religion of love; words and form dissolve in the search for something beyond physicality. 
The parallel between the poet’s morbid state and that of modem Arab civilization is implied here: 
his own spiritual death derives directly from that of the entire nation.
The Martyr (1989)
Here al-Bayyati articulates his philosophy of death and resurrection through the unknown martyr, 
drawing on inspiration from al-Hallaj, to Ernesto Guevara, to the Palestinian f i d d ’i. This 
philosophy fuses the revolutionary experience -  ‘transcendence through death’ -  with the 
religious one. al-Bayyatf s martyr is a Nietzschean god-man who achieves mystical perfection by 
laying down his life for others. He attains immortality through his heroic, revolutionary death, 
surpassing the finitude of ‘the peoples of the Earth’. This is a recapitulation of his previously 
expressed neo-mystical idea that lovers [cushshaq], revolutionaries and artists die to create a 
bridge towards a more perfect selfhood for human civilization. By becoming ‘united in the 
essence of God’ in death, the mortal martyr achieves immortality. Death for al-Bayyati, in his 
desperate optimism, means ‘real birth in the course of history’, since it
is not conquered by renewal; it conquers tem porally-lim ited life , but it does not conquer renew al. It 
extends it by means o f  continuation [b a q a ’], so long as that renewal is perfection and renew al along a 
straighter path. This means: revolution and death for the sake o f  revolution are in reality nothing other 
than a positive extension o f  the achievem ent o f  renewal."86
286 al-Bayyati, Tcijribati, p. 44
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To Jorge Luis Borges (1989)
By this volume al-Bayyatl’s greater poetic maturity allows him to communicate meditations on 
Being and non-Being with greater succinctness and clarity, giving these poems a new directness 
and power. This homage to the blind Borges is one his most definitive poems: candid, concise 
and unencumbered by the potentially awkward use of poetic masks. It credits him with visionary, 
esoteric powers: he can see ‘behind the door... behind the mask of myth’, i.e. the archetypal truth 
denied to exoteric vision. Borges may have no outer eye, but his inner eye (the cain individuation 
symbolism again) penetrates the mask that veils the truth. In this sense, the great Argentinian 
writer is equivalent to the one who ‘trusts in God’ and who sees ‘my other face beneath the mask 
of death... in the kingdom of exile.’ This other face, the Eastern face referred to above, is the 
esoteric truth hidden behind the ruinous exoteric mask of death that the poet must wear so long as 
he lives. Life is death, and death therefore becomes life. Since the inner eye possesses real vision, 
the poet reflects: ‘which of us is blind / in the prison of freedom?’ In keeping with the logical 
inversions, ‘prison’ is not the realm of enclosure, but that of unending open-ness, where he is cast 
off ‘in sheer isolation’, unable to restore his split selfhood to perfection.
Birth (1989)
In this lament for two of his poetic heroes, Neruda and Hikmet, the internal unity of al-Bayyatl’s 
themes is once again clear: ‘innovation, love and death are all birth’, i.e. psychological 
fulfilment. However, he must simultaneously acknowledge the irrationality and irony of his 
philosophy: this rebirth is ultimately a matter of faith, concealed from the poet himself.
cA’isha’s Orchard (1989)
Here al-Bayyati reaches the crux of the volume: cA ’isha’s orchard is none other than the 
‘enchanted’ city from which he is exiled. The ‘northern Arabs’ search in vain for entry, turning to 
sacrificial ritual in their desperation. The poet alludes to the failure of Communism in opening 
the gates -  ‘the morning star faded’ -  but what is the alternative? It might be via the river 
Khabur, perhaps indicating a mystical means of entry, but ultimately only death is the door. 
Death is simultaneously man’s salvation and his end: this is the cruel paradox. The last five lines
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suggest that the magic circle of Being is but an illusion in man’s mind. Al-Bayyati has descended 
into the endless, cyclical madness of the postmodern, from which there is no escape: human 
existence, it seems, is predicated on a void that consumes the poet from within.
Sacred Revelation (1989)
Still now, al-Hallaj, perhaps the most enduring of al-Bayyati’s personae, reappears. There is an 
unmistakeably mystical and archetypal climax to this poem: al-Hallaj ‘makes love’ to the Tigris, 
uniting his self with the water. This is his fa n a ’, his return to God, dissolving back into the source 
of his existence in order to be reborn. The true man does not die but is merely part of this endless 
revolution. As the poet says of cA ’isha, here al-Hallaj ‘ultimately dissolve[s] into the constantly
287revitalized spirit of being.’
The Face (1989)
This poem is about man’s relation to God/Being. Both the Sufi and the postmodern perspective 
see man as an unreality, a mere reflection. Here the poet affirms man’s place in the dualistic 
constellation of Being: in exile, i.e. the object, not the subject, of divine grammar.
The Secret of Fire (1989)
This poem, above all, defines the ‘religion of love’ to which al-Bayyati resorts in the shadow of 
his mortality. This religion, like all religions, is a means of overcoming death. The exoteric, 
visible half of cA ’isha he describes here simply as a woman, perhaps the ‘perfect (yet faceless) 
woman’ to complement the ‘perfect (yet faceless) man’, while the other, esoteric half lies beyond 
language: ‘inexpressible’. He has reached the point where language turns in on itself:
For words 
Escape me 
And I from them
287 Ibid, p. 45
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W e both co lla p se ...288
He nevertheless does his best to express this esoteric half in what symbolic language he has left, 
describing her in those familiarly elemental terms that bring man back to his origin: ‘the fire of 
the forests’, ‘the water of the river’, ‘the secret of fire’ and, ultimately, ‘a priestess in the temple 
of cIshtar’. This final, archetypal image revives the themes of the ancient, the natural, the earthly 
and the mystical, all of which belong inside the circle of Being, while the temple symbolizes the 
fusion of finite and infinite. Her exoteric half is visible with his outer eye, while the other half, 
like Borges, he must see with his inner eye. Thus the duality of the exoteric and the esoteric is 
combined into one unified vision. The relative brevity of such poems reflects the fact that he has 
come much closer to perfecting his vision of love: all further words are superfluous.
Lament for Hafiz of Shiraz (1998)
Hafiz of Shiraz (d. 1390) makes a fitting final hero for al-Bayyati in this poem written less than a 
year before his death, not only because he had used Shiraz, ‘city of wisdom and poetry / land of 
God’s friends’ [i.e. the Sufi ‘saints’] so often as a symbol of the virtuous city, but also because 
this Persian Sufi poet confronted the very same paradox of existence that so preoccupies him. 
Hafiz gained the epithet liscin al-ghayb, ‘The Tongue of the Unseen’, due to his visionary powers. 
We are reminded of al-Bayyatl’s goddess of love, cA ’isha, when Hafiz says:
O Lord, who is worthy to hear this subtle secret?
S h e’s w itnessed everywhere, but she’s never shown her face.289
Shiraz is the virtuous city: only those who have taken on divine characteristics may enter it, 
hence the veneration of this Sufi poet. Al-Bayyati sees Hafiz as one of few who have looked over 
the city walls into the unseen, and indeed who ‘opened a crack in the wall’ for those who wish to 
do the same. Only the visionary poets may be victorious in the struggle against time and 
mortality, which explains his description of Hafiz as having ‘died in Shiraz’. The ‘cup of 
immortal wine’ -  a clear reference to his Sufism -  cures him of the paradoxical human condition:
288 al-Bayyati, Bustan, p. 88
289 Hafiz, quoted in Chittick, Sufism, p. 153
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the implication is that al-Bayyati desires this Sufi deliverance. But ‘evening descends’: the cycle 
of life and death continues and the poet must confront his imminent departure.
At this late stage in his life, when ‘no wine is left in the ja r’, al-Bayyati seems ready to surrender 
everything to God, his salvation: ‘let us pawn the rag with my master the taverner’... ‘who will 
buy the sultan’s turban / for a bottle of wine’. ‘Hafiz the poor’ -  poor materially, rich spiritually -  
goes mad and burns into nothingness in his love for God. Al-Bayyati attests to the sole 
permanence of God, while all else perishes: ‘The cities whose cheeks I kissed / have turned to 
ashes.’ Insofar as he is human, he is finite, but insofar as he is a reflection of this God, a part of 
Being, he is infinite. Asides from leaving behind his poems, this is the only remaining way to 
transcend death. Like Hafiz, he goes mad with desire for his god, although his religion is now the 
‘religion of love’.
This religion is then consummated in a mystical union, or unitive fusion, of lover and Beloved, 
which transcends the concept of identity. This is the very act of entry into the city. Here al- 
Bayyatl’s central theme, and the mandala used here to interpret it, is once again made explicit: 
the ‘circle of magic’ is the kingdom of love. In it the body is a poem -  the outer manifestation of 
the inner truth -  while the ‘cycle of the seasons’ represents that of earthly existence itself: man, 
as part of nature, is locked in a perpetual cycle of death and rebirth.
Although al-Bayyati still dreams of a time when he, like Hafiz, enters the magic circle, he must 
now reconcile himself to his imminent death: ‘here is autumn / spreading through the gardens of 
the gods’. However, if this death is merely the prelude to ‘the fires of birth’, the struggle for 
human perfection will outlast al-Bayyati’s end, to be taken up always and everywhere by future 
poets and revolutionaries. This birth, the final word in the poem, is a desperate note of optimism 
that resonates on many levels: personal (the poet), national (Iraq), civilizational (Arab) and 
universal (humanity). What seems to be a confession of deep melancholy is therefore ignited by 
his enduring hope. He seems to recognise that the greatest progression is simultaneously a return 
to the origin: the circle goes on and on, spinning in infinity.
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The Night of Meaning (1999)
Al-Bayyati’s final published poem is a concise recapitulation of his poetic philosophy: only the 
true poets among men have been able to defeat the Sphinx who guards the virtuous city. Life is 
ultimately a journey towards death, just as Plato said that to philosophise is to learn to die. Al- 
Bayyatl has spent his whole life learning how to die, how to enter the city gates. Now that he is 
standing on the brink, the irrational nature of Being is clearer than ever: he has seen nothing and 
yet everything at the same time.
Perhaps al-Bayyati has finally reconciled himself to death in the only way he can, religiously. He 
implores God, to whom he knows he will shortly be returning, to allow him to defeat the Sphinx 
with one final magic poem of truly divine words. The night of meaning will, he is convinced, 
lead to that perennial new dawn of which all his poetry is an expression. If external vision is 
blind, then perhaps in the Unseen, to which death is the bridge, he, like Borges, Hafiz, al-Hallaj 
and his other exemplary heroes, will see all.
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Conclusion
Al-Bayyatl’s life is a search for the perfect city and the perfect existence; ultimately, for the 
perfect man. To answer this chapter’s opening question, he can indeed be considered as the 
exponent of a ‘revolutionary esoteric’ mode in his attempts to maintain a harmony between 
individual and collective salvation. What he describes as his ‘mythical-historical hero’, the 
exemplar of his mystical humanism, is highly reminiscent of the radical Iranian thinker CA1I 
SharTatTs (1933-77) ‘theomorphic man’, who is ‘a blend of Camus’ homme revolte and Ibn al- 
‘Arabi’s ‘Perfect Man” :
This ideal man passes through the very m idst o f  nature and com es to understand God; he seeks out 
mankind and thus attains God. He does not bypass nature and turn his back on mankind. He holds the 
sword o f  Caesar in his hand and he has the heart o f  Jesus in his breast. He thinks with the brain o f  Socrates 
and loves G od with the heart o f H allaj... Ideal man has three aspects: truth, good n ess and beauty -  in 
other words, know ledge, ethics and art. He is a theom orphic being ex iled  on earth: w ith the com bined  
wealth o f  love and know ledge, he rules over all b e in g s ... He is the great rebel o f  the w orld.290
Al-Bayyati’s archetype traces its intellectual genealogy to Sufism, Marxism and existentialist 
thought. If Truth is divine in Sufism, then human justice and equality, along with the poet’s 
romantic aspirations, achieve the same status for him. This occasions a sense of participation  
mystique, whereby he effectively identifies God with humanity and thereby to some extent 
reconciles his Communism with his neo-Sufism. This participation mystique is ‘an unconscious 
identity’: loss of ego-consciousness in the mass is a quasi-mystical union. Al-Bayyati’s 
humanistic instincts find their first outlet in this Communist ideal, elevating it virtually to divine 
status. However, since hopes of realizing this ideal in the Arab context are repeatedly dashed, and 
since even al-Bayyati begins to sense that the Communist revolution enslaves the individual 
within an absolutist framework, denying his freedom in both a social and a spiritual sense, he 
exhibits a gradual but unmistakeable shift from collective to individual perfection, from city to 
orchard as symbol of salvation.
290 cAll SharL'ati, quoted in Malise Ruthven, Islam in the World, (Penguin, London, 2000), p. 347
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Human perfection, the goal of the Sufi, comes about for al-Bayyati primarily through revolution 
and love. These are but two guises that manifest the sole unchanging yet ever-changing Existent 
around which his poems revolve. His al-Hallaj is a symbol of the interpretation of this Absolute 
value precisely in terms of these two values; the result is martyrdom and, perhaps, new life. Ever 
the revolutionary romantic, al-Bayyati chooses such a historical character not for his Sufi status, 
but on account of his radical principles, even if the two coincide in this instance. For him, al- 
Hallaj is an early exponent of Communist values. But his search for the Absolute, for the keys to 
the city gates, takes him far deeper than any creed or dogma. To capture the essential, pre- 
cultural elixir of Being, he reverts to mythological and mystical modes that form a bridge to the 
dawn of humanity. His extensive use of ancient mythology -  drawn from the Babylonian, 
Sumerian, Assyrian and Akkadian traditions of Iraq -  derives, like his neo-mystical tendencies, 
from the attempt to articulate the archetypal origins of mankind towards which his search for 
human perfection pushes him. Expression of archetypal experiences requires this metaphorical 
language that is the preserve of mysticism and myth, as Jung notes:
It is .. .  to be expected  o f  the poet that he w ill resort to m ythology in order to g ive his experience its most 
fitting exp ress ion ... The primordial experience is the source o f  his creativeness; it cannot be fathom ed, 
and therefore requires m ythological im agery to g ive it form. In itself it offers no words or im ages, for it is
291a vision seen “as in a glass darkly” . It is merely a deep presentiment that strives to find expression.
However, if this chapter has demonstrated the circular nature of al-Bayyati’s thought, whereby 
love, revolution and death all coterminously represent mystical union and therefore can be 
expressed in analogous terms, then the mandala always remains incomplete, in accordance with 
the postmodern paradigm. Like the Sufi God, it is present but also at the same time mysteriously 
and irrevocably absent: the ‘unseen’ is unknowable. This paradox fires the poet’s tragic urge to 
continue an apparently hopeless quest. The pregnant tension between the m andala 's  logical 
opposites -  exile/hom e, oppression/revolution, fragm entation/unity , separation/love, 
mortality/immortality, exoteric/esoteric, and so on -  is the source both of his psychological 
trauma and his artistic creativity, caught as he is in the never-ending search for unity between 
them, while the ambiguity of Sufi language allows for simultaneous expression of more than one 
polarity. The poet comes to regard poetry as the creative fusion of these two aspects of reality,
291 Jung, Modern Man, p. 168
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akin to the alchemical fusion of opposites to produce a new and distinct product. In the process, 
the nature of fundamental issues such as exile, death and meaning is illuminated.
There can be no doubt then that al-Bayyati’s ever-recurring city/orchard motif is psychologically 
equivalent to the mandala symbols of Eastern religions that bear clear philosophical relations to 
Sufism. In his discussion of the Anthropos, or perfect man, archetype (see Introduction) in the 
context of a comparative analysis of psychology and religion, Jung notes an instance in which 
The Anthropos himself is the city and his members are the four gates. The Monad is but a spark 
of light, an atom of the Deity.’292 Al-Bayyatl’s city of light is, likewise, the symbol of his psychic 
disposition, simultaneously incorporating the archetypal al-insan al-kdmil of Sufism, the leftist 
radical’s vision of the perfect state, and the psychological refuge from his exilic state.
As Jung points out elsewhere, mandalas ‘often represent very bold attempts to see and put 
together apparently irreconcilable opposites and bridge over apparently hopeless splits... The 
mandala affords protection against extreme opposites; that is, the sharpness of the conflict is not 
yet realised or else is felt as intolerable. The protective circle then guards against possible 
disruption due to the tension of opposites.’293 Al-Bayyatf s city/orchard plays precisely this role: 
it is a protective circle against the vulnerability and insecurity of exile, a symbol of unity in the 
face of political fragmentation and psychological disintegration. Freedom can be, in the poet’s 
own words, a ‘prison’, while the mandala, conversely, ‘shows the divine power before the 
creation’ -  before the fall from the paradise of unconsciousness for which the Sufi path offers a 
remedy -  and in it ‘the opposites are still [or once more] united. The god rests in the point.’ Al- 
Bayyatl’s city, in other words, fulfils the psychological function of the Sufi God.
Since Sufism is the search for the Absolute, al-Bayyati’s own existential experience -  his quest 
for truth and salvation -  begins inevitably to mirror the Sufi experience. In the Sufi lexis, 
therefore, he finds the capacity to express this quest, and Sufism functions as a route into the city 
to discover the esoteric secret of immortality. Thus a poet who initially rejected everything
Jung, Psychology, p. 70
293 Jung, Archetypes, pp. 367-90
134
beyond the scope of “reality” as a dangerous diversion came eventually to seek a reconciliation 
between this reality and the unattainable infinity that lies beyond it.
Al-Bayyati’s long physical exile was merely the outer shell of a profound and inescapable 
existential exile. His mystical tendencies should also be considered in the context of the modem 
Arab history through which he lived: at the apex of his alienation and despair, when no apparent 
alternative remains, the poet’s hazardous and tragic journey turns inwards and probes the deepest 
recesses of the psyche in search for certainty, faith, and love, for some unmovable permanence 
that might offer a spiritual home and hope of new life. His own acute personal experiences of 
exile directly contributed towards his conceptualisation and profound investigation of the 
universal spiritual exile of the modern age. In Sufism, then, al-Bayyati finds a very suitable 
framework to express of his human quest for individuation: the constant struggle between exile 
and the kingdom, death and life, separation and love, belies a universal dialectic between the Real 
and the unreal, God and the world. In his despair at his experience as a politically committed 
Iraqi, at the state of modern Arab civilization, and at the human condition universally, the 
esoteric journey offered some hope of relief and transcendence.
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CHAPTER 2: TH E TH EISTIC EX ISTENTIALIST
SALAH CA B D  A L -SA B U R ’S N EO -SU FISM
‘No one knows the dignity of Man and his place in the universe except those who know how to
contemplate God perfectly.’ -  ibn al-cArabI
This chapter will examine the life and work of the late Egyptian poet Salah cAbd al-Sabur (1931- 
81) with reference to his increasingly strong inclination towards Sufism. An erudite, widely-read 
and deeply contemplative man, his unique humanist philosophy was clearly influenced by 
mystical ideas. His poems and plays, which span a 22-year period, are a direct animation of his 
meditation on man’s struggle to reconcile inner and outer experiences. The analysis begins by 
addressing cAbd al-Sabur’s ideas on Sufism and self-knowledge, and his theory of poetic 
creativity and mystical imagination, which form the foundations of his philosophy. This will be 
followed by an investigation of his play The Tragedy o f  al-Halldj, in which the themes of 
individual and collective perfection, human choice and responsibility, ideology and ijtihad are all 
prominent. Finally, the relation between existentialism and mysticism will be examined in the 
context of his religious quest, with analysis of some relevant poems. To show the commonality 
between two very different poets, the conclusion will entail the same critical apparatus as that 
used previously.
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Sufism and Self-Knowledge
W hen Socrates said ‘Know your s e l f ,  he changed the course o f  hum anity, for this philosopher was 
attempting to divide up the great existential particle known as mankind, the confluence o f w hose elem ents 
w e call ‘so c ie ty ’, and the m ovem ent o f w hich w e g ive the name ‘history’, and w hose m om ents o f  ecstasy  
w e know as ‘art’.294
So Salah cAbd al-Sabur begins his autobiographical work My Life in Poetry, published twelve 
years prior to his premature death in 1981. cAbd al-Sabur’s life can be seen as a desperate 
attempt to fulfil this ambition, which explains his inclination towards Sufism, the quest for self- 
knowledge in an Islamic context. He later summed this up by saying:
. . . I  love  the Sufi experience... because it is very sim ilar to the artistic experience. W riting poetry is a 
form o f ijtih ad295... The Sufis said that man travels along the m ystical path, performs ijtih ad  and devotes 
h im self to the service o f God, so that som ething might open itse lf to him. This opening is nothing but a 
revelation from God."96
From the perspective of the Sufi idea of wahdat al-wujud, the importance of ‘knowing the se lf is 
paramount. Indeed, one of the principle meanings of the term wujud is ‘finding’, or ‘presence’, 
and ‘the way of finding is “to know ourselves” in order to know God, of which we are, ibn al- 
cArabT insists, in reality, no other.’297 In his quest for self-knowledge, which for the Sufis is 
coterminous with knowledge of God, cAbd al-Sabur therefore subscribes to the Akbarian298 logic 
of the unity of existence.
This same logic dictates that ‘individuals have no self other than what they are with God, and all 
of what they are belongs to God, not to them. Our true and proper self is no self at all, that is, no 
self of our own.’299 According to Chittick, the problem with much modem thought is that the 
‘s e lf , or nafs, is reified, given specific, identifiable characteristics, when in fact its only
294 Salah cAbd al-Sabur, Hciycitlfi al-Shicr, (Dar al-cAwda, Beirut, 1969), p. 5
29:1 Ijtihad is an Islamic term referring to individual intellectual or spiritual effort.
296 Salah cAbd al-Sabur, ‘Tajribatl fi al-Shicr’, Fusul 1981, p. 18
297 Peter Coates, Ibn Arabi and Modern Thought: The History of Taking Metaphysics Seriously, (Anqa, Oxford,
2002), p. 32
298 ‘Akbarian’ is the adjective relating to ibn al-cArabi, ‘al-Shaykh al-Akbar’
299 Chittick, Sufism, p. 46
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characteristic is that it has none, as in al-Junayd’s maxim: ‘the water takes on the colour of the 
container’. The Sufi conception of the self sees it as ‘unknown and indefinable’, making self- 
knowledge no small task. Likewise, Coates asserts that for ibn al-cArabI, ‘the human self is to be 
properly viewed as essentially and unequivocally a point of vision... which acts as a mirror in the
300unitive Divine act of Self-Expression.’ In other words, self-knowledge is a point at which 
one’s consciousness is fully attuned to God’s Self-disclosure according to wahdat al-wujud, 
which may be achieved via the mystical path. Wahdat al-wujud is a philosophy of perfect balance 
and total reconciliation between the complementary poles of esoteric and exoteric, both on a 
cosmic and personal level. In order to experience this unity of existence, therefore, the individual 
must eliminate all conflict or duality within the self, reconciling esoteric and exoteric aspects and 
becoming ‘a witnessing isthmus [barzakh] which expresses and synthesizes both the Divine and
301 —the Human aspects of the single unique reality.’ This is cAbd al-Sabur’s ultimate objective in 
his discussion of self-knowledge, and he sees the poet or artist as the archetype of the perfect 
man, since ‘the human self, with its various sensibilities, can only be known through art.’302
However, given his fascination with mystical thought, it is ironic that cAbd al-Sabur chooses to 
begin with Socrates, the forefather of Western rationalism, whose emphasis on logical proofs 
moved philosophy away from ancient irrationalists such as Heraclitus. Socrates’ insistence on 
reaching truth through debate presupposes an ontological duality between what cAbd al-Sabur 
refers to as the ‘observing self’ and the ‘observed self’, whereas ibn al-cArabI would argue that 
this distinction does not exist. The dichotomy here lies between the respective methods towards 
self-knowledge: rational/exoteric or super-rational/esoteric. From a Sufi perspective, Socrates 
effectively cut man off from his inner truth, thereby indeed changing the course of humanity, as 
LAbd al-Sabur points out. Nevertheless, following Socrates, cAbd al-Sabur discusses the relation 
of poetry to self-knowledge:
The m eaning o f  self-reflection is not for man to turn in on h im self, but that the se lf becom es an axis for 
im ages o f  being and o f  things, and through se lf-reflection  man exam ines his relationship with these  
th in gs...T h e  poem  is a kind o f tripartite dialogue that begins as an idea in the mind o f the poet, w ho is 
unaware that it has descended from a source higher than man. For the Greeks it was a divine inspiration,
300 Coates, op.cit, p. 124
301 ibid, p. 125
302 c Abd al-Sabur, Hciycitl, pp. 38-9
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with Plato arguing that the poets’ poem s and the soothsayers’ prophesies shared the sam e source, and that 
the poet sings not with the power o f art but with that o f  the gods.303
W hat is significant here is cAbd al-Sabur’s belief that knowledge of the world comes about 
through self-knowledge, so that man’s relationship with exterior reality is transformed through 
his own self-reflection. This is indicative of a modern interpretation of Sufism as a force for 
human liberation.
303 Ibid, pp. 6-7
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The Structural Identity of Poetic Creativity and Mystical Imagination
cAbd al-Sabur therefore alludes to the divine origin of his art. Such ideas are reminiscent of the 
work of Izutsu and Adonis, who trace all creative and imaginative expression back to a single 
esoteric source. Likewise, classical Sufi thought sees the cultural product of poetry as a merely 
secondary or exoteric reflection of the primary Source. °Abd al-Sabur is well aware of this when 
he describes poetic inspiration as a movement from esoteric inspiration to exoteric expression:
There is, then, an original idea that arrives in the mind, bursting forth suddenly like a flash o f  lightning, 
w hich w e strive to catch and pin down into word form, through w hich it gains material existence... Here it 
is necessary to exam ine this idea that springs from the calm  recesses o f  the self, w hich is confined by its 
languor and yearns to becom e self-aware. And from one peaceful w ave to another arises a w hirlpool that 
wants to acquire form so that it w ill not lose its existence in its random spinning around itself.304
This idea that great art is the product of the artist’s journey into isolation and self-contemplation 
is very much consistent with the conceptions of poetic inspiration promulgated by classical Sufi 
poets. For cAbd al-Sabur, then, poetic creativity can be divided into three stages, which he 
compares to three levels of self-awareness achieved on the mystical path. The first of these is 
called al-warid  -  the poem in its initial stage of formless inspiration -  which cAbd al-Sabur, in 
mystical fashion, points out ‘must fully immerse the heart’. He supports this idea by reference to 
classical Sufi literature:
Dhu al-Nun, God bless him, said: ‘a l-W a rid  is truth that has com e to rouse up hearts’ .. .  A l-Q ushayrl tells 
us in his R isa la  about another expression used by the Sufis, and that is signs and stars and flashes, as a 
defin ition  for those rapid ideas w hose source is unknown to man and w hich live in the course o f  his 
conscious mind, produced not so much by mental effort as by a condition o f mental clarity. They are like  
thunderbolts, disappearing as soon as they appear... That w hich leaves its influence is the w d rid .  The 
word w d r id  has a more specific meaning than hads  [intuition] as used by philosophers like Bergson in his 
introduction to m etaphysics... Bergsonian intuition can be useful to interpret great intellectual leaps, but 
not to interpret psychic leaps, for these must be interpreted by a special concept not found am ong the 
philosophers but among the authorities o f spiritual endeavour o f  the prophets and Sufis.
304 Ibid, p. 8
140
T he poem  as w d r id  m ight occur when the starting point o f  the p o em ... returns to the mind, and the poet 
h im self can barely decipher its meaning. It may arrive at any tim e ... w ith barely any prior n o tice ... The 
poet finds that this w d r id  might open the w ay to a poem , so  he repeats it over and over until one route 
becom es clear. Then the incubation o f the poem  is com plete and the se lf  wants to show  itse lf  in its
305mirror.
Thus cAbd al-Sabur rejects Western concepts of intuition and links poetic creativity explicitly to 
the spiritual self-knowledge of prophets and mystics. Rational thought is implicitly demoted to a 
secondary status behind the irruption of divine truth. If the wdrid involves direct esoteric 
inspiration, the poet must aim to make himself receptive to such inspirations, i.e. to gain self- 
knowledge. From here cAbd al-Sabur moves on to the second stage of poetic creativity, which is:
the poem  as an action fo llow ing  and emanating from  the w d r id  stage, for the latter, as the Sufis tell us, 
m ust be fo llo w ed  by som e actio n ... This is the stage o f  a l - ta lw in  wa a l- tam kin  [co lou rin g  and  
consolidation], about which al-Qushayri says:
“A s long as the servant remains on the path he com es to the stage o f  talwln,  because he ascends from state 
to state and m oves from one characteristic to the next, leaving one stage (the p lace o f  departure) and 
arriving at a m eadow (the place o f spring and p rotection )...”306
In the second stage, therefore, so long as the poet has the requisite strength of mind and spirit to 
maintain his trajectory, a point of consolidation is reached. This is the difficult stage in which the 
poet attempts to transform his flashes of inspiration into coherent written material. cAbd al-Sabur 
clearly sees it as analogous to the Sufi path:
there is a source som ew here that the poet tries to attain in the course o f  this exhausting journey, and the 
su ccessfu l poet is the one w ho is able to advance som e w ay towards this source until he com es into 
contact with it, at which point he is separated from h im self or the se lf  is separated from itse lf in order to 
becom e aware o f  i t . .. or we could say that the se lf has becom e split into observed and observing se lf.307
303 Ibid, pp. 8-10
306 Ibid, p. 11
307 Ibid, p. 11
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In his view, therefore, the successful poet manages to leave his bodily self behind and become 
completely identified with the spiritual self, just like the Sufi who manages to stay on the 
mystical path. From this universal vantage point, fully immersed in his own subjectivity, the poet 
is able to view things as they are, since external objectivity is by definition impossible. This is the 
logic behind cAbd al-Sabur’s statement that ‘all good art is subjective and objective at the same 
tim e’, fulfilling the Sufi simultaneity principle.308 To corroborate this, cAbd al-Sabur refers to 
frequent comparisons between artistic composition and the Sufi journey, adding that ‘in my early 
days I felt that the poetic journey is that of meaning to the poet, not of the poet to meaning.’ This 
re-emphasizes his point that creative imagination is akin to a divine gift, offered to each 
individual who is ready to receive it. He identifies Sufism as the strand of Islamic culture that 
attempted to find existential meaning in this way, which explains the usefulness of its ready­
made terminology for his own theory of poetic creativity. cAbd al-Sabur justifies his appeal to 
Sufism by arguing that:
the Sufis were the first to point out that the spiritual experience is sim ilar to the journey. They saw their 
striving towards the truth as an exhausting journey full o f  surprises and anxieties on a long and lonely path 
which could bring the traveller to a happy end, if  God agreed and w ished. One o f  them says: “The journey  
o f  the seekers ends in the overcom ing o f  their sou ls, for if  they overcom e their souls then they have  
arrived [at G od].” This statement refers not only to the em otional experience, but also to the objective o f  
artistic endeavour, w hich is precisely overcom ing the s o u l .. .309
In this process cAbd al-Sabur refers to the artist’s desire for the self’s realisation of its self, 
recalling the Sufi vision of one unique divine source engaged in a constant process of Self­
disclosure. For the individual poet, in his view, the construction of a poem is but a symbolic 
microcosm of this cosmic event, the unlocking of the inherent truth of existence. In such a 
process the poet is given almost unique status alongside prophets and mystics as those who have 
reached sufficient self-awareness to knowingly participate in this unveiling.
For cAbd al-Sabur, then, the process of artistic endeavour is structurally identical with the 
journey of the mystic towards his god, and the ultimate goal of both is identification with truth
308 Ibid, p. 37
309 Ibid, pp. 15-16
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and meaning. The stage of the mystical path in which the seeker returns from his state of ecstasy 
towards external consciousness is therefore equivalent to his third stage of poetic creativity, 
which is ‘the return of the poet to his normal state prior to the arrival of the wdrid , prior to his 
plunging into the journey of al-talwin wa al-tamkin. At that point the poet cuts off the dialogue to 
begin judgement, and his critical powers are revealed in his rereading of his poem so he may see 
where he went wrong.’310 Here the poet takes a dispassionate view of the results of his esoteric 
journey, tightening and editing it according to established poetic criteria. In his state of 
transformed consciousness he ‘may restore or erase, put forward or back, change expressions, 
switch lines around and so on in order that the final form of the poem is completed, which is its 
artistic secret’.311 This return to the exoteric domain of language and social interaction recalls the 
Sufi state of baqa’, and the resulting poem is the linguistic symbolisation of the journey.
Furthermore, cAbd al-Sabur implicitly compares the Nietzschean distinction between the 
‘impulsive spontaneity... ecstasy and drunkenness’ of Dionysus and the ‘reason, strategy and 
exactitude’ of Apollo to the Sufi distinction between batin (esoteric) and zahir (exoteric). He then 
expands this assessment of Greek tragedy to all disciplines, not least poetry, in which the ideal 
work should ‘serve both these masters at the same tim e... whereby one part should not 
compromise the harmony of all the other parts and its synchronization with them is closed.’312 
This closure appears to represent a token of artistic integrity and accomplishment for cAbd al- 
Sabur. Despite the perceived need for form in creating successful poetry, the inspirational aspect 
-  codified in the Sufi technical terms al-warid  and al-talwin wa al-tamkin -  show that the 
esoteric dimension still maintains precedence in his philosophy, even if it requires externalising 
to acquire complete meaning:
The poet, then, is in need o f  a transformation from an inner view point, or what som e critics call, using a 
psychological term, profound self-know ledge (al-istibtan al-dhati),  to an outer v iew  on life and the world. 
Poetry thereby becom es not just a personal experience lived  by the poet with his feelings and em otions, 
but also one that stretches out to becom e an intellectual experience as w ell, including an attempt to take a 
position on the world and life in general.313
310 Ibid, p. 18
311 Ibid, p. 18
312 Ibid, pp. 19-20
313 Ibid, p. 35
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As Reuven Snir314 has pointed out, cAbd al-Sabur’s theory is fairly arbitrary in its selection of 
Sufi sources and somewhat liberal in interpreting them. However, what is significant here is this 
modem poet’s self-conscious examination of his poetic inspiration and method using the analogy 
of the mystical experience. For the philosopher, truth is an intellectual value; for the mystic, it is 
something qualitatively different, requiring a quantum leap beyond the tenets of grounded logic. 
cAbd al-Sabur effectively joins the poststructuralist anti-philosophers in the Nietzschean tradition 
when he proposes that this truth cannot be attained through normal rational means, although 
unlike them, he appears to still believe it exists.
cAbd al-Sabur makes much of the confusion that can result from sustained intellectual endeavour, 
something to which his own method of argumentation bears testimony. His attempts to synthesize 
so much thought into a single scheme produce a slightly strained mixture of ancient Greek 
philosophy (Socrates, Plato, Aristotle), modem Western philosophy (Nietzsche and Kierkegaard) 
and classical Sufi thought (al-Qushayrl, al-Sarraj al-TusI, ibn al-cArabI). However, despite its 
methodological peculiarities, his subjective theory of poetic creativity clearly intersects with that 
of other modern poets and thinkers. His suggestion that poetry is the manifestation of a hidden 
divine truth is comparable to the Adonisian view of poetry as a creative bridge between esoteric 
and exoteric. To this extent, it contains a religious aspect, although it is only the inner dimension 
of this experience that drives artistic inspiration. cAbd al-Sabur himself suggests that Nietzsche’s 
Uberman (a Western insdn kcimil) achieves his unique and independent status through a process 
of Sufi-esque ‘resolution and discipline’. He sees the perfect man as one who must give ‘a noble 
answer to the lacking of his age’, the ‘age of lost truth’, which is an omnipresent concern in his 
work. In this lament for the spiritual barrenness of the age, of which he sees Nietzsche’s 
Zarathustra and his own al-Hallaj as examples of inspired human responses, he was much 
influenced by Eliot, and in particular by The Wasteland, which he ironically depicts in his 
autobiography as standing in the dock, accused of corrupting the concept of ‘progress’.315
314 Reuven Snir, ‘The Poetic Creative Process According to Salah cAbd al-Sabur’, in Ami Elad, ed, Writer, Culture, 
Text: Studies in Modern Arabic Literature, (York, Fredricton, 1993)
313 cAbd al-Sabur, Haydtl, pp. 61-3
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Individual and Collective Perfection in The Trasedv of al-Hallai
The question of moral opposites has a profound bearing on the quest for individuation and 
selfhood. These opposites are not only polarities but also complementarities, devoid of meaning 
without their respective others: the existence of a ‘self’ always presupposes an ‘other’ without 
which it would be meaningless. An orthodox society defines itself in opposition to certain 
prescribed ‘others’, who by their particular characteristics are excluded from truth. From the 
opposite perspective, it is the orthodox who, by virtue of their collective identity, are exiled from 
truth, just as man is alienated from God prior to mystical purification. The Sufi who is baql 
billdh, subsistent in God, recognises no separation between his own identity and that of God: he 
bears witness to the continuum of wahdat al-wujud. He has transcended the rational division 
between ‘se lf and ‘other’. However, for the neo-Sufi, individual perfection is impossible without 
collective perfection, since there is ultimately no separation between the microcosmic and 
macrocosmic self. One living in an imperfect society cannot himself be perfect, as al-Hallaj 
makes clear in the play. To perfect the self, therefore, requires interaction with others to change 
the nature of the social environment. But does this give him the right to act in God’s name?
This is the theoretical background to cAbd al-Sabur’s most important play, The Tragedy o f al- 
Hallcij (1965). Its protagonist faces these questions of social responsibility as an extension of his 
own question for individuation. If truth is by nature esoteric, but society exoteric, how to 
reconcile the discontinuity between individual and collective selfhood? If the individual self can 
be perfected through fa n a ’ or annihilation of the ego, then baqa \  the prophetic consciousness, is 
the key to collective perfection. But orthodox Islamic society is predicated on Muhammad’s 
status as the ‘seal’ of the prophets, and anything that undermines this must by definition be 
apostasy.
The crux of cAbd al-Sabur’s play is the perfection of collective selfhood as a logical and moral 
extension of the perfection of individual selfhood. Al-Hallaj aims to reach God through mystical 
annihilation (fana’) and subsistence (b a q a ’). As the introduction chapter showed, the latter 
requires a return to society to rid it of the very same imperfections, illusions and contradictions -  
the constructed ‘self’ -  of which he had previously purged his own individuality. The 
strengthened, visionary selfhood he has achieved in reaching the stage of baqcT supposedly
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endows him with the ability to act in truth. The underlying paradox here is that men can only 
perfect themselves from within, not by external influence. But al-Hallaj’s individual truth, and its 
radical message, is surely worthier than the institutional ‘truth’ in whose name the corrupt 
government functions. The fact that he must die explains cAbd al-Sabur’s profoundly 
melancholic persuasion and existential pessimism. Confronting himself with the stark fact that 
society cannot be perfected, he then illustrates it by portraying a man who tries to achieve it and 
is sentenced to death by that very same society.
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Choice and Responsibility in The Tragedy o f al-Hallai
Related to the omnipresent undercurrent of self-knowledge in much of cAbd al-Sabur’s work are 
the two important ethical variables of choice and responsibility. The act of choice is an existential 
determinant, a definition of selfhood: by consciously choosing certain actions as opposed to 
others man specifies his identity and individual existence. Here cAbd al-Sabur was clearly at 
pains to emphasize the (perhaps inadvertent) complicity of the masses in their own misfortune, 
unable to see themselves as free moral agents. The play begins and ends with a candid admission 
that it was they who really condemned al-Hallaj. In their inability or unwillingness to act 
independently, and by compliantly repeating the self-serving propaganda from the authorities, 
they seal their own fate:
They said, “Shout ‘Heretic! H eretic!’”
W e shouted, “Heretic! H eretic!”
They said, “Shout ‘Let him be killed, his blood be on our heads!’”
W e shouted, “Let him be killed, his b lood be on our heads!”
Then they said “G o.” And we went.316
As a social and human critique, cAbd al-Sabur’s play shows that the individuals who collectively 
constitute society cannot avoid their responsibility for the nature of that society and its regulatory 
institutions. The poet highlights the absurdity of the categorisation of political opponents in a 
religiously sanctioned order as ‘heretics’, since it is precisely they who have the potential for 
progressive change and human emancipation. This was a clear challenge to the dominant 
discourse in Egyptian society, based on the faltering Nasserist ideology that suffered its fatal 
blow shortly afterwards in 1967. Al-Hallaj’s hero-status revolves precisely around his being 
rejected as a heretic, resisting the unholy alliance of discourse and power. A heretic in this 
modem sense undermines the prevailing ideology and foretells of its imminent destruction.
The play can therefore be seen in the light of the Foucauldian analysis of discourse-based identity 
creation and the general poststructuralist concept of the socially and culturally constructed self. In 
this regard the concepts of fa n a  ’ and baqci ’ take on meanings beyond their original Sufi
316 Salah ^Abd al-Sabur, Murder in Baghdad, tr. K. Semaan, (Leiden, Brill, 1972), p. 5
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designation, corresponding to the poststructuralist deconstruction of the ‘self’ and an imagined 
‘reconstruction’ beyond it. If poststructuralist philosophy, by deconstructing all beliefs, tends 
inevitably towards a solipsistic ethereality, this is equivalent to the Sufi remaining in a state of 
fa n a ’, absorbed in God and utterly lacking in any individual selfhood or active personal identity. 
But for a committed modem writer like cAbd al-Sabur this cannot be a coherent ethical position. 
In the words of his revived, neo-Sufi al-Hallaj:
Suppose w e manage to avoid the world.
H ow  shall w e deal with ev il then?
How  can I c lose  my eyes to the world,
And not wrong my own heart?317
So al-Hallaj chooses to take responsibility for his fellow men by demanding justice, despite the 
dire personal consequences. In his prose writings cAbd al-Sabur places a very strong emphasis on 
human responsibility, particularly that of the artist, whom he claims must ‘feel an intimate 
connection with the [intellectual and spiritual] heritage of the world’ in order to ‘realise his role 
as a responsible human being.’318 In a revealing passage concerning his religious persuasions, he 
further defines his vision of human responsibility:
M an’s responsibility is to g ive  both form and purity to ex isten ce sim ultaneously. H is long struggle is 
merely an attempt to im m erse the mind in matter, and to create total balance and harmony, w hich  he can 
ultimately offer to God as authentication o f  his life on earth.319
Here he recognises the need for balance between essence (esoteric) and form (exoteric), and 
implies that the world can only be bettered through self-knowledge. Accordingly, inner personal 
truth is the catalyst for outer social justice. cAbd al-Sabur’s unswerving belief in man’s collective 
responsibilities for himself and his environment finds expression in his revived al-Hallaj, an 
exponent of free will, human accountability and responsible, dynamic mysticism. Al-Hallaj
317 Ibid, pp. 12-13
318 c'Abd al-Sabur, Hayatl, p. 79
319 Ibid, p. 87
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embodies the balance between essence and form. In an attempt to tie his philosophy together, 
c Abd al-Sabur then links responsibility explicitly to the need for self-knowledge:
T he p innacle o f  truth is truth w ith the se lf, w hich  entails man understanding and being aware o f  his 
existence, know ing his position on life, and bearing his role and the burden o f  his existence regardless o f  
how  harsh it may be.320
320 Ibid, p. 88
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Dynamic neo-Sufism in cAbd al-Sabur’s al-Hallaj
For cAbd al-Sabur’s al-Hallaj an individually perfect self in an imperfect society is a 
contradiction in terms. This implies the concept of baqd’, which explodes the duality of esoteric 
and exoteric into wahdat al-wujud. If al-Hallaj is a Sufi, then Sufism is a dynamic and liberating 
force. His religious devotion is matched only by the strength of his call to action against injustice. 
Like al-Bayyatl, cAbd al-Sabur’s concern is man’s interaction with the outer world. He cannot 
condone a retreat from the world into inaction and solipsism; to remain ensconced in fana  ’ would 
be to acquiesce in human injustice and therefore be as guilty as its perpetrators. This is the reason 
why al-Hallaj goes beyond the Sufism of his erstwhile comrades into the true subsistence in God:
You mean this cloak?
If it is a chain on my limbs
Which keeps me in my house, amid deaf walls,
And prevents my friends from hearing my words,
1 w ill abandon it, I w ill cast it off!
0  Shaykh! If it is a veil w oven from our “w e are this and w e are that'’
In order to hide us from the people -  and thus be hidden from God,
1 w ill abandon it! I w ill cast it off!
W itness my oath O God:
This is Your Vestment,
The mark o f  our servitude to You,
I abandon it! I cast it off, so that You may be pleased with me!
W itness, God!
W itness, G od!321
It is clear that in his quest for truth cAbd al-Sabur’s al-Hallaj embodies the characteristics 
exemplified by the perfect man of classical Sufism: a balance of individual spiritual distinction 
and the dynamic prophetic consciousness. This divine equilibrium is reflected in al-Hallaj’s 
opening lines:
321 cAbd al-Sabur, Murder, p. 22
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I am explaining to you
W hy the M erciful Lord chooses particular people,
S ingles them out and distributes among them glimmers o f his light.
They are chosen so that they can g ive balance to this sick w orld .. .322
This idealised al-Hallaj stands alongside the Marxist al-Bayyatf s revolutionary insan kcimil, who 
bridges the esoteric and exoteric domains. If for Marx our mission was not to understand the 
world but to change it, then for cAbd al-SabOr, changing the world before achieving self- 
knowledge is the path towards darkness and oppression.
Integral to cAbd al-Sabur’s understanding of Sufism, then, is the notion that divine truth must be 
externalised; indeed, this is the culmination of the mystical journey. From a modem perspective, 
the annihilated mystic is guilty of the same hyprocrisy of those who criticize the political 
authorities but fail to act. Al-Hallaj’s socio-political concerns outweigh his spiritual qualities:
The poverty o f  the poor;
The hunger o f  the hungry;
In such eyes as theirs, I see a glow
W hich means som ething -  som ething -  but I don’t know what.
W ords g low  in their eyes: I am not sure what they mean.
Som etim es I think I read there;
“N ow  you see me;
But you are afraid to see me
123God curse your hypocnsy.
These authorities are depicted as authoritarian and ideological throughout, purveyors of a rough 
official justice. c Abd al-Sabur repeatedly emphasizes the effects of their deceptive propaganda on 
the masses:
And the chained prisoners, a mad guard stands over them,
Whip in hand;
Ibid, p. 11
323 Ibid, p. 12
151
W ho knows who put it there? N ot he -  
He raises it over the back o f  his charges,
M en and wom en enchanted, forgetting the freedom which they lost.
They look at authorities as though at gods, forsaking G od.324
cAbd al-Sabur implies that the state ideology, with its self-perpetuating propaganda machine, has 
reduced people to false, secondary goals, a notion he aligns very closely with the classical 
Islamic sin of shirk, polytheism. This idea that false gods have obscured man’s vision of the truth 
is comparable to the discourse used simultaneously by radical Egyptian Islamists, who were 
equally critical of the political authorities. Although cAbd al-Sabur’s conception of God may 
differ radically from that of the Islamist intellectuals, their criticisms are remarkably similar. 
Whether the concept of shirk is used here as a literary tool to express the shortsightedness of the 
masses, or it has achieved a wider connotation in the modem Egyptian milieu, it is adaptable to 
secular as well as religious critiques of the status quo. For al-Hallaj, the Sufi, shirk is sin:
A question perplexed me:
Is associating other B eings with God preordained?
Otherwise, how w ould I worship Him alone?
And concentrate my thought on Him alone?
In order that I be free from fear,
And feel secure.325
Here °Abd al-Sabur expresses his own existential doubts and insecurities, implying that the Sufi 
path may be the only way to escape the insecurity and peril of ‘normal’ human life. The criticism 
of shirk -  worshipping false gods -  becomes in this view tantamount to the contention that 
ideology and truth are mutually exclusive: a postmodernist perspective framed in Islamic 
terminology.
■ _ Ibid, p. 13
32:5 Ibid, p. 65
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The Rejection of Ideology
In The Tragedy o f al-Hallaj, cAbd al-Sabur articulates his personal vision as a synthesis of 
socialism and mysticism, and at times al-Hallaj’s speeches become a heady mix of mystical and 
revolutionary rhetoric. The poet’s philosophy descended out of a broadly Marxist paradigm 
towards a postmodern scepticism of grand narratives and human progress. His strong mystical 
inclinations further betrayed his misgivings at the inadequacies of the dominant leftist/nationalist 
ideology, which he knew could not offer a fully human solution to Egypt’s problems. 
Nevertheless, the play defines political commitment as the apex of the spiritual path, even if the 
protagonist’s death shows what a sacrifice that entails. As it develops, however, it becomes ever 
clearer that al-Hallaj himself craves his own execution, which for the temporal authorities 
represents his punishment from God, but for him represents perhaps the final step in his goal of 
mystic union. His strong death-drive betrays an overriding desire for the perverse security of 
transcending the world. As Eagleton points out, ‘A martyr who dies deliriously happy is only 
questionably a martyr. Martyrs give up their lives because they are the most precious thing they 
have, not because they are only too eager to die.’326 Such a criticism may be applicable to cAbd 
al-Sabur’s al-Hallaj, whose journey towards ‘martyrdom’ is an ambiguous mixture of mysticism, 
revolutionary commitment and death-drive. Despite his insistence on the primacy of human 
responsibility, therefore, there is a deep paradox at the heart of cAbd al-Sabur’s play. Behind this 
death-drive one can sense unmistakably the author’s own ambivalence, even attraction, towards 
death as a retreat from the harsh reality of the world. Al-Hallaj’s words recall the organic, womb­
like security of Sufi tawakkul:
Punish me, O my B eloved, for I have divulged the secret 
And betrayed our covenant.
Do not forgive me; my heart can bear no more.
Punish me as a man punishes his foe,
Not as a beloved punishes his lover.
D o not forsake me.
Do not turn your face from me.
326 Terry Eagleton, After Theory, (Penguin, London, 2003) p. 113
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D o not kill my soul with indifference.327
Ambiguously, al-Hallaj thirsts for a meaningful death either because he craves a release from the 
torment of existence towards the infinite bliss of the afterlife, or because he really believes his 
revelation deserves the ultimate punishment. What makes existence meaningful is precisely that 
for which he is prepared to relinquish it. But his endorsement of the verdict of execution gives 
away the author’s own psychological torment and ambivalent outlook on life and death:
W hen man realises that he is condem ned to death ... he realises that being and non-being are but tw o faces 
o f the sam e ex is ten ce ... Man is a slave, not because God com m anded him to be, but because life itse lf is 
slavery and im prisonm ent, and how can man escape? Suppose he replaces one place for another as i f  they 
were shoes, as Brecht put it, could he replace one being [kun] for another? Man is condem ned to life, and 
the final cho ice  is the acceptance or rejection o f  this sen ten ce ... The only means to reject [it], as Camus 
said, is su icide.328
For cAbd al-Sabur, working beyond Marxism, truth equals justice, both individually and 
collectively. In searching for the ultimate victory of these values, the play suggests the only 
possible way may be an irrational one, since existence itself is irrational. This is one reason for 
the author’s descent into a postmodern mysticism. For cAbd al-Sabur, even Sufism, with its 
specifically Islamic discourse and rituals, is just another ideology, and his personal vision 
transcends it. It is significant that by tcisawwuf, he means not just Sufism but mysticism in 
general, as this extract from a late speech shows:
The poetic experience approxim ates to the m ystical [siifiyya ] experience through their mutual attempt to 
obtain truth and arrive at the essence o f  things, regardless o f  their externalities. The correlation is in fact 
very great indeed. In my opin ion , the great revelations o f  [organised] re lig ion s are m ysticism  [a l-  
tasawwuf]  itself. If religion is confined to public worship and to everyday conduct and procedures, w ithout 
attempting to reach the essen ce  o f  truth, it becom es another form  o f oppression. It must be m oved to a 
higher plane to becom e a form o f  spiritual assurance and serenity, and it is this plane that M uslim ,
cAbd al-Sabur, Murder, p. 33
328 cAbd al-Sabur, Hayati, pp. 67-76
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Christian, Jew ish and Hindu m ystics [mutasawwifin],  o f which I have seen many, have tried to articulate. 
Each o f  them attempts to arrive at full know ledge and understanding o f  the higher universal truth.329
This quote underlines once again cAbd al-Sabur’s preoccupation with mysticism and his equation 
of poetic creativity with the mystical journey. Confined to its exoteric dimension, the religious 
experience is a tool of oppression; in its esoteric dimension, it is the inspiration for creative 
activity and human liberation.
329 L'Abd al-Sabur, ‘Tajribati’, p. 18
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Iitihad: prophets, poets and philosophers
We may now examine more closely cAbd al-Sabur’s above-quoted view that writing poetry is ‘a 
form of ijtihad’. The concept of ijtihad is a vital one for him, as he sees the individual’s personal 
struggle as integral to the meaning and purpose of human life. He elaborates this idea by saying:
There are three kinds o f  individual effort [ ijt ihad],  each o f  w hich tries to extend their vision  through man 
to help him to overcom e his self, so that he can g ive  his life  meaning. T hese are religion, philosophy and 
art. The prophet, the philosopher and the artist are authentic voices, w hose authenticity em braces all kinds 
o f human life in order to organise it and overcom e its chaos and discord ..33°
Thus cAbd al-Sabur sees each of these individuals as exponents of ijtihad, through which their 
lives acquire meaning. Each of them ‘sees a deficiency’ in the present reality and therefore has ‘a 
desire to reform the world’. Thus their efforts attempt to engender truth, justice and freedom, 
which may or may not be conceived as a journey towards God. What differentiates poets from 
philosophers and prophets, in his view, is the nature and direction of their respective messages. 
The latter are liable to construct ‘an ordered m ethodology’ in order to overcome such 
deficiencies, whereas poets ‘know that their route is that of excitement and emotion, and that 
their discourse is directed towards the heart’. Here again cAbd al-Sabur relates his art not to 
systematic rationalism but to esoteric mysticism, which he believes has ‘a deeper effect than 
expression through mere language’. His imagery recalls the Sufi discourse concerning direct 
communication from man’s heart, the metaphor for a fully integrated consciousness. Further, 
these individuals share the characteristic of taking an ‘acute and illuminating’ view of life as a 
complete whole, the pressure of which ‘often weighs heavily on their souls, so that they are 
racked with doubt as to the possibility of reform. Therefore in the life of every poet, prophet or 
philosopher there are moments of bitter despair or total revulsion of reality and nature.’ It seems 
to be the overcoming of such a moment of despair that gives life meaning. cAbd al-Sabur 
supports this argument using the examples of, among others, Muhammad, Jesm. and Nietzsche, 
whom he quotes as saying “No artist is able to bear reality, for it is in the nature of artists to be 
unable to put up with the world.” This theme of reform, of overcoming the self and the world, is 
one of the central preoccupations in cAbd al-Sabur’s work. He recognizes that it is essentially a
330 cAbd al-Sabur, Hayati,  pp. 68-9
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religious mission, as the lives of prophets and radical Sufis show. For him, therefore, it is a vital 
part of man’s own inner spiritual quest, and a vocation for poet, prophet and philosopher alike, to 
bring freedom, justice and truthfulness to the world. This is how cAbd al-Sabur conceives of the 
poet as an expressly religious and political figure. But the question of how to establish these 
values is so taxing that he is often driven to silence. In one poem, having asked himself about the 
meaning of freedom, justice, love, honour and truthfulness, he concludes:
[These] questions crowd around me; I have no answer 
I beg them for mercy, and sleep.
When morning com es 
I wander in the streets, in the sun, in days;
The black foot asks me 
About the m eaning o f  the word 
‘S ilen ce’.331
With his theory of personal struggle, cAbd al-Sabur is effectively forcing open the ‘gates of 
ijtihad ’ within Islamic history. Again, this radical ‘desire to transcend towards reform of the 
world’, albeit esoterically oriented in his case, links him clearly with Islamist thinkers of the 
1960s, such as Sayyid Qutb, who was undertaking his own ijtihad with his modem exegesis of 
the Qur’an. cAbd al-Sabur’s ijtihad , like that of Qutb, emanates from a strong sense of human 
responsibility, articulated so forcefully in The Tragedy o f al-Hallaj. He accepts this responsibility 
unflinchingly as inevitable in a godless modern world where human beings create their own 
destiny. He exhibits a genuine passion to live life fully before death, but real existence brings 
both individual and collective duties, and humanity has only itself to blame. This philosophy of 
responsibility recalls the discipline and effort of the Sufi, who may be rewarded by God’s mercy:
God does not torture us with life, but He g ives us what w e deserve, because He has delivered us innocent 
into the w orld... W e could have made it into a verdant heaven o f  justice, goodw ill and love. Instead w e  
have sullied it w ith poverty, enslavem ent and tyranny. Nothing remains for us on the table o f life except 
corpses for that is what w e d eserve .. .332
331 Salah cAbd al-Sabur, Shcijar al-Lciyl, pp. 62-5
332 cAbd al-Sabur, Hayciti p. 86
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Towards his middle age, this disgust with human actions increasingly inspires speculations on 
death and nothingness as a relief from existence:
D o you loathe me so much, oh Lord, that you w ould b low  a breath 
Into the gaunt pipe o f  my b od y ...?
Turn your com m andm ent away from me, oh giver o f  b lessings,
333C hoose a different cup for your magnanimity
The yearning -  almost prophecy -  for death is a feature not only of the mystical life but also 
occurs in existentialist philosophy and Freudian psychoanalysis. It is intimately connected with 
an innate sense of loss and vulnerability, as if the protagonist has been cast out from a safe cave 
(as in Plato), the mother’s womb (as in Sufi tawakkul), or a garden of Paradise (as in the Adam 
myth). Both mystics and philosophers, in their different ways, have believed that finding the 
absolute truth would repair this loss. cAbd al-Sabur’s ijtihad collates these two cognitive strands 
and fuses their common features into a new and fertile compound.
333 cAbd al-Sabur, cil-Ibharfi al-Dhakira, (al-Watan al-cArabT, Beirut, 1979) pp. 45-6
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cAbd al-Sabur. Existentialism and Mysticism
Existentialism is a philosophy of the human subject, of what it means to be an authentic and fully 
developed human being. It explores the nature of human potential, through ‘the internally 
experienced worlds of human subjectivity, intersubjectivity and encounter.’334 In this sense, it is 
not dissimilar to mysticism, which is also an expression of man’s inner potential. Sufi baqa’ is an 
inspired human intersubjectivity, since the mystic in this state recognizes a political responsibility 
to complement his inner accomplishment.
Existentialism  in Europe was a historically rooted reaction that tried to reassert the intrinsic 
dignity of the human subject over and against all those industrial, technological, and social 
processes which tend to dehumanise and diminish the value of an individual. It therefore 
naturally focused on the inner realms of human existence, as a return to the truth of the self. Both 
existentialism and neo-Sufism resulted from specific socio-political and cultural conditions. 
Where existentialism was generally the philosophical product of post-Enlightenment, industrial 
Europe, neo-Sufism should be viewed against the canvas of the post-colonial Middle East, which 
inherited the trappings of modernity in the form of industry and technology, but an ongoing 
political and economic subservience. In both cases, the despair of the human in time turns him to 
confront the timeless questions of existence.
Yet however much human subjects are fashioned by prevailing external conditions, there remains 
something unique and inexpressible within them that is the object of both existentialist and 
mystical searching. Human existence is seen by existentialist philosophers not as essentially 
immutable but as potential being. ‘Human beings are bom unfinished and have to define and 
create them selves...’335 Analogously, the human being through his birth acquires a lack, or 
becomes fallen, and may travel the mystical path to regain it and restore himself to wholeness.
Like al-Bayyatl, the neo-Sufi cAbd al-Sabur was strongly influenced by existentialist thought. 
There are some clear affinities between existentialism and mysticism which may allow us some 
insight into his preoccupation with, and amalgamation of, both cognitive systems. Coates points
334 Coates, op.cit, p. 68
335 Ibid, p. 68
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out that they both display ‘an astonishing freshness of vision into the overwhelming immediacy 
and meaning of existence... [and] emphasize [its] sheer givenness, variety and primordiality... 
For both, the primary datum is existence,’336 from which all else follows. Both systems therefore 
effectively restore the Cartesian ‘I think therefore I am ’ into ‘I am therefore I think’. In the 
absence of an Archimedean point of universal, objective knowledge, the human being strives to 
complete the subjective process of total self-realization. This is the process of ‘finding’ our 
selves, as is suggested by the term wahdat al-wujiid, in which all things find their true selves, i.e. 
become aware that they are at once themselves and part of a larger Self.
Choice is an integral aspect of existentialist philosophy and, as noted above, is closely related to 
human identity. It is the real human choices, ‘those decisions which determine the quality and 
depth of human authenticity’, often at times of crisis, that concern existentialist philosophers. The 
basic human project is ‘to choose, or fail to choose, the kind of human being we want to 
become’. Likewise, the choice of ‘repentance’ is the starting point of the mystical path. The 
mystic resolves to travel a long and arduous path without prior knowledge of his reward, which 
requires faith and discipline. This choice, too, is a turning point that occurs in a moment of crisis 
in the individual’s life. Once accepted, it may bring a new sense of authenticity and freedom. 
However, freedom can also be a frightening prospect, and the objective of Sufis is arguably to 
escape into total dependence on God. The Sufi tawakkul involves a relinquishment of their 
individual freedom and total trust in God, which partly explains the widely-held view of Sufism 
as passive. cAbd al-Sabur often seems prone to this fear of freedom, prompting the search to 
close his own psychological circle, while at other times he suggests that this cannot lead to fully 
authentic selfhood, and that human responsibility must outweigh the desire for security.
The Danish philosopher Spren Kierkegaard (1813-55) is regarded as a founder of modern 
existentialism. Like Socrates, Muhammad and ibn al-cArabI before him, he exhorted people to 
know their own selves. He searched for “the idea for which I can live or die”, for something in 
which he could place total faith. According to Kierkegaard, ‘we must become our unique selves; 
we must become “the single individual, which everyone can be and should be”.’ This idea has 
strong parallels with the Sufi path to God, Jungian individuation, and the concept of the perfect
336 Ibid, pp. 71-2
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man, or Anthropos archetype. It suggests that the Truth -  God -  lies deep within each individual, 
who must struggle to perfect themselves (fana ’) before turning outwards to their fellow human 
beings (baqd ’). Collective perfection is therefore the logical corollary of individual perfection, as 
depicted in cAbd al-Sabur’s al-Hallaj. But, as Kierkegaard notes, “the crowd is untruth”: society 
cannot undergo the same mystical annihilation as the individual, since it is an inner pursuit. This 
accounts for the difficulties over collective perfection implicit in the play.
The central existentialist themes are freedom, choice, authenticity, commitment and potential. In 
exploring human potential, existentialism is a philosophy of human becoming, inherently 
progressive and future-oriented. It denotes the dynamic potential and nature of human 
consciousness. For existentialists, human identity is a continual act of self-creation and self­
projection into an open future, where we become what we choose to be. Similarly, the mystical 
journey implies a progression in self-awareness and authenticity. cAbd al-Sabur is attracted to it 
for these very characteristics, which he deems sadly lacking in modem Egyptian society.
Both mysticism and existentialism, then, are concerned with man’s relationship with his self, on 
an individual and collective level. They see the need for self-knowledge, self-awareness and self­
creation in similar terms, but differ with regard to their conceptual apparatuses and their means of 
achieving them. In existentialist philosophy, the individual is conceived of as possessing an 
irreplaceable and unique centre of consciousness, despite the historical and cultural conditions 
surrounding it. Mysticism, too, is an enquiry into the universal logic of human subjectivity and 
consciousness, exploring the recesses of the self for an esoteric God. Moreover, the goal of the 
mystical path is to achieve all-encompassing consciousness that can apprehend the true nature of 
reality and man’s place in it. This consciousness offers the possibility of self-generated change as 
a result of one’s own decisions and effort, or ijtihad. Self-consciousness makes man aware of his 
potential for improvement, as well as the consequences of ignoring it.
Existentialism asserts that the human subject cannot be reified: it is an'existence (das Sein) rather 
than an existent (das Seiende). ‘Human subjectivity can transcend social or historical ideological 
reifications of its nature,’337 as well as the cognitive restrictions of its time. In fact, both
337 Ibid, p. 70
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existentialists and mystics would say, this transcendence is a vital condition of true existence. 
Each human being, therefore, as an existence, is its own unique cosmos, which is a microcosm of 
the larger cosmos. This is why Sufis postulate that man has been made in the form and nature of 
God. Kierkegaard’s existentialism, in particular, contains some quasi-mystical ideas that are later 
reflected in cAbd al-Sabur’s thought. For him, ‘the primordial relationship was between the 
single individual and God... he views the human subject as embracing both the finite and the 
infinite, the temporal and the eternal and... characterizes the deepest inward striving of the 
human soul as a desire to go beyond the finite self to the infinite self.’ This was very much the 
case for cAbd al-Sabur, who, like Kierkegaard, can be described as a ‘theistic existentialist’, 
someone for whom the ‘primary human existential encounter is with the spiritual’.
Mysticism has been defined as: ‘our path is not to seek God but to seek God’s vision of Himself 
as us’. In other words, God is the universal subject, and existing things are both the subject in the 
sense that they are part of Him, whether aware of it or not, and the object in the sense that they 
are secondary to Him. God is the Existent; all beings and things are existents. The responsibility 
of man, therefore, is to acquire a heightened awareness such that he can exemplify this eternal 
truth in all his attributes, in other words, to become al-insan al-kdmil.
Neo-Sufis such as cAbd al-Sabur recognise that mere philosophy alone is incapable of fully 
embracing the inner truth of man’s authenticity. The allure of mysticism lies in its greater, more 
direct access to that comprehensive subjectivity. As Coates observes, ‘it is only from the point of 
view of the Unity of Existence that the true nature of human potential can be properly 
appreciated.’338 That is to say, a view comprehensively encompassing and balancing both aspects 
of reality, as in the doctrine of al-insan al-kdmil. This appears to be the very conclusion cAbd al- 
Sabur reaches in his attempts towards complete self-knowledge. The Sufi path is the key to an 
extraordinary existential and human possibility in which the individual is fully aware of his role 
and responsibility in the world. Whether the subsistent individual can fulfil that responsibility is a 
question cAbd al-Sabur cannot answer, except to relate what happened to al-Hallaj:
338 Ibid, pp. 73-4
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... the play presented the question of the role of the artist in society. Al-Hallaj’s answer was that 
he should speak... and die.
It seems that a committed death is ultimately preferable to a meaningless life, that faith in 
something -  mankind, God, truth -  is the ultimate objective for the human subject. He continues:
A l-H a lla j’s torture w as a sym bol o f  the torture o f  in te llectu a ls in m ost modern so c ie tie s , o f  their 
h elp lessn ess and bew ilderm ent between the sword and the word, w hen they have rejected the idea that 
their aim is to achieve personal salvation by throwing the problem s o f  existence and mankind o f f  their 
shoulders, and chosen instead to carry the burden o f  hum anity.339
The Sufi concept of baqa ’ is implied here than anywhere else in his prose writings. Human 
responsibility is the key to self-knowledge and self-perfection. Baqa ’ is as much political as it is 
spiritual, the duality between them yielding to the singularity of wahdat al-wujiid. For cAbd al- 
Sabur it is an expression of his ultimate faith in humanity. What troubles him, however, is the 
artist’s powerlessness, stranded between words and action, or as he puts it in the poem 
A bstractions , between the ‘sword of futility’ and ‘the desert of inactivity’. Since power and 
action so often lead to darkness and oppression, he is left to cling to a desperate faith in words:
The T ra g ed y  o f  a l -H a l la j  w as an expression  o f  m y one great faith that has rem ained pure and 
unblem ished, that is, faith in the word.
However much cAbd al-Sabur is convinced that words are man’s greatest weapon, a sense of 
frustration and disillusionment remains, since they alone cannot rid the world of evil. In the play, 
al-Hallaj occupies cAbd al-Sabur’s paralysing ethical position between the sword and the word. If 
only he could synthesize the two into a ‘seeing sword’, i.e. achieve the dynamic action of human 
responsibility without losing the purity of the vision:
M en like m yself do not carry swords.
For a sword in a blind hand becom es the instrument o f  blind death.
339 cAbd al-Sabur, Hayati,  p. 120
163
Suppose my words sang for the sword.
The sound o f  its blow s
W ould echo their syllables, their comm as, and their rhymes.
And betw een one consonant and another 
A head that once m oved, rolls,
And a heart that once rejoiced, breaks,
And an arm is cut o ff at the sounds o f the letters’ poetical rhymes.
How unhappy I w ould then be: how unhappy!
M y words w ould have killed.
W here are the persecuted and where are the persecutors?
Has any among the victim s not persecuted 
A neighbor, a spouse, a child, a maid, or a slave?
Has any among them not wronged the Lord?
W ho w ill g ive me a seeing sword?
W ho w ill g ive me a seeing sword?340
Man must first cure himself of his own blindness before he may be a force for good. This is why 
cAbd al-Sabur’s dramatic hero is a mystic, the process of fa n a ’ being the cure for blindness after 
which enlightened action supposedly becomes possible.
340 cAbd al-Sabur, Murder, pp. 49-50
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The Religio-Existential Quest
cAbd al-Sabur’s life can ultimately be seen as a religio-existential quest, a mission to rediscover 
faith, very much in the Kierkegaardian mould. Working against the grain of the Zeitgeist, 
Kierkegaard stressed the integrity of the individual and was highly dubious of collective 
hypotheses. Like cAbd al-Sabur, he was a lonely, alienated and introverted figure who had a 
strong belief in duty and self-discipline and despairingly compared his position to that of an 
immovable chess piece, a metaphor the Egyptian poet may have consciously emulated in his 
early poem Night Journey. With his talk of ‘the dark background which, from the very earliest 
time, was part of my life,’ it is not difficult to see the reasons for the later poet’s affinity with his 
thought, which also issued in a similar atmosphere of ‘gloom and religious guilt... a deep sense 
of personal inadequacy and confusion’. Both thinkers’ inward suffering eventually prompted 
them to retire into a private existence,341 meditating on the most meaningful relationship in their 
lives, the private attachment to God.
In pondering the various relationships between poetry, creativity, responsibility, self-knowledge, 
truth and justice, cAbd al-Sabur cites the Kierkegaardian pronouncement that ‘one can never 
escape the idea of God’, and endorses his suggestion that human existence is in essence religious 
torment. The life journey described in his autobiography supports this view, taking him through 
three distinct stages of psychic development: fervent religious belief in his youth, a long period of 
doubt and confusion, and finally back to a reconciliation with God. cAbd al-Sabur traces these 
stages to show that he had never truly abandoned the idea of God. His renewed spiritual 
persuasion represents his attempt to close his psychological circle, in order to regain the lost 
innocence and truth that has engulfed him as a modem subject in ‘the age of lost truth.’342
cAbd al-Sabur reveals his intense spiritual awareness by relating an episode from his youth, when 
his attempt to see God led him to emulate the behaviour of Sufi shaykhs:
341 P. Gardiner, Kierkegaard: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford, OUP, 1988), pp. 3-6
342 Salah cAbd al-Sabur, Aqulit Lakum, (al-Maktaba al-Tujari lil-Tibaca wa al-TawzIc wa al-Nashr, Beirut, 1961) p. 
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In my early youth I was extrem ely religious, so much so  that I remember deciding to pray for a w hole  
night to reach the state spoken o f  by pious men, whereby their hearts are em ptied o f  everything except the 
m em ory [dhikr]  o f  God. I began in the usual w ay, with m y mind occupied by the various issues o f  life. I 
recited the verses o f  the Qur’an, and tried hard to em pty m y se lf o f all ideas except God. I continued like 
this until I alm ost broke down in total exhaustion, and the fatigue and concentration sent me into a state o f  
ecstasy in which I thought I saw God. I remember som e o f  m y fam ily com ing to interrupt me for fear that 
I was going mad. I only recall this w hole experience faintly, since I was fourteen at the time. I remember 
how  I must have looked: a young lad w ith his head covered, kneeling and prostrating on an old mat, 
starting his prayers and rem em bering the story o f  that pious man w ho was bitten by  a snake during his 
prayers, but w ho did not even  fee l the bite or m ove until he had fin ished  praying. I tried m y best 
[ i j tahadtu]  to reach this very high stage, by kneeling, prostrating, standing up, sitting down. The night 
flew  past and my knees began to g iv e  w ay, but suddenly I rose from one o f  my prostrations and saw  
before me a halo o f  light. I nearly fell unconscious with alarm and terror. I remember that at that m om ent I 
was reading the Qur’anic passage: “And M oses w as struck down by lightning.” This experience did not 
grant me a divine peace [sakina],  but probably increased my anxiety. If it was a gift from God, then why  
did He not g ive it to me without effort, and if  H e was revealing H im self to me here then w hy did I not see  
Him in other places?343
Several aspects of this passage demonstrate cAbd al-Sabur’s lifelong instinct towards Sufism: the 
dhikr, the meditative concentration on God; the ecstasy and attendant loss of bodily sentience and 
rational faculties; the vision of God and its overwhelming force; the circle of light, and so on. He 
goes on to describe his bewilderment at this event and his vain attempts to repeat it, until finally 
religious doubts began to gnaw at him and he gave up. His reading of Darwin and Nietzsche 
heralded the second stage of his life, about which he tellingly says that ‘I became assured, or at 
least tried to be assured, [emphasis added] of my position on [the death of God].’ This is the 
stage of confusion and spiritual sickness which haunts so many of his poems, only increasing 
with his continued intellectual endeavours. It was in this stage that he engaged most with the 
leftist/nationalist ideology of the day. However, with the failures of socialist thought and practice 
becoming clearer, and the disasters of cAbd al-Nasir brewing on the horizon, the way was 
prepared for the final, definitive stage, the return to the esoteric:
343 cAbd al-Sabur, Hciyati, pp. 80-1
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1 searched for an object o f  worship other than society  and ended up back with man, and the idea o f  man in 
his temporal and spatial totality lead me once again towards thinking about religion.
Thus I becam e religious [m u ’allih ] once again, and this remains my chosen psychic position. That is, our 
sterile and absurd life  is not linked to a general and total idea, to a striving after perfection. For what is 
perfection? Is it technical and industrial progress? Has all that added anything to the ideals and morals o f  
man, indeed, has it even made a worthy contribution to his material life  and protected him from poverty  
and crim e? M ay the revolution then be on b eh a lf o f  existence, and may it return to where it started, and 
may perfection be the return to God, as pure as it was at the mom ent o f  departure from Him .344
With this rejection of totalising narratives and poignant re-espousal of the inner divinity of man, 
cAbd al-Sabur’s psychic life journey came full circle. His contempt here for material and 
technological ‘progress’ is all too clear, as is his misgivings about systematic thought and the 
notion of perfection. His much sought-after refuge can only be found in the entirely subjective 
relationship between man and Self. He continues:
I have com e to be at peace now with God, and I believe that every addition to the know ledge, intelligence  
or sensitivity o f  humanity is a step towards perfection [kamal],  or a step towards God. I believe that the 
purpose o f  existence is the triumph o f  good over ev il through a long, bitter struggle, so that man may 
return to his innocence, which is not a blind, careless innocence as it was at the time o f  his departure from  
God, but an innocence o f  overcom ing the experience and com ing out o f  it as gold  com es out o f  fire, 
having gained form and purity.343
The circularity of cAbd al-Sabur’s life journey is evident in his talk of the return to lost 
innocence, something for which he, like the Sufis, is always searching. In his vision of a 
strengthened and transcending innocence, the influence of Sufi doctrine seems likely. This is the 
perfection [kamal] for which mystics strive, and in this respect cAbd al-Sabur was a modem 
mystic. His psychological cycle mirrors the three life stages described by Kierkegaard as the 
aesthetic, the ethical and the religious, the latter being the most definitive of man. This
344 cAbd al-Sabur, Havati, p. 86
345 Ibid, pp. 86-7
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philosopher of faith once compared himself to a two-faced Janus: “with one face I laugh, with the 
other I weep.”346 In a similar vein, cAbd al-Sabur writes:
D em ocratus and Heraclitus were tw o philosophers; the former considered the human condition absurd and 
futile, and whenever he was among people his face w ould display amusement and ridicule, w hile the latter 
fe lt pity and com passion for it, and never a day passed when sadness was absent from his face or tears 
from his eyes.347
cAbd al-Sabur clearly empathised with Kierkegaard in this self-appraisal and saw himself as a 
bewildering mixture of Democratus and Heraclitus, a conflict that informed much of his literary 
output. W hat has been said of Kierkegaard is valid for him, namely that he was ‘profoundly 
dissatisfied with the emptiness of his existence and with his inability to find some centre or focus 
for his life. On the one hand, he complains of the futility of seeking pleasures which invariably 
left in their wake feelings of ennui and malaise; on the other, he expresses impatience with 
learning in so far as this is regarded as a purely dispassionate pursuit of knowledge and 
understanding’.348 It is precisely these conflicting perspectives that are summed up in one of his 
late poems, Abstractions, in which he is caught between recognizing the futility of existence and 
the desire to change it. For cAbd al-Sabur, the only way out of this quandary is to reassert one’s 
faith in the strongest possible terms, in contradistinction to reason. In transcending the need for 
empirical proof, and providing a defining narrative and focus to an individual’s life, faith can, for 
Kierkegaard, reaffirm one’s essential human integrity. For cAbd al-Sabur, it salvages him from 
the nightmare of the modem into the relative safety of the postmodern. Throughout his endless 
soul-searching, cAbd al-Sabur envies those who have faith, perhaps partly since it absolves the 
individual of awkward questions over human freedom and choice. This human freedom, once 
accepted in a godless world, is a mixed blessing: all it leaves is his deep sense of responsibility 
and the tragic impossibility of ever fulfilling it. Both thinkers suggest that man may often rather 
not be free, and it is in faith that he finds shelter -  another significant theme in his poetry -  from 
this shattering freedom. This is an important factor in cAbd al-Sabur’s return to God. He has 
looked too deep into the well of human existence not to be traumatized by it and, just like the 
Sufis, yearns for the relief of returning to an all-encompassing God. The mystical secrets that
346 Gardiner, op.cil, p. 6
347 Montaigne, quoted in HayatT, p. 53
348 Gardiner, op.cit, p. 7
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strangle him are inexpressible by their very nature, knowable only from within. Thus his outer 
mission of collective perfection is aborted and he is left adrift in the silence of the esoteric.
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Analysis of Individual Poems
As in chapter 2, our attention now turns to analysis of particular poems in order to further
demonstrate the progression of cAbd al-Sabur’s mystical inclinations. The selected poems span
four of his volumes, from I  Say Unto You (1961) to Sailing in Memory (1979).
I Sav Unto You (1961)
This long poem, which is divided into eight sections, encapsulates the poet’s vision of himself as 
a preacher in the manner of Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, but with mystical tendencies. The poet 
implies that only a radical life choice can solve the ethical questions that so trouble him. In part 4, 
entitled Words, we find the Hallajian dilemma between words and deeds:
D id n ’t they tell you in the Book that in the beginning
There was the Word -  the A lm ighty Word -
D idn’t they tell you in the B ook that tmth is a matter o f  words?
But I say unto you that truth is a matter o f  deeds.349
Here he acknowledges that his quest for truth must be more than a matter of words, yet still he 
cannot find the ‘seeing sword’ that al-Hallaj craves. Perhaps he was aware here of the exile of 
language from truth, but his vision encompasses a fusion of right word and deed, which he sees 
as ‘two exalted wings’ of the same balanced body. His conviction that words are meaningless 
without deeds is echoed in the next section, The Saint, where we glimpse his personal epiphany. 
After the long night of uncertainty and confusion, he reveals that:
I saw  the reality o f  the world
I heard the m usic o f the star, the water and the flowers 
1 saw  God in my heart.350
cAbd al-Sabur, Aqulu, pp. 57-8
350 Ibid, p. 61
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This is a direct analogy to the long esoteric path undertaken by the Sufis, who are rewarded with 
the vision of God. He follows this with a symbolic throwing of his books into the fire, implying 
that all intellectual knowledge and learning is but a hindrance from God. As in Sufi doctrine, it is 
the heart, not the head, that leads man’s wayward ship to the safety of the shore:
In the recklessness o f  our blithe time 
W e break, then w e thank our guiding heart
That it anchors us on the shore o f  certainty, for the mind has led us astray.351
c Abd al-Sabur repeatedly employs the metaphor of the lost sailor finding land to convey his sense 
of salvation in rediscovering faith after the long period of doubt and confusion in which he read 
countless books in search of truth. The image of the sea is ambiguous: it conveys the ideas of 
exile and bewilderment, but at other times it can represent the bliss of being lost in God’s infinite 
Ocean. However, it is important to note that, despite this inner victory and the accompanying 
exclamations of mystical rapture, he is still very much concerned with his fellow men:
I felt my fevered body throbbing like the heart o f  the sun 
I felt that the corners o f  my heart were filled with w isdom  
I felt that I had becom e a saint 
And that my m ission ...
Was to sanctify you.352
Therefore, as with the Sufi state of bciqa’, esoteric enlightenment leads directly to a universal
mission, with his desire for self-purification extending to encompass all mankind. Now, however,
the poet is experienced enough to understand what sacrifices this entails, as the final section title 
makes clear: ‘I spurn you ... in order to know you.’ After enjoying his friends’ companionship he 
must return at night to his loneliness, where he can confront his self and know it fully. Only then 
can he return in full knowledge and awareness to face his fellow men. This introversion- 
extroversion dialectic clearly corresponds to the elevation from fana  to baqa’.
351 Ibid, p. 59
152 Ibid, p. 62
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Exodus (1964)
Here cAbd al-Sabur envisions a cathartic hijra or emigration as an escape from his tortured 
existence. This emigration represents his inward journey in search of God, who, according to the 
mystics, is present in the deepest recesses of man’s heart. The poet’s model here is the original, 
archetypal hijra of the Prophet Muhammad through the desert from Mecca to Medina in 622CE, 
as part of his prophetic mission. cAbd al-Sabur insinuates a parallel between the Prophetic hijra 
and his own spiritual hijra, through which he aims to accomplish ‘my only w ish... to kill this 
burdensome soul of mine’. This directly evokes the Sufi disdain for the soul, which is seen as a 
veil between the lover and Beloved. There is also a subliminal reference to the Sufis’ reverence 
of Muhammad as their first shaykh and the paradigm of mankind, al-insan al-kamil. cAbd al- 
Sabur himself holds the Prophet in similar regard, and there is a clear affinity between his sense 
of spiritual dispossession and the latter’s status as an orphan. He also empathizes with 
Muhammad’s concern at human suffering, which he resolved to overcome despite the great 
personal cost. cAbd al-Sabur’s autobiography depicts the Prophet as an example of the inspired 
revolutionary who transcends his humanity to carry this heavy burden.
The physical journey through the desert in the poem symbolizes his long and difficult spiritual 
journey, leaving behind his original city -  the exterior world with which he has become so 
disillusioned -  and traveling until he reaches the city of light -  the interior world of God. 
Through his hijra, the poet is trying to flee outside of himself, to be exiled from his unbearable 
self, but he has no foreknowledge of success. The danger of the mystical path is that the goal is 
invisible until it is reached. cAbd al-Sabur struggles with this burden of faith, wondering whether 
this magical ‘city of light’ really exists or is just an illusion.
Does the tough spiritual discipline of the path, ‘the torments of your journey’, really lead to God 
and salvation, or is it all simply absurd and futile? The poet seems unsure and pessimistic, but 
given the degree of his suffering in the world he sees no alternative.
cAbd al-Sabur plays on the ambiguous state of exile in this poetic narrative. Man is somehow 
more real, more alive, when he is in exile, just as the other is the key to the self. The hijra is a 
retreat into exile in order to know the self and live in truth, as conveyed by Theodor Adorno’s
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ironic dictum: ‘It is part of morality not to be at home in one’s home.’353 Suffering is a necessary 
part of the mystical journey, just like the healing of a wound. For cAbd al-Sabur, the embrace of 
exile in the desert is coterminous with the act of spiritual cleansing:
The torture o f  the journey is my purification354
From this comes the idea that the security of death, the shedding of the unbearable soul, is 
preferable to this hazardous and painful life, just as the Sufi undergoes fa n a ’ ‘dies’ and is reborn:
And death in the desert is m y permanent resurrection 
If I die then I w ould live forever in the city o f  light.355
Death, as the Sufis say, is the way to reach God. But this ultimately requires a leap of faith, since 
the perfect city of light, just as for al-Bayyati, is always distant and opaque. Despite their 
different experiences, the intertextuality between the two poets is clear. Both search for this 
invisible lost paradise, and both eventually admit that it cannot exist in this world. The use of the 
light metaphor to express divine perfection is common to both, as is the concept of death and 
resurrection in God. This concern with death shows how cAbd al-Sabur combines the 
psychological impulses of the medieval Sufi with those of the modem existentialist.
353 Adorno, quoted in Said, op.cit, p. 184
354 cAbd al-Sabur, Ahlcim al-Ftiris, p. 74
335 Ibid, p. 70
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Dearer Than Eves (1964)
The Sufi idea of sudden illumination after a long journey in the darkness recurs here in one of 
cAbd al-Sabur’s most optimistic and romantic poems. He uses this metaphor to convey his 
feelings of love, with a strong link between romanticism and esoteric fulfillment, as discussed in 
the introduction. The poet continually describes his love in terms reminiscent of Sufi ecstasy:
Your palms are blessings you have given to a poor journeym an  
A wayfarer on the road o f  love and bliss 
W ho travels without provision  
On a lonely m ission
And suddenly good new s appears before h im ...356
Sufi poetry is renowned for its multi-leveled ambiguity, addressing both the human beloved and 
the divine Beloved simultaneously. Human love, for the Sufi, is merely part of the greater divine 
Self-love or Self-disclosure, just as in Lacanian theory it represents an attempt to replace the 
organic lost Real. The poet plays on this concept here, equating his love with something 
altogether more cosmic, the return to innocence lost:
Your eyes are my final resting p la ce ...
With them, I know  that I have reached 
The end o f  the journey.357
This is structurally analogous to the return from exoteric loss to esoteric fulfillment for which the 
Sufi strives. cAbd al-Sabur expresses such a movement in various ways, each mystical in 
motivation. Sometimes it is recovery from the disease of life to the psychological purity of love:
Your gentle devotion cleanses me 
A s the clouds cleanse the sky358
356 Ibid, p. 76
357 Ibid, p. 75
358 Ibid, p. 77
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Sometimes it is portrayed as a movement from sterility to fertility and rebirth:
M y sterile, unending sorrow finally dies,
M y face, lit by your sm ile, greets life anew 359
Or by reference to the source of all earthly life:
I stretch out my palms to the sun 
And raise my eyes to the stars360
These are the ecstatic words of one who has found his identity in love. This is very similar to al- 
Bayyatfs later espousal of ‘the religion of love’; in both cases the psychological lack has been 
fulfilled. This love, which cAbd al-Sabur expresses here as ‘our safe paradise’, is also very 
reminiscent of the state of tawakkul, which is expressed in Sufi imagery as the union of two 
lovers. Tawakkul fulfils a yearning for the lost innocence of youth, whereby the mystic becomes 
dependent on God as a child is on the mother. The God or mother figure represents safety and 
companionship, prior to the psychological split, from which the trajectory of life removes the 
subject. The goal of the Sufi, like the lover, is to restore himself to this psychological position 
and thereby regain his lost security.
The idea of the fall from original organic purity and innocence into the world of time and space is 
strongly implied here. The departure from the timeless esoteric realm generates a sense of 
emptiness:
From what pure source does our love flow
And flood us with happiness as i f  w e were children
W ho have not yet wandered in time?361
The poet must return to the esoteric, either through romantic or mystical union. He constantly 
attempts to elevate his human love to the level of the divine:
359 Ibid, p. 77
360 Ibid, p. 77
361 Ibid, p. 78
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W hen w e are alone together
What perfection no beauty ever witnessed
God is fair to us, and the world is still g o o d ...
Love, my dearest, is our com passionate lord 
Listen and obey him .362
This is one of the rare occasions when cAbd al-Sabur seems content to focus his attention purely 
on the personal, as he fuses his self with that of his beloved. In Sufi terms, it is as if he is 
remaining in the blissful cocoon o f fa n a ’, in which the mystic’s identity is entirely fused into 
G od’s. Although the poet’s profound sense o f duty and compassion usually leads him to 
contemplate baqa’, this romantic fa n a ’ is a breakdown of ego-consciousness and a form of 
escapism from the terrors of exoteric existence:
Our journey to the shore o f  destiny ends 
W e melt into the air, sm iling and rejoicing 
Like m elod ies.363
It seems, then, that like al-Bayyatl, cAbd al-Sabur realizes that the only deliverance from worldly 
torment is love, whether human or divine, which is on a par with religious faith. Both poets are, 
like mystics, romantic at heart. This volume’s title poem, Dreams o f the Ancient Knight, draws a 
similar conclusion: in it he expresses both the torment of separation, once again in the context of 
his life journey from youthful innocence to the darkness of adulthood, and his pity for the fate of 
mankind. Dearer Than Eyes conveys the poet’s yearning for eternity, nature and resurrection, 
couched here in romantic terms. M an’s romantic fusion is an expression of his mystical fusion 
into God, whereby duality becomes singularity, or wahdat al-wujud.
Memoirs of the Sufi Bishr al-Hafi (1964)
If this romantic vision is optimistic, then cAbd al-Sabur soon reminds us in no uncertain terms of 
the spiritual barrenness of this world. As he says of his poem Memoirs o f the King cAjib bin al-
362 Ibid, p. 79
363 Ibid, p. 81
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KhcisTb, “The one harsh truth that the king finds is that man has fallen ...”364 This is also the 
overwhelming message of this dark and melancholy poem: man has fallen and there is scant hope 
for salvation. The misery portrayed here is the nadir of man’s fall from God. For the first time in 
cAbd al-Sabur’s poems there is an explicitly Sufi -  albeit simultaneously very modern -  
protagonist,365 one who has lost all faith in human progress. Like al-Hallaj, he believes in human 
will and responsibility: man is at fault in God’s eyes, and is being punished accordingly. Bishr’s 
horror at man’s predicament prompts a lament at the depravity of the modem age, with its loss of 
certainty and identity. This age is populated by ‘a generation of devils’ perpetuating a dark, 
Eliotean sterility. What can man do if he gives up on trying to change this wasteland? Bishr’s 
answer is to turn away from it all, and ‘hang on the rope of [Sufi] silence’. Here even the poet’s 
desperate faith in the word appears to be deserting him, as speech ‘slips into the sand’:
The word is a stone 
The word is death
And if  you arranged words next to others
You w ould produce from them only more w ords.366
Bishr seems aware here of the endless circularity of language, and its exile from truth. This 
kindles in him the desire for silence, which, paradoxically, entails truth and death simultaneously. 
Although ‘a truth remains in the heart, tormenting and consuming it’, he holds out little hope of 
ever attaining it:
What w e find w e do not want 
And what w e want w e do not find.367
This is the paradox of human existence in the exoteric world of language, as post-structuralist 
theory maintains. Bishr is consumed with disgust for it, but recognises that: ‘if the seas of speech 
dried out’, then ‘no sailor would unfurl the sail of doubt over its waters’. He therefore wishes to 
return to a state prior to speech, fa n a ’, which he insists must be God’s punishment for man’s sins:
364 cAbd al-Sabur, Hayatl, p. 101
36:1 Based loosely on the original historical Sufi figure of Bishr al-Hafi (767-840)
366 cAbd al-Sabur, Ahlcim al-Faris, p. 118
367 Ibid, p.
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G od A lm ighty, you bestowed on us this torture 
A nd suffering
B ecause w hen you saw us w e did not shine in your eyes  
G od A lm ighty, this world is diseased, and 
There is no cure.368
Bishr implies unequivocally that truth will only be found within, since the world cannot be 
perfected. This manifests itself in a yearning for annihilation, for death, characteristic both of 
Sufis in general and cAbd al-Sabur’s al-Hallaj:
If the C om passionate took mercy on us he w ould hasten us 
Towards death
God A lm ighty, this world, nothing 
Can save it
Where is death, where is death, where 
Is death?369
There is no clearer indication in cAbd al-Sabur’s writing of his desire to abdicate his absurd 
human responsibility and retreat into his inner self. Bishr sees the people in the market as no 
more than wild animals engaged in endless and meaningless conflict, squandering God’s gift of 
life. He searches in vain for a genuine human being, a perfect man who will save mankind, 
concluding that in this diseased world such hopes are absurd, and that man’s only choice is to try 
to save himself from within:
D o you know the time in w hich w e live?
This diseased day is the eighth day 
O f the fifth w eek  
O f the thirteenth month 
Man, man has passed  
Years ago
368 Ibid, p. 122
369 Ibid, p. 122
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B efore I might know him
He was buried in the gravel, and slept
Sw athed in su ffer in g ...370
Night Meditations (1972)
Eight years and two volumes later, cAbd al-Sabur remains in the depths of despair, still terrified 
by the dark stillness of the night, still comparing himself to a sailor lost at sea. This metaphor, 
one to which consistently returns, conveys the loss, uncertainty, vulnerability, isolation, fear and 
helplessness he experiences in his search for personal salvation. Like being lost in the desert, it 
represents the prolonged journey that the Sufi must undertake before reaching his Beloved:
I set sail alone in the eyes o f  men, ideas and cities 
1 wander alone in deserts o f  em otions and doubts.371
Like Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, he exhibits a strong desire to return to the heights and overcome his 
fallen status, since the lowlands represent ‘oblivion’ and ‘darkness’. However, he is now aware 
that what he is searching for will remain unspoken inside him and cannot be shared:
D o you want to get to know it, oh spy o f  time?
N o, I must hide it from you 
For in truth
372I cannot express it to you.
The final section appears to symbolise the annihilating process of fa n a ’ through the use of poetic 
form. This ta jrid , or abstraction, analogous to the m ystic’s abstraction o f his human 
characteristics in order to assume the attributes of God, foretells his later poems Abstractions. 
Thus the verse, like the human ego, erodes away into nothingness:
Nothing relieves y o u ... nothing relieves you
Ibid, p. 125
371 cAbd al-SabQr, Shajar, p. 10
372 Ibid, p. 20
179
N othing relieves y o u ... nothing relieves 
N othing relieves y o u ... nothing 
N othing relieves y o u ...
N othing
N o . . .373
This is also reminiscent of the endless repetition of the dhikr ritual in which the Sufi gradually 
nears the barzakh  between language and silence until he reaches a state of heightened self- 
awareness. The poem loses its dimensionality and physical form in a similar way. The fa n a ’ 
expressed here is the negative annihilation of alienation from his self - “I didn’t know I was 
naked / Until now ...” -  but, ironically, it is this alienation that strips away the veils of his soul 
and brings him closer to its essence. The modem subject’s externally-enforced nakedness 
therefore aids him in his voluntary internal nakedness before God.
The Search for the Ice Rose (T972)
cAbd al-Sabur’s spiritual search continues, despite its apparent futility, in this piece which he 
overlays with an obscure quote from ibn al-cArabI referring to the first, or warid, stage of 
mystical enlightenment in his above-quoted theory of poetic creativity: ‘I remained in the state I 
have classified in this chapter vis-a-vis the divine imports (waridat), spiritual debasements 
(tanazzulat), and heavenly harmonies (m unasabat), following our ideal path.’ As such, the 
‘search for the ice rose’ can be seen as a metaphor for his quest for God, akin to the ideal path 
codified by al-Shaykh al-Akbar. Fittingly, each verse begins with the word abhathu, ‘I search’, 
emphasizing the urgent and devoted nature of this quest. The poet’s separation from God, or 
existential absence, comes across as the root source of his profound sadness:
I search for you in the departing step
W hich leads to nothing, to nowhere
The delusion o f  waiting and presence and absence.374
cAbd al-Sabur couches his strong desire for union in terms borrowed from classical Sufi poetry:
3/J Ibid, p. 21
374 Ibid, p. 27
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1 see  you naked as the stars 
Sleep ing scattered  
L onging for union and intimacy 
For a hint o f  wine and song.375
However, his desire is all the more painful for the elusiveness of its goal, leaving him in total 
despair, reflecting on a ‘helplessness that pours down like rain on the straw of my wilting, broken 
soul’. He compares this sense of abandonment to the terrifying wilderness of the desert:
You slip away through the threads o f  imagination and prayer 
Fading into the light and glass.
The chair and table turn to dust 
Leaving a dark and empty space 
Like a desert.376
His reference to prayer and use of specific terms -  ‘the moment of revelation’ (tajalli), 
‘disclosure’ (inkishcij), ‘union’ (wasl), ‘the ceilings of mosques’, ‘the truth’ (al-haqiqa) -  render 
this quest explicitly religious or mystical, and, moreover, fundamentally absurd. For the Sufi may 
indeed finally glimpse the face of God, but only for the most fleeting of moments. Separation is 
m an’s fate in life. cAbd al-Sabur seems mindful of this strange paradox when he talks of ‘our 
brief conversation’, and in his final summation:
Our m eeting is im possible, cutting as a sword 
But for the blink o f  an e y e . . .377
This conclusion suggests that he is doomed to live in an imperfect world, prone to the vagaries of 
evil and misfortune, and although he may toil along the inward path to meet God, only death can 
truly free him from harm. Human existence for cAbd al-Sabur is therefore inescapably tragic.
375 Ibid, p. 24
376 Ibid, p. 26
377 Ibid, p. 32
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In Memory of the Dervish cUbada (1972)
Towards the end of this penultimate volume, The Trees o f  the Night, comes a short, suggestive 
piece about an obscure dervish whom the poet knew in his youth. The nostalgic description of the 
descent into adulthood, with the attendant dispersal of friendships, recalls his familiar themes of 
loss, separation and the distressing effects of time. But the dervish, of whom no word has been 
heard for many years, seems to live outside time, in a mad and shadowy world:
H e used to sit anxiously in frozen fatigue 
Staring at the cloudy horizon  
U ntil the blood flashed in his eyeball 
Often words were destroyed in his mouth 
W hen he spoke
Until they becam e terrified screams, like the wind,
Drops o f  water from a bottle
378Or jum bled, unfathomable voices.
The pregnant tension between inner and outer dimensions in the dervish’s muted words, which 
resemble the incoherent eruptions of a psychotic or a drunkard, clearly recalls the parallel 
between mysticism and madness noted in the introduction, a classic theme in Sufi writing. As the 
Sufi becomes closer to union with God, he moves beyond the domain of rational and linguistic 
demarcation. As Chittick states, ‘Naming brings about a certain distance, differentiation, and 
sobriety ... [it] pertains to separation and m ultiplicity ... In contrast, the uncreated and 
undifferentiated realm represents a kind of drunkenness.’379 With this drunkenness, however, 
comes supposedly a visionary clarity, in contrast to the strange darkness that results from 
intellectual endeavours. It is this clarity, achieved through mystical discipline and only distorted 
when the dervish attempts to externalize it, which the poet can somehow sense, if not rationalize:
Som etim es I wonder
C ould he see som ething w e couldn’t?
Did he know som ething w e didn’t?
37S Ibid, p. 104-5
379 Chittick, Sufism, pp. 38-9
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C ould he sense the wild horses o f time 
A dvancing behind our steps?380
Although the protagonist and the dervish cannot communicate normally, since they inhabit 
separate psychic domains, a trace of understanding persists. cAbd al-Sabur hints that the dervish 
can foresee the social troubles ahead -  such as the struggles between powerbrokers and religious 
radicals, both of whom have a flawed claim on truth -  even if he is powerless to solve them. This 
is the disturbing irony of mysticism for the modem poet: the visionary Sufi, like al-Hallaj, 
understands the world all too well, but remains impotent in the teeth of political reality.
Abstractions (1979)
This is one of cAbd al-Sabur’s most important poems and the definitive exposition of his 
existential predicament. As previously, he explicitly refers to what has become a highly 
developed sensitivity towards Sufism through the use of specific terms, such as tajridat itself, 
which denotes the stripping away of false selfhood on the path of purification. The poem 
describes the special, unpredictable state reached through these abstractions, his experience of 
which bears analogy to the Sufi in fa n a ’ in that it entails ‘the bliss of sleep’, ‘a serene assurance’, 
where ‘I became air / dissolving into erasure’; in other words, the existential release of reaching 
union with God. This state is an ethereal, almost out-of-body experience whereby he becomes the 
object of divine love rather than the subject of human will:
In it I heard no echoes;
The echoes heard me,
1 did not touch anything;
Things touched m e.381
However, this state now eludes him and, frustrated, he is left to contemplate how to establish real 
meaning in life. This leads to a clean break from the mystical allusions of the first part to the 
practical exploration of the paradoxes of human existence and the consequent choices:
cAbd al-Sabur, Shcijcir, p. 105
381 cAbd al-Sabur, al-Ibhar, p. 81
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The sword o f  futility
Falls betw een desire and reason.
The desert o f  inactivity 
Stretches betw een desire and value.
What can the terrified m ouse do 
B etw een the sword and the desert?382
All his actions, whether their inspiration be esoteric (desire) or exoteric (reason), fall inevitably 
under ‘the sword of futility’, and thus have no meaningful consequence, causing him to question 
the purpose or even necessity of human action. To achieve anything of value involves crossing 
‘the desert of inactivity’, a seemingly impossible task. This leaves the human being in an utterly 
absurd position, stranded not just between action and inaction but also between desire and failure 
to fulfil that desire. cAbd al-Sabur posits the mouse in this terrible catch-22, which renders his 
body unbearably heavy, since he believes that ‘artists and mice are the two most sensitive 
creatures towards danger.’ Deprived of his former bliss, the poet/mouse can see three equally 
desperate solutions:
First hypothesis:
F lee from the sword o f  futility to useless activity.
Second hypothesis:
F lee from the desert o f  inactivity to the depths o f undesire 
O nly to be cut down by the sword o f futility.
Third Hypothesis:
Retreat down the hole o f  futility,
Undesire,
And inactiv ity ...
And die!384
cAbd al-Sabur sees the first option, to ignore the meaninglessness of one’s actions, as nothing but 
a vicious circle, a Sisyphean stone. The second option, similarly, is an absurd stand in the face of
382 Ibid, p. 83
383 c Abd al-Sabur, Haycitl, p. 54
384 c Abd al-Sabur, al-Ibhdr, p. 83-4
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the human condition resulting only in defeat and death. In his existential predicament both action 
and inaction are ultimately futile. Thus he is left to choose between an absurd life and a miserable 
death, the third option. The only hope is to make this death somehow meaningful, as al-Hallaj 
did. This provides a further logic to cAbd al-Sabur’s preoccupation with mysticism, the path of 
‘death in life’, which is clearly implied in the final part:
Oh Lord! Oh Lord!
So much have you let me drink
That your cup has entered the home o f  my secrets
You have com pelled me to silence,
And here I am, choking,
-io c
Strangled by my secrets.
Like the dervish cUbada, he is strangled by divine ‘secrets’: he may yet see the Truth, but will 
never be able to exotericize it into dynamic, meaningful action. cAbd al-Sabur finds himself 
paralysed between the bliss of truth and the agony of its limits. Man can only change himself 
from within, and is thus ‘compelled to silence’.
This poem, written shortly before cAbd al-Sabur’s death, is a succinct and definitive expression 
of his final psychic position. Again, form is used to elucidate meaning: the three sections reflect 
the three distinct phases of his inner life, passing cyclically from faith to doubt and back to faith. 
His final faith, however, is certainly very different from his original, naive faith: it is the last 
resort of a man who is stricken by Kierkegaardian despair, and who is honest enough to confront 
it. Like the Danish philosopher, he sees m an’s irrational relationship with God as the ultimate 
principle in life, rather than the ideal of rationalism that he so clearly rejects here.
Death In Between f 1979)
c Abd al-Sabur perhaps differs from Kierkegaard, however, in the immanence of his internal god, 
in contrast to the latter’s distinction between God and man. In this final poetic dialogue, he 
parodies the Qur’anic God by quoting him and arguing passionately against him.
385 Ibid, p. 85
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The dialogue between the ‘weak voice’ (man) and the ‘great voice’ (God) opens with the latter 
proclaiming -  despite the poet’s religious despair and the spiritual sterility of the age -  that He 
has not forsaken mankind. The speech is lifted directly from Qur’an 93:1-5:
By the morning brightness 
And the stillness o f  the night
Your Lord has not abandoned you, nor does He abhor you
The last is better for you than the first
Your Lord w ill provide for you and you w ill be content.386
Clearly, this Sura is highlighted for ironic value in the context of a dismal post-1967 Arab reality. 
cAbd al-Sabur returns to an important theme here: since his youth the poet has believed that the 
afterlife is a dangerous delusion and that man must strive to perfect himself before  death 
intervenes. The tragedy of Arab defeat is an inevitable result of the persistence of blind faith. The 
weak, human voice therefore begins to ask God some searching questions:
Where?
Where are your gifts, oh Lord o f existence?
Here I am, stumbling between two doors 
Falling into purgatory...
The burning spears o f alienation in the heart, oh my scorched eyes 
I writhe in vexation, my Lord
And each morning I receive the poison-tipped dagger o f  my listlessness 
In my chest.387
The poet sums up his disillusion with the human condition through this idea of a constant 
purgatory. Consciousness is torment, and unconsciousness respite. While sleep may offer some 
relief, only death provides the ultimate liberation. Since it is this same psychological need that 
inspires the Sufi to sacrifice his individual consciousness for the sake of the all-embracing 
consciousness, the poet can describe his vision of annihilation in Sufi terms:
i u m v j ,  F .  - r . .
Ibid, pp. 43-4
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M y stay goes o n ...
Until I im agine that I have fallen into utter oblivion  
And your lum inous force annihilates me
I d on ’t speak about it, my Lord: it is a secret sealed betw een two hearts.388
Here again is the longing to return to God -  in existential terms, death -  which runs throughout 
his work. Death may be an escape from a tortuous existence, but only into sheer nothingness. 
Surely the ‘death in life’ of fa n a ’, would therefore be preferable. But by this stage in his life, 
cAbd al-Sabur has surrendered to extreme pessimism and seems unable to achieve it. Whenever 
he feels God’s presence it disappears like al-Bayyati’s cA’isha, leaving him distraught:
You cam e close, and gave 
Until you m oistened my lips 
With the blessed water o f Paradise 
And sow ed  sw eet basil on my shoulders 
Then you withdrew.389
G od’s voice resumes with the famous Qur’anic passage (2:30-32) in which He teaches Adam the 
names of everything in the world. Here cAbd al-Sabur returns to the theme of man’s fall from 
Paradise, a powerful metaphor for his life. By incorporating Qur’anic passages into his dialogue, 
cAbd al-Sabur undermines the sacred cornerstone of classical Islamic belief in the Qur’an as the 
uncreated and eternal word of God, highlighting instead its status as a historical document closely 
related to poetry. In His original act of naming things for all time, God exiles them from truth, 
just as language remains outside the mandala. cAbd al-Sabur bitterly satirises this divine act:
He taught Adam all the names
Then he show ed them to the angels and said: “Tell me 
T hese names, if  you are truthful.”
T hey said: “A lm ighty, w e know only that w hich you have taught us 
You are the know ledgeable and the w ise.”
388 Ibid, p. 44
389 Ibid, p. 43-4
187
He said: “Adam , tell them their n a m es ...”390
The weak voice responds by rejecting the very idea of naming, and of life in God’s shadow:
Turn your comm andment away from m e, oh G iver o f  b lessings
C hose another vessel for your magnanimity
A s for long now , since the sun o f  your eyes abandoned me,
I have becom e accustom ed to the crafty shadow .391
This is the state which the poet calls ‘living... and not living’, that is, the negative ‘death in life’. 
Behind this lie three fundamental questions, the answers to which, as he states in his 
autobiography, he has always searched:
What is the purpose o f  life?
What is the purpose o f  love?
What is the purpose o f art?392
When answers elude him, it is tempting to take an ironic pleasure in his defeat and reconcile 
himself to ‘the crafty shadow’. What can a man in total, irrevocable despair do but take perverse 
pride in it? Failure to find a meaning in life elicits his exasperation with this exoteric God:
What do you want from me, oh Lord?
D o you want me to call evil by its nam e?393
But by now, as seen earlier, cAbd al-Sabur is unable to undertake any meaningful action. He 
seems so terrified of the vulnerability of human existence that he craves his lost security, even if 
this means disappearing altogether. Thus he literally wishes the earth would swallow him up. The 
final speech turns to the only other solution besides sleep and death, namely love, the substitute 
for divine union. Paradoxically, then, the escapism of romantic love becomes the final conclusion 
of a deeply committed life:
391 Ibid, p. 46
392 cAbd al-Sabur, Hayatl, p. 52
393 cAbd al-Sabur, al-Ibhctr, p. 46
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C over m e ... cover me!
Stand by m e ...
Take me betw een your breasts, embrace me, for the divine voice  
Cannot find a way to my ears or eyes  
B ecom e an earth
Break open a cave for me in your dark soil 
And sw allow  m e .. .394
cAbd al-Sabur stumbles through an Arab postmodemity in which man is utterly disillusioned and 
spiritually fragmented. The theme of the return to nature, or mystical union with the earth, reveals 
both an escapist and an ecological dimension to his neo-Sufi quest of fa n a ’:
B ecom e water
And spread out a ship from your forearms 
Carry me to where the cloud and darkness sleep  
Or turn into a bottle
In which I d issolve into wind and sm oke
When you low er your flow ing hair as a veil, a cover, a shelter
Protect me, hide me, take me from God
Cover m e ... cover me!
Stand by m e ...
D on’t desert me; my certitude is lost.395
Thus cAbd al-Sabur ends with a complete rejection of the exoteric deity and an overwhelming 
desire for the esoteric, staying true to his observation that man cannot escape the idea of God. As 
with al-Bayyatl, the last resort for one who has lost faith in everything is to dissolve into the 
cocoon of human love.
•’*  Ibid, pp. 47-8
395 Ibid, p. 48
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Conclusion
With his mystical theory of creativity, his blend of esoterism, existentialism and egalitarianism, 
and what developed finally into an Eastern brand of postmodernism, Salah cAbd al-Sabur made a 
unique contribution to modem Arab thought. His considerable erudition only increased his 
perplexity and encouraged him to seek an otherworldly source of salvation. In his defining work, 
The Tragedy o f al-Hallaj, he expresses his belief that individuals can only transform themselves 
from within, thereby uncovering the totalising and distorting discourses that control their lives.
This chapter has demonstrated the circularity of cAbd al-Sabur’s psychological life, ending with 
the third and final stage, the vision of the return to the esoteric, in which the principle of Sufi 
taw akkul and the Kierkegaardian primacy of faith are paramount. The identification with 
taw akkul -  the idea that m an’s ultimate goal is to become utterly dependent on God -  has 
inevitably morbid connotations that link it to existentialist thought, such as the notion that man is 
only safe from harm before birth and after death. Although the conscientious cAbd al-Sabur 
found this view morally distasteful, his despair clearly increased its allure. Such was his desire to 
return to his original organic state that he openly discussed suicide, foretelling his early death.
Like Western postmodernists, cAbd al-Sabur, while thinking beyond a broadly Marxist paradigm, 
had lost hope in the public functions of reason inspired by the European Enlightenment, was 
sceptical of political grand narratives (such as “pan-Arabism”), and had a deeply ambiguous 
relationship with the language, the tool of his trade. His works reveal a profound concern with the 
important postmodernist ethical debate concerning the relationship between discourse and power: 
only God, not the exclusive and exploitative political system, could ultimately judge al-Hallaj. 
Individual human subjectivity and the call to universal values, as exemplified by the latter, 
exposed the moral and intellectual bankruptcy of the dominant ideology of the 1960s.
However, the incompatibility of such postmodernist attitudes to a commitment to any settled 
philosophical question created great psychological difficulties for cAbd al-Sabur, leaving him 
paddling helplessly in a kind of moral ethereality. His play showed that effective political action 
requires more than mere disillusionment with reality: the modem subject must reach both fa n a ’ 
and baqcT. How can one return meaningfully from this postmodern fana  ’ and justify any
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programme for action to improve the world? How can disinterested justice be done? What can fill 
the moral and spiritual void of an age lacking faith in either reason or revolution? Paradoxically, 
the dynamic return to the world -  for him, the ultimate objective of Sufism -  seems doomed to 
failure. To be a complete moral agent or individually perfect self, al-insdn al-kcimil, by this 
definition, is impossible, since the collectively perfect self cannot exist. This precipitates cAbd al- 
Sabur’s increasing withdrawal, summed up in his late poem A bstractions  and in his other 
pessimistic speculations on death like Death in Between and Memoirs o f the Sufi Bishr al-Hafi. 
Ultimately, however, the resort to God for relief and restored psychic wholeness proves illusory, 
since his faith has been irrevocably shattered. Despite his considerable alienation, this modem 
poet is too worldly and consumed by doubt to be able to reinvent tradition.
cAbd al-Sabur’s Eastern postmodernism, then, much inspired by Nietzsche and critical of Marx, 
seems no less pessimistic and morbid than much of its Western counterpart, and no more a 
programme for effective action. Is the esoteric anything more than an existential black hole that 
deconstructs the socially constructed ‘subject’? What choice is there but to enter this black hole, 
thereby losing all active selfhood, or to remain in the exoteric world as merely a false, incomplete 
self, utterly contingent on the surrounding social and cultural forces?
M an’s fall from Paradise is the premise of Sufism. Like the Sufi, cAbd al-Sabur attempts to 
overcome this predicament, which accounts for his conspicuous mystical inclinations. As such, 
his existential outlook can also be illustrated with the mandala diagram (see over), which posits 
the exoteric values -  m an’s fallen status -  and esoteric values -  his mystical goal -  in 
simultaneous opposition and complementarity. In searching for baqd’, the poet seeks to unify 
these apparent dualities and thus testify to the oneness of God/Self.
cAbd al-Sabur’s attempt to bridge the Sufi barzakh between esoteric and exoteric realities is 
evidently a lonely and bewildering journey. His neo-Sufi project of baqd  ’ remains forever 
incomplete, leaving him in the selfless passivity of fa n a ’. This perhaps accounts for his many 
images, so common in Sufism, of being lost in the divine sea: the blissful freedom of being 
thrown open and destroyed. In its endlessly oscillating desire for the danger of the sea and the 
safety of the shore, the poet’s character is revealed as irrevocably lacking in psychological unity.
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Human Existence According to Salah cAbd al-Sabur
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CHAPTER 4: ADONIS: TOTAL ESOTERIC REVOLUTION
“Wherever you turn, there is the face of God” -  Qur’an 2:115 
“Art is a lie that makes us realize the truth” -  Pablo Picasso.
“Things keep their secrets” -  Heraclitus396
“The Ccilim is in slavery... the wdqif is free” -  al-Niffari397
This chapter will show the continuities and dissonances between the different stages of Adonis’ 
(b. 1930) intellectual life and demonstrate the role that Sufism plays within his vision of 
existence. Given that analysis of the mystical element in his work necessitates an appreciation of 
the overall philosophical outlook of which it is part, this will involve examination of his early 
religious and ideological influences, his engagement with the cultural other and his critique of 
Arabic culture, as well as his theoretical studies pertaining specifically to Sufism. The initial 
hypothesis is that his mysticism both forms as an intellectual standpoint in its own right and a key 
component of his broader cultural perspective, from the specific to the universal level. The 
principal difficulty here is that the mystical elements appear to be embedded within not just the 
content, but the very ‘genetic code’ of his writing. Esoteric principles function primarily at the 
deeper level in a unified hybrid of form and content rather than superficially, a factor accentuated 
by his calculated ambiguity and obscurity. Adonis’ poetic writing is therefore comparatively 
unsuited to ‘proof-texting’, i.e. demonstrating the strength of a critical observation through direct 
quoting. This emphasis on inner or deep structure rather than outward statement necessitates a 
slightly different approach. I will therefore examine each of the various aspects of Adonisian 
thought in turn as a prelude to analysis of a late work from his voluminous oeuvre.
396 Heraclitus, Fragments, tr. Brooks Haxton, (Penguin, London, 2001), p. 9
397 Al-Niffari, The Muwdqif and Muukhdtabdt of Muhammad ibn cAbdi ‘l-Jabbdr al-Nijfari, ed A. J. Arberry, 
(EJ.W.Gibb Memorial Trust, Cambridge, 1935), p. 15
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cAlawism and Esoteric Thought
While Adonis’ attitude towards the structure of Arab-Islamic civilization -  essentially that radical 
change is essential to its meaningful continuation on the global stage -  is well known, there has 
yet to be a full investigation into its theoretical genealogy. Our starting point, therefore, is his 
own religio-cultural background, ostensibly the root of his distinctive Weltanschauung. In this 
light there stands a marked dichotomy between the highly esoteric doctrines of cAlawism and the 
exoteric institution of Sunnism, revealing a schism that coheres with Adonis’ attack on Islamic 
orthodoxy and thence ideological thinking in general.
Adonis was born and bred in the mountainous cAlawI region of northwest Syria. The cAlawI 
religion’s problematic relationship with Sunni Islam seems as much documented as the religion 
itself.398 Although prominent cAlawIs insist they are legitimate Muslims for explicable reasons of 
political expediency, neutral observers tend to classify them as a subsidiary ShIcI sect. Analysis 
of the available literature on cAlawism reveals that its doctrinal relation to Sunnism is at most 
highly tangential, and often outright opposed. The two traditions have radically different 
worldviews. cAlawism is regarded as syncretistic and heterodox in constitution, possibly 
incorporating various ancient cults such as Phoenician paganism, which is noted for veneration of 
natural phenomena (such as trees, wind, sacred springs, high places, stars and celestial bodies and 
so on, all prominent in Adonis’ poetry), Mazdakian dualism, Christian trinitarianism, ‘as well as 
Persian... and Muslim -  both Sunni and ShIcI -  religious precepts and practices’.399 The Qur’an 
is reputedly of secondary importance, and even then interpreted figuratively rather than literally. 
Such heterodoxy stands in marked contrast to the relatively rigid structures of historical Sunni 
Islam, which values “orthopraxy” and liturgical unity. Essentially, cAlawism is an esoteric creed 
whose cosmological underpinnings correspond closely to Sufism. In these cognate traditions, 
orthodox practice (sh a rV a ) is viewed as but the first stage towards truth (haqiqa), reached 
through a long path of discipline (tariqa).400 These factors lead to ritual diversity and eschewal of
398 It should be noted here that difficulties persist in discussing the Alawis in general terms for two main reasons: 
their secrecy and heterodoxy.
399 Meir M. Bar-Asher and Aryeh Kofsky, The Nusayri- 'Alciwi Religion: An Enquiry into its Theology and Liturgy, 
(Brill, Leiden, 2002), p. 1
400 For example, the ‘Alawi tradition in Turkey views the eponym of the Sufi Bektashi order as one of their main 
spiritual ancestors. See for this David Shankland, The Alevis in Turkey: The Emergence o f a Secular Islamic 
Tradition (Routledge, London, 2003)
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central authority, in contrast to the Sunni ideal. There are also similarities vis-a-vis social 
hierarchy and spiritual structure, as both feature mediating holy men and the idea of transcendent 
spiritual faculties (i.e. baraka). Significantly, one observer has described cAlawism more in terms 
of a culture than a religion.401 Its allegorical and antinomian tendencies, the preference for 
internal meaning over external action, the belief in transmigration (tanasukh) and incarnation 
(ihuliil, particularly with regard to CA1I), and its emphasis on divine immanence, all link it clearly 
to Sufism. Conversely, exoteric or legalistic Sunnism regards incarnation and transmigration as 
heresies. cAlawism also purportedly rejects a central tenet of Islamic eschatology, namely the 
Last Judgement and resurrection of the dead, which would account for a very different 
conception of key philosophical categories such as time, causality and teleology (circular rather 
than linear), which are far more consonant with Adonis’ existential outlook. Finally, cAlawIsm’s 
heterodoxy breaches the insistence on the utter singularity and unknowability of God embodied 
in standard Islamic monotheism. The influential Hanball jurist ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328) 
considered cAlawIs mere idolaters and authorized jihad  against them.402
cAlawism, then, differs from Sunnism not only politically, by virtue of its status as an extreme 
ShT'I sect, but also philsophically. The inference follows that its role in Adonis’ intellectual 
constitution, and his stringent criticisms of Arab-Islamic order, has been seminal. Some later 
poetry, discussed below, hints at this link between cultural background and his worldview.
The correspondence between pre-modem cAlawI culture and the European postmodern values 
embraced by Adonis merits discussion here. cAlawism’s eclectic nature is consistent with the 
notions of pluralism and relativism, while its distmst of central authority and antinomian instincts 
contain the seeds of political liberalism and cultural change, values that Adonis has vociferously 
supported. Positively describing an ‘alternative path to modernisation within Islam ’, Shankland 
charts how the Turkish cAlawI (or Alevi) community, with its fundamental principle of political 
secularism, has adapted relatively easily to the modem world.403 While Sunnis may conflate 
Islam with state, he argues, Alevis are more able to distinguish between a religio-cultural 
affiliation to Alevilik (cAlawism) and a political affiliation to the state. This is consistent with
401 Shankland, op.cit., p. 153
4(12 H. Halm, ‘Nusayriyya’, El, vol, 8, p. 147
403 The real question is, however, whether this modernisation is ‘within Islam’ or not.
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Adonis’ interpretation of the lack of freedom in many Islamic societies to a failure to differentiate 
between religion and state: ‘Islam unites words and actions. Hence its political tendency.’404 
Particularly interesting is Shankland’s observation of ‘the way the Alevi creed takes one aspect of 
Islamic mysticism [edep , the believer’s goal of reaching the God within] and relates this 
explicitly to the social order: they say that God can only be reached if all are at peace within the 
community, that God is reached by doing another a kindness with no expectation of return, for 
then we enter into our hearts, the true Mecca, where God lies.’405 As with Sufi baqa \  then, both 
individual and collective perfection are the product of the inner path. Shankland describes Alevi 
social organisation as the collective attempt to externalise the individual’s internal balance. 
Moreover, the references both to God’s immanence within the human heart, rather than status as 
transcendent judge, and to the esoteric idea of the internal Hajj, are unambiguous here. These 
remove the definitive separation between man and God that defines the exoteric perspective, and 
restore man to his active role as participant rather than passenger in the divine order. The ‘highly 
sophisticated’ Alevi theology, Shankland asserts, which contains ‘complementary but different 
religious perceptions of the deity... presents God as being both immanent and transcendent at the 
same time. The internalised conception of God, as being a part of all people, both men and 
women, is stressed in many ways: it is said, for instance, that the point of worship together is to 
see into one another’s faces, and thereby into the heart, where the true God lies.’406 This 
simultaneity principle, or what we might call ‘suspension of the logical’, a central motif in 
Adonis’ thought, recalls the Sufi insan kamil as the embodiment of a perfect synthesis of esoteric 
and exoteric realities.
Culturally, then, cAlawIsm’s clear detachment from the Qur’ancentric, legislative, institutional 
forms of belief has arguably engendered a more localised, secular and pluralist sense of 
citizenship. The importance of CA1I (al~macna) and Salman al-Faris! (al-bab) in cAlawism also 
suggests a spiritual inclination towards the heterodox, mountainous Persian ShT'ism and Sufism 
to which it is historically connected, rather than the more austere Sunnism of the Arabian desert 
and urban centres.
404 Adonis, The Pages o f Day and Night, tr. S. Hazo (Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1994), p. 102
405 Shankland, op.cit, p. 8
406 Shankland, op.cit., p. 113
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Describing it as a ‘universal peaceful mysticism’, Shankland concludes that ‘this way of life is 
made coherent within the Islamic tradition by having recourse to the great body of esoteric lore 
present in Islamic mystical ideas.’ Since the teachings of the Alevi Tarikat are fully intertwined 
in the everyday life and outlook of every Alevi individual, both a mystical, esoteric interpretation 
of religious rules, an interpretation at once hierarchical and internalised, therefore become 
‘dispersed throughout the community, available to all its members, both men and women, by 
virtue of their birth into an Alevi community... In their wholesale embrace of a secular outlook, 
the heterodox Ale vis... really do appear to be different in some qualitative way from orthodox 
communities.’407 An Alevi man interviewed by Shankland quoted ibn al-cArabI: ‘An idolater’s 
worship is not [directed] to the idol, but to the light of God that is reflected through the idol.’408 
Herein lies Shankland’s ‘qualitative’ difference: for the esoterist, God is manifest in the world, 
present in everything, exposing him to charges of polytheism, or shirk', for the exoterist, He is 
essentially absent.
It has been demonstrated beyond doubt that cAlawism and Sufism -  Adonis’ cultural background 
and intellectual inspiration -  are profoundly intertwined on a historical, philosophical and ethical 
level in contradiction to exoteric monotheism. Adonis’ neo-Sufi inclinations can therefore be 
legitimately viewed as, inter alia, a return to cAlawT principles that he internalised in his 
formative years. The dichotomy between esoteric and exoteric worldviews informs all 
consequent intellectual, political and ethical standpoints. Adonis’ cAlawI background, with its 
inherent heterodoxy and localisation, is easily reconcilable with his mystical humanism, and 
probably contributed significantly to its formation.
Further, cAlawism’s status as a distinct religion has a distinct bearing on Adonis’ cultural mission 
and critique of Arab-Islamic civilization. His endless struggle with the relationship between 
language and Arab existence should be seen in the context of his status, by birth and 
subsequently by choice, as the civilizational outsider par excellence. Speaking and writing in a 
holy language while remaining marginal to its religious tradition, he seems tom between his love
407 Ibid, pp. i
408 Ibid, p. 24
79-80.
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for the language and his spiritual exile from it.409 However, his project remains ostensibly an 
attempt at cultural revival rather than rejection.
409 See Adonis, Pages, pp. 101-8. He himself implies that marginality is a notable feature of many radical thinkers 
such as Ibn al-cArabT, a Muslim from Spain.
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The SSNP. cAlawism and Sufism
It is well known that for much of his early adulthood Adonis was a full and active member of the 
fascistic Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party (SSNP), under whose ideological banner his critique 
o f the prevailing reality began. Antun Sacada (1904-49), SSNP founder and ‘originator of a 
renaissance the like of which may not be found in the entire Near East’410, was the foremost 
intellectual influence on the young poet.411 Like a mahdl or a hidden imam (an impression only 
reinforced by his subsequent ‘m artyrdom ’), Sacada, who exuded all the charisma of a 
revolutionary religious leader, spent most of his leadership in exile, waiting for the triumphant 
return. His political organisation purported to espouse an altogether new and radical outlook on 
human existence in Syria, in which secularism itself became an article of faith. Aiming at a total 
transformation of society, Sacada maintained that, “literature and art will not change unless there 
exists a new philosophical attitude toward the big questions of life and the universe...”412 
Adonis’ involvement with a consciously anti-Islamic movement and subsequent re-espousal of 
the Arab-Islamic cause clearly merits further investigation.
Sacada attempted to radically redefine his human environment, claiming that the party’s mission 
was to ‘regenerate the Syrian nation and make it possible for Syria to become a modem, viable 
political community.’413 The inertia of traditionalism should not obstruct the advancement of the 
nation. It was this rejection of the status quo and direct call for change that encouraged many 
young intellectuals to support the SSNP’s almost wholesale identification with W estern 
modernity. The party utterly rejected the Islamic worldview and the notion of transcendental God 
in favour of a modem, scientific standpoint, heavily influenced by Darwin and Nietzsche. It held 
the historicist, relativist view that religion is but a function of the human mind. Its first reform 
principle was separation of religion and state, which it maintained was a vital underpinning of 
any modem society. It seems the SSNP’s alluringly destructive energy contributed to a distinct
410 Kamal Jumblalt, quoted in Labib Zuwiyya Yamak, The Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party: An Ideological 
Analysis (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1966), p. 139
411 Apparently eager to underplay his SSNP allegiance, Adonis would later deny that Sacada had given him his 
penname, but given his ideological commitment at the time it seems more likely that this was indeed the case.
However, it was the SSNP’s preoccupation with change and modernization that appeared to have appealed most, 
rather than its fascistic structure.
412 Joseph Zeidan, 'Myth and Symbol in the Poetry of Adunis and Yusuf al-Khal’, Journal of Arabic Literature 10 
(1975), p. 73
413 Yamak, op.cit, p. 89
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stage in the development of the mature Adonisian worldview. Even long after his break with 
them, Adonis would agree with Sacada’s (albeit hypocritical) belief that “in the political system 
where there is no separation between church and state, government is always on behalf of God, 
not the people”. What would replace divine authority was another question.
Adonis’ youthful experiment with the SSNP can be interpreted as a stage in the development of 
his later esoteric viewpoint, rather than an aberration. “Every nation”, Sacada argued, “which 
seeks a free and independent life through which it can achieve its noble ideals must possess real 
spiritual unity.”414 Later, Adonis would maintain this notion of spiritual unity whilst rejecting that 
of the national boundary: ‘In a first step to remove frontiers between me and my self within me I 
began to see the word frontier not as a wall or an end but rather, as a window and a beginning of 
another path, another knowledge, another search, and another affiliation.’415 That progress 
depends on transcending traditional foci of allegiance is an idea common to both Syrian 
nationalism and neo-Sufism, the latter merely taking the process a step further. As such, 
SSNPism  fulfilled the function of second, ideological stage in Adonis’ psychological 
development, with the third lying implicit within it.
Yamak claims it is no exaggeration to say that Sacada saw himself as a superhuman political 
revolutionary who founded a new religious movement. This harked back, whether deliberately or 
not, to the Muhammadan paradigm. Structurally, the SSNP was comparable to the hierarchical 
formation of a Sufi tarlqa  with a divinely inspired leader. “The world has witnessed many 
religions descend from heaven,” Sacada declared, “but today it is witnessing a new religion 
emanating from this land to lift the souls... to heaven” . Yamak asserts that Sacada actually 
believed that his message ‘constituted not only a new religion for Syria but the only valid outlook 
on life.’416 However, whilst radically new, it merely manifested the age-old, cyclical human 
instinct for regeneration. Conceptually, it is not a quantum leap from this earthy nationalist 
revolution to the cosmic, eternal revolution of mysticism.
414 Ibid, p. 95
413 Adonis, ‘Beyond EastAVest: Towards a Culture of the Future’, lecture delivered at Dartmouth College, 
09.05.2001.
416 Yamak, op.cit, p. 98
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Just as pre-Islamic Arabia had been the time of jahiliyya, contemporary life in Syria was, for 
Sacada, characterised by ‘chaos, darkness and decline’, The SSNP purported to offer the 
individual a new identity, obeying a higher self in “an unbreakable union based on belief in the 
ideology of social nationalism, complete faith in the doctrine of the party and continual devotion 
to the movement.”417 This mystical vision bears notable similarities to modern reformist visions 
of the original Muhammadan umma, in which any contradiction of the sacred text is seen as 
apostasy against its infallible Word.
In referring to himself as “the teacher and guide of the nation and mankind,” Sacada ‘all but
41Hproclaimed himself a prophet.’ Some of his more fanatic followers even ascribed divine 
powers to him, as if he were a Sufi sahib al-karamat or insan kamil. “ ‘The party”, declare its 
apologists, “is the nation in microcosm. It is man-society at his best as represented in this 
magnificent unity of institutions which constitute one whole administrative body, one perfect 
Man.”419 The iconic image of Sacada as the revolutionary man of vision, the redeemer sent to 
guide men to truth, must have been intoxicating for young, impressionable intellectuals and 
recent migrants to the cities. Adonis’ desire for a new prophet to wipe away the debris of the past 
is explicit in much early poetry. Sacada’s Zarathustra-esque posturing doubtless informed to 
some extent the creation of Adonis’ ‘heathen saint’, the prophetic420 Mihyar.
Yamak views Sacada according to the Weberian typology of charismatic leadership in which God 
is transformed into a focal point of the ideology in question and axis of collective identification. 
Adonis’ neo-Sufi esoterisation of the transcendent Islamic God can be seen as a philosophical 
extension of this phenomenon. The SSNP defined its leadership ‘in “religious” terms as being 
apostolic -  a qiyada rasuliyya\ or prophetic leadership. Since the charismatic leader’s authority 
is internal, or esoteric, ‘it follows that he owes allegiance to no one’421, neither the temporal 
government nor the inherited religious edifice. Sacada’s sense of prophetic mission strongly 
resembles the mystical doctrine of the qutb, or axis, prominent in Sufi thought, although it is not 
directly derived from it. SSNP ideology posited him as an eternal axis around which the party
417 Ibid, p. 114
418 Ibid, p. 107
419 Ibid, p. 115
420 “Prophetic” here is used in the original sense of being sent to reveal a divine mission, rather than the common 
sense of being endowed with clairvoyant capabilities.
421 Yamak., op.cit. p. 1 19
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members revolve, like murids in a Sufi tarlqa. As discussed later, the qutb’s power, according to 
Sufi doctrine, is comparable to that of the prophet. Corbin deems the qutb  a ShIcI idea later 
adapted back into Sunni mysticism (although the exoteric authorities firmly reject the idea of 
saintly hierarchy), correlating with the Shlci imam  as ultimate spiritual and temporal authority. 
Charismatic religious figures in Sufi / Islamic history, such as Ahmed Sirhindl, have ascribed 
qutbiyya to themselves. Sacada’s supposed infallibility was essentially no different.
Both in its hierarchical structure and otherwise, the SSNP resembled a Sufi tarlqa: the party 
constitution strongly resembles a muncTs pledge of absolute devotion to the infallible authority 
of a sheikh. The party initially practised a form of taqiyya, dissimulation, a practice common to 
Sufi orders and ShPi sects. The adaptability of the tarlqa structure from spiritual family to 
political party to confront an external threat is well attested. The SSNP’s quasi-mystical 
preoccupation with regeneration and the earth -  celebrated in Adonis’ early poem The Earth 
Spoke -  implies a pagan or pantheistic conflation of nature and God. This “earthly religion” saw 
itself as constituted in the organic continuity between the land and people of Syria since time 
immemorial, and explicitly prior to Islam. The earth is therefore a salient feature both of Adonis’ 
ideological and post-ideological phases, the latter also representing a return to his rustic cAlawI 
roots.
As seen previously, neo-Sufism has been accompanied by forays into ancient history and 
mythology in order to emphasize the plurality of both the poet’s identity and his spiritual 
heritage. The m otif of regeneration is prominent here. The Tammuzic fertility myth used by 
Adonis during the 1950s bears a clear structural analogy to the Sufi dialectic offa n a ’ and baqd': 
both conceive of death as prelude to a new birth. The SSNP, too, proclaimed the death of the 
present Arab civilization in anticipation of a great new era. In this regeneration dialectic, Adonis’ 
neo-Sufi phase would form a continuity with his ideological phase.
The rejection of the finality of Muhammad’s prophecy and with it orthodox Islamic belief and 
practice, implicit in cAlawism and SSNPism, is central to Adonis’ argument that knowledge can 
never be complete. He views his own poetry as ‘a questioning of the truth of any discourse 
whatsoever, be it human or divine. It presents a text that is open and unfinished, the opposite of
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the sealed eternal text of [institutional] religion’. “  M an’s religious inclination should be open 
and future-oriented, rather than tied eternally to a specific historical moment, which leads to what 
Adonis calls ‘pastism’. cAlawism, unlike Sunnism, appears to conceive of the religious tradition 
as rooted in successive layers of esoteric leadership, rather than an uncreated, utterly immutable 
book recorded once and for all time. It is debatable whether Adonis’ project is a revolution within 
Islamic civilization or an altogether new undertaking.
Like the cAlawI and Sufi tariqas, the SSNP, initially a secret society (for fear of persecution), 
exhibited a concentric initiatory structure revolving around an ‘immaculate’ central axis, or qutb, 
that is synonymous with absolute truth. All three were formative influences on the young poet. 
Although in Sufism the qutb’s integrity is supposedly guaranteed by his spiritual discipline, in a 
secular context this can descend into autocracy. Ignoring crucial aspects of identity such as 
language, religion and history, the SSNP’s self-serving totalitarian ideology saw society as the 
primary existential unit. The sharp boundaries that it drew implied qualitative differences among 
mankind, rather than merely exterior differences within a human continuum. It therefore merely 
offered one totalising belief for another. Its nationalism remained a form without content, unable 
to transform Syrian society into a self-sufficient political community. With his empirical belief in 
freedom, Adonis’ rejection of the SSNP was inevitable. Yet despite its failings, the party’s 
emergence raised a fundamental question that remained at the heart of his critique: ‘How can a 
community, whose raison d ’etre is its faith in the absolute reality of its transcendent religious 
doctrine and the code of ethics and law that derives from it, face the challenge of a modem 
tradition that attacks not only its institutions but the roots of its belief?’423
In his neo-Sufi phase Adonis was strongly opposed to all closed intellectual systems. He 
therefore dissociated himself utterly from the SSNP. The complete circle is an incipiently 
totalitarian one, but his mystical circle forestalled the possibility of closure for the sake of 
individual freedom. The limitless cosmos of mysticism which he began to explore goes beyond 
the notion of a definitive teleological narrative or final order. As will become clear, this would 
become a central theme in his later work. Nevertheless, as an erstwhile devotee of SSNP 
ideology who became the qutb of his own esoteric world, on an intellectual level Adonis merely
422 Adonis, Pages, p. 106
423 Yamak, op.cit, p. 6
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transcended as much as he rejected Sacada’s dynamic mission. It was out of this intoxicating mix 
of cAlawism, Sufism and SSNP ideology that his distinct worldview originally emerged.
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Thunder on the Desert: Mihvar the Damascene
Adonis’ Songs o f Mihyar the Damascene is widely acknowledged as an important transition both 
in his work and in modem Arabic poetry more broadly. The mysterious, self-contradictory 
persona of Mihyar ushered in a more oblique, surrealist style to articulate Adonis’ hopes for 
renewal. Paradoxically, however, in place of the discarded religious heritage, Mihyar instigates a 
religious revival. His tone is unambiguously prophetic: each section opens with a ‘psalm’; he 
calls rejection his ‘bible’; he comes to ‘proclaim the resurrection of roots’ while ‘carrying the 
prophecy of the seas in his eyes’. The paradoxical nature of this persona, who rejects religion but 
claims to be a ‘heathen saint’, a ‘prophet and sceptic’ a ‘sorcerer of dust’ and a ‘master of 
darkness’, expresses Adonis’ idiosyncratic vision of change: the old god must yield to the new, 
exoteric to esoteric. The poet is demanding nothing less than a complete overhaul of his culture 
and its values:
I bum  m y inheritance, I say:
‘M y land is a virgin,
and my youth sees no graves.’
I transcend both God and S atan ...424
This audacious enterprise is clearly indebted to Nietzsche’s ‘revaluation of all values’. Mihyar is, 
Adonis admits, the intellectual progeny of Zarathustra425, who defiantly heralded the death of the 
Christian God. In the poem The Bliss o f Madness, he announces:
I have danced to the setting o f stars,
To G od’s corpse426
And in another, he declares defiantly:
Today I burned the mirage o f the Sabbath and the Jumca 
I tore down the veil o f the House
424 Adonis, Aghani Mihyar al-Dimashqi, (Manshurat Dar al-Adab, Beirut, 1960-1), p. 49
423 Adonis, ‘There are many Easts in the East and many Wests in the West’, Banipal 2 (1998), p. 38
426 Adonis, Aghani Mihyar, p. 131
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And replaced the god o f  blind stone 
The god o f  the seven days 
W ith a dead god.427
Clearly nothing is sacred. Nevertheless, into this pregnant void a new god must step:
W e shall cross that sea to its end,
W e shall go on, and pay no heed to that god;
W e long for a new  god.428
Between these two positions, Adonis recognises man’s absurd relationship with the divine:
U nless w e create gods, w e die 
U nless w e kill gods, w e die.429
Mihyar himself is this new god. He transcends dimensionality; he is simultaneously present and 
absent. He is contradictory, surreal, chaotic, blessed with magic and miraculous powers. He 
claims to be ‘reality and its antithesis, life and the world beyond life.’ Like Zarathustra, Mihyar is 
an intoxicating expression of the unconscious mind. In a cultural sense, he is ‘the thunder on the 
desert’: the storm that washes away the present wasteland to prepare for a new tomorrow, 
revealing Adonis’ yearning to return to the pre-fall state and start history anew:
I live in the garden o f apples and in heaven  
In the first ecstasy and despair,
In the hands o f  E v e .. .43°
Adonis implies that by tying itself to a specific historical moment, Arabic culture has been 
severed from nature’s perpetual revolution. A radical transformation is therefore necessary to 
restore man’s organic relationship with existence. The poet’s love for his land develops into a 
pagan, futuristic geotheism in which his broken identity is reborn:
427 Ibid, p. 106
428 Ibid. p. 180
429 Ibid. p. 149
430 Ibid. p. 47
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I w orship this gentle stone
In its lineaments I have seen my face
In it I have seen my rootless poetry.431
Death and loss are offset by a new faith in the primordial dynamism of Mihyar, whose madness, 
which he calls ‘my master and messiah’, bears a clear comparison to Sufi fa n d ’. The poet’s 
celebration of madness is an act of intellectual alchemy: the chaos, despair and meaninglessness 
that surround him -  i.e. the madness of the world -  are sublimated onto the level of esoteric 
vision, playing on the unconscious connection between madness and genius.
Death, like madness, is theoretically analogous to fa n a ’: source of vision and new birth. Mihyar 
proclaims the ‘allure of death’, which for him is essentially knowledge of the other, of the 
unknown. By co-opting it, the poet conversely hopes to achieve rebirth. For Adonis, ‘The unity 
of the “se lf ’ is only apparent, for this self is fundamentally a rift. And the “other” lives deep 
inside the “se lf’. There is no “se lf ’ without the “other”. Living identity exists within the fertile, 
ambiguous relational tension between the self and the other.’432 This reciprocality, or self/other 
dialectic, would become the basis of his neo-Sufi vision. M an’s psychic revitalization through 
contact with the esoteric is symbolised by the mutual validation of night and day, body and spirit, 
earth and sky. Adonis himself has recognized that his contact with the cultural other in Paris, 
where he wrote the volume, was a formative influence at this stage.
Before the seeds of the mystical outlook can come to fruition, the poet must confront the strange 
paradox between his rejection of God and his religious instincts:
I want to pray
To the bewildered star in the sky 
And in my incense I would bum  
M y sterile days, my songs,
M y book, my ink and inkwell,
I want to pray
431 Ibid. p. 46
432 Adonis, Pages, p. 107
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T o anything oblivious o f  prayer.433
In Songs o f Mihyar the poet resurrects the dynamic and innovative aspects of his heritage, 
symbolised by the iconic al-Hallaj. ‘Elegy for al-Hallaj’, the earliest neo-Sufi work to focus 
directly on him, encompasses the medieval mystic’s multidimensional, Christ-like nature: at once 
mystic, poet, rebel and martyr. His mission and subsequent crucifixion fits both the Tammuzic 
death-rebirth and th tfa n d ’-baqd’ paradigm. Adonis emphasizes his poetic spirit and links this to 
the hoped-for resurrection of the Arab nation: al-Hallaj is the ‘poet of the roots and mysteries’, or 
the
Star rising from Baghdad
434Bringing poetry and renaissance
Terms like hudur and asrar  foretell Adonis’ neo-mystical orientation. In the face of ‘our 
recurrent death’, Adonis’ al-Hallaj is not only a social and political revolutionary, but a symbol 
of fertility and life. Here he symbolizes the poet’s intense desire for cultural revival and human 
freedom, uniting all times and places, but set in a specifically Arab and Islamic context. He is an 
archetype for the perfect man of the future: the poet-prophet who will overcome the 
depersonalised language of institution and restore the primal bond between man and his self. 
Poetry here provides the conceptual link between the outer world of revolution and the inner 
world of mysticism: the perfect poet, like al-insan al-kdmil, straddles both domains. Self­
transformation thus becomes coterminous with transformation of the world, since the self and 
world are indistinguishable.
Al-Hallaj, like Abu Nuwas and Abu Tammam, symbolizes the future, a time of freedom, for 
Adonis, who attempts to incorporate this idea into the open-ended structure of his poetry. By 
dedicating himself purely to his God, al-Hallaj was liberated from political control. For this 
modern Arab poet, the entire Sufi tradition comes to exemplify the sacred principle of human 
freedom. Adonis stressed this connection between poetry and freedom in his monumental study
433 Ibid. p. 173
434 Ibid. p. 186
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of Arabic culture, quoting Jubran that “Man can be free without being great, but he cannot be 
great without being free.”435
Conversely, institutionalised language, the antithesis of poetry, is a product of ideology which 
‘shakes the very foundations of freedom and democracy. It is the language of death and massacre 
where both the I and the Other discover their deaths.’436 Adonis’ poetic project, therefore, is 
profoundly political, in that it attacks the theoretical and linguistic foundations of the status quo. 
If mysticism must be political, as it was in al-Hallaj’s case, it is a politics of the sceptic, the 
individual, the outsider, reflecting the uniqueness of each human being.
435 Adonis, cd-Thabit wa al-Mutcihawwil: Bcihth fi al-lbdac wa al-Itbac linda a l-cArab, (Dar al-Saqi, Beirut, 2002), 
vol4, p. 177
436 Adonis, Pages, p. xv
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The Madness-Prophecv Dialectic and Adonis’ Intellectual Forebears
He who questions the epistemological underpinnings of society is often marginalized, exiled, or 
labelled insane. In creating the mad prophet Mihyar, Adonis was consciously influenced by the 
Lebanese romantic poet Jubran Khalil Jubran (d.1931), who saw a fundamental incompatibility 
between old and new in Arab life. Like Adonis, Jubran was a mystically oriented Arab poet from 
a religious minority who lived in exile. For both writers, madness represents the destruction and 
transcendence of inherited values and norms, which are remade by a new prophet. This 
deconstruction-reconstruction dialectic incorporates the circularity of human social development: 
the prophet’s coming is at once a departure into the future and a return to the beginning. Likewise 
the structural analogy with the mystical progression from fa n a ’ to baqa ’: deconstruction of 
partial self (ego) prior to restitution of the universal self. This deconstructive madness is 
analogous to Sufi fa n a ’ because it alters the human-divine relationship from exoteric to esoteric. 
As demonstrated previously, the prophet’s role -  reconstruction of the world -  is directly linked 
to Sufi b a q a ’. The implication is that the process of deconstruction and reconstruction will 
restore lost balance and meaning to the world, just as the fusion of exoteric and esoteric aspects 
of the self produces the “perfect man” . The primary impulse for both writers, therefore, is a 
mystical romanticism, although the destructive element is more prominent in Aghani Mihyar.
In this context, madness represents freedom from limitations of perception, whereby ‘God and 
the human being become a single being with two manifestations: God is the tomorrow of the 
human being, while the human being is a stem and God is the flower of that stem.’437 Madness is 
a destruction of boundaries, a vision of inner truth, and an opening of the door to Infinity. For 
Jung, the confrontation with the unconscious (c.f . fa n a ’), when overcome (c.f. baqa’), leads to a 
higher level of consciousness. On a philosophical level, Adonis links this dialectic to the Sufi 
conception of human and social perfection. In his destructive element, Mihyar is an ‘argument 
against this age’, invoking death, chaos and madness:
I attack and annihilate, transcend and despise. W here 1 transcend, the waterfall o f  another world flow s, 
Death and the inaccessible.438
437 Adonis, cil-Thabit wa al-Mutahawwi\, p. 155
438 Adonis, Aghani Mihyar, p. 39
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This fierce, intoxicated annihilation is a preparation for the new prophet. The madman and 
prophet archetypes stand in mutual validation, forming a self/other unit. Adonis views Jubran as 
‘a continuation of the ancient Eastern tradition of prophecy,’ which is the essential ambition of 
great men.439 This religious overtone can be seen as an expression of cultural authenticity. 
However, Adonis’ prophet is not a passive receiver of divine revelation, but an active creator of 
esoteric vision. Prophecy is a dynamic mission, ‘for the prophet must also fight and wage war in 
the path of ju s tice ...’ He argues that this Jubranian conception of prophecy is a form of 
humanism, since Jubran ‘offers himself as a prophet for human life in its natural and unknown 
aspects, but without delivering any divine message.’440 Adonis therefore empties the concept of 
prophecy of its divinity (lahut) and establishes it in the realm of humanity (nasut), comparable to 
the esoteric conception of the divine in Sufism. Humanist prophecy, then, ‘sees what is hidden 
and follows its call, and “hears the secrets of the Unknown’” .441 Adonis’ view of Jubran as a 
radical renewer of Arab reality stands in marked contrast to his dismissal of his contemporaries. 
His own outlook is directly inspired by his interpretation of Jubran’s poetic attempts to reveal the 
Unknown and transcend reality towards the future.
Both the Jubranian and Adonisian visions reveal the pervasive influence of Nietzsche, himself the 
harbinger of a new prophet and unifier of ancient and modern. Nietzsche, at once both the 
culmination and the destroyer of the Western metaphysical tradition, was a formative influence 
behind Adonis’ new vision of Arab-Islamic civilization. His pagan god, Dionysus, fits well into 
the (neo-)Sufi model: ecstasy, intoxication, primitiveness and madness, in short, man’s irrational 
dimension. The Dionysus-Apollo dialectic corresponds to the synthesis of esoteric and exoteric in 
the perfect man. Adonis is well aware of the deep structural affinity between these two gods as 
symbols of nature and culture. By uniting them in Mihyar, the poet reaffirms Nietzsche’s 
transcendence of logical opposites, good and evil:
1 choose neither G od nor Satan -  
Each is just a wall 
that closes my eyes.
439 Adonis, al-Thabit wa al-Mutahawwil, p. 147
440 Ibid, p. 148
441 Ibid, p. 148
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W hy change one wall for another,
when my perplexity is
that o f  the illuminator, the omniscient?442
Traditional morality and the inherited religio-cultural infrastructure must be discarded as the first 
step in the poet’s search for a new and free existence. Adonis removes the cornerstone of the 
exoteric bridge between the Western and Islamic traditions and rebuilds it along esoteric lines. 
Nietzsche and Jubran’s outlook are connected at this deeper level, despite their different 
civilizational backgrounds.
For Adonis, Nietzsche’s “death of God”, the decisive break that led Western thought towards the 
endless flux of postmodernism, merely signifies the demise of the traditional conception of the 
divine, rather than the disappearance of the noumenal realm. In this context, it opens the way 
towards a renewed esoterism. Nietzsche is therefore a starting point for two parallel intellectual 
trends, and his atheism paradoxically reveals the divine nature of man.
Nietzsche’s madman and prophet, Zarathustra, was a direct influence on Jubran and, later, 
Adonis. The nihilism inherent in Adonis’ cultural fa n a ' reflects Nietzsche’s critique of the divine 
sanction behind Western morality and the consequent reconciliation between man and God. After 
Nietzsche, the divine vision becomes humanized: the journey to God is now a confrontation with 
the unknown self. Adonis explicitly links this unknown, irrational world to the future, the 
temporally unknown, maintaining that logic can only govern what is known and therefore 
effectively past. Mihyar is a creative fusion of the ancient man -  primordial, natural, irrational -  
and the modem -  progressive, rational, future-oriented. He is the microcosm of the perfect 
society: free, open and dynamic. The fluidity and restlessness of this archetype, reflecting the 
permanence of change in the universe, is but the outer face of an unchanging essence. The 
freedom and creativity at the heart of Adonis’ social vision acquire value in proportion to their 
revelation of their unknown Source. This reconciliation of opposites is the abstract form of his 
mystical vision, as typified by Jubran, who is ‘at once modem and classical, realistic and 
mystical, nihilistic and revolutionary.’443 Likewise, Adonis paradoxically attempts to continue the
449 Adonis, Aghani Mihyar, p. 48
443 Adonis, al-Thabit wa al-Mutahawwil, p. 191
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past by breaking radically with it. The future is given meaning through preserving the dynamic 
elements of the past.
Mihyar exemplifies the Nietzschean and Sufi notion of man’s contradictory status. His madness 
and prophecy, or deconstruction and reconstruction, while opposites, stand in a dialectical 
relationship to one another, creating something new and original. Adonis’ vision of man and 
existence is a committed one. By decoupling the concept of prophecy from divinity, he aims to 
restore it to its original mission and direct it towards a humanist goal.
Nietzschean and Jubranian anthropocentrism stands in fundamental philosophical opposition to 
the theocentrism of high Islamic culture. Continuing this intellectual movement, Adonis dreams 
of liberating Arab society from the inherent stasis of its theological system. Beyond these two 
thinkers, it was in the Sufi movement -  an integrally Arab-Islamic phenomenon -  and its internal 
conception of the divine, that he found an intellectual trend emphasizing the centrality of man, 
rather than God, in the creative act. That the Sufi dialectic underpinning his civilizational critique 
emanates from within that same civilization affords it far greater cultural authenticity, even if it 
initially required engagement with the cultural other.
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Poetry as Esoteric Vision
In a long essay on Jubran’s contribution to Arabic thought, Adonis articulates and defends his 
own profoundly esoteric definition of poetry. In its simplest terms, poetry is the expression or 
revelation of the Unknown. It is therefore a ‘vision’ that occurs ‘only through separation from the 
tangible [exoteric] world’.444 Given the necessity of unconsciousness, it follows that Adonis’ 
poetry is replete with dreamlike images and sequences.
Adonis’ description of poetic vision is essentially identical to the classical Sufi descriptions of 
divine illumination: those endowed with this vision in the first degree ‘see the thing in its reality, 
while others see it less clearly, according to the degree of their preparedness.’445 Just as the Sufi 
must purify his heart to achieve mystical union and enlightenment, so the poet requires an 
equivalent discipline to perfect his vision, which emanates not from the eye but the heart, the 
classic Sufi symbol for the essence of the human psyche. The heart, according to Adonis, must 
overcome the visible world in order to attain truth. Vision is not the result of logical causality, but 
arrives suddenly and unexpectedly, like mystical illumination (ishraq). Adonis therefore 
subscribes to a classically mystical conception of poetic language, implying the inferiority of all 
other writing.
Adonis attributes to his poetic vision all the familiar characteristics of the unitive state of Sufism: 
contradictions are reconciled, reason and logic overruled, time and place transcended. This 
vision, according to ibn al-cArabI, is ‘a continuation of divine power’. Following the latter’s 
comparison of vision to the womb, Adonis calls it ‘a kind of union with the Unseen’. The womb 
is the state of pre-fall perfection, the psychological equivalent of Ihe. fa n a ’/tawakkul to which the 
Sufi aspires: total annihilation and dependence on God. Aware that this state is theoretically 
coterminous with death, Adonis emphasizes the idea of rebirth from this divine womb. However, 
despite his insistence that the Unseen is the locus of perpetual regeneration and eternal 
possibility, the logical impasse remains: union with the Unseen is tantamount to death, and the 
world of change is the world of imperfection.
w  Ibid, p. 149
w  Ibid, p. 149
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Despite his passion for an active approach to self-knowledge, Adonis sees no contradiction in 
describing vision of the Unseen as a revelation, which places the poet in a passive relationship to 
the source of his vision. In ego-consciousness, man and Nature are independent actors, but to 
reach the creative Source, man must surrender his ego. This accounts for the hazardous reputation 
of the Sufi journey. Whether the poet can penetrate unconsciousness and regain his individuality 
is ultimately a question of faith.
If vision of the Unseen entails perpetual regeneration, then it is also a source of constant 
innovation, especially on the level of form, as Adonis’ own poetry shows. Since the state of fa n a ’ 
lies beyond physical form, all forms can theoretically express it. This concept of vision therefore 
inheres a constant innovation of poetic form, as ibn al-c Arab! said, “My heart has become capable 
of every form”. Form and content thus conceived are but two sides of an indivisible whole. 
Adonis insists that what one says and how one says it are fundamentally inseparable, and 
therefore that transformation of reality requires transformation of the means of expression, i.e., 
the Arabic language. This is the rationale behind his desire ‘to put the language to death’ and start 
anew. This argument legitimises his poetic project: he is transforming reality by transforming the 
prism through which it is seen. It is this perpetual innovation, Adonis avers, that is the key to 
freedom, which may account for his statement that “the Arab poet’s only shelter is the hell of 
exile’” .446
For Adonis, then, perpetual innovation belies an essential stability, perceived by the poet with the 
eye of his heart. Paradoxically, this logical contradiction is evidence of the strength of poetic 
vision, where opposites are unified. As mysticism dispenses with logical opposition, true poetic 
vision must likewise transcend it. Poetry based on such a unitive experience has the advantage of 
disqualifying standard criteria of rational judgement as unable to penetrate its meaning. As 
Adonis puts it: ‘the heart liberates, the mind imprisons.’ This vision is an enactment of the 
simultaneity principle, the notion that something is itself and its logical opposite at one and the 
same time, which is in fact the key to Sufi baqa’.
446 Adonis, Pages,  p. viii
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Madness, Existential Transformation and Rejection of the Shanca
Adonis explicitly links madness, his first stage in remaking the world, to dream, vision and 
poetry in a circle of mutual authentication. Such reasoning doubtless leads to a revolution in the 
poet’s own being, if not his external reality. But this constant overcoming is also inherently 
unstable. The poet is aware of this ‘tragic tension’ or ‘vertigo’ that comes with contact with the 
Unseen; his answer is to transcend madness to the level of prophecy, which entails ‘the desire to 
arrive at the impossible place, to know what cannot be know n’, and corresponds to the 
progression from fa n a ’ to baqa.’.
Madness, Adonis claims, is ‘the pull towards a strange and distant world’ behind external reality, 
fundam entally transforming the relationship between man and God away from that of 
slave/master, son/father, creature/creator. This esoteric outlook implies a radical subversion of 
the traditional external order: orthodoxy, patriarchy, passivity and “pastism”. Madness, then, 
must be ‘a rejection of the prevailing law’, a tool to help deconstruct Arab reality. However, it 
simultaneously obliges him to abandon the concept of perfection, of completing the circle. A 
complete existence symbolizes the past, and ‘the future is lack’. Madness is a double-edged 
sword: it liberates the poet and yet ensnares him in an endlessly unfulfilled desire. Imperfection 
and openness, therefore, replace the impossible goal of permanent mystical unity. Adonis’ 
“madness” thus reveals the parallel between mysticism and postmodernism.
A counter-orthodoxy idealizing difference and infinity might seem irresponsible. But Adonis’ 
madman merely heralds the prophet, who will replace the destroyed values. Destruction and 
innovation are legitimate only to the extent that they lead to truth. In Adonis’ view, the death of 
the traditional god has produced a dangerous nihilism, which is ‘the distinguishing feature of the 
present Arab era’. But this nihilism could be a transitional moment -  a ‘time between ashes and 
roses’ -  towards a more perfect existence, just as fa n a ’ leads to baqa’. In this light, Adonis refers 
to Jubran’s “The Madman” and “The Prophet” as two halves of a whole that showed ‘the error of 
the interpretation of world and man in traditional religion and ethics’ and engendered a positive 
new ethics through which individuals and societies can grow. Thus Adonis synthesizes the 
themes of madness and prophecy to envision a wholesale linguistic, cultural and political 
renaissance of Arab civilization.
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This total transformation carries an inevitably heretical conclusion: rejection of the sharlca, of 
which the Sufi movement is the clearest example in Islamic history. According to orthodox 
theology, the sh a rica is the definitive actions of a Muslim. Sufism, prioritising the tarlqa , 
approached this idea from the opposite direction: truth is less external observance than internal 
spiritual orientation. As an alternative, anti-orthodox strand of Islamic civilization, Sufism is a 
symbol of life and intellectual dynamism for the poet. If clinging to external traditions represents 
a form of slavery, or death, Sufism, by contrast, is ‘a revolution against the past, towards the 
future’. Adonis, like Jubran, yearns for the coming of he who ‘is not enslaved and does not 
enslave’, that is, the perfect man.
Contrasting esoteric and exoteric values, Adonis effectively sees the sharica as a conceptual 
prison imposed upon and internalised by Arab man, who can therefore escape into ‘the other, real 
world which has no walls or barriers around it’. This transcendence has three stages: awareness 
of imprisonment, certainty of the existence of another, superior reality, specifically identified as 
‘Sufi reality’, and desire to reach it. His search for this other reality by definition entails rejection 
of sharVa reality and, he proposes, illuminates the true meaning of mystical terms like tariq 
(path), safar (journey) and wahda (solitude). The latter, for the Sufi, brings not removal from 
fellow men but unity with them, ‘a deepening of the connection between man and the other.’ The 
Sufi’s inward retreat into fa n a ’ before returning to the world is psychologically related to the 
prophetic hijra: the retreat into solitude to receive revelation for his people, as in cAbd al-Sabur’s 
‘I spurn you... in order to know you’: only internal inspiration can improve external reality. If 
seclusion from the world is merely precedes greater participation in it, what appears to be 
escapism can be a sign of true commitment.
Adonis’ rejection of external restrictions on human freedom and his embrace of Sufi values 
demonstrate that man -  in his simultaneous individuality and universality -  is#the axis of his 
vision. His neo-Sufism is a testament to m an’s inner freedom. Man and God become one, 
revolving in permanent flux (tahawwul) at the centre of the cosmos, in direct contrast to the 
thabdt (stasis) of the exoteric edifice. This extreme position -  a product of both tragic devotion 
and brutal honesty -  is a reaction to what he sees as the inertia and death of Arab-Islamic culture. 
If the objective is civilizational rebirth, his extremism is theoretically a temporary measure.
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However, it runs the risk of becoming so removed from reality as to lose all relation to it. In this 
spiral into obscurity lies both the beauty and the tragedy of Adonis’ thought: the future prophet is 
left waiting as the madman hits the wall of the present.
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The Influence of al-Niffari
If Adonis finds the mystical in Jubran and the seeds of the postmodern in Nietzsche, both his 
poetic447 and prose448 writings leave little doubt that his principal inspiration is the wandering 
Iraqi Sufi al-Niffari (d. c. 976). Inspired by his mystical experiences, al-Niffari appears to have 
constructed a well-defined science of Sufism. For Adonis, al-Niffari is the pioneer of a 
revolutionary epistemological outlook that views Qur’anic interpretation metaphorically and 
tradition iconoclastically. In short, he is the archetypal esoteric figure who, like al-Hallaj, sees 
himself as answerable only to God, i.e. his inner self.
To ascend the hierarchy of al-Niffari’s mawaqif (stations) is to graduate from the dualist/exoteric 
existential view towards the unitary/esoteric view, i.e. wahdat al-wujud. Like cAlawi theology, 
al-N iffari’s schema comprises into three main categories or levels of consciousness: cilm, 
m acrifa, and the highest, waqfa, which is specifically449: the presence of God; the gate of vision 
(r u ’ya ); freedom from the slavery of the world; the destroying hand, or wind, of God; emergence 
from unreality; the realisation that all prior states were otherness.
Waqfa ‘sees only God’ and is ‘beyond the utterable’; it is the point at which all duality becomes 
unity. However, it remains a station ‘relative to God’ rather than total identification with Him. As 
Adonis acknowledges, the mystic’s longing for God, the Absolute, Infinite Truth, will therefore 
never be quenched. The seeker’s attempts to reach Him only compel him to redouble his efforts, 
and distance from Him paradoxically increases with proximity. This exponential deferment of 
union in al-Niffari’s doctrine produces something akin to postmodern relativism, albeit posited 
around a hypothetical Absolute.
Al-Niffari draws an important contrast between the w aqif the mystic/esoterist position, and the 
cdlim, the theologian/exoterist position: “the waqif is not approved by theologians [culama’] nor 
does he approve of them ... the cdlim  is in slavery... the w aqif is free... the cdlim  tells of 
command and prohibition, and in these his cilm consists... the waqif tells of God, and in God his
447 See for example Adonis, Kitdb al-Tahawwuldt wa cil-Hijrafi AqdlJm al-Nahdr wa cil-Lciyl, (al-Maktaba al- 
cAsriyya, Beirut, 1965)
448 See for example Adonis, An Introduction to Arab Poetics, (Saqi, London, 1990), pp. 62-4
449 Al-Niffari, M awaqif pp. 14-24
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w aqfa  consists.” He asserts that the w a q if  “almost overpasses the condition of humanity 
(,bashariyya ) and... transcends the quality of phenomenal existence. [He is] separated from 
limitation [and] nearer to God than any other thing.” 450 The waqif, therefore, is much closer to 
Truth, or freedom, than the calim. Adonis endorses al-Niffari’s contrast between the cdlirri's 
prohibitions and legislations, which maintain temporal power, and the waqif s transcendence.
Adonis contends that modem Arab political parties have merely changed the face, rather than the 
essential structure, of authority, and have therefore failed in their revolutionary mission. From 
this perspective, religious and governmental authorities are both oppressive institutions founded 
on secondary principles of cilm, exoteric knowledge, which have, al-Niffari claims, “no 
penetration of God”. Absolute power and absolute truth are mutually exclusive. The cu lam a’ 
guide only to the obedience, not the vision, of God. In establishing themselves as “Truth”, they 
and their secular counterparts merely demonstrate their own will to power, to which all is 
subordinate. Unquestioning allegiance -  whether to God or the state -  only substantiates 
institutional authority. Through al-Niffari, then, Adonis exposes the conflation of power and truth 
that produces tyranny and alienation. The parallel between the w aqfa/cilm  and truth/power 
dichotomies illuminates the dialectic between exoteric and esoteric interpretations of Islam, 
between Order and chaos. Adonis’ professed aim is to harness this inner chaos to regenerate the 
external order.
If poetry for Adonis is a ‘vision’, then the gate of this vision is waqfa, which “severs the bond 
between the mystic and things... establishes the heart and effaces existence [completing] the 
identity of subject and object... Vision consists in seeing God in everything...”451 Adonis aims to 
exemplify such characteristics -  reconciliation of opposites in unity, transcendence of physical 
condition, universal Presence -  in his poetry. The reconciliation of opposites, or the idea of 
complementarity instead of mere opposition, implies that obscurity belies a deeper clarity, as will 
later be demonstrated through textual analysis.
Ibid, pp. 15-6
451 Ibid, pp. 18-9
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Al-Niffari tells us: “If the mystic’s call is answered by God, God makes him deaf towards the call 
of all other than Him”.452 As noted above, the central principle in Islamic thought, Sufi or 
otherwise, is tawhid, God’s unity, which annihilates otherness. To uphold this unity, the Sufi 
deems it necessary to eliminate any distinction between himself and God. Consequently, “the 
mystic must free his house of otherness, covering his face and heart until otherness goes forth, 
when there will be the laughter of b liss ...”453 However, what this means depends on an exoteric 
or esoteric interpretation of ‘God’; the Sufi verifies the truth of tawhid by pursuing the inner God. 
By invoking al-Niffari, therefore, Adonis revives an alternative interpretation of Islam, 
emphasizing the pursuit of inner truth rather than external orthopraxy. This recalls al-Hallaj’s 
dedication to the inner God rather than the political authority that claimed divine sanction. Both 
al-Niffari and al-Hallaj function as symbols of individual freedom and integrity as opposed to 
collective untruth. Through them, Adonis challenges the historical practice of Islam, if not the 
religion per se, exposing collective interpretations of religious experience as false. Al-Niffari’s 
conception of Islam deems ritual merely the exterior function of a subjective and ultimately 
inaccessible Truth that requires constant reinterpretation.
Al-Niffari’s tripartite concentric schema -  waqfa, m acrifa, cilm -  clearly resembles the cAlawI 
hierarchy of m acnd, bdb and ism. Accordingly, waqfa, or m acna, represents the highest stage of 
mystical consciousness, coterminous with the qutb, or axis, of the world:
Ma crifa /  Bab
cIlm /  Ism
452 Ibid, p. 21
453 Ibid, pp. 20-1
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This structure, showing ascending states of consciousness from T/ra/othemess to waqfalunity, 
also occurs in al-Hallaj’s Kitab al-Tawasin,454 cIlm/lsm, theological or scientific consciousness, 
remains exiled from Truth. Al-Niffari’s commentary on m a cna, the analogue of waqfa, again 
reveals parallels with cAlawi doctrine: “God has manifested everything, and appointed order 
therein as a veil from its m acnawiyyah... The world may be considered as existing on two levels: 
on the upper level are the spirits and lights, on the lower level the bodies and darknesses...”455 
This suggests a psychological connection between Adonis’ cAlawI background and his 
admiration for al-Niffari.
The section of Adonis’ An Introduction to Arab Poetics on al-Niffari’s contribution to Arab 
creativity reveals, albeit implicitly, how his writing is a transcript of the mystical experience. As 
noted, this epistemological journey is exponential and endless. The seeker remains perpetually 
other. For Adonis, al-Niffari writes on the cusp of “the gulf which ‘contains the tomb of reason 
and the cemetery of things’”, i.e., the barzakh. Here “moves his text, silent in its speech, 
articulate in its silence.”456 Since words are necessarily exoteric and the visionary experience 
esoteric, he must make the divine silence speak, an endeavour in which he deems al-Niffari 
uniquely successful. This is likewise the paradoxical objective of his own poetry, which he 
strives to write in a ‘language of absence’. The importance to Adonis of this mission to make the 
silence speak is clear in the opening statement of his Book o f Transformations and Migration, 
which quotes al-Niffari: “Expression narrows as vision broadens”.
The goal of al-Niffari’s writing, like that of mysticism, is to know the self in all its dimensions. 
This is not a stationary or linear pursuit: it involves a perpetual oscillation or flux between states. 
This recalls pre-Socratic philosophy, and specifically Heraclitean enantiodromia, 457 the principle 
of alternate confluence and dispersion of cosmic energy, which Adonis finds in al-Niffari: we 
find “an interchange of absence and presence in an eternity of light... images which engage and 
disengage, and move together and apart, outside all causality... clashing and harmonizing in a
454 al-Hallaj, Kitab al-Tawasin, p. 57
4'’5 al-Niffari, op.cit, pp. 23-4
456 Adonis, Introduction, p. 62
457 Adonis, al-Sufiyya vra al-Surydliiyya, (Dar al-Saql, Beirut, 1995), p. 75
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beautiful, captivating frenzy.”458 The ideal text, then, attunes to the reality of existence in which 
change is the sole permanent.
Al-Niffari’s mysticism alters the individual’s relationship to the Qur’an from legal to ontological: 
“In this affirmation of the subjective the problem changes. According to the literalist view, it was, 
‘How shall I act so that my conduct and my thinking comply with the law?’ but it becomes, ‘Who 
am I? How shall I know myself and know the truth?” ’459 That said, the very same text implies the 
impossibility of this task. Adonis sees this text as the antithesis of institutional language, “a 
complete break with tradition”, simultaneously renewing “Arab creative energy and the language 
of poetry”. The aim seems to be an “existential union” between poetry and thought, reflecting the 
bliss of f a n d ’. Ultimately, al-Niffari’s text of bliss is an experience of freedom, Adonis’ 
fundamental concern.
Al-Niffari’s exponential experience leaves him in a “permanent state of unfulfilment”, absurdly 
striving after infinity. Unable to overcome the exile of the human condition, his mysticism, like 
postmodernist thought, seems doomed to an ecstatic failure. But poetry, despite its exile from 
truth, can function as a door, like the cAlawI bab, towards the Unknown. Adonis highlights this 
paradoxical quality in the opening to his comparative study Sufism and Surrealism by quoting al- 
Niffari: “See me, not my name, otherwise you see it and not me.”460
Adonis’ revival of al-Niffari seems to authenticate his own position vis-a-vis modern Arabic 
poetry and culture, and may reveal more about him than about the latter. Through it he 
demonstrates that, at certain periods, Arab thought transcended the boundaries of orthodox 
theology, leading to coexistence and interaction between different epistemological systems. For 
him, al-Niffari’s unique, qualitatively different register deconstructs institutional discourse by its 
very nature. Hence its relevance to modem times: it not only serves as the gate to self-knowledge, 
but subverts the supremacy of the socio-political institution.
458 Adonis, Introduction, pp. 63-4
459 Ibid, p. 63
460 Adonis, al-Sufiyya, p. 171
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It is in the Book o f Changes and Migration that Adonis’ modernist mysticism, heavily influenced 
by al-Niffari, first becomes clear. In the surreal opening section, entitled The Flower o f Alchemy, 
the poet and Nature become one. Quotes from al-Niffari’s Kitab al-Mawaqif, are followed by 
references to Sufism in a poem such as The Tree o f the East, which recalls Abu Yazid al-Bistaml:
1 have becom e the mirror:
1 reflect everything
I have turned the water rite into your fire 
I have changed the shape o f  sound.
I have begun to see you double:
You and the pearl that sw im s in my eyes
W e have becom e lovers, the water and I:
I am bom  in its name 
And it is bom  in me
W e have becom e twins, the water and I 461
The title seems doubly significant. Firstly, the tree is a symbol of nature and life, and indeed of 
the dual faces of the divine, reaching both upwards towards heaven and down into the earth. 
Secondly, this is a specifically Eastern tree, and for the Sufi tradition, the East is the source of 
truth, where the sun rises to illuminate the world. There is an element of cultural and spiritual 
authenticity here: the poet is announcing his transcendence of “West” -  where the sun descends 
towards the relative darkness of external knowledge -  towards an “East” of eternal illumination. 
Adonis himself follows this up in Sufism and Surrealism:
T o reach this [highest] point m eans, for the Sufi, to depart from “W estern alienation”462, as SuhrawardI 
calls it. . .  Both the Sufi and the Surrealist experiences show  us how  the life o f  man is an adventurous 
journey betw een his present, fa lse life  and his absent, real life. It is an adventure in tw o stages: firstly, 
becom ing aware o f  internal exile, the alienated I, and secondly, the descent into the soul, into the depths o f
461 Adonis, Kitcib al-Tcihuwwulat, p. 15
462 Adonis uses a kind of wordplay here: the term “Western alienation” in Arabic is ghurba gharbiyya. Both words 
come from the same root, which insinuates that the West is synonymous with alienation.
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the self. “W estern alienation”, for Suhrawardi, is a good exam ple o f this adventure, as it occurs from  tw o  
perspectives: exile, outside the “point”, which for Suhrawardi is “the East”.463
The East, then, represents truth, light and deliverance from exile, implying a contrast to the 
malevolent darkness of the West. Such dualism implies a kind of reverse Orientalism reminiscent 
of the discourse of political Islam. Although the use here is figurative, it was during this period -  
prior to 1967 -  that Adonis began to voice his utter disillusionment with the West and vehement 
espousal of the Arab cause: “We no longer believe in Europe. We no longer have faith in its 
political system or in its philosophies. Worms have eaten into its social structure as they have 
into... its very soul. Europe for us -  us backward, ignorant, impoverished people -  is a
,,464corpse.
References in The Flower o f Alchemy to the “fields of despair”, the “tree of sorrow” and the 
“withered tree” reveal A donis’ gloom vis-a-vis the Arab predicament. Profound and 
unmistakeable sorrow pervades the whole volume, and yet becomes a source of creative 
inspiration. The Arab poet’s “internal exile” is another form of “Western alienation”: he has lost 
his homeland, his sense of belonging. This, in turn, provides the impetus for the mystical return, 
in order to overcome external reality, the source of this “Western alienation”, and transform his 
being into truth. In this poem, this takes the form of union with Nature. Water, bringer o f life, 
becomes his twin and lover, reunifying his split self, reunifying the whole. The focus on the East 
is a return to the natural surroundings of his childhood, when the organic relationship with the 
land remained intact, or when, in his own words, “I used to press my body to the earth, and roll in 
the grass as if I was fondling a woman’s body.”465 This theme of childhood, which, like Sufism, 
signifies psychic wholeness, becomes increasingly important.
463 Adonis, al-Sufiyya, pp. 178-9
464 Adonis, quoted in Zeidan, op.cit., p. 86
46:1 Adonis, ‘Many Easts’, p. 31
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Sufism and Surrealism
The above discussion leads directly into a discussion of one of Adonis’ major theoretical 
propositions: that Sufism and Surrealism, although superficially different and independent, 
represent parallel experiences. His comparative study Sufism and Surrealism  (1995), the 
culmination of his career-long research into Sufism, provides an opportunity to examine his 
ideas. The book, which implicitly vindicates his own poetic work, assesses Sufism on five 
specific levels: knowledge, imagination, love, writing and aesthetics. Adonis argues that these 
aspects of Sufism share characteristics that are not only are present in Surrealism but also 
distinguish Sufism from external or ‘objective’ approaches to truth.
From the outset, Adonis’ understanding of Sufism clearly differs from its widely held conception 
as a religious movement. His thesis is premised on mutual exclusivity between Sufism and 
institutional religion. For him, prevailing interpretations of Sufism misapprehend its distinct 
nature: its ‘religious’ status is but a superficial veneer concealing its true orientation.466 
Accordingly, the Sufi is a thoroughly anti-orthodox figure who sees all of existence as God, the 
“ultimate point”, or as a manifestation of Him. God, in the Sufi sense, “is in fact existence itself 
in its dynamism and infinity.” The congruence between Sufism and Surrealism is located in the 
deep structure of their existential and epistemological outlooks, which lie “beyond language, 
epochs and cultures”. Adonis therefore interprets Surrealism as a “pagan” Sufism, and Sufism as 
a theistic Surrealism; both are esoteric disciplines that seek identification with the absolute.
On this basis, Adonis calls Sufism a mode of discovering the Unseen and an attempt to answer 
hum anity’s deepest questions that by its nature penetrates deeper than logical or institutional 
religious enquiry. Accordingly, modem science and traditional religion are relegated to the same 
epistemological level: that of cilm, external cognition. Transcending the rational is a definitive 
trait of the Sufi experience. There is a decisive distinction between external rational knowledge
466 In dealing initially with potential counterarguments he appears to some extent willing to accept that this is an 
unusual perspective. However, despite the particularity of his views, it must be acknowledged that Adonis has gained 
a profound knowledge of Sufism, perhaps unsurpassed among his peers, through his readings of ibn al-cArabI, al- 
Niffari, al-Hallaj, al-Qushayri, al-Bistami, al-Jilanl, al-Junayd, al-Misrl, al-Shibll and others since at least the early 
1960s.
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and internal gnosis: one dictates that something can only be itself, while the other affirms the 
simultaneity principle, i.e. that it can be both itself and its opposite.
The Sufi return to the origin implies both a separation and assimilation between two beings: man 
and God. If the ontological monist perspective is followed, the separation is merely apparent: the 
Origin, God, “remains Himself, both in being manifested through His creations, and in their 
return to Him.” The parallel between Sufism and Surrealism, then, lies less in content or names 
than in the mode of identification with the “ultimate point” . Adonis’ concern with Sufism also 
relates to intellectual and spiritual freedom. When the mystic reaches the Absolute, he attains 
total liberation from external forces: the cultural, political or religious institutions that veil his full 
individuality. Sufism, Adonis claims, worships God “with emotions, doubts and innovations”, 
rather than orders and laws, re-establishing an intimate rapport between man and nature. It is, 
then, both a return to the primeval consciousness of Jung’s “archaic man” and a progression to 
the total consciousness of ibn al-cA rabfs “perfect man”, who share the characteristic of absolute 
freedom. These archetypes represent a circular totality: the snake with its tail in its mouth.
Sufism’s truth is thoroughly internal and subjective. God is immanent within man. Once aware of 
this “inner continent”, man becomes ready for assimilation rather than separation, sharing rather 
than supremacy. Fusion with the Absolute, therefore, is the “moment of love”, in which two 
entities both sides form a unity that exceeds the sum of its parts: “they are reality and the 
absolute, existence and what is beyond.” Related to this dialecticism, another characteristic of the 
Sufi experience emphasized by Adonis is its inherent creativity. In his eyes, the Sufi poetic 
experience redefines the concept of writing. As an experience beyond form, Sufism generated an 
explosion of poetic form that anticipated modernist ideas like the prose poem, which integrates 
form and content.
Adonis notes that Sufi principles are by definition marginal and individualistic. The Sufis’ 
radically different interpretations of the Arab heritage -  literary, intellectual, religious and 
political -  gave them a subversive dimension that orthodox culture considered dangerous and 
therefore heretical, denying its legitimacy and even its existence. In the Islamic and European 
contexts, Sufism and Surrealism have contested this anathematisation of the esoteric, and are 
therefore intellectual resistance movements against their respective orthodoxies. In the case of
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Sufism, this is true only for the ontological (wujudT) perspective, since the phenomenological 
(,shuhudi) perspective remains within the bounds of the sharVa. This for Adonis is tantamount to 
a wholesale denial of the esoteric, since deconstructing the human origins of the sharVa  is his 
goal. Following Nietzsche and Foucault, he emphasizes the revolutionary momentum  of 
intellectually marginalised groups: it is these “madmen” or “heretics” who undermine and 
regenerate the accepted order of things. Adonis’ view of Sufism reclaims its officially marginal 
and illegitimate status, creating a new centre of gravity and celebrating its alternative relationship 
between man and existence. The existential struggle of the Adonisian poet/mystic is to stand 
against all prior knowledge, certainty, and orthodoxy, perpetually destroying and recreating the 
world. The true poet is fundamentally committed  to this position in the furthest depths of his 
being: he does not merely write poetry, but lives it.
The poet’s role, duty even, is therefore nothing less than to change reality through esoteric 
knowledge, which is precisely the role of the prophet. Thus Adonis combines these two roles into 
one revolutionary mystic archetype. Such a view, he contends, corresponds to a central tenet of 
Surrealism, namely that: “the poet is a prophet who reads the text of the world and intuitively 
knows the hidden laws of existence.”467 This substantiates his conflation of Sufism and 
Surrealism, suggesting a common goal of human perfection through integration of conscious and 
unconscious forces. This striving for perfection must be the meeting-point of Sufism and 
Surrealism: overcoming their temporal and geographical settings, reconnecting with m an’s 
primal yet eternal energy.
Adonis attributes three further general characteristics to Sufism: indescribability, the existence of 
spiritual states beyond linguistic definition, knowable only through direct experience; 
ephemerality, the fact that such states do not last; and passivity, the fact that the Sufi surrenders 
his individual will (i.e. ego) to an uncontrollable higher power.
467 Veronique Bartoli-Anglard, Le Surrealisme, quoted in Adonis, al-Sufiyya, p. 28
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Sufi Epistemology
Adonis sees in Sufism a correlation between knowledge and proximity to God: the nearer the 
absolute point, the greater the knowledge. This knowledge entails not peace and certainty, but 
surprise and wonder, and is achieved by transcending the false individuality of ego- 
consciousness, i.e. fand’. Adonis thus explains the Sufi saying: “Insofar as you are alien to your 
self, you are able to achieve knowledge” -  and alienation is all too familiar to the Arab poet. His 
inexorable death-in-life, tom away from his sense of identity and meaning, finds an analogue in 
fa n d ’. But beyond this negation lies affirmation, as al-Junayd says: “the Truth... makes you dead 
in terms of yourself and alive in it”. Paradoxically, therefore, the death of a specific identity 
anticipates the affirmation of a universal identity.
Adonis discusses various stages of Sufi consciousness: unveiling (mukashafo), revelation (tajalli) 
and witnessing (mushdhada), which he compares to the reflection of divine light in a perfect 
mirror. These stages are accompanied or followed by the sudden divine gift of rapture (inkhitaf), 
itself comprising six stages in ibn al-cA rabfs schema. Significantly, however, Adonis notes that 
the highest goal is not rapture, but for the Sufi to be “a means of increasing knowledge and 
perfection”, i.e. to bear an external mission.
Adonis locates Sufism in the Eastern esoteric tradition going back to Buddhism and Taoism. 
Esoteric reality is by nature obscure and unknowable -  a “hidden treasure”, as Lao Tzu calls it. 
This perspective views existing things as an attribute or function  of Existence, possessing only 
metaphorical presence. There are two classic analogies for this in Sufi literature: the sun and its 
rays, and the sea and its waves. Light is an effect of the sun, which precedes it existentially, but 
there can be no ultimate division between the appearance of the sun and that of its light. 
Similarly, the sea and the waves cannot be separated: “the wave is different forms of the sea; it 
has no existence independently of it. The sea cannot be without waves; it is apparent in every 
wave, in a different form, but remains actually single in all the w aves...”468 There is no wave 
without the sea and no sea without waves: such is the relationship in Sufism between God and 
man. All existing things are divine insofar as they are a function of the Source. Adonis uses this
468 Adonis, al-Sufiyya, p. 45
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Sufi logic to clarify man’s existential position within the context of ontological monism, in which 
nature is the existential Subject and man the object. Comparing Sufi rapture to the delirious 
discoveries of Surrealism, he argues that both movements sought to reveal m an’s unconscious 
mind and allow it to control them. Surrealist techniques such as dreams and hypnosis are esoteric 
experiences comparable to fanci’, spawning a spontaneous form of writing known in Sufism as 
shath, the expression of a higher Reality in which esoteric and exoteric are united. Indeed, in 
A donis’ view, this is the essential objective of both experiences: “the reconciliation of 
contradictions, or the unity of existence. This means the unification of the essence and the 
subject, the external world and internal knowledge.” Theoretically, any speech or action in this 
state would issue in truth.
This brings Adonis back once again to the ancient existentialist Heraclitus. The transcendental 
principle -  “Logos” -  has various faces: water, fire, wind or earth, but always in flux. In Sufism, 
likewise, the same Essence -  “God” -  manifests Itself in endlessly different ways, illuminating 
the Qur’anic aya: “Wherever you turn, there is the face of God” (2:115).
Creativity is an extension of this principle: the dialectic fusion between Self and Other, (i.e. 
Itself) produces infinite formal reproduction. Ideally, poetry and existence join at this barzcikh of 
internal-subjective and external-objective. The universality of this “highest point” inheres an 
egalitarian outlook: higher and lower are equally attributes of God. Adonis retraces this to the 
theories of ontological monism and divine incarnation, despite the fact that most Sufis outwardly 
rejected the latter. He calls the Sufi path of knowledge “not so much a question without an 
answer as a horizon to be travelled”, and horizons are in fact not straight lines but circles. 
Travelling this horizon is the key to freedom and identity, since “dualism is what keeps man in 
ignorance, prisoner of his individual, social and traditional ego, what keeps him a stranger". 
Unity, then, is an “awakening”, overcoming m an’s worldly alienation towards a “recollection of 
what we were before our loss”. The condition for illumination is “man’s withdrawal into himself 
to live the essential inner life, cutting his ties with the outside world and its detached, rational 
epistemologies”, something undertaken by both Surrealists and Sufis. In Islamic terms, this is a 
kind of hijra, migration, into the self, moving inwards from external alienation towards the 
eternal Source, providing a conceptual link with the Prophet.
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Although the Absolute is always obscure and inexpressible, the poet, according to Adonis’ 
definition, must nevertheless reveal it. A distinct ‘language of absence’, necessarily obscure and 
irrational, is therefore required. Adonis’s quest is to circumscribe the infinite, to answer the 
question of questions. But the circle has no circumference, and can never be conclusively 
encapsulated.
In Adonis’ esoteric revolution, the poetic instinct constantly renews man’s exoteric view of the 
world. The key to this revolution is the moment of mystical intercourse, when the I becomes the 
other and vice versa. Its goal is to reveal the perfect parallel between the visible and invisible 
worlds, “so as to overcome the agonies of existence”. Accordingly, he sees ontological Sufism as 
a genuine revolution in Islamic thought precisely because it issues from a premise entirely 
opposed to the prevailing epistemological methodologies.
Adonis compares the Sufi and Surrealist quest for freedom as a corollary of the open-ended 
esoteric experience. He argues that the logic of cause and effect -  of the answer -  alienates man, 
exposing him to external control and oppression, and ultimately betraying him. The endless 
question, conversely, subverts that authority and restores man’s original freedom. Put another 
way, definition is exile: “when you define God, you exile Him, because you put him on a par 
with defined things”. Adonis thereby appears to formulate an esoteric conception of the Islamic 
sin of shirk: God should not be defiled by association with definitions and names.
Accordingly, the mystical experience is akin to a psychic earthquake whose epicentre lies in the 
unconscious, but whose reverberations are manifested in intoxicated speech and writing. As such, 
poetry -  the reflection of this experience -  is necessarily obscure, ambiguous, and rationally 
incomprehensible. In it, Adonis attempts to create “a complete antithesis to everything that is 
institutional... not succumbing to any established path or precedent”. The emphasis is on total 
novelty, uniqueness and flux, making it “a perpetual beginning” . For Adonis, the poetic text is 
read precisely through its unreadability, capturing “the permanently indefinable” . The internal 
structure of this writing is unity, even if the surface appears chaotic. Likewise, the unity to which 
the poet/mystic aspires annihilates the contradiction between life and death: “In the universal
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presence of this unity, death is no longer the opposite of life, but becomes its other face, or 
another kind of life,”469 i.e. baqd ’, life after rebirth.
In the super-rational Sufi experience, knowledge is achieved not through the mind but the heart. 
Following al-Qushayri, Adonis tells us that, “when man has achieved this knowledge, he 
witnesses the Truth (God, Meaning) in every manifest thing, and worships it in every way. The 
knower is the perfect man who embodies all the attributes of existence, and is therefore a perfect 
picture of the Truth. His heart is a mirror reflecting his existence as a microcosm of the infinite 
Truth. Thus he bears witness to the Truth, and his heart contains it.” The perfect man is therefore 
God in microcosm, and his heart (qalb) is the axis (qutb) of all Existence.
The infinite nature of the Sufi experience means that esoteric knowledge, or vision, is by 
definition an “endless horizon”, since it reflects the perpetual motion of the universe. This 
illuminated vision is for Adonis the true one, despite, or rather because of, its heretical status. 
The esoteric perspective rejects the separation between God and the world, viewing existence as 
simultaneously singular and plural; such harmony theoretically opens the way for infinite 
knowledge. If divinity (lahut) overcomes humanity (ndsut), then external or partial vision of the 
truth is replaced by total vision. However, Adonis admits that even the highest esoteric 
knowledge is not perfect, and only further intensifies the seeker’s thirst. Desire for the Absolute 
increases with proximity to it, but since opposites are united, greater proximity paradoxically 
only yields greater distance. There is therefore an important exponential characteristic in Adonis’ 
interpretation of Sufism. What Jung calls “the disease of poets,” the burning desire to apprehend 
the impenetrable mysteries of existence, only worsens as the cure is taken. Considered as such, 
Sufism celebrates the fact that all things exist as a function of the unity of existence, and 
therefore are bom and die at every moment. Existence involves constant regeneration, and to 
match it, poetry must be a constant innovation.
Adonis, then, views Sufi (self-)knowledge as the key to liberation from limits externally imposed 
on the individual. Pursuing this inner knowledge is the real experience, and by externalising it the 
poet guides others towards it. Sufi knowledge helps man to transcend the ideologies and
469 Adonis, al-Sufiyya, p. 61
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institutions that prevent his aspirations of full individuation and his experience of “real selfhood, 
real existence and real life”. On an epistemological level, then, Sufism represents a revolution 
against the metaphysical prison of the dominant culture, both celebrating internal truth and 
critiquing external reality. Institutionalized religion, state ideologies and rational thought are 
effectively epistemological veils that Sufism and Surrealism attempt to uncover. Only subjective 
knowledge, the stuff of the poet/prophet, can recreate the world.
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Sufi Writing and Aesthetics
As he sees it, Adonis’ poetic experience is a rejection of the prevailing reality and a search for a 
new one. Accordingly, the text itself becomes his world and homeland, the only place in which 
he can live. This explains his empathy with Sufi writing, “a genre on the margins of Arab cultural 
history,” whose words were “places of refuge” . Sufi writing spoke of an alternative reality 
beyond the dominant culture, and yet it became an integral part of that same culture. Adonis sees 
this Sufi writing as the direct result of gnosis, an “exclusive dialogue between the I and the You, 
man and God”. Since gnosis has no logical end-point, such writing rejects the notion of closed 
knowledge and therefore orients itself towards the openness and uncertainty of the future. Whilst 
recording the intimate relationship between the Self and the Other, Sufi writing also attempts to 
reconcile past and future in a subjective moment of unity.
In emphasizing the subjective, supposedly unmediated nature of his writing, Adonis appears to 
exempt himself from objective criticism. How can the utterly subjective experience be judged by 
external standards? Moreover, total subjectivity is by definition almost impossible for the 
impartial reader to penetrate. In disclaiming objective constraints or standard aesthetic criteria, 
Adonis claims that his poetry is perpetually against the institution or group mentality, for 
individual haqTqa over collective shcirica. He defines ecstatic writing as “diametrically opposed 
to traditional classical writing”: spontaneous, irrational, chaotic, defying conventional aesthetics. 
Such writing is by definition marginal and exiled, forever misunderstood, and doomed to an 
almost tragic solitude. The intoxication of the creative experience produces shathiyat (effusions) 
that remain objectively obscure but nevertheless contain a universal truth-value that can inspire 
the reader to constantly recreate the original experience in their own image and form.
The unitive experience in Sufism leads to a “state of revelation between the Sufi and God, in 
which God reveals his secret to the spirit: that it is He, and He is it” -  the very same secret 
revealed by al-Hallaj’s definitive shath, And al-Haqq. Adonis sees the shath as the universe’s 
“cosmic language”, articulated by the Sufi, the by-product of an alchemical fusion between man 
and God. For him such an experience is not only entirely legitimate; it affirms the integrity and 
totality of the self as a focal point in the unity of existence in contrast to the rational limits of the 
religious institution. Sufi writing is therefore comparable to the spontaneity of Surrealist writing,
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which aimed to “return words to their lost paradise” and “to free ourselves from social and ethical 
control, in order to properly understand ourselves”, totally rejecting the prevailing worldview. 
However, it seems that this anti-orthodoxy defines itself in opposition and can never attain 
universal legitimacy.
The Sufi attempt to reach the Absolute can be seen as a return to the collective unconscious, 
transcending ego-consciousness towards the ancient archetypes of mankind. If the poet’s mystical 
experience brings him to the level of the collective unconscious, his words may well have a 
universal validity. Sufi metaphors naturally incorporate image, symbol and myth, all of which are 
a meeting point between esoteric and exoteric, “a point of radiation, a dynamic centre that 
spreads in all directions”. This g«;£>-esque quality is, according to Adonis, what allows them not 
only to reveal the unknown, but to breathe new significance into the known.
In comparing Sufi shath and the spontaneity of Surrealist writings, Adonis also relates fa n d ’ to 
the principle of democracy: “the collective property of some works inspired by spontaneous 
writing are a testament to the faith in the democratic characteristic in the function of art”. Given 
his observation elsewhere that “the Arab poet speaks ever o f freedom and democracy as 
illusions”470, this shows that his interest in Sufism is closely connected to his political critique. 
When all outer revolutions have failed, the mystical experience offer the possibility of revolution 
and human emancipation from within. The poet’s role thus becomes nothing less than “the 
liberation of mankind”, enabling others to reach this lost paradise that is behind reality”. Like al- 
Hallaj, he is the revolutionary mystic. Appropriately, Adonis discovered this idea not through the 
cultural self, but in the cultural other of Surrealism, which enabled him to look at Sufi writing 
and realise that their common objective is “to speak and know ourselves, and therefore to be” . 
Language thus conceived becomes the key to inspiration and therefore prophecy, the regeneration 
of the world. This is why, contrary to the notion of art for art’s sake, Adonis argues that
the essence o f  literature lies in its m agical or transformational dim ension, w hich aims to change man into 
a radiant being. Its role is not to create texts that are beautiful by and for them selves, but ones by w hich
470 Adonis, Pages , p. xv
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and in w hich a natural, m agical efficacy  is created, and to establish the illum inating, transform ative link  
betw een the unknown depths in man and those in the universe.471
Writing, then, is a risdla, a mission of prophetic proportions, whose value lies less in its aesthetic 
qualities than in its transformative power. Despite his profound esoterism, or perhaps because of 
it, Adonis still wants to change the world according to his own vision. This is effectively the 
inauguration of a new religion. But can language really change the world? Did al-Hallaj’s shath 
restore truth to a corrupt social order or merely condemn him to death? The Sufi and the 
Surrealist, respectively, journey to the “highest point” to become a new qutb (axis) of existence, 
bringing truth into the world. However, the same problem persists: by entering the world this 
truth is no longer itself but a veil. What alternative for the Sufi but to yearn for death, like al- 
Hallaj? Does such writing help us know how to live in the world other than in a permanent state 
of abstraction? The necessary obscurity, irrationality and contradictory nature of Sufi writing is at 
once the source of its liberating and inspirational power and of its incapacity to construct a viable 
alternative reality.
God is simultaneously present and absent in the Sufi experience. While the essential Self remains 
absent, and therefore cannot be spoken, Its presence is implicit it in the emanation of “sparks” 
from the creative dialectic (al-barzakh) between absence and presence that forms, according to 
Adonis, as the basis of Sufi aesthetics. The perpetual distance of the Absolute, and the 
exponential quest to reach it, renders the Sufi poetic experience an absurd and endless 
undertaking, despite its captivating beauty.
Sufi writing expresses the point where logical opposites -  self and other -  meet in total unity. 
Everything necessarily becomes its other: death becomes life, night day, and thus acquires true 
meaning. Through this point, the aesthetic dimension in Sufism “encourages man to progress 
perpetually forward into what is beyond the finite and the known”, constantly renewing himself 
to remain existentially alive. Adonis argues that the act of poetic innovation thereby reveals 
God’s existence, since “the I and the not-I melt in a dialectical movement that transforms man 
himself into a movement of deep penetration (istibtan) into existence and identification with its 
secrets”. He maintains that self-knowledge comes only through this unitive experience, which
471 Adonis, al-Sufiyya, p. 132
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“awakens things and explodes their secrets”. But existence in this alternative, unified reality is 
fatally undermined by its own paradoxical nature, the very thing that brings self-knowledge. To 
use Adonis’ own metaphor, the greater the sun’s illumination, the less able we are to behold it. 
Meaning is veiled by its own light.
Adonis knows that metaphor is the key to the poeticality of Sufi writing. It is the symbol of an 
inexpressible Truth. If permanent Islamic laws were derived from the religious text, poetry must 
be a secularizing force, inspiring freedom of interpretation and enquiry. In contrast to the eternal 
certainty of religion, the metaphor is a site of continual change and a subversive idea. In Adonis’ 
view, it renews thought and language, undermining any monolithic worldview by its very nature. 
M etaphor is a barzakh, a bridge to the Other, connecting man to the unseen world whose 
revelations are in continuous flux. Thus the poetic text becomes a site of struggle between 
literalism and figurativism for the identity of Arabic culture.
In keeping with his interpretation of Sufi aesthetics, Adonis defines poetry as “the movement of 
the human being, in feeling and in thought, to understand things and his relationships with them”, 
i.e. the act of harmonizing with the very pulse of existence. By definition, only those who explore 
both aspects of existence can achieve this. From this perspective, poetry acquires value to the 
degree of its esoteric orientation. Adonis likens this to awareness not only of the branch, leaf and 
fruit of a tree, but also the roots, sap and inner movement. The truth is “a mystery that lies within 
things”, reachable only by gnostic paths that liberate the individual from the arbitrary limits of 
the religio-political institution, or the culture of the exoteric.
Adonis sums up his experience of writing the self as “one of death, in the Sufi sense: death from 
all levels of the social exoteric for the sake of life in the cosmic esoteric. It is therefore necessary 
to transcend and destroy the exoteric.” He sees modem institutional language as a corollary of the 
dominance of the exoteric viewpoint; his esoterism is an attempt to overcome it and return to the 
wholeness of childhood. Thus the first and third stages in his psychological development 
complete a broken mandala.
To transcend the exoteric, the poet must discover a “cosmic language”, whose ecstasy reflects his 
inner experience and expresses the parallels between Infinite and finite. Language must undergo
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f a n d ’, just as the Sufi does. Poetry, then, is not only a literary project, but an existential one, 
changing the relationship between man and Nature. The poetic image, the dream, the vision, the 
shath  and madness are all variations on the barzakh  between them. To articulate an absent 
essence, esoteric writing involves “a continuous destruction of forms”. Ideally, form and content 
become unified and indistinguishable, like the Sufi self and other. However, the poet is merely 
the other, not the self: it is not he who articulates meaning through the image, but vice versa. 
Adonis does not write Mihyar; Mihyar writes him.
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Sufi Love, Imagination and the Barzakh
Following the parallels between romanticism and esoteric tradition discussed in the introduction, 
Adonis compares the characteristics of the experience of love to those of the Sufi experience: 
super-rational, inexpressible and permanently transforming. The bliss of love is an existential 
union in which lover becomes beloved, shedding his own attributes to assume those of the other, 
in accordance with the classic Sufi dialectic of annihilation and subsistence. Human love, in 
Sufism, is merely a reflection of God’s perfect Self-love, for all things are manifestations of Him. 
The union must therefore be between two people and no more and, as in Islamic tawhid, human 
love brings the individual onto the divine universal level, an idea much explored by Adonis.
The bliss or fa n a ’ of love is for Adonis a moment of madness, which begins “when the lover is 
no longer able to speak, or when words betray him” . In this strange recess lies the essence of 
poetry: “the fleeting moment between... a madness that speaks and a speech that is m ad ...” 
Reciprocal dissolution in the beloved -  the unique moment of intoxication when distinction 
between self and other becomes impossible -  represents a fana  ’-experience, the source of the 
poet’s art, as in cAbd al-Sabur’s Aghld min cUyun.
Love-fana’ is the death of ego-consciousness towards rebirth in the beloved. As such, the woman 
comes to symbolize the cosmic womb, progenitor of new life, embodying “total freedom”. Al­
ii ay yatfs  “religion of love” is a variation on this neo-Sufi theme: for him, woman becomes 
divine, or the archetypal earth mother. The lover dies to himself in order to live in her, just as the 
Sufi sheds ndsut for Icihut. Thus the Sufi transforms death into birth, and individuality into 
universality -  Adonis quotes al-Hallaj’s maxim: “My life is in my death” . Love/death denies 
duality and affirms unity. The cyclical quality to this existential viewpoint suggests a 
psychological link with Buddhist karma or cAlawI tanasukh : life brings death, which in turn 
brings new life. The idea of death as deliverance from all that separates the seeker from the 
Absolute is clearly attractive to a despairing, alienated poet. Death in life is liberation, rebirth. 
Love and death are an ascent towards the lost paradise of unity, the point where man meets his 
Reality and is freed from the shackles of his ego. In this context Adonis compares the religious 
and erotic experiences as ecstatic moments representing simultaneous death and resurrection at 
the moment of unity between self and other. This inexpressible moment elevates the seeker/lover
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to a transcendent level, beyond definition, which therefore requires m etaphor to be 
communicated. Paradoxically, therefore, the poetic language of mysticism and love is also the 
language of death. Adonis argues that this annihilating moment, or inner revolution, is the 
primary liberator of mankind.
If human love is part of divine love, it is a moment of perfect truth, a revelation of God. 
However, as noted, God is simultaneously present and absent in the Sufi experience. Poetic 
language therefore speaks of an essence that always remains elusive, however close it seems. The 
Sufi is entranced by that which will forever remain impossible. The exponential nature of the Sufi 
experience, wherein final union is a mirage, perhaps therefore undermines its liberating power. 
Does it merely exchange internal slavery for external? The poet/mystic strives perpetually after a 
dream, despite knowing that it cannot be fulfilled. Adonis claims the value is in the journey, not 
the arrival, but such neo-Sufi absurdity bears comparison to the endless relativism of postmodern 
thought.
The key concept of the barzakh (isthmus) becomes the axis on which Adonis’ esoteric theory 
turns, and his poetry is an ongoing attempt to write through it. Following ibn al-cArabI, he sees it 
as the locus of Sufi imagination (al-khayal), where meanings appropriate their images. For the 
latter it is a technical term denoting the interface between esoteric Truth and exoteric creation, 
embodied by the perfect man who conjoins both domains. The barzakh is “the home of endless 
possibilities”, a site of perpetual transformation and creativity existing beyond logical barriers, 
where the human poet meets the divine and their alchemical fusion exotericises hidden Truth in 
the endlessly varying form of mystical poetry. Through this unifying moment, the divine Self 
returns to itself through the human other, which is a part of It. The restlessness and omnipresence 
of the barzakh accounts for the poet’s endless quest, who strives to articulate the ever-changing 
image of Truth. For ibn al-cArabI, this divine image is attainable only through the barzakh, the 
basis of khayal. In al-Niffari’s schema, imagination is “the gauge of gnosis” (m acrifa) and “the 
presence of divine revelation”. As it joins exoteric speech to esoteric Truth, the mystic at this 
level embodies Truth. The classic Sufi analogy of the double-sided mirror expresses this same 
process: at the point of unity, the Sufi “looks in a mirror, but he is himself that mirror”. This 
exemplifies wahdat al-wujud: not merely beholding the divine mirror, but becoming it.
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By linking imagination to vision, and therefore prophecy, Adonis collates the roles of poet and 
prophet. Following ibn al-cArabI, he argues that prophetic inspiration has its origins in Sufi 
imagination, accessing Truth through gnosis. The prophet, who is al-insan al-kamil, is an 
intermediary towards this Truth. It follows that imagination, i.e. poetic creativity, is the key to 
restoring reality to truth, implying that Adonis himself is a new prophet who has come to revive 
Arab life. In remaking reality, prophetic vision destroys logical oppositions, since logic “fixes the 
representation of the world within a series of oppositions... that create and preserve the fabric of 
society”. This is the latter half of Adonis’ deconstruction-reconstruction dialectic. Therefore, 
whatever deconstructs external reality -  dreams, fa n a ’, hypnosis, madness (which rational 
theologians equate with Sufism) -  has a devastating validity in Adonis’ Sufi-Surrealist vision, 
since it elevates man to the barzakh and gives him regenerative power. Adonis, then, claims to 
use the cognitive processes of Sufism less for their intrinsic value than their extrinsic power to 
change reality. However, it was the Surrealists that helped him reach this conclusion, as their 
connection with the unknown lead them “to re-examine their position vis-a-vis the external world 
and move towards a union between the ideal position and the material theses they subsequently 
built” , in order to reaffirm human freedom. Adonis’ supposed use of Sufism as external 
revolution finds support in the classical doctrine of baqa \  since transforming reality first implies 
rejecting it. However, the collective potential of this esoteric revolution remains debatable.
Of the barzakh, Adonis says: “Infinity is produced from this perfect integral dialectic between 
revelation and absence, image and meaning, nearness and distance.” But what appears is never 
fully apprehended: “Nearness is a flash in which distance seems only more distant”. Its 
contradictory nature renders it perpetually out of reach. And yet, “existence is nothing but a 
continuous movement of the dialectic of hidden/manifest and manifest/hidden... Man himself is a 
barzakh: a bridge between the shadow and light, and his existence revolves around the axis of 
transcendence towards the light. He lives through his perpetual desire for this transcendence.” 
The perpetual absence of the barzakh “is the source of his profound desire for death, that is, for 
life”. By unifying opposites, it turns all values on their head: “absence from the shadow is but 
presence in the light. Death is light: death is the real existence. The past is the light, and the 
present is the barzakh / the image, and the future is death: eternal life.” 472
472 Adonis, al-Sufiyya, p. 151
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The concept of man as the living barzakh reveals Sufism’s humanistic message, in which divinity 
and humanity form one dynamic hybrid. Adonis’ conception of the barzakh  resembles a 
mountain lying between two countries, one of which lives in its shadow. The poet must leave this 
country and make the arduous ascent in search of light. Only at the summit of this mountain -  the 
barzakh -  does he see both countries and realise that they are in fact one. Here he receives the 
divine light rising from the east and reaches a prophetic level of consciousness. His mission is 
now to return with this vision back down to his fellow men, so that they might travel the same 
path, recreating their reality with his divine knowledge.
Such a vision is implied in Adonis’ poem of the same name, The Barzakh, with its pregnant
refrain: “Things shed their names; I do not name them ...” Here the orthodox worldview is
overcome by the direct relationship between poet and reality, beyond the distorting prism of 
naming. Things exist in themselves, for themselves, like the Sufi relationship with the Unknown. 
They are the subject rather than the object of his vision: “I am the silent one and He is the Word”. 
Adonis reveals a fraught relationship with external reality throughout:
And the dream is light and fertilisation 
Upon it I was founded and built
Oh reality, w ho named you, where did you com e from?473
The dream is the barzakh, the bridge on which man meets his eternal nature, esoteric reality. It is 
a moment of access to divine transformation and creativity through which the poet remakes 
himself. The dream, then, is his departure from the dark country to scale the mountain summit, 
where union with divine light awaits. As Jung notes, myth performs an analogous psychological 
function. The land of myth is the esoteric homeland that cannot be defined geographically:
In the land o f  myth which I have chosen, I have a 
Hom e that has becom e narrower than my steps.474
473 Adonis, Hadha Huwa Ismi wa Qasd'id Ukhra, vol. 2, (al-Mada, Cyprus, 1996) p. 372
474 Ibid, p. 376
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The Flux of Obscurity and Clarity
Since God is limitless, Sufi knowledge is infinite and therefore impossible to perfectly 
circumscribe. Physical or linguistic form is a human conceptualisation of divine essence. Due to 
its permanent transformation, Meaning can only be revealed to each individual according to his 
or her own distinctive understanding and forms. Man apprehends the Absolute not through Itself 
but through Its images, which oscillate between obscurity and clarity. It follows that clarity and 
obscurity are essentially the same thing. Esoteric and exoteric do not refer to distinct entities, but 
a single One viewed from different perspectives, two sides of the same coin. The exoteric other is 
merely a form of the esoteric Self, since there is nothing other than the Self. Meaning is present 
in the image and yet absent from it, at one and the same time. It is this relationship, according to 
Adonis, that holds the key to poetic language, and that he explores fully in the volume In  
Celebration o f  Things Obscure and Clear, a set of mystical meditations on life, death, love and 
nature that function both as a series of shath-esque poems and one complete whole. Just as 
macrocosm and microcosm reflect each other, the knowledge of the world reflected in it is the 
very same self-knowledge that is the goal of the Sufi path.
The volume’s central theme is the Sufi self-other dialectic: that the self can only exist through the 
other. Hence the statement that “light is the certainty of shadow”, or that:
The most beautiful lamps, som etim es,
Are those w e ignite 
Not to bring light
But so that w e can see the darkness.475
Beyond this opposition lies the fundamental identity of self and other, which is cosmic union:
Light is furthest, yet
Nearer to us than the nearest darkness
Distance is usually an illusion.476
47:> Adonis, Ihtifa’an, p. 48
476 Ibid. p. 36
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At the locus of this cosmic union, the unconscious/divine, logical opposition is destroyed:
The sun doesn ’t say yes 
And d oesn’t say no;
It says itself.477
Here the paradoxical becomes natural, revealing the inevitable truth within the self:
H ow  strange then the lost lover -  
He is not me
Nor is he other than m e.478
This self is unified by a classic Sufi symbol for the divine:
The sea, with its constant glitter,
Is the one w ho taught him  
To leave his se lf 
In order to stay in it.479
The reciprocality of meaning between self and other reflects the return of plural into monad in 
wahdat al-wujud. This theme of cosmic integration inspires various natural barzakh-ima.ges, such 
as dusk, when day meets night, or autumn, season of change:
Dusk leads m e to its possibilities -  
M y face is split:
One cheek in day, the other in night.
Winter is loneliness 
Summer emigration  
Spring a bridge between
477 Ibid. p. 63
478 Ibid. p. 83-4
479 t u ; . i  ~  1 1
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O nly autumn penetrates all seasons 480
The Niffarian exponentiality of the quest for truth and wholeness is also prominent. The circle 
can never be complete; there must always be a wound, for:
I w as w ounded early 
And early I knew:
T he wound is what created m e.481
Adonis never arrives; he only departs. The meaning of his journey ultimately lies in the quest, 
rather than its goal.
Every time I ask anything, I split into two:
M y question and I -
The question searches for the answer,
And I search for another question.
You are born only from your lips:
You are bom  only from your questions.
H is success in what he achieved  
Is his failure
In what he hasn’t achieved.482
Adonis sees any answer as a kind of ideology or false perfection, a betrayal. Heresy and exile are 
the poet’s home; his life is an endless question. This is the logical conclusion of Niffarian 
epistemology, a mystical relativism which can only be quenched by “an inaccessible water”. The 
circle of (self-)knowledge will never be complete. But there is a painful tension between his 
embrace of imperfection and the natural inclination for psychic fulfilment:
The fence that protected him
480 Ibid. p. 17
481 Ibid. p. 57
482 Ibid. p. 14
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Is the wall that besieged him .483
The circle will only be complete at the moment of death: “life produces the death that is itse lf’. 
The volume culminates in a Heraclitean embrace of death as the moment of real life:
Death in Arabic is a m asculine word, and the spirit fem inine.
Their relationship is one o f  union and dispersal.
Y ou only really find the spirit in this union -  death.
Death is cosm ic sex, and this sex is real existence.484
Death and life are not themselves until they are each other, a cosmic reciprocality that occurs at 
the bcirzcikh. The union of death is clearly equivalent to fa n a ’:
485Entering death is a marriage, and obliteration in it is ecstasy.
This brings us back to the original myth of the fall:
Birth is separation: the greatest happiness is not to be bom  -  
to remain in the unity o f  the origin -  death.486
Leaving the womb, then, means experiencing the pain of the human condition, which the Sufi 
strives to transcend through fa n d ’ /  tawakkul, as with cAbd al-Sabur. The poet’s village is 
psychologically analogous to this womb of non-existence:
I w as born in a village  
Small and secret like a womb  
And I have never left it -  
I love the ocean, not the shores.487
483 Ibid. p. 12
484 Ibid. p. 99
485 Ibid. p. 100
486 Ibid. p. 100
487 Ibid. p. 59
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This surely marks Adonis’ full emergence into the third stage in life, the quasi-completion of the 
circle back to childhood. He himself seems aware of this psychic development:
I hear bells and voices  
Announcing my third birth.
I still walk behind the child  
That walks in my lim bs.488
But this third stage will only be complete upon entry into the Unknown -  death -  and all that lies 
in between is the fall:
The time has passed
For you to be yourself, to know  w ho you are 
Your childhood has gone 489
Adonis couches such existential meditations in the language of nature mysticism, repeatedly 
using limitless, intangible images such as air, sea and wind:
The wind -  jum bled words 
Uttered by the cosm ic silence.
The wind -  the one harbour
That m oves endlessly towards the U nknown.490
His celebration of the wind culminates in a moment of pure Sufism, conjuring up images of the 
Mevleviyya’s circular dancing dhikr:
The wind is the universe’s whistle 
The wind is dance 
And all things
488 Ibid. p. 57
489 Ibid. p. 30
490 Ibid. p. 24
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Are a stage for dancing.491
The Sufi goal is to become the perfect universal microcosm. In Adonis’ case, similarly, an 
intoxicating mix of Sufi, cAlawI, Surrealist, ancient Greek and other influences attunes him to the 
very pulse of existence, at whose divine source he constantly hints:
In the dust I touch the w ind’s fingers 
In the wind I read the dust’s writing.
G ive me your face, I ’ll g ive you my w ishes 
And the storm is our promise:
Then you can lead me, oh sea.
The sky reads you
But only after the earth writes you.
They say imitation is easy -
Oh, if  only I could be like the s e a .. ,492
Perhaps the clearest example of Sufi influence is the following lines:
The individual is a unity from the infinite 
And the group is an infinite from the unity 493
This perfectly symmetrical couplet implies the Sufi principle of wahdat al-wujud, revealing the
intimate relation between microcosm and macrocosm. But perhaps this vision of collective
harmony can only be a dream:
The dream is a pillow
On which two loving heads lie -
The dream is singular in plural form .494
491 Ibid. p. 22
492 t u : . i „  n
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Adonis’ mystical inclinations are by now overflowing, shath-like, into every utterance. Each line 
seems to contain a universe. The circular motif -  denoting both psychic fulfilment and perpetual 
revolution -  frequently recurs under the surface:
Principle is alw ays 
A  recurring deviation.
Your arrival here is m ost probably 
T he beginning o f  your real journey.
The horizon has as many faces 
A s the eyes that see it,
The light has many bodies 
But only one face.
A ll time appears and becom es my face -
A s if  the orbit is slackening and som ething is beginning -
W ill the circle o f  revolution really com plete itself,
W ill this world end?
I was stamped with heresy 
And truth spread through m e.495
Throughout this, the poet reiterates his desire for the sea -  symbol of the divine -  and the waves -  
symbol of change and revolution -  over the moribund shore. As noted, the relationship between 
the sea and the wave exemplifies the unity of existence. Through his interpretation of Sufi 
epistemology, the poet becomes a human wave in the divine sea, always restless and dynamic:
The shore uses its time
To keep still
The wave uses its time
4y4 Ibid. p. 61
495 Ibid. p. 88
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To keep m oving.
M ild ly  /  w ildly  
I break, and my sides shatter,
Still,
I want not a shore but a w ave.496
The conflict between orthodoxy -  the collective truth -  and heresy -  the individual truth -  comes 
down to its most empirical, even geometric terms: the straight line, such as the Qur’anic al-sirat 
al-mustaqim , versus the mandala of individuation, which implies a unique path to wholeness. For 
the individualist Adonis, “deviance” will always be truer than collective “rectitude”:
Som etim es,
The straight line
Is a path that leads nowhere.
The straight line,
In love, is a circle.497
Adonis’ text functions like a linguistic mandala, a poetic circle performing taw af around an 
untouchable core. The straight line can never enclose the other; it can only be a tangent leading 
away from this axis, whose inaccessibility only increases its pull:
W herever you go, how ever you get there 
Your spirit is the furthermost place.498
This endless journey towards the axis of the self incorporates the “madness” of the unconscious, 
i.e. the super-rational simultaneity principle, or mutual inclusivity. Adonis’ sustained attachment 
to madness is a recurring milestone on the path to self-knowledge. Here it is a crossroads that 
reveals the simultaneity principle at work:
496 Ibid. p. 89
497 Ibid. p. 53
498 Ibid. p. 50
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M adness is an eternal meeting with everything 
A nd, at the sam e time, an eternal farewell.
Y ou w o n ’t enter the night o f  the body 
U nless you surrender to the sun o f madness.499
Madness being a purely individual route, the poet knows that collective perfection is a dream:
H ow ever mad you are,
Your m adness w ill not be enough  
T o change the world.
T o gather people behind you
M eans that they are walking in another direction -
In every gathering there is a kind o f guilt.500
The simultaneity principle, or mystical identity of self and other, incorporates both logical 
opposites within the whole, and thus illuminates what is otherwise incomprehensible:
The purest thunderbolts 
Com e from the heart;
From the heart, too,
The blackest clouds.
You cannot be present 
W ithout a certain absence.501
One lacks meaning without the other. This integration and interdependence throughout the 
volume renders it a linguistic mandala  reflecting the relationship between inner and outer 
existence, although the recurrent dualism always belies a deeper unity:
499 Ibid. p. 53
500 Ibid. pp. 65-6
501 Ibid. p. 68
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T he transitory is what you surprise 
T he eternal is what surprises you.502
Since unity and multiplicity are mutually valid worldviews, the poet celebrates infinite plurality, 
as exemplified in language:
W riting is a house that is built, but never com pleted,
B y this vagabond fam ily, the alphabet.503
Adonis’ veneration of childhood in this volume fulfils an analogous psychic function to Sufism. 
The recurring themes of completing the circle of life and returning to his earliest experiences 
recalls Jung’s child archetype, a significant motif in the individuation process, which “anticipates 
the figure that comes from the synthesis of conscious and unconscious elements in the 
personality. It is therefore a symbol which unites the opposites; a mediator, bringer of healing, 
that is, one who makes w hole...”504 Rediscovery of a lost past can play a vital role in the 
individual’s efforts towards self-knowledge. The future means nothing without the past, although 
it cannot be imitated literally:
I still walk behind the child
That walks in m y lim bs -
N ow  he stands at the top o f  a shaft o f  light,
Searching for a corner to rest 
And read the night’s face once more.
W hat should I say to my other body 
That I left in the rubble o f the house 
W here I was bom ?
N o, nothing can quench my childhood  
Except that star that glitters above it 
And sprinkles the sky’s path with m y steps.
502 Ibid. p. 36
503 Ibid. p. 37
504 Jung, Archetypes, p. 164
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Still my childhood is born 
In the hands o f a light 
W hose name I do not know  
It’s him w ho names m e.505
Significantly, the child archetype relates not only to psychic wholeness, but to futurity, a vital 
notion for Adonis. Through his confrontation with the unconscious he encompasses the different 
functions of time -  past, present, future -  within one unified continuum:
W ords are yesterday
A s for the poem  com posed with them
It is tomorrow -
Is this the alchem y o f  poetry?
L ove is our past steps
And the past is our future dust.
Life uproots death -  in order to remain.
It is death, yesterday, today and tomorrow.
At every moment,
The ashes testify that they are the palace o f  the future.506
Just as al-Bayyatl does with Borges, Adonis assimilates physical (exoteric) blindness with 
esoteric vision. This vision, like poetic meaning, lies beneath the surface, where the alchemical 
individuation process occurs:
In the past, you were blind 
But now , you are a future -  
Reading roads and space,
Trees and fields,
505 Adonis, Ihtifci’an, p. 58
506 Ibid. p. 8 '
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People.507
As noted, an essential characteristic of this writing is its exilic status. Exile is a necessary 
prerequisite for achieving union; through it, the poet sublimates his spiritual alienation into gold:
Y our homeland, poet,
Is the place where you can only be in ex ile .508
Adonis defines his new homeland from the premise of exile. Fana’ -  “annihilation” -  is a blissful 
existential exile from the outer world through which the poet/mystic can be reborn into b aqa ’. 
The pain of alienation is transformed into psychic redemption, centred round the axis of self- 
fulfilment. F a n a ' and exile, as doors towards the Other and thereby the Self, are therefore 
analogous and necessary stages on the circular journey from the original to the final state, from 
birth to death, from archaic man to complete man. In this blissful void the new birth is incubated:
A  reality -
In it the roads o f  defeat becam e 
The only thing
That leads to the roads o f  freedom.
From one moment to the next, he is naked:
N othing to wear except words.
H e tires
And can only rest in his shadow.
The source is an inkwell -  its water is ink 
Pouring endlessly out, wandering endlessly around -  
It can’t even live in its ow n house.
H e draws maps 
But they tear him up.
507 Ibid. p. 97
508 Ibid. p. 67
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Be absent
So you can remain a question.
I alw ays forget what I own
To increase my freedom from what ow ns m e.509
This volume, then, can be considered as a mandala revolving around the hidden essence of the 
poet’s self. Being simultaneously the centre and circumference of this mandala, the poet attempts 
to fully unite with existence, implicitly fulfilling the function of the esoteric qutb, or axis. 
Perhaps the most significant line in the entire volume sums up this dialectical individuation 
process offa n a ’-baqa’:
I have becom e connected to nothing, to becom e the axis o f  everything.510
w Ibid. p. 27
10 Ibid. p. 93
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The Qutb
Through the various stages assessed above, Adonis’ poetic project centres around the desire for a 
new prophet. The notion of an external mission through inner enlightenment suggests ibn al- 
cArabi’s doctrine of the qutb, or axis, possessor of universal prophetic consciousness, a role for 
which Adonis implies his own aptitude.
As noted earlier, the perfect man’s heart is the axis of his being (microcosm) and by extension of 
existence (macrocosm). Hence he becomes the all-seeing qutb, representative of “Muhammadan 
Reality”. In the heart (qalb) lies each human being’s own qutb, the axis of his consciousness. 
Therefore, the qutb is to the macrocosm, the universe, what the qalb is to the microcosm, the 
human being. By knowing his own heart, i.e. his self, the mystic knows the world. As change is 
the sole permanent in divine revelations, only through endless revolution can the perfect m an’s 
heart remain true to existence. In this process of identification, argues Adonis, the mystic 
becomes the Absolute, and may therefore say: “I am not the speaker, but the Absolute.”511 This is 
the key to interpreting al-Hallaj’s shath “Ana al-Haqq”.
The qutb is a re-establishment of the original theomorphism, for “God created Adam ‘according 
to His form’” . Al-QashanI refers to the qutb as “the place of God’s appearance in the world at all 
times”.512 De Jong relates that for ibn al-cArabI,
“the universal rational principle, the ruh M uham m ad, or al-hakika al-m uham m adiyya  [sic] through w hich  
D ivine know ledge is transmitted to all prophets and saints, finds its fullest manifestation in and is identical 
with the kutb [qutb], who is al-insan al-kdm il. He is the cause o f  creation, for in him alone creation is fully  
realised. He is al-barzakh , the hakikat a l-h a k a ’ik .. .  he is M uhamm ad as the inward aspect o f  A dam , i.e. 
the real Adam (Mankind) or al-ldhu t [divinityl, w hich is forever m anifesting itself on the plane o f al-n asu t 
[humanity] in prophets and saints (i.e. in aktab  [pi. o f  qutb]) w ho com e within the category o f  al-insan  al- 
kdm il, since they are perfect m anifestations o f  God and have realised, in m ystical experience, essentia l 
oneness with Him. This m akes a k ta b  infallib le, and since there is only one ku tb  at a tim e (a l-ku tb  a l-
;’11 Adonis, al-Sufiyya, p. 69
;'12 F. de Jong, ‘Kutb’, El, vol 5, p. 543
256
w ah ic l), he is G od’s real kh a lifah , who is the preserver and maintainer o f  the universe, the m ediator
513betw een D ivine and hu m an ...”
The concept of qutbiyya, or nubuwwci mutlaqa (absolute prophecy), unifies Adonis’ diverse 
influences and inclinations, from the early cAlawI experiences and the secret hierarchy of the 
SSNP (with Sacada as its qutb) to the concept of the barzakh, al-insan al-kdmil, Nietzsche’s 
“Superman” and Niffarian waqfa. As “al-kalima al-jamic c f  -  “the unifying Word” -  the qutb is 
both a philosophical and linguistic cognate of the Heraclitean Logos, or cosmic energy principle. 
It has also been linked to the ShIcI conception of the infallible Imam and the neo-Platonic nous. 
All these paths lead to qutbiyya: the pinnacle of the esoteric journey, where man becomes the 
divine axis of existence and achieves universal vision.
Adonis’ entire life project appears to culminate with the concept of qutbiyya: “Annihilation in 
this unity is annihilation of ego-consciousness, i.e. its subsistence is subsistence in the Witnessed 
(God), where the Sufi sees himself on another level “and finds himself ecstatic, pure, revelling in 
everything, surrounded by everything, but at the source of everything” .”514 The poet becomes 
connected to nothing to be the axis of everything, ecstatically achieving unity with all existence 
in its inner and outer dimensions. Self-knowledge is revealed to be world-knowledge. Thus the 
human poet comes to conceive of himself a divine agent, an esoteric khalifa , despite the 
outwardly narcissistic impression this creates.
Despite the inherent elitism of the qutb principle, Chodkiewicz notes that ibn al-cArab! sees it as 
the primus inter pares of the m uqarrabun, a Q ur’anic term denoting “those close to God”. 
Through his universal perspective, the qutb sees that all things are equally faces of the Divine. In 
his Kitab Manzil al-Qutb, ibn al-‘Arabi states: “The qutb is both the centre of the circle of the 
universe, and its circumference. He is the mirror of God, and the pivot of the w orld ...”515 This 
reveals a remarkable parallel with the nature of God according to St Augustine, as Jung also
513 Ibid, p. 544
514 Muhammad al-cAmilI, quoted in Adonis, al-Sufiyya, p. 123
3,5 Ibn al-‘Arabi, quoted in M. Chodkiewicz, Seal of the Saints: Prophethood and Sainthood in the Doctrine of Ibn 
‘Arabi, (Islamic Texts Society, Cambridge, 1993), p. 95
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notes: “in ecclesiastical as in alchemical literature the saying is often quoted: “God is an infinite 
circle (or sphere) whose centre is everywhere and the circumference nowhere”.”516
This circle and axis theory produces the notion of infinity, as do the Niffarian schema of cilm, 
m acrifa and waqfa and the cAlawI bab, ism and m acna. These threefold hierarchies culminate at 
the level of the qutb, and are structurally analogous to Jung’s formulation of conscious, personal 
unconscious and collective unconscious. The divine level of qutbiyya, then, is equivalent to the 
collective unconscious, where the poet/prophet apprehends the entirely of human existence. From 
this perspective, at the centre of the circle, the division between esoteric and exoteric explodes 
and the whole of existence is one, affirming the theory of wahdat al-wujud. This accounts for the 
non-existence of the circle’s circumference both in ibn al-cA rabfs view and Jung’s research.
It seems, then, that Adonis’ fascination with esoteric doctrines is part of an individuation process 
whereby he becomes the qutb of his own mandala, and through it axis of the world, subjectively 
speaking. This seems a natural progression for the poet, seer of the age, and is reflected both on a 
semantic and structural level in the volume discussed above.
Jung, A rchetypes, pp. 324-5
258
Conclusion
Adonis’ esoteric experience displays the following interdependent characteristics: super-rational, 
spontaneous, subjective, exponential, subversive, exilic, progressive, chaotic and permanently 
transforming. This is the nature of the total esoteric revolution that he envisages on all levels of 
human existence, from the linguistic and political to the cultural and spiritual. His poetry is the 
writing of this total revolution -  sometimes a manifesto, often a dream, always viewing man and 
existence from within. Ironically, however, these esoteric characteristics at once bring profound 
insights and undermine his broader mission. Due to its extreme subjectivity, his liberating project 
only truly works at an individual level. Like Jubran, he attempts to be simultaneously ‘modern 
and classical, realist and mystical, nihilist and revolutionary.’ But it is far easier to deconstruct 
than to reconstruct.
Adonis’ ideal poet is like the Sufi perfect man, combination of madman and prophet, who 
harmonises both sides of existence and regains the lost unity of the original theomorphism, 
‘where the primeval and the cultural meet’... But since this meeting point, this barzakh, is never 
still, Adonis’ world is inherently unstable. Such is his rejection of the status quo, he goes to the 
other extreme, verging on an esoteric fundamentalism. This represents an equal and opposite 
reaction of chaos to what he sees as the static nature of Arab civilization, which must be utterly 
destroyed and rebuilt. For Adonis, Arab reality requires this transitional madness if it is to 
maintain its own identity in a future world civilization. It is ultimately unclear, however, to what 
degree his esoterism springs from m easured socio-cultural analysis rather than his own 
psychological inclinations.
For Adonis, mysticism is an aspiration towards the infinite and the unknown. This implies 
perpetual motion, rather than completion, which he aims to exemplify in the structure of his 
writing. This is why the mandala does not apply to Adonis in the same way as it does to al- 
Bayyatl and cAbd al-Sabur: rather than trying to close the circle of psychological wholeness, he 
ultimately celebrates its perpetual openness -  “The wound is what created me” -  despite the 
obvious tension this creates. Closure, for one who believes in the infinite progression and 
beginning, is tantamount to rank traditionalism, imitation, death. However, his conviction that the
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Sufis were aware of the exponential nature of their quest, whilst itself a creditable viewpoint, 
cannot escape the problems of relativism.
Such issues are part of his apparent pioneering of postmodern values in Arabic thought, although 
he consciously locates them in the depths of the Arabic heritage. Besides the emphasis on open- 
endedness, this postmodern esoterism includes his concept of istiqsa’, or infinite exploration; the 
absurdity of attempting to attain Truth; the principle of Timitlessness in art’517; and the 
Heraclitean notions of perpetual flux and relativity. There is a clear post-structuralist influence in 
his inclination for deconstruction and bringing marginal texts to the centre (c.f. Derrida); in 
tracing the archaeology of knowledge/power relationships in Arab-Islamic history, and deliberate 
use of the ‘language of madness’ to circumscribe them (c.f. Foucault); and in his use of ecstatic 
language (c.f. Barthes). His neo-Sufi inclinations are therefore a means to intellectual rebellion 
and cultural difference.
Adonis conceives of art as an expression of esoteric reality and of the artist as unifier of all levels 
of consciousness into one indivisible whole. For him, as for the Sufis, the source of creation lies 
in this unknown, divine dimension of existence. This accounts for the deliberate absurdity and 
obscurity of his work, both in terms of structure and content. Importantly, however, he does not 
self-consciously write ‘Sufi poetry,’ since he is not a Sufi and for him all true poetry needs no 
qualifying adjective. Such open-ended writing is by definition impossible to explain or translate 
in any conclusive way, and is open to as many interpretations as it has readers.
W ith this conception of artistic creation, all unconscious processes become keys to poetic 
imagination. The dream, for example, takes man to the barzakh, as does fana  for the Sufis. From 
this viewpoint, immersion into esoteric chaos, inherently illogical and unpredictable, is the 
catalyst for the birth of a new order, if only in the poet’s own self.
Despite his distinctive historical view of Sufism and inevitably selective use of the extensive Sufi 
sources, Adonis’ Sufism and Surrealism  remains a convincing argument for the esoteric 
viewpoint. In it, he demonstrates how Sufis achieved freedom on all levels of existence -  love,
517 Adonis, ol-Thabit wa al-Mutcihawwil, p. 179
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knowledge, writing, etc. -  through dialectical principles that connect them with other cultural 
movements. The result is a humanistic secular mysticism through which he aims to “obtain anew 
this union that we have lost since the fall.”
As such, Adonis unites two distinct but complementary viewpoints: m ysticism  and 
postmodernism. However enlightened or progressive, the problem is that neither truly solves the 
Arab world’s modem socio-political issues. To embrace a postmodern mysticism before the 
establishment of an authentic modernity and secular values inevitably entails the permanent exile 
that Adonis defiantly cherishes.
With the deconstruction-reconstruction dialectic Adonis attempts to transform existence and 
restore man to himself “through the return of his lost powers”. This is a rejection of externally 
imposed conditions and an attempt to return to the lost paradise. In this way his neo-Sufism 
comes across as an attempt to replicate the organic wholeness of childhood or the womb, 
reflecting the circularity of human consciousness. But the three main phases of Adonis’ life -  
childhood, ideological and neo-Sufi -  should be seen not as discrete entities separated by sharp 
philosophical switches, but as an overlapping continuum. For example, aspects of SSNP 
ideology, such as rebirth and mythology, remain implicit within his subsequent esoterism. Of the 
two volumes discussed here, Songs ofM ihyar the Damascene (1961), standing on the cusp of this 
shift, carries a clearer socio-political message than the later In Celebration o f  Things Obscure 
and Clear (1988).
CA1I Ahmad SacId is no ordinary poet. He could be seen as anything from a militant atheist to a 
progressive neo-Islam ist philosopher: the difference between atheism and pantheism is 
essentially a matter of linguistics. To remain true to himself and the world, his thought purposely 
exemplifies the paradox of the super-rational simultaneity principle: exile is home, obscurity is 
clarity, madness is wisdom, death is life, chaos is order, betrayal is faith, flux is permanence, 
deviation is truth, scepticism is certainty, relativism is absolutism, contradiction is sense. Identity 
is not based on geography, but on liberty. As two sides of the same existential coin, these 
oppositions belie the existence of a unified divine Meaning. Sufism, the mystical path of self- 
knowledge in Islam, for him represents but one route towards total freedom and the affirmation 
of a simultaneously unique and universal identity.
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CONCLUSION
Words in Arabic today 
Are all blind
Except for one: God.518
Comparative Analysis
The three case studies of this thesis have sought to illustrate and explain the broader trend of neo- 
Sufism after 1960, defining each poet as follows: al-Bayyatl: revolutionary mysticism, cAbd al- 
Sabur: theistic existentialism, Adonis: total esoteric revolution. The clear variation in these poets’ 
individual approaches, not only to ideological questions, but also to language, poetic creativity 
and ultimately in their use of Sufism, has necessitated a slightly different approach in each case. 
Nevertheless, there exist fundamental commonalities underlying these differences.
The variation in approach and methodology can be appreciated by examining each poet’s use of 
al-Hallaj. cAbd al-Sabur and al-Bayyatl conceive of this pivotal figure more as revolutionary hero 
than as Sufi saint, while for Adonis he is primarily a poet and heretic. Such a discrepancy reflects 
a fundamental split in the poets’ approaches: the use of Sufi characters as masks or moral 
exemplars versus exploration of their creative and visionary potential. This, in turn, goes back to 
their alternative conceptions of the role and meaning of art, and ultimately to contrasting 
ontological viewpoints: for Adonis, creativity, which is simultaneously self-discovery and world- 
discovery, “is founded on the abyss of the Unlim ited...”519 It is, in other words, essentially no 
different to the Sufis’ esoteric journey, an intrinsically personal and metaphysical view traceable 
to his early inculcation in Islamic mysticism. Whereas for him poetry entailed the discovery of 
the Unknown, those of a more directly committed persuasion attempted to fuse Sufism with a 
socialist ideal to express aspirations for truth and justice in the public sphere. Thus al-Hallaj 
effectively became a political mask in al-Bayyatl and cAbd al-Sabur’s existential struggles. The 
inner world was significant insofar as it affected the outer: mystic union was incomplete without 
perfecting the macrocosmic self, the achievement of social justice. Adonis, meanwhile, being
3IK Adonis, Ihtifa’an bil-ashyci’ al-ghamida al-wadiha, p. 60
Sl-’ Adonis, cd-Shicriyya a l-cArabiyya, (Dar al-Adab, Beirut, 1985), p. 105
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more preoccupied with cultural renewal and innovation, gives ontological priority to the esoteric 
viewpoint in its own right. Despite their shared ultimate aim of changing reality, therefore, the 
fundamentally different approaches of these poets are reflected in their alternative uses of an 
archetypal symbol such as al-Hallaj.
However, this major difference belies several major commonalities regarding the motivation for 
neo-Sufism, which transcend the perennial debate over the role of art. These revolve around the 
effects of social, political and cultural reality on the psychological constitution of the individual. 
This conclusion will identify a generic, albeit necessarily flexible, neo-Sufi paradigm that reflects 
their attempts to cope with a common reality. Despite differing backgrounds, all three came to 
fully appreciate the connection between the cultural product of poetry and its inner esoteric 
inspiration. This relationship superseded ideological differences: indeed, the affinity between 
mysticism and poetic creativity represents a significant point of commonality for two poets, 
Adonis and c Abd al-Sabur, who were otherwise quite different.
The thesis has discussed the psychological conditions behind this neo-Sufi paradigm: 
fragmentation, disillusionment, exile, spiritual emptiness, loss, despair and existential angst. 
These in turn are directly related to external factors: lack of individual and cultural freedoms, the 
political repression and corruption of the post-colonial state, the country/city dialectic, social and 
economic issues in the urban reality. All modem Arab poets suffered from this predicament, 
albeit in differing ways; all were faced with the fundamental loss of wholeness and identity that 
simultaneously afflicted both nation and individual. Neo-Sufism can be considered but one 
among various interrelated psychological reactions to this fraught historical circumstance. It can 
be defined at once as a critique of modem Arab reality and an attempt to transcend it, a quest for 
cultural and artistic authenticity, an affirmation of the integrity of the individual in the context of 
mass ideologies and oppressive political orders, a will to freedom, an expression of the inherent 
affinities between ancient mysticism and postmodernist thought, a search for simultaneous 
microcosmic and macrocosmic wholeness that was encapsulated in the Andalusian ideal, and 
finally an expression of ‘cultural individuation’ in response to the angst-ridden Zeitgeist.
263
i) Cultural Authenticity: the Response to a Civilizational Crisis
Neo-Sufism can be viewed in light of the trend towards rejection of secular rationalism and the 
religious revival in and after the 1960s. Where Islamic nationalists after 1967 poured scorn on the 
secular pan-Arab doctrine and advocated a return to the ‘pure’ Islamic principles, the neo-Sufi 
poets had anticipated this development some years earlier by reviving Islam’s esoteric tradition. 
However, while the neo-Sufi ideal contrasted strongly with its Islamist counterpart -  the poets 
remained avowedly secular, for example -  the themes and terminology used were often 
ambiguous. Sufism was a major part of all the poets’ cultural background and spiritual heritage, 
Sunni and cAlawI alike. Like the Islamists, the neo-Sufi poets came to reject the Nasserite 
project, whose defeat they effectively foresaw. Faced with this crisis, the approaches of °Abd al- 
Sabur and the Islamist ideologue Sayyid Qutb reveals some interesting parallels, such as the 
Kierkegaardian need for commitment to an irrational principle in response to state oppression, 
and the reinterpretation of ancient religious principles in an attempt to restore truth to the world. 
Adonis’ attitude towards the ShIcI revolution in Iran also reflects a dangerous ambiguity between
5^0the exoteric and esoteric movements. " In both cases, the return to religious motifs can be 
considered symptomatic of a desire to re-establish universal principles like truth and justice in 
familiar and culturally legitimate terms. For the neo-Sufis, this entailed a return to the East after 
embracing European ideas, synthesizing the cultural ‘other’ of Western rationalism and the 
cultural ‘self’ of Eastern mysticism. By using Sufism, however, they effectively called into 
question the ability of reason and logic -  the founding principles of the European Enlightenment 
-  to foster an Arab-Islamic society that lives in truth.
The identity crisis of these poets revolves around a love-hate relationship with modernity, a 
double-edged sword that brings both emancipation from traditional structures and a renewed 
cultural and political vulnerability. Neo-Sufism, therefore, is simultaneously an impassioned 
restatement of the modernist ideal in art -  the right to creative freedom -  and a bitter rejection of 
the all-encompassing exoteric Order that modem secular reason paradoxically helps to maintain. 
If enlightenment reason locks society into a rigid system of logical oppositions that is always 
incipiently totalitarian, then the irrational chaos of the esoteric experience allows the artist to
3-" Adonis, cil-Muhit cil-Iswid, (Dar al-Saql, Beirut, 2005) p. 108
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perpetually renew it. It follows that neo-Sufism is both a rejection and continuation of the 
inherited culture, and its attitude towards the West, like that of the Islamist ideologues, is more 
complex than it first appears. To overcome the conflict between cultural authenticity and the 
acceptance of a cultural other whose own agenda deprives it of legitimacy, Adonis has repeatedly 
striven to distinguish between the colonial-ideological aspects of this other, which he spurns 
outright, and its spiritual-irrational aspects, which form the bridge to a common humanity. 
Indeed, he himself crossed this bridge twice: the outward journey to discover super-rational 
movements in European poetry and thought, such as Surrealism, and the return, armed with this 
knowledge, to rediscover the super-rational movements in Islamic thought, such as Sufism, and 
thence to equate the two as alternative approaches towards the same Absolute Truth. This 
cognitive dialectic of self-knowledge via the other is indeed the very essence of Sufism. Yet the 
fact that Adonis needed to express this universal human quest in culturally specific terms reveals 
the overriding importance of authenticity: postmodern irrationalism thereby appeared not as an 
import but as a renewal of original Eastern thought. This is despite the fact that his wholesale 
reinterpretation of Arabic letters can be very much attributed to his European experiences: “It 
was reading Baudelaire which changed my understanding of Abu Nuwas...and M allarme’s work 
which explained... the mysteries of Abu Tammam’s poetic language...”521
In their self-conception as the visionary guides, even latter-day prophets, of the Arab nation, 
these poets reacted to the breakdown of Arab society and culture with a mixture of rejection and 
desperate desire for its rebirth. While the specifically non-Islamic fertility myths of the 1950s 
paradoxically expressed both of these, the subsequent return to Sufism was more in keeping with 
the mood of the following decade, in which any rebirth required at least a veneer of Islamic 
legitimacy. Al-Hallaj could be reclaimed not only as a poetic mask, but as a symbol of the true 
Islamic values: justice, equality and love. Whilst maintaining cultural legitimacy by using a 
figure from Islamic history, the poets thereby effectively continued the age-old struggle between 
the esoterists (Sufis) and exoterists (culama’) for the heart of the religion.
121 Adonis, An Introduction to Arab Poetics, p. 81
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ii) Individual versus Mass and the Will to Freedom
Neo-Sufism clearly internalised the search for truth that each poet had pursued in the political 
sphere. The structure of society under the secular state differed little from that under theocratic 
rule: for Adonis, whose interpretation of Sufism was strongly influenced by post-structuralist 
French thought, both entailed a moribund, static order functioning in the name of the meekly 
assenting masses. Disillusionment with the quest for a modem Utopia spawned a new kind of 
quest: for individual integrity in contradistinction to the mass. The failure of the outer revolutions 
in Iraq, Egypt and elsewhere led inevitably to an instinctive reassessment: real truth ultimately 
was hidden within the individual, “that infinitesimal unity on which a world depends”.522 The 
Sufi God or Absolute became effectively synonymous with the total liberation of the individual 
in the face of repressive state systems and rigid cultural norms. Sufi characters were symbols of 
the will to freedom and individual wholeness, transcending external repression. As individual par 
excellence, the poet’s spiritual journey inevitably takes him beyond collective solutions. Living in 
truth required the remaking reality from within, so that external reality might become a function 
of inner truth. The neo-Sufi experience clearly charted such a shift from collective to individual: 
al-Bayyatl’s move from the virtuous city to the orchard of love, cAbd al-Sabur’s gradual 
withdrawal from society and solitary attempts at Sufi-esque abstraction, A donis’ nature 
mysticism and surrealist dream-joumeys. Paradoxically, moreover, it was precisely through the 
profoundest individual experience that the poet hoped to return to his fellow men, as if going 
beyond the individual unconscious to the collective unconscious. “I spum you so that I may know 
you”, says cAbd al-Sabur, suggesting the ascent from fa n a ’ to baqa’.523
Freedom is among the Arab poet’s highest ideals. Through subordination to the abstract idea of 
the State, these poets were denied their individuality and therefore their deepest level of identity. 
They shared a common objection to the circular logic of God as Order (the religious experience 
being subordinated to a repressive, static, controlling institution) and Order as God (the 
contemporary political system elevated to the status of a divinely-sanctioned order, just as 
totalitarian and intransigent as the religious institution). Both involve a severe curtailment of 
individual freedom. To achieve freedom requires deconstructing this overarching Order through
m  Jung, The Undiscovered Self, p. 79
523 cAbd al-Sabur, Aqulu Lcikum, p. 66
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the opposing force of chaos, and reconstructing it in another form. But the annihilation of the 
individual ego within the all-encom passing system  entailed precisely that: through 
totalitarianism, the individual had been unmade and could be remade, analogously to Sufi fa n a ’ 
and baqa’. This mystical dialectic was the madman and the prophet remaking reality. Thus the 
language of Sufism offered the radical Arab poet a discourse through which to attempt his 
recreation of reality. Sufism was therefore a means of reasserting the primacy of the individual in 
the face of externally imposed mass ideas, as if the poet was reclaiming the State-imposed 
psychological annihilation to his advantage. If Sufi annihilation was merely the prelude to 
subsistence, then this formula could be restated in modem terms. However, language alone could 
not achieve this, and external reality needed more than poetry to undergo real change.
The will to individuality therefore deconstructs the exoteric institution. Naturally, individuality 
can be passed off as egotistic obstinacy by the purveyors of cilm: science condemns it as 
subjectivism and religious authorities denounce it as heresy. Again, al-Hallaj represented an ideal 
here: expressing his individuality through being anchored in God, in contradistinction to the 
political reality. If the individual could not find his Truth, then society -  which after all consists 
merely of individuals -  would also fall short. The role of religion as a counterbalance to mass­
mindedness is well attested: “the individual will never find the real justification for his existence, 
and his own spiritual and moral autonomy, anywhere except in an extramundane principle 
capable of relativizing the overpowering influence of external factors. The individual who is not 
anchored in God can offer no resistance on his own resources to the physical and moral 
blandishments of the world. For this he needs the evidence of inner, transcendent experience 
which alone can protect him from the otherwise inevitable submersion in the mass.”524
5-+ Jung, The Undiscovered Self, p. 16
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iii) Mysticism and Postmodernism
The neo-Sufi trend stands at the intersection of two concepts, mysticism and postmodernism, 
simultaneously exhibiting characteristics of both. As a reformulation of the timeless principles of 
Sufism in the light of modern knowledge, it represents, particularly in A donis’ case, an 
authentically and specifically Arab postmodernism. Mysticism and postmodernism share several 
attributes: both are irrational ideas that break through the restraints imposed by scientific or 
theological rationalism (cilm). They disturb the rational philosopher no less than the theologian. 
The unitive experience of mysticism, where conceptual opposites are reconciled and the cause- 
effect binary transcended, is perfectly symbolised by the unity of the m a n d a la  and 
philosophically equivalent to postmodern suspension of the rational. As established previously, 
there is a clear parallel between “deconstruction” and mystical annihilation (fana’): reality 
implodes and attains zero dimensions at the Sufi barzakh. Sufism, therefore, inherently 
deconstructs present reality and effectively subverts the logical, ethical and political norms that 
exercise social control. Adonis in particular emphasizes this revolutionary potential, whereby the 
division between personal and political is revealed to be a cultural construct. Like 
postmodernism, Sufism thereby criticizes the unhealthy alliance between discourse and power, in 
favour of the “mad”, the marginalised, and the minority. The true mystic is a perpetual outsider 
who by definition questions orthodoxy. It is in this vein that Adonis attempts to undermine the 
monolithic -  or “logocentric” -  axis of Arabic culture.
Adonis tells us that, “I write in a language that exiles me.” Both postmodernism and mysticism 
are inherently sceptical of language and external reality, viewing them as a form of unreality and 
revealing their impotent exile from truth. For both the concept of ‘normality’ or ‘reality’ is 
fraught with difficulties and cannot be sharply defined. Everything is a metaphor for an abyss, 
whether the latter be divine or not. In this, they hint at the falseness of the ‘real’, i.e. exoteric 
world of culture, inhabited by constructed selves or ‘subjects’/egos which in Sufism are 
exchanged for the natural, organic, divine Other. Both therefore imply that humans lack genuine 
individuality and exist merely as a function of a larger system or Being. This also reveals their
Adonis, Transformations o f  the Lover, p. xiii
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common ethical ambiguity, beyond the diametric polarities of conventional morality. All that 
remains outside is power; all that remains inside is the quest for wholeness.
Neo-Sufism and postmodernism, both of which are profoundly indebted to Nietzsche, reaffirm 
the precedence of the subjective in human experience in contrast to the false objectivities of the 
rational institution. The prophetic spirit in art eschews objective relationships in favour of the 
dark chaos of subjectivisms. It is as if man can only attain ultimate objectivity through the pursuit 
o f his own subjectivity. The ancient man and the hypothetical future man unite origin and end in 
a circular totality, the m andala  of the Anthropos. Just as the pre-modem poets possessed 
prophetic powers, so in postmodemity the distinction between poet and philosopher is blurred. 
The distinction between epistemological fields demarcated by modem thought become once 
more immaterial: the snake’s tail reaches its mouth.
Furthermore, mysticism and postmodernism share an ateleological existential viewpoint: death as 
mere transition in esoteric religions, lack of closure in postmodern relativism. For Adonis, 
following al-Niffarl, meaning arises not in reaching a destination, but through the constant 
journey, which in itself is what sustains vitality and prevents fossilization. These endless 
experiences, however, inevitably entail relativism. The natural tendencies o f the unconscious 
mind incline towards mystical ideas, or the relativity of existence around an Unseen Absolute. 
The fact that good and evil function concurrently creates a moral conflict for the exoteric 
believer. Freedom from opposites, achieved through mystical experiences, offers a resolution to 
this conflict. The “eastern relativity of good and evil” implies liberation from the moral opposites 
that so tormented cAbd al-Sabur.
The global religious revival accompanying the decline of Enlightenment rationalism, with the 
spread of new-age spiritualities and the rise of radical fundamentalisms, is a postmodern 
phenomenon in whose context neo-Sufism may be viewed. By proclaiming the end of progress, 
postmodernism has provided fertile soil for “fundamentalist” ideologies, but it has also 
relativized their claim to absolute truth. If political Islamism offered a potential means to 
preserve distinctive identity in the face of modernity and secularisation, then neo-Sufism also 
attempted to rediscover culturally authentic meaning. These were Kierkegaardian attempts to 
restore meaning to a world in which science cannot offer the same psychological underpinning as
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age-old irrational beliefs. Like European postmodernists, the neo-Sufis were disillusioned, often 
pessimistic, erstwhile leftist thinkers whose revolutionary aspirations remained unfulfilled and 
who were critical of the public functions of reason. However, neo-Sufi postmodernism naturally 
displayed unique and distinctive characteristics; the postmodernism of ‘the other’ was inevitably 
different from that of the European ‘self’. The fact that these poets were heirs to both European 
and Arab-Islamic thought engendered an intellectual hybridity that continued and transcended 
both traditions. Where the Europeans followed the exoteric rationalist mould by denying the 
noumenal realm, the neo-Sufi postmodernists, particularly Adonis, vehemently affirmed it. While 
for the European relativists human identity was effectively a fiction and the mandala a black 
hole, the Arab poets maintained that the creative self lies beyond the ego. They could not accept 
that language entirely constitutes reality.
M oreover, effective action for change requires more than mere deconstruction of logical 
opposites. It implies the need for reconstruction in altered form, just as fa n a ’ leads to baqd’, the 
prophetic revolution. Indeed, mere annihilation without subsistence could be seen as disengaged, 
solipsistic and irresponsible by the committed Arab poet. cAbd al-Sabur and al-Bayyatl 
particularly encountered the major ontological dilemma between the abstraction and introversion 
of the poetic ideal and the perennial issue of external responsibility. Words are exiled from truth, 
but still necessary for socio-political interaction. Hence the need for a prophetic level of 
consciousness in which words and truth are united, although this forever remains a mirage.
Naturally, the Arab poet needs psychological strength in contrast to the endless slippage of 
relativism. Through mystical inclinations the notion of a central axis, or God, reappears, around 
which all else has relative value, like ibn al-cArabI’s “secondary causes”. Psychological 
fragmentation can only be overcome by absolute wholeness. In the case of cAbd al-Sabur and al- 
Bayyatl, this wholeness becomes the ultimate goal; Adonis’, conversely, celebrates the endless 
Heraclitean flux and a relativism he attributes not to European thinkers but to the wandering Sufi 
dervish al-Niffarl, who represents for him the apotheosis of poetic modernism. Aware that the 
circle cannot be definitively closed, he rejoices in openness. A closed epistemological system is 
precisely what creates a moribund culture and external oppression. Against this he posits an 
ateleological, postmodernist flux in which uncertainty is a virtue:
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T he fence that protected him  
Is the w all that besieged him .526
Yet Adonis fluctuates between desire for the Absolute and acceptance of the relative. While he 
acknowledges that the Absolute cannot be reached, he still maintains that Sufi writing is “a
527symbol that transcends the relative to the Absolute” , a return to the collective unconscious. In 
his profoundly mystical 1988 volume this conflict pushes him towards paradoxically suggesting 
the absolute truth of relativism. Adonis’ interpretation of Sufism was strongly influenced by the 
European theoretical milieu. Like al-Niffari, his poetry gradually dissolves into unclassifiable 
fragments, affirming the postmodem/mystical breakdown of conceptual boundaries:
Y es, light prostrates itself 
But only to another ligh t...
Thirsty
B ut I can only be quenched
5^8B y an inaccessib le water. "
Adonis’ concept of poetic creativity as analogous to the esoteric journey towards the creation of a 
utopian future betrays his oscillation between triumphant absolutism and desperate relativism:
It is poetry that declares the death o f  all that kills man. It does not thereby only kill the gods, but a lso  all 
that tries to take their p la ce ... be it a political power, a system  or an ideology. That is why revolutionary  
poetry orients itse lf towards the future and remains a dream o f som ething w hich poetry alone cannot 
realize: its realization needs all o f  history as com prehensive m ovem ent and com plete progress. That is 
w hy poetry, by itself, may seem  never able to realize this dream. Revolutionary poetry is like a m ovem ent, 
alw ays renew ing itself, but alw ays failing. Yet, its effectiveness lies in this very failure, in this constant
529surpassing, and in this horizon that alw ays leads to another horizon.
■m  Adonis, Ihtifa’cm bil-ashya’ al-ghamida al-wdcliha, p. 12
527 Adonis, al-Sufiyya wa al-Surydliyya, p. 156
52fi Adonis, Ihtifd’an bil-ashya’ al-ghamida al-wdcliha, p. 26
52<l Adonis, Zamdn al-Shicr, quoted in Khairallah, ‘Adunls and the Quest for a New God’
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iv) The Granada Paradigm
As previously established, the impetus for a mystical journey is provided by an acutely modem 
sense of loss, which the modem Arab poet suffers on a number of levels: loss of the organic 
psychic wholeness of the womb, of childhood innocence, of epistemological certainty, of cultural 
innocence, of a spiritual (and often physical) home, of the historical pre-eminence of the Arabs. 
The mythical fall of Adam, which equates unconscious childhood with paradise and presents the 
dawn of consciousness as a curse, functions as a metaphor for all of these. Restoring the paradise 
lost is the ultimate existential journey. At a civilizational level, the yearning for rebirth is 
encapsulated in the idea of Arab Andalus, the medieval Umayyad caliphate in Spain. For Adonis, 
it is a symbol of hope and honour, and the prototype of the perfect society of the future, for al- 
Bayyatl, it epitomizes the Arabs’ unique contributions to world civilization.
For these poets Andalus was al-mujtamac al-kamil, the perfect society, embodying the 
progressive principles of multiplicity in unity, or harmony in difference, which are integral motifs 
in Sufi thought. Ibn al-cArabi himself, al-Sheikh al-Akbar of Sufism, and other great thinkers 
such as ibn Rushd, contributed to its outstanding philosophical and mystical achievements. 
According to Adonis, Andalus was a human mosaic, “a hybridization of the world in form as well 
as in essence”. By transcending all individual cultures, it created a new and qualitatively different 
crossbreed culture. He attributes to it the progressive ideas of overcoming geographical 
boundaries and creating the open space of freedom. Al-BayyatT, similarly, came to idealise the 
plural nature of medieval Granada. Site of the illustrious Alhambra palace, it fulfils his recurring 
motif of the perfect city that must somehow be regained:
W hich o f  us plays m elod ies beneath the Arabic balcon ies o f  Granada, w eep ing for love  or a lover, 
wandering dow n alleyw ays in the drunken desolation o f  one w ho must leave or stay, one w ho begins or 
ends his journey, saying farew ell to the Alhambra’s minarets, circling alone around God and His earthly 
ab od es... I cry out at the climax: which o f  us, oh Granada, has betrayed the agony o f  the poets and sold  
the food o f  the poor? ... S till the wom an w eeps in her eternal ex ile , and in the Alhambra the fountain
530w eeps too.
Al-Bayyati, ‘An-Nur ya’ti min Ghamata’, in Hubb wa M awt wa Nafy, pp. 210
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Adonis’ very latest volume (2003) expresses this vision of Granada:
Listen, oh poet, to Granada
Y ou only loved the evening past
B ecause you were taken by the morning to com e.
N ight foretells the dawn -
Like a root that the horizon opens for you
A nd a depth that nourishes you with transcendence.
Like the sun, and like Granada, you have 
T w o cheeks:
O ne in the East,
531A nd one in the West.
For Adonis, identity is not fixed, but an open-ended horizon, irrepressibly flowing beyond 
geographical or social limits. He locates the seeds of this idea firstly in the deep resources of the 
Arab poetic imagination, which overlaps with Sufi thought, and secondly in the cultural and 
political milieu of Umayyad Andalus, His search for the culture of the future is directly inspired 
by his immersion in Sufism, in which, he says,
. . .  there ex ists a notion that revolves around the notion o f  the perfect human being w ho nonetheless 
remains capable o f  even greater perfection -  like a universe with no end to it. This perfect human being is 
universal is as far as he transcends his particular affiliation to becom e a new and Other human being: he is 
the quintessence o f  both aspects o f  the universe, the v isib le as w ell as the invisib le but w hose identity is 
the universe in its entirety. In a culture that transcends cultures lies that w hich prepares for the com ing o f  
this perfect human, the human o f  the future.
Adonis thereby affirms that the democratic ideal is implicit within Arab Sufi thought. To 
maintain internal consistency, his ‘total esoteric revolution’ must function on all levels: 
linguistically, since changing reality requires changing the means of expression; romantically, 
since love leads the self towards completion and liberation; epistemologically, since the mystic 
searches continually for the unknown. But it must also function on the most macrocosmic level:
5:51 Adonis, ‘Ithna cAshar Qindilan li-Gharnata’, in Tanabbu’ ayyuha al-Acma, (Dar al-Saqi, London, 2003) 
5:i2 Adonis, from a speech delivered at Dartmouth College, 19th May 2001.
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the global, or civilizational, which is represented by the Andalusian model. Fundamentally, his 
entire project is a civilizational critique from within, tracing how Islamic civilization has reached 
its present state and presenting a potential future based on Andalusian values. This provides a 
sense of historical continuity and legitimacy for his outlook on international relations. His belief 
in a unified world, where differences exist not in kind but in degree, can be traced to Sufi values 
such as ibn al-cArabi’s wahdat al-wujud (ontological monism) and therefore to Andalus.
With the complex relation between order and chaos, it seems the perfect democracy would be an 
institutionalized anarchy. This putative perfect society, or culture of the future, may be 
impossible, but it nevertheless remains the poet’s goal. The existentialist dimension in Sufism 
implies this through the “death in life” offa n a ’: man only enjoys perfection before birth and after 
death, i.e. in unconsciousness. Everything in between is equivalent to the Adamic fall, which is 
overcome in fa n a ’. However, the flower of the Andalusian seed, argues Adonis, can today be 
seen in the idea that human culture penetrates the false segregation of political frontiers. Through 
exilic experiences, which by their very existence undermine the idea of an art imprisoned within 
national or ideological boundaries, poetry can “assume a universal scope without detaching itself 
from its linguistic, civilizational, or human origins.” It can therefore simultaneously attain both 
specificity and universality, like the Sufi perfect man. The neo-Sufi development, in other words, 
is intimately related to the advance of an alternative, humanistic globalism to counterbalance the 
dominant politico-economic globalism.
In the Arab poetic imagination, then, Andalus is the nucleus of modernity, incorporating the 
cultural other within the self. Likewise, the plural and interexistent culture of the future will 
define identity through diversity rather than homogeneity. Otherness must be “an organic and 
constituent” component, through which this culture finds its own self, rejecting simplistic 
divisions between “East” and “West”. But just as this picture of the original Andalus is an 
idealised historical vision, so this future utopia perpetually proved a mirage. As a younger adult, 
each poet aimed to help create al-mujtamac cil-kamil through new ideas such as nationalism and 
communism. But as Arab reality continued to deteriorate and collective perfection remained a 
mere dream, the shortcomings of such systems became clear: they betrayed man’s uniqueness 
and right to freedom. Imposing the vision of perfection externally was a contradiction in terms: 
abandoning the just means betrays the end a priori. Whatever the beauty of the inner vision, Arab
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reality proved a constant source of disillusion. As al-Bayyatf s case so poignantly portrays, this 
promised land, the lost self of the Arab nation, stood beyond an infinite ocean, leaving him 
broken at the seven gates of the world. In his role as prophet, the modern Arab poet would 
remain a tragic, heroic failure, washed up on distant shores. Exile and wandering are his destiny; 
his modern Granada (whether envisioned as Thebes, Nishapur, Shiraz, etc) rem ained 
conspicuously absent.
If the dream of collective perfection, the future Andalus, remained just that, then the poet was left 
with little option but to internalise the quest. In despair at the failure to create a socio-political 
utopia, consolation could be sought in what Adonis tellingly called “the inner Andalus,”533 i.e. 
individual wholeness. Hence the shift in al-Bayyatf s search from the city of God to the romantic 
Absolute, cA ’isha -  the psychological “twin of Sufism” -  and his “religion of love” . The 
collective yields to the individual. This too explains Adonis’ conflation of love poetry with his 
quest for the esoteric Absolute: both involve the return of the split self to itself. The image of the 
“inner Andalus”, a universal mandala symbol of Arab consciousness, powerfully combines the 
collective and the individual in a unified archetype, definitive of the poet’s endless quest. It 
effectively elevates the Arab nation’s quest for its lost self to a mystical level. The search for the 
civilization of the future, which carried on regardless, thereby takes on a more transcendental, 
mythical dimension. The journey must be perpetually undertaken in the microcosmic and 
macrocosmic selves, although neither will ever be complete. When the poet realises that change 
begins not with mass organization or collective solutions, but within the individual self, the neo- 
Sufi quest for unitive fulfilment comes into its own. The “inner Andalus” is “an ocean without 
shores”,534 the infinity of the unconscious, in which he must forever sail:
I plunge into the ashes o f the horizons
To the dark islands o f  the known unknown
Through the com m otion o f  the waves, the gentle w ind takes me
In the last remnants o f  the night
The w ind’s offerings com e to me
And the tumultuous troughs hurl my anchor...
533 Khairallah, ‘The Greek Cultural Heritage and the Odyssey of Modern Arab Poets’, p. 56
334 Ibid. p. 59
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From behind the darkness a voice  
Stuns me, repeating its heartfelt echo: 
“Offer your sacrifice to the angry sea,
Offer your sacrifice to the angry sea,
535Offer your sacrifice ..
^  cAbd al-Sabur, ‘al-Ibhar ft al-Dhakira’, in A l-A cm ala l-K am ila , pp. 51-2
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v) The Metanoia and Cultural Individuation
Neo-Sufism may also be seen as a metanoia, or rebirth of the spirit, a compensatory movement of 
the unconscious in response to the one-sided spirit of the age. This Jungian term refers to the 
hypothesis that “any deficiency in consciousness -  such as exaggeration, one-sidedness, or lack 
of a function -  is suitably supplemented by an unconscious process”.536 On a civilizational level, 
these poets were subversive elements, perpetrators of Nietzschean chaos, engaged in a prophetic 
mission to restore the lost balance of a civilization that had erred towards excessively exoteric 
order and institutionalisation. It had fallen out of touch with the primary truth. When a society 
deviates too far from its instinctual foundations, causing friction between conscious and 
unconscious, it is perhaps inevitable that the collective unconscious will redress this imbalance. 
Such is the function of the poet in the Nietzschean or Heideggerian mould, who is most sensitive 
to the needs of the age and must sacrifice his own happiness and security to undermine the static 
order. Even if Adonis undertook this mission in an extreme fashion, making many enemies in the 
process, there is an internal logic to the compensatory movement. It is an attempt of that 
civilization to maintain its original dynamism and character for the future, and thus stay faithful 
to itself. This opposition inevitably creates conflict, since static forces will protect their own 
interests. Every nation must constantly renew itself.
This is, of course, an essentially prophetic mission to rescue a society from perhaps its greatest 
danger: the loss of roots, losing touch with the spirit of its past and therefore the vitality of its 
future. The breakdown of a moribund religious tradition will always provoke instinctive 
reactionary responses, such as those seen in Egypt in 1967. Yet this cure, retreating into what is 
known and familiar, only worsens the illness and perpetuates the potential for psychic injury on a 
mass scale. If the conscious mind is severed from its instinctual basis, the imbalance is increased. 
However, the breakdown will also provoke genuine forces of renewal, who seek to revive not the 
outer actions of the golden age, but its dynamic spirit and genius. It is also worth noting Jung’s 
observation that the unconscious Zeitgeist not only compensates the attitude of the conscious 
mind but also anticipates changes to come. Egypt’s defeat in 1967 is a case in point. The 
nightmarish experiences suffered by neo-Sufi poets on a personal level, such as in cAbd al-
Jung, Essays on Contemporary Events, p. 2
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Sabur’s Meditations on a Wounded Age were effects of the fragmented reality. By deconstructing 
the inherited truths through his art, this poet in fact spoke with the voice of millions, effectively 
foretelling that fateful day of reckoning and the radical changes that would follow it.
Neo-Sufi poetry is replete with irrational motifs: dreams, mystical states, erotic ecstasy, myth, 
madness, etc. Such eclipses in consciousness are all expressions of an esoteric response to the 
conscious attitude of the day, attempting to restore a dangerous state of consciousness towards 
equilibrium. Individually, they might themselves appear dangerous, extreme and atavistic, but 
only in geographical and temporal context can their deeper significance be appreciated. These 
manifestations of the collective unconscious also reflect the internalisation of the aspiration 
towards radical political change: disillusioned with the notion of collective ideas, which are 
always incipiently oppressive, the poet turns increasingly towards expressions of inner 
psychological truth. Of these, the myth is perhaps the most significant in the context of the 
metanoia. For Jung, myths are “original revelations of the preconscious psyche, involuntary 
statements about unconscious psychic happenings...” A nation’s mythology “is its living 
religion, whose loss is always and everyw here... a moral catastrophe” .537 W ithout its 
mythological heritage, the nation’s psychic life falls into decay, like a man without a soul. As 
noted previously, the Arab responses to the encroachment of modern science and the 
disintegration of its central mythological symbol at first assumed a non-Islamic character (al- 
Bacth, Arab nationalism, the SSNP, the Tammuzl movement), but subsequently resumed an 
Islamic colouring. Despite the failure of these secular restorative movements, the neo-Sufi poets 
still carried the psychological burden of the nation on their shoulders. By assisting -  
inadvertently or otherwise -  the revival of a religious mythology they helped to restore a 
semblance of psychological equilibrium that the secular movements could not offer. Religion 
being a vital link with psychic processes beyond the limited remit of consciousness, the rebirth of 
the spirit was an instinctive reaction. Furthermore, this was perhaps a necessary reaction, since in 
order to participate in the formation of a new, globalised culture, the Arab nation first needed to 
re-establish the myth upon which its own culture stood. To be a genuine part of this hypothetical 
future culture, each nation needs to continually rediscover its own myths and historical memory. 
Faced with the question of a meaningful role in global civilization and cultural production
5:!7 Jung, The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious, p. 154
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without sacrificing its own identity, the Arab nation required what could be called a process of 
‘cultural individuation’: discovering the cultural other and assimilating it into a new, more global 
version of its own original myth. Such a process is inevitably prone to dangerous 
misinterpretations, but the neo-Sufi movement implied its necessity nonetheless, since no culture 
can properly exist without a meaningful connection to its past.
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Stages on Life’s Wav
It is now possible to circumscribe the psychological journey of neo-Sufism with greater certainty. 
The trans-regional model discussed below makes no claim to be definitive or comprehensive, and 
should be interpreted flexibly according to each case. It describes not the rigid characteristics, but 
merely ‘family resemblances,’ of the three fairly distinct, yet continuous, phases in the life of the 
neo-Sufi Arab intellectual. Some aspects are universal reactions to the wider context of 
modernity; others are specific to the Arab case. The boundaries between each stage are never 
utterly distinct, although they often relate to particular historical landmarks or phases. This model 
will help to contextualise the neo-Sufi development both politically and psychologically.
i) Stage 1: Pre-modern
The first stage of the poet’s development is primarily characterised by the innocence and organic 
psychic wholeness of youth, usually in a rural setting. The immediate environment can be defined 
as traditional and religious, often incorporating aspects of popular religion and mysticism. Sufism 
was an integral part of these poets’ early experiences: al-Bayyatl grew up near the great Sufi 
master cAbd al-Qadir al-Jllani’s tomb538, cAbd al-Sabur was influenced by local holy men in his 
rustic youth, while Adonis’ early schooling in Sufism and S hfism  is well established. Sufism 
was therefore ingrained in the poet’s unconscious during childhood -  when the deepest levels of 
his identity are established -  and remained dormant while other experiences and ideas took over. 
This early mystical worldview foretold later forays into romantic poetry. At this stage, prior to 
awareness of the presence of the other, his cultural orientation remained essentially inward and 
his intimate relationship with mother Earth remained unbroken. As Adonis says, recollecting his 
early youth: “I used to press my body to the earth, and roll in the grass.. .”539
This pious upbringing was consistent with the age-old traditions of rural social settings. The poet 
was generally inculcated into Arab-Islamic values, worldview and life, in which the transcendent, 
institutional conception of God remained dominant. It was this that the poet would fundamentally 
reject.
S18 Al-Bayyati, Tajribciti al-Shicriyya, pp. 22-3
Banipal Magazine 2 (June 1998), p. 31
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ii) Stage 2: Modern
The striking characteristics of the second, modem stage are its relative brevity and state of crisis. 
As a young adult the poet’s inward orientation inverts as he enters the orbit of the cultural other. 
Consequently, his loyalty to traditional and religious values comes under unbearable strain. The 
youthful innocence and naivety is now left behind. A schism appears in the poet’s being: between 
two cultural poles, the integrity of the self is tom apart. This incipient dualism triggers an identity 
crisis, since he is attracted by what are deemed ‘foreign’ ideas. These ideas are expressly anti- 
Islam ic : they reject the transcendental, advocating a separation between the public and the 
private; they either originate from or are oriented towards the secular rational West; they are the 
hopeful answers for a Godless world. Replacing the lost tradition, the new, secular faiths save the 
poet from a psychological abyss: for al-Bayyati, Communism, for Adonis, the SSNP. Honestly 
striving to “live in truth” and socio-political justice, the young poet enthusiastically supports 
these radical ideologies.
The meeting of the young Arab intellectual with modernity causes a split between cultural loyalty 
and their progressive call for change. Their adoption of new ideologies is bome of the realisation 
that the Arab nation is technologically and scientifically underdeveloped -  a fact brought home 
by military defeats -  and politically repressive -  a fact brought home by censorship, lack of 
public freedoms and ailing civil societies. On an intellectual level, these poets have a generally 
positive and inquisitive attitude towards the west, whilst rejecting its imperialist tendencies. 
However, critics dismiss their calls for change as defeatist submission and cultural betrayal, thus 
increasing their psychological turmoil. Adonis even claims to have been accused of being a 
foreign agent on account of his radicalism.540
As discussed in the introduction, the effects of these social, political, economic and cultural 
conditions are alienation and despair. Both physically and psychologically, the organic 
relationship with the land is broken, either by relocation to an urban milieu, by imprisonment for 
political subversion, or most emphatically by enforced exile. The meaninglessness and confusion
340 Ibid, p. 36
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of identity in a Darwinian world, coupled with religious scepticism and disaffection with the city, 
inevitably provoke deep questioning, and the poet comes to admire the European existentialist 
tradition. Al-Bayyati read Camus and Sartre, as well as Marx. Chapter 3 noted cAbd al-Sabur’s 
similarity to Kierkegaard. However, the central figure was undoubtedly Nietzsche, who, along 
with Jubran, can be seen as the “proto-neo-Sufi”. Each poet identified profoundly with 
N ietzsche’s Zarathustrian experience, which provided direct inspiration for his neo-Sufism. 
Adonis’ indebtedness to Nietzsche is matched by cAbd al-Sabur’s intoxication at reading Thus 
Spake Zarathustra: “What spirit-wrenching vertigo I felt upon reading that book. Few books in 
the history of man can leave such an impression on the soul, and few philosophers can have such 
an impact on the human psyche as Nietzsche does. Those who do colour their philosophy with 
poetry, and dip their quill into the blood of the heart... It was as if [Nietzsche] was giving a noble 
answer to the lacking of his age.”541
Total psychological crisis can be temporarily averted, of course, through commitment to an 
ideological cause, which the poet believes will create a better future collectively and personally. 
In the absence of the transcendental God, the ideological becomes almost divine, exchanging one 
exoterism for another. Al-Bayyati was the politically committed poet par excellence, even 
subordinating artistic integrity to the struggle of the masses. cAbd al-Sabur’s profound social 
conscience was very clear, especially early on, although like other poets of the 1960s generation 
he soon became disillusioned with Marxism. Adonis’ commitment was characteristically 
different: subtler, more ambiguous, more culturally oriented, already more internal.
So long as the dedication to a collective idea persists, the poet remains shielded from immediate 
religious experience. However, in a relatively brief period, approximately from the early 1950s to 
the early 1960s, the commitments of younger adulthood turn to dust. The individual poet is 
frustrated and betrayed by events beyond his control: the revolutions have given way to 
oppression, reviving the old ills in altered form. The psychological crisis can now no longer be 
averted. In Sufi terms, this culminates in an involuntary fa n a ’, or deconstruction of ego- 
consciousness, between the cultural I and the cultural Other. It is hardly surprising that the 
Nietzschean themes of madness, chaos and darkness are prominent in the poetry of this period.
541 Salah cAbd al-Sabur, H ayati f i  a l-Shicr, pp. 40-42
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Not only does the Arab poet suffer the universal condition of modernity, the age of the spiritual 
orphan, but he suffers it in his own culturally specific and particularly harrowing form. By the 
early/mid-1960s, he has reached a midlife tipping point, when the second half of life begins and 
he is closer to death than birth. The political crisis is therefore also an existential crisis, whereby 
the individual becomes far more conscious of his mortality and so many cherished values no 
longer hold true: “what was great in the morning will be little at evening”.542 At this phase in life, 
around 35 to 40, when mental depression among men is relatively common, a significant change 
is in the making. Such a change purportedly rises from the unconscious, bringing back to light 
certain traits which had disappeared in childhood.543
Thus begins another transition, in many ways the opposite of the first. The poet has read so much 
philosophy, learnt so much about the world, but it only seems to have increased his perplexity 
and anxiety. His learning has only led to total estrangement from his instincts. Despite his great 
intelligence and learning, his neurosis gradually overpowers him and undermines his morale. The 
separation from his ‘true’ self, brought about by his immersion in rational thought and 
civilization, plunges him into a conflict between conscious and unconscious, between knowledge 
and faith. His adopted Weltanschauung, with its rational and intellectual basis, is no defence 
against this demoralizing neurosis and alienation; indeed, it only makes it worse. It seems 
unsurprising that when his cherished convictions fail him man resorts to his childhood religion in 
the hope of finding relief.
Not only this, but the poet is increasingly aware that the ‘change’ brought about by radical mass 
movements, with their violence and propaganda, cannot save him from such a predicament. 
These movements are as much the problem as the solution. He is now aware that society should 
only exist for the individual, the natural carrier of life, and not vice versa. Real change is that 
within the individual psyche, a change in outlook and values, and only through accumulation of 
these will collective change really occur. Progress means nothing if man achieves it as a mere 
fragment of himself. This is a postmodern kind of despair, a rejection of the powers of reason. It 
is a function of the general psychic disturbance resulting from the fact that a natural human 
function is denied expression: the neuroticizing of modern man in the age of reason. He
Jung, Modern Man in Search o f a Soul, p. 111
54;i Ibid, p. 107
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desperately wants to overcome the dissociation of personality, integrating two back into one and 
thus regaining his certainty and direction. As Jung notes,
Such dissociations com e about because o f  various incom patibilities; for instance, a m an’s present state 
may have com e into conflict with his childhood state, or he may have v io lently  sundered h im self from  his 
original character in the interests o f  som e arbitrary persona more in keeping w ith h is am bitions. H e has 
thus becom e unchildlike and artificial, and has lost his roots. A ll this presents a favourable opportunity for
544an equally vehement confrontation with the primary truth.
The individual is suffering from the ‘disease of poets’: oversensitivity to the imbalance of the 
age, the exoteric Zeitgeist. As an artist, his life is inevitably tom between two contradictory 
forces. The longing for happiness and security competes directly with his creative instinct and the 
prophetic mission to rebuild his nation. Thus the scene is set for a tragic outcome: the individual 
life sacrificed at the altar of the divine creative fire. His conscious life lies at the mercy of the 
powerful forces of unconscious life, which overwhelm him. But this psychological disintegration 
is offset by an (almost miraculous) compensatory operation which arises from this same 
unconscious, the symbols of which -  such as the qutb or the orchard -  suggest a process of 
centring. The poet is in the process of a rebirth into a strengthened sense of selfhood that may 
only be achieved through the very disintegration he has suffered. The traumatic denial of 
individual personality paradoxically appears to contribute to the development of a universal 
personality. Whatever the mystic loses in fa n a ’, he gains infinitely more in baqci’: “I become 
connected to nothing, to be the axis of everything.” It is as if to reach the heights, he had as an 
indispensable precondition to plumb the darkest depths. Others might avoid the dangers of this 
enforced descent, but lose thereby its benefits.
iii) Stage 3: Postmodern
The third stage of the neo-Sufi model sees an attempt to synthesize the previous two stages and 
reconcile their diametrically opposed perspectives. The poet transcends the Western rational 
viewpoint and embraces the fundamentally irrational nature of existence. Through various motifs 
and techniques, his poetry attempts to return to the psychic unity of childhood. This is to some
^  Jung, The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious, p. 162
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extent successful, but in the endless, open-ended and perpetually changing cosmos, absolute 
perfection will always elude him. Prior to death, he will never fully regain his loss. He must 
therefore “die in order to live”, as the Sufis say: the involuntary fana  or death in life, of the 
critical modem period must be sublimated into the renewed and strengthened selfhood, baqa\ the 
prophetic level of consciousness, “subsistence in God”. Adonis’ entire project was self- 
confessedly prophetic:
Death is our destiny;
w e have seen the shores o f  despair
and are reconciled to its cruel, icy sea.
W e shall cross that sea, right to its end, 
we shall go  on, and pay no heed to that God; 
we long for a new god.545
Baqa , the final stage of the Sufi path, is a reinforced psychic wholeness, in which opposites 
reappear and man acquires divine attributes. Like the postmodern, it is a state of transcendent 
consciousness, qualitatively different again from the original innocence. In Jungian terms, this is 
the level of the collective unconscious, which affords a universal perspective analogous to the 
notion of prophetic consciousness. The poet now knows that his individual self is but a 
microcosm of the greater, macrocosmic self, and the two cannot be definitively separated. He 
must strive for perfection of both, even if this entails perpetual failure.
Having engaged with modernity, and to a large extent rejected it, the poet emerges more aware of 
his place in the world. Knowing the self means reconciliation with the other: they are two sides 
of a universal whole. In political terms, however, each contributes to his internal and external 
exile. Although he feels a renewed sense of belonging to his own culture, he nevertheless inhabits 
the strange no-man’s-land of permanent exile, beyond the scope of geographical definition. In 
fact, his exile, or Hijra, becomes an integral part of his identity. This idea takes him all the way
back to Muhammad, the original Sufi insan kdmil, whose revelations also began at the critical
midpoint in life. The Prophetic paradigm of meditative withdrawal from society in order to 
reform resonates with the radical poet in flight from a corrupt order.
545 Adonis, ‘al-Nuh al-Jadld’, in Aghanl M ihyar al-Dimashqi, p. 180
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As the poet reaches a more universal level, cultural and political boundaries become to some 
degree obsolete, but they can never disappear. Throughout Adonis’ outward orientation, there 
always remained a deeper current committed to the cultural self. Whatever the extent of cultural 
assimilation or borrowing, these poets remained defiantly Arab. Their frame of reference, since 
their youth, had always been the Arab-Islamic world rather than the West; the latter provided not 
a new home but merely a means of cultural self-knowledge.
The postmodern stage sees the return of the divine: man cannot ultimately escape from an 
Absolute idea. Destruction of the gods only puts others in their place, since the religious impulse 
is an instinctive human function. Some principle inevitably functions absolutely, even if that 
principle is relativism. It is not a question of absolutism or relativism, but absolutism and 
relativism. The poet’s quest for truth is couched in explicitly more religious themes and 
terminology. However, unlike his Islamist counterparts, he does not attempt to restore the 
transcendent God. He revives the esoteric conception of the Divinity that is an integral, if less 
prominent, part of Islam. For him, God is no longer patriarch or ideology as in the previous 
stages (exoteric), but is now synonymous with the complete self (esoteric). Like the unconscious, 
the divine is an absence, a perpetual unknown. His poetry now reveals prophetic overtones, 
involving religio-political notions such as the qutb.
It follows that, rather than Western thinkers, the great mystics of the poet’s own cultural-spiritual 
heritage -  ibn al-cArabI, al-Hallaj, al-Niffari and others -  come to prominence. The poet realises 
that his worldview after his journey through modem European thought is effectively identical to 
ibn al-cArabi’s principle of wahdat al-wujud, or ontological monism. However, since he is now 
functioning on a more universal human level, the Western thinkers are not discarded but 
internalised and adapted towards more culturally specific ideas: N ietzsche’s irrationalist 
inclinations, prophetic tones and poetic madness remain influential, while his Uberman finds a 
ready-made equivalent in the much older Sufi concept of al-insdn al-kamil (both being 
expressions of the Anthropos archetype). Revolution, egalitarianism and social justice are no 
longer M arxist ideals, but the preserve of early Islamic figures, whether specifically Sufi or 
otherwise, such as al-Hallaj, Abu Dharr al-Ghifarl or Muhammad himself. The existentialist 
philosophers also relate back to figures such as cUmar al-Khayyam. Similarly, the ambiguity of
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the earlier themes such as madness, chaos and darkness renders them still useful poetic tools: 
they represent the destruction that paves the way for reconstruction. This inversion of values is 
consistent with the contradictory effects of the reconciliation of opposites in the esoteric 
experience. Adonis, for one, attempts to embody this synthesis: he is both a committed modernist 
and progressive radical on one level, and a committed traditionalist and trenchant conservative on 
another.
This stage, then, sees an attempt to rediscover genuine identity and certainty, although like 
Western postmodernism it seems at times to be a certainty of uncertainty. The poet needs answers 
to his existential soul-searching: cAbd al-Sabur and al-Bayyati want to close the circle; Adonis’ 
answer is that there is no answer. In this his postmodernism differs from the others’: flux, rather 
than union, is closer to perfection. Only continual oscillation between union and dispersion keeps 
the individual alive. This Heraclitean flux may entail harmony or conflict, but he derives meaning 
from the dialectic rather than the union itself. The reassertion of specific identity, for Adonis, is a 
necessary step on the path towards universal identity, i.e. belonging to a genuinely global 
“culture of the future”. This flux explains the constantly changing form his neo-Sufism takes. 
Poetic form is chaotic and kaleidoscopic in his hands: he writes beyond form to reflect the 
world’s permanent transformation. Put another way, he is uniting form and content at the point of 
unity -  the majmac al-bcihrayn, in Sufi terminology — to reveal their essential identity.
As noted, this stage sees a shift from collective to individual, from sociological to psychological. 
The poet now tries to restore his cosmic, ecological relationship with nature and the earth and 
give it renewed meaning. The greater balance between east and west, between esoteric and 
exoteric, is embodied in the archetypal notion of cil-insan al-kamil, the perfect man, who stands 
on the bridge between the known and the unknown. In this sense, the neo-Sufi poet strives to 
reach forwards toward the hypothetical perfect man of the future and at the same time back to the 
archaic man of the past, when human consciousness was still undifferentiated from nature. 
However, the return to nature can itself only be cultivated: it will never reach complete original 
wholeness. The poet’s long acculturation, the dubious gift of civilization, has changed him 
irrevocably. Such is the case, too, with the idea of return to undifferentiated childhood. The child 
archetype and its psychological equivalents -  such as the Sufi concept of tawakkul -  feature 
strongly in this stage. But the notion of a second childhood is always an unfulfilled dream: “The
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time has passed / For you to be yourself, for you to know who you are -  / Your childhood has 
gone.”546 Childhood is both past and future, but like al-Niffari’s search for the divine, the future 
is perpetually deferred. Religious observances, as in cAbd al-Sabur’s case, are closely connected 
with the image of childhood: the ritual repetition and retelling of the religious myth links the 
conscious mind with the original condition of unconsciousness, thus fulfilling a psychological 
need:
. . .  em brace me, for the divine voice  
Cannot find a path to my ears or eyes 
B ecom e an earth,
Break open a cave for me in your dark soil,
A nd sw allow  m e .. .547
Thus cAbd al-Sabur attempts to make his peace with God, to reconcile himself to his self and 
become what he always was. Individuation here is an attempt to return to the point of origin, the 
unconsciousness of childhood, thus closing the circle. This is the definitive neo-Sufi journey 
from inward orientation to outward and back again. To prevent his childhood psyche from falling 
into nothingness, he returns to the mysteries of religion, of which he now has a deeper and subtler 
understanding. For the sake of wholeness, he must keep the idea of God alive in some form, and 
thus regains his religiosity. However, his deeper understanding renders the general principle of 
God unacceptable: his is an excessively subjective experience.
As this attempted return to childhood suggests, neo-Sufism can be seen as a kind of romanticism, 
albeit steeled with a heavy dose of realism. Despite their political commitments, all three poets 
were deeply romantic. As noted above, the poet finds himself undergoing a compulsory fana  ’, 
‘death in life’. In its Kierkegaardian sense, this means being dead existentially although 
physically alive, whereas in its more positive Sufi conception it is a stage on the way towards 
universal consciousness. Jung suggests that those who have landed themselves in such a 
‘Kierkegaardian neurosis’ are often susceptible to “the magic and novelty of Eastern symbols”,
546 Adonis, Ihtifa'an bil-ashya’ al-ghamida al-wadiha, p. 30
547 Salah cAbd al-Sabur, ‘al-Mawt Baynhuma’, in al-Acmdl al-Kdmila, pp. 47-8.
288
since that is the essential function of such symbols.548 Finding himself in this state of living 
death, he may attempt a rebirth by sublimating it into b a q d ’, thus transcending his anomie. 
However, the age of prophets has passed, and these are irrevocably modem, secular thinkers. The 
other route towards wholeness, or restoration of Lacan’s “lost Real”, is romantic love, in which 
Adonis and al-Bayyati found great succour. Neo-Sufi poetry entails a synthesis of self and other 
on both the personal and the cultural level, and is simultaneously open to multiple interpretations. 
It unites romantic and committed poetry in an integrated whole.
The major difficulty with the third stage is that the poet’s psychological development has 
inevitably continued while the political reality has remained static. The paradox of neo-Sufi 
thought is that mysticism is more postmodern than modem, and thus effectively betrays the 
secular ideal. Neo-Sufism is the product of individual intellectuals who have been exiled from the 
Arab masses. There therefore arises a highly problematic incompatibility between the neo-Sufi 
position, which has returned to the inner, subjective experience, and the external status quo. The 
gap between Adonis’ criticisms of Arab reality and his poetry steadily increases: as the poet 
retreats into inner exile, the individual and the collective become fundamentally out of synch. 
Individually, the poet enters an uncertain postmodern state before even experiencing the luxury 
of solid political foundations. His psychological life has overshot external reality, whether 
deliberately or not, leaving him in total exile. In this sense, neo-Sufism is a symptom of the 
effects of globalisation on a region where, for both internal and external reasons, a genuine, 
organic modernity has been unable to fully emerge, and the poet’s descent into irrational 
postmodernity, although a natural psychological development, therefore seems outwardly 
perverse.
The tri-stage neo-Sufi development reflects the circular nature of human psychic life, both on an 
individual and a social level. Just as prehistoric polytheism gave way to a monotheistic divinity, 
which led towards modern rational values, and in turn to a simultaneously atheistic and 
polytheistic postmodemity (since atheism and polytheism are effectively the same), the neo-Sufi 
poet journeys from early experiences in popular religion to a modem secular mindset and finally 
back to inner religious experiences. As Jung puts it in his discussion of Nietzsche: “The gods first
Jung, The A rchetypes and the Collective Unconscious, p. 8
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lived in superhuman power and beauty on top of snow-clad mountains or in the darkness of 
caves, woods and seas. Later on they drew together into one god, and then that god became 
man.”549 Adonis’ graduation from the premodern heterodoxy of cAlawism through modem 
rationalist ideologies to his embrace of a postmodern esoterism provides a definitive example. 
The striking parallel between cAlawism and postmodern values emphasizes the circular nature of 
this journey: from the womb of the unconscious, out into consciousness, and then a third 
movement which can be seen as both forward towards a prophetic superconsciousness (i.e. 
Niffarian waqfa) and simultaneously back towards the unconscious. (In this sense the poets 
recognised how progressive the original Sufis were.) Indeed, waqfa can only be achieved by 
transcending cilm and m acrifa : Adonis could only rediscover al-Suhrawardl’s ‘East’ via the 
‘W est’. His life embodies this principle: travelling outwards in search of the self, and only 
reaching it by persevering beyond the other, as if circumnavigating the globe completely to reach 
universal consciousness. This brought him back to his origin, which is the goal of mysticism:
I w as bom  in a village  
Sm all and secret like a womb  
And 1 have never left it -  
I love the ocean, not the shores.550
There is a remarkable parallel between the passage from al-Suhrawardl quoted by Adonis551 and 
Jung’s comparison of these stages of life to the sun’s daily cycle. Having shone its light upon the 
world, it withdraws in order to illumine itself. Man likewise retreats into his dark, inner self, (or 
increasingly adopts a reactionary, doctrinaire position as an alternative to self-illumination). The 
semi-circular arc of the sun’s visible journey can be a metaphor for these stages: childhood, rising 
in the East, prior to consciousness; adulthood, when the sun is rising towards its zenith; and the 
return, when the sun has passed the midpoint and descends towards the horizon, and man returns 
once more to unconsciousness. The first and third stages are certainly different, but they share the 
important characteristic of immersion in unconscious psychic events. Sun analogies, common in 
Sufism, include QushayrT’s ideas on Sufi vision: “He is like the one who is in the light of the 
lamp when the darkness is intensifying, and when the sun comes up over him, it conquers the
549 Jung, Psychology and Religion, p. 102
350 Adonis, Ihtifd'cin bil-ashya’ al-ghamicla al-wddiha, p. 59
551 Adonis, al-Sufiyya wa al-Surydliyya, pp. 178-9
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light of the lamp, and the light of the lamp dwindles in comparison to the light of the sun.” 
Moreover, such parables also show that there is considerable continuity as well as difference 
between these stages. The apparently abrupt turns in the life of a poet like Adonis belie a deeper 
consistency. The ideological inclinations are perhaps as much a submission to unconscious forces 
as the later neo-Sufism, in which the more experienced poet moves his Absolutism to an 
individual level.
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Esoteric/Exoteric Postmodernitv: Neo-Sufism versus Political Islam
Just as the second, ideological stage yielded to the re-emergence of esoteric ideas, so it led to an 
exoteric revival. With the failure of ‘revolutionary’ postcolonial nationalisms and socialisms that 
had previously derived their legitimacy from overturning imperialism, two parallel trends 
emerged, neo-Sufism and political Islam, each interpreting the Arab-Islamic heritage according 
to its own philosophical preconceptions. Both were extreme reactions to a fragmented political 
and psychological reality that effectively equated the concepts of freedom and divinity, although 
this in turn depended on transcendent or imminent interpretations. The contemporary conflict 
continues a philosophical struggle within Islamic civilization dating back to figures such as ibn 
al-cArabI on one side and al-Ghazali (1058-1111), ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328) and ibn Hanbal 
(780-855) on the other, over the nature of Islamic truth. This contest between esoteric and 
exoteric postmodemisms for the soul and future direction of Islam, whose relevance is greatly 
increased by globalization, hinges very much on the inherently dualistic nature of language: the 
holy word is open to both figurative and literalist interpretations. The danger of mixing ancient, 
historically specific religious texts with modem methods of information processing underscores 
the wisdom of the neo-Sufi inclination towards metaphorical exegesis and deconstruction of the 
monolithic edifice of the Qur’an as the ‘uncreated’ -  and therefore ahistorical -  word of God. In 
contrast to literalist exoterism, metaphorical exegesis is central to the neo-Sufi worldview:
The poetic nature o f  the metaphor lies in its refusal o f  authority, in being an innovation, like a perpetual 
beginning, with no past. A s a force for producing questions, it renew s man, it renews thought, language, 
and their relationship with things. It is a rejection o f  the present existence in search o f  another one. For all 
metaphors transcend: just as language overcom es itse lf  in them, so, through them, does the reality that
552they articulate. Thus the metaphor joins us to the other dim ension o f  things -  their invisible dim ension.
In the abovementioned psychological development, a radical split clearly emerged in the third 
stage, when secular ideologies were rejected in favour of more culturally authentic ideas. When 
the modern intellectual despaired of the political status quo and the overbearing structures of 
state power, he faced a choice: to reformulate ideology along more authentic lines and continue 
the outward struggle through whatever means necessary, or to transcend ideology altogether in
^  Ibid,p. 144
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favour of the metaphysical realm. Although the dividing line is always indistinct, two broad paths 
lay ahead: the Islamist, external, literal, social, objective, or the neo-Sufi, internal, metaphorical, 
psychological, subjective. Faced with the indestructible omnipotence of the state, the neo-Sufi 
trajectory effectively sought refuge in subverting the structures of language and rational belief 
systems that maintained the order of things, since it seemed to be precisely such thought that had 
caused the crisis. While textual freedom alone could not remake the world, it at least offered 
some compensation for the lack of political freedom. Adonis, for one, espoused the 
postmodernist perception of reason and logic as a closed system that perpetuates an oppressive 
political order and can only be broken through recourse to the irrational experience, which he 
found in Sufi esoterism. As the quote above shows, his attempt to recreate the Arabic language 
reflected his desire to recreate reality entirely, in accordance with his deconstruction- 
reconstruction dialectic. If poetic intoxication led to quasi-mystical ecstasy, this might 
deconstruct the rigid system of moral opposites supposedly at the root of the static order. But this 
endeavour was perhaps ultimately overwhelmed by forces majeures, larger cultural shifts beyond 
the scope of the mere individual. Ultimately, language provided no more of a spiritual home than 
did the alienating political reality: poetic inspiration might deconstruct, but it cannot reconstruct. 
Al-Bayyatf s “Exile is my homeland / Words are my exile” is testament to this.553 This emptiness 
perhaps encouraged Adonis’ increasingly desperate preoccupation with the deconstruction aspect 
of his dialectic, as the static order of which he despaired grew increasingly entrenched. At a 
linguistic level, the breakdown of Islamic truth in the face of modernity could also lead 
paradoxically to an intensification in the authority of the Qur’an to compensate for the lost 
authority of the religious institution, leading to literalist exoterism as well as neo-mysticism.
These esoteric and exoteric postmodemisms have arisen both in parallel and in diametrical 
opposition, often interpenetrating and using similar terminology and themes. The ambiguous 
relationship between them is a corollary of their origins the same historical circumstances and 
socio-cultural conditions, particularly since the 1960s: lack of political freedoms and economic 
opportunities, disillusionment with postcolonial reality, substantial population increases and 
urban influxes. The urban setting was instrumental in the alienation of both neo-Sufi and Islamist 
intellectuals. As al-Bayyati recognized, the modern city could be a congested, soulless, violent
533 Al-Bayyati, ‘al-Mawt wa al-Qindil’, in Hubb wa Mawt wa Nafy, pp. 180
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place, devoid of hope and relief, in stark contrast to the beauty and innocence of rustic life: “I 
came from the country... and my first shock was discovering the reality of the city... It was a 
false city [and] as for its great civilizations that had lived for several centuries on the banks of the 
Tigris, I felt they had died, never to return. It was not that I wanted them to return, but I wanted 
the city to extend like a tributary rising up and running down into a river, embracing it and 
melting into it.”554
Analysis of the relationship between the esoteric and exoteric trends helps to contextualise the 
neo-Sufi ideal within both Arab and global contemporaneity. Whilst neo-Sufism and Islamism 
can be viewed as parallel trajectories, they are fundamentally opposed, most notably towards 
their recognition of the other. Both are products of the crisis of modernity and political 
participation in a world that was entering a new phase of globalisation, thus creating a dangerous 
cultural schism. The two trends would react to globalisation in different ways, either 
inadvertently legitimising its economic imperialism in one case or forming a humanist counter- 
globalism in the other. As an alternative discourse of dissent, neo-Sufism stands in diametric 
contrast to the ideological universalism of both economic globalism and Salafi Islamism, which, 
while ostensibly the worst of enemies, seem also to be locked together in a mutually legitimising 
‘unholy exoteric alliance’. Economic globalisation, the logic of late capitalism, is itself supported 
amongst other things by a strongly exoteric religious framework, while Salafi Islam ism ’s 
violently reactionary, hyper-ideological programme for universal victory only perpetuates the 
cycle of antagonism. Both ideologies find their meaning and legitimacy via a confrontational 
opposite, monopolising ‘good’ against the ‘evil’ of the other. Neo-Sufi human universalism, 
however, simultaneously rejects this unholy alliance and transcends its tendency to divide the 
world into discrete ontological camps. In this sense, it belongs to the incipient “anti­
globalization” movement, which is itself also universal in scope. The logical culmination of the 
neo-Sufi ideal is a universal human message, one rendered all the more important in a rapidly 
polarising age when these competing ideological globalisms vie to extend their stranglehold over 
the impressionable, the alienated and the economically dependent. In an age when the 
compatibility of Islam and democracy is hotly debated, the significance of Sufi principles is their
5S4 Al-BayyatT, Tajribati al-Shicriyya, pp. 19-20
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inclusivity: they remove the sharp boundaries that are a feature of exoteric interpretations and 
therefore encourage identification with other religious and traditions.
As attempts to overcome their despair at the modem order of things, both exoteric and esoteric 
revivalisms distinguish between Islam as concept and Islam as historically practised, and 
therefore return to the roots of the civilization, claiming to have inherited the real source of truth. 
However, while both claim religious authenticity in their search for a new order, their use and 
interpretation of various authorities differ markedly. Islam can be interpreted as a political 
ideology, in the mould of institutional order and orthodoxy, or as a personal spirituality, in the 
mould of creative chaos and heresy. Both are influenced, directly or indirectly, by Marxist ideas, 
which they relate to the Islamic principle of human equality before God, as well as existentialist 
thinkers such as Nietzsche. The ongoing confrontation with the cultural other inevitably reopened 
the infamous ‘gates of ijtihad ' , independent or innovative reasoning, that had been closed some 
centuries earlier. On both sides, new interpretations of age-old principles reflected the endeavour 
to find a place for Arab-Islamic culture in the fickle modem world. The meaning of mortality 
became a point of difference. If death was interpreted metaphorically by the neo-Sufis as ‘death 
in life’, whether spiritual emptiness or mystical abstraction, for the more literalistic thinker it 
could mean physical death itself, and therefore “martyrdom”. Having failed to recreate the perfect 
society, the latterday jihadi, in contrast to the neo-Sufi withdrawal into the “inner Andalus”, may 
ultimately find that same return to psychological truth (and unconsciousness) in far more violent 
and apocalyptic way, effectively making a literal interpretation of the Sufi fa n d ’. In both cases, 
death entailed liberation from despair, the ultimate existential predicament, as a return to the 
point of origin, God. Both are attempts to reunite the self with what it has lost from its state of 
childhood / cultural innocence, thus restoring meaning to existence.
Progressive neo-Sufism and reactionary Islamism, or esoteric and exoteric postmodernism, agree 
on several points: the status quo is fundamentally flawed and change is necessary. Arab-Islamic 
civilization must be revived, and on its own terms. However, they differ entirely on how to 
achieve this. It is worth noting that both camps interpreted the 1967 defeat as a vindication of 
their criticism of the political order and their radical programmes for change. On a theoretical 
level, their differences can be broadly defined as: literalist versus metaphoricalist; dogmatic 
versus heterodox; conservative versus progressive; orthopraxic versus looking for internal
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meaning; monocultural versus pluralist; homogenizing versus embracing difference; oppositional 
versus holistic; based on transcendence versus immanence; theological versus mystical. Exoteric 
and esoteric postmodemisms reflect alternative interpretations of jih a d : the “Lesser” struggle 
against the external enemy versus the “Greater” struggle for the inner self. They also have very 
different conceptions of the relationship between being and time: the exoteric is deeply 
retrospective and past-oriented, while the esoteric position, following ibn al-cArabI’s notion of 
time as merely a perspectival rather than ontological reality, is essentially future-oriented, aiming 
to recreate the time-bound through an experience beyond the limits of space-time. Neo-Sufism 
combines existentialism and mysticism to affirm that human subjectivity is essentially restless 
and dynamic, ‘a process and a potential, not a thing’, i.e. avoiding reification of the self.
The fundamental difference between these positions lies in the exoterist positing of an inherent 
separation between man and God/nature. From this perspective, the two domains (inside and 
outside the mandala) are essentially discrete, thus maintaining the fundamental division of the 
world into distinct ontological camps, while the esoteric view has them as one continuous 
existence bridged by a theoretically traversable barzakh. For the exoterists, the external values of 
the mandala represent truth; the interior values for the esoterists. As with modem rationalism, 
from which it borrows, the exoterist position fails to create psychological unity, since this 
requires uniting the inner and the outer. Moreover, the literalist focus on exteriority inclines the 
exoterists to imitate the outer actions of historical heroes like Muhammad, rather than the spirit 
and dynamic values that such figures espoused, or to embrace the products of modem thought 
rather than the intellectual processes that generated them. However, it should be emphasized that 
there is no distinct dividing line between these positions. Naturally, Arab intellectuals often 
exemplify an idiosyncratic blend of exoteric and esoteric, without falling neatly into either 
category -  as we have seen in the case of both cAbd al-Sabur and Adonis -  and the rise of 
esoteric postmodernism, with its ostensibly religious themes and terminology, may even have 
assisted the rise of its exoteric counterpart.
Finally, in their yearning for civilizational rebirth, both esoteric and exoteric postmodemisms 
hark back nostalgically to an imagined ‘just community’ of a previous ‘golden age’, dubious 
historical methodologies notwithstanding. In both cases, it is hoped that a viable future may be 
based on imitation of this just community. But the contrasting ideals of Arab Granada -  the
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prototypical perfect society in the Arab poetic imagination -  and the original, ‘pure’ 
Muhammadan state of the 7th century only reinforce divisions between the neo-Sufi and Islamist 
worldview.
\
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Endpiece
In summation, neo-Sufism should be seen less as a specific movement in its own right than as an 
internally-split intellectual shift which forms but part of broader movements in Arab cultural life. 
Beyond that, it is part of a more general shift beyond belief in the efficacy of rational ideologies 
and sciences to reach truth and provide an enlightened answer to the needs of mankind. For these 
poets the debate is essentially the same as it was in the “liberal age” , albeit in more fraught 
circumstances: how to match the W est’s advances without sacrificing personal, cultural, national 
or religious identity, how to reconcile the permanence of Arab-Islamic civilization with a fickle 
modem world. Contemporary societies are faced with the need for simultaneous continuity and 
change. Hence the poet’s attempt to synthesize, refusing to view the cultural other as a 
monolithic entity to be rejected outright, and to discover libertarian elements in his own heritage 
that might provide the key to a brighter future.
The neo-Sufi thinkers represent the latest generation to attempt the monumental task of 
civilizational reconciliation, between a materially superior West and an underachieving Arab- 
Islamic. world, and regeneration, between the legacy of a glorious Arab past and the burden of a 
relatively dismal present. As an internal and external exile, Adonis amply problematizes the 
Janus-like nature of dissenting discourse in the context of a ‘holy language’ such as Arabic. Can 
-  or should -  the language of resistance and legitimacy be decoupled from that of religion? Even 
the neo-Sufi critique, while overwhelmingly secular, is prone to religious motifs and 
terminology, as it pushes towards a specifically Arab brand of postmodernism before even the 
enormous but necessary project of an Arab modernity has reached fruition.
Modem Arab intellectuals and poets have ended up conspicuously powerless, fulminating vainly 
against forces mcijeures. Many have therefore turned to seek inner perfection. This crisis 
functions on all levels, from linguistic and cultural to political and spiritual. Neo-Sufism is a 
radical reaction to that crisis, enacted likewise on a spiritual level, i.e. at the deepest level of the 
human psyche, both consciously and unconsciously. Like its political alter ego, it desperately 
tries to restore meaning to the world. By integrating the divine and the human, but moving the 
religious impulse into the personal domain, it upholds the need for separation between religion 
and state without losing the transcendental aspect. Inspired by cultural exchange with European
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existentialist philosophy, it consciously champions humanist values (as opposed to being 
accountable to a transcendent God, which effectively legitimises worldly power). It sees 
humanism as a natural progression within an authentically Islamic civilization. Crucially, 
therefore, this Islamic authenticity can be at once both itself and a genuine component of human 
civilization at large.
Sufism is an intellectual tradition of pluralism, enlightenment and progression indigenous to the 
Arab-Islamic world. In a modem, spiritually impoverished generation, these thinkers were at the 
forefront of an alternative reinvention of tradition, one that allowed an organic and authentic 
continuity between past and future, Islam and democracy, tradition and modernity, and thus 
established the nucleus of a secure identity.
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